

The *Antarvyāptisamarthana*
of
Ratnākaraśānti

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Volume II

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The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology
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In this PDF, plates
are not included.

PREFACE

The present work contains a reproduction of photographs in color of the manuscript of the *Antarvyāpti* (-*samarthana*) by Ratnākaraśānti, preserved in the National Archives, Kathmandu, Nepal, its transliteration in Roman script, a list of rewritten portions of the manuscript, a new edition of the Sanskrit text, juxtaposed with a collated text of the Tibetan versions, an English translation, and other relevant materials. In the introduction I have focused mainly on the development of Buddhist proofs of the momentariness of all things from Dharmakīrti to Ratnākaraśānti.

Although I have been interested for many years in the theory of internal or intrinsic pervasion that Ratnākaraśānti formally propounded for the first time in the field of Buddhist logic, I had not been able to finish my study of it largely due to the numerous differences between the Sanskrit text of the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* edited by Haraprasād Shāstri in 1910 and the Tibetan translation of the same text. Not long ago Mrs. Sani Maiya Rana, Chief of the National Archives, Kathmandu, kindly granted me permission to reproduce the photographs of the manuscript of the *Antarvyāpti*. This prompted me to reexamine the text and to publish, at last, the present work. Although I may not have found explanations to all the perplexing differences between the texts in question, I hope this exposition clarifies the theory expounded by Ratnākaraśānti and regenerates interest in his views that are indeed central to Buddhist logic.

In 1962 I had the good fortune to study with the late Prof. Erich Frauwallner in Vienna. Though my stay there was short, I was able to work very closely with the great scholar, and also make the acquaintance of Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, the then assistant of the Indologisches Institut and the present Director of the Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde der Universität Wien. The latter came to Kyoto University as a visiting professor in 1982, during

which term he read a Buddhist text on logic to both students and staff. In return, I went to Vienna in 1985 to conduct a seminar on the *Antarvyāpti* at the Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde; to this day I have not forgot the cooperation and the informative support that I received from the staff and those attending the seminar.

Many years ago, Prof. Esho Mikogami of Ryūkoku University, Kyoto, gave me a black and white film of the *Antarvyāpti* which he brought back from the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York. In 1989 as a member of the Tachikawa group dispatched by the Centre for the East Asian Cultural Studies for UNESCO, Tokyo, Mr. Takamichi Fukita, lecturer of Bukkyō University, Kyoto, went to Kathmandu. During his visit there he took many pictures among which were the very clear photographs of the manuscript of the *Antarvyāpti*; and the latter of which he later entrusted to me for studies. Around 1990 Mr. Toru Funayama, presently an associate professor at Kyūshū University, Japan, went through my study of the *Antarvyāpti* in draft and helped with further revision of the text. Shortly into 1998, Mr. Noriyuki Kudō, lecturer of Bukkyō University, Kyoto, started the arduous task of inputting my entire manuscript of this work on a computer. He did so with excellence, making astute observations incorporated here that led to the refinement of this publication. In the Sanskrit manuscript he spotted portions which seemed to have been rewritten at a later period most likely by a hand other than the original scribe.

Without the cooperation and generous contributions of the above-mentioned scholars and free access to writings of numerous individuals not included here, I could not have brought this work to its present form. With much appreciation for the benefits reaped, I express my heartfelt gratitude.

ABBREVIATIONS and BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) Texts

(A-1) *Antarvyāptisamarthana* of Ratnākaraśānti

M: Sanskrit Manuscript

Preserved in the National Archives of Nepal, Kathmandu.

Accession No. 3-364 B; NGMPP No. A 934/19; Reel No. B 23/34,
6 folios, 7 lines per folio, Newari and Gupta mixed, Palm-leaf.

cf. Manuscript's information given by *A Catalogue of Palm-leaf and Selected Paper MSS. belonging to the Durbar Library Nepal*, Vol. II, ed. by Hara Prasad Sastri, Calcutta, 1905, p. 43; NGMPP Number given in Reinhold Grünendahl, "A Concordance of H.P. Sastri's Catalogue of the Durbar Library and the Microfilms of the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project," in *Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementband*, 31, ed. by Albrecht Wezler, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1989, p. LXXIX.

[Photographs in color of the MS. supplied by the East Asian Cultural Studies for UNESCO in Tōkyō; Microfilm supplied by The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York: LMhj-000, 655-1/1; MBB II-1973-207.]

S: Sanskrit Text

Antarvyāptisamarthanam in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, ed. by Haraprasād Shāstri, BI new Series 1226, Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, pp. 103-114, 1910.

T: Tibetan Tranlations

Cone She 303b3-308a5
Derge No. 4260 She 309b4-314a5
Narthang No. 3749 Ze 338b6-344b5
Peking No. 5757 Ze 329b6-335a4

Translations

[Japanese]

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1960 「ラトナーカラシャーンティの論理学書」 『仏教史学』

第八卷第四号、219-238頁。(“A Logical Text by Ratnākaraśānti”) in *Bukkyō Shigaku Kenkyū* [*Journal of the History of Buddhism*], Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 219-238.)

- 1989b 「ラトナーカラシャーンティ『内遍充論』」『佛教大學
大學院紀要』第17号、1-27頁。(“The *Antarvyāpti-
samarthanam* of Ratnākaraśānti,” in *Bukkyō Daigaku Daigakuin
Kenkyū Kiyō* [*Memoirs of the Postgraduate Research Institute*],
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[English]

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(A-2) Other Texts and Translations

Blue Annals: See (B) Roerich

HB II: *Hetubindu*

E. Steinkellner: *Dharmakīrti’s Hetubinduḥ, Teil 1, Tibetischer Text und
rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*, Österreichische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Wien, 1967; Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen.

JNA: *Jñānaśrīmitra-Nibandhāvali*,

ed. by A. Thakur, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna,
1959.

NA: *Nyāyavatāra*

The Nyāyavatāra of Siddhasena Divākara, ed. with Notes and an
Introduction by P.L.Vaidya, Bombay, 1928.

NB: *Nyāyabindu*

Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti with Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara, ed. by
T.Stcherbatsky, Bibliotheca Buddhica VII, 1918.

NBT: *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*

See NB.

PSJZ: *Pag Sam Jon Zang* by Sumpa Khan Po Yeçe Pal Jor,

edited with An Analytical List of Contents and Index in English by
Chandra Das, II parts. Calcutta, 1908. Reproduced by Rinsen Book
Co., Kyoto 1984.

PV: *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti.

Pramāṇavārttika by Dharmakīrti, with a commentary by Manorathanandin,
ed. by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1937;

Pramāṇavārttikam of Acharya Dharmakīrti, with the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, ed. by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, 2 vols. Vārāṇasī, 1968.

PVin II: *Pramāṇavinīścaya, Svārthānumāna*.

E.Steinkellner: *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavinīścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam*, Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 1973; Teil, II, Übersetzung, 1979.

PVSV: *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti*

The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary, ed. by R. Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23, Rome: Is.M.E.O., 1960.

RNA: *Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvali*,

ed. by Anantalal Thakur, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, Second Revised Edition, 1975.

SBNT:

Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, ed. by M.M.Haraprasād Shāstri, Calcutta, 1910.

Tāranātha: See (B) Tāranātha

TBh: *Tarkabhāṣā*.

Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna, ed. by H.R.Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore, 1952.

TS: *Tattvasaṃgraha*

Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntaraksita with Commenatary 'Pañjikā' of Śrī Kamalaśīla, ed. by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi, 1968.

TSP: *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*

See TS.

VN: *Vādanyāya*

Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāyaḥ, ed. by Michael Torsten Much, Teil I, Sanskrit-Text; Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 1991.

JIBS: *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenyū)*.

JNBRA: *Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association (Nippon Bukkyō Gakkai Nempō)*.

WZKM: *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*.

WZKSO: *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*.

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- 1995 「8世紀ナーランダー出身注釈家覚え書き—仏教知識論の系譜—」『日本仏教学会年報』第60号、49-60頁。 (“Notes on 8th Century Commentators from Nālandā – A Genealogy of Buddhist Logico-epistemology,” in JNBRA, No. 60, pp. 49-60.)

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第40号、17-53頁。("Reversion in Thought – Chronological
Order: Ratnākaraśānti to Jñānaśrīmitra with an Abstract in
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53, pp. 1-21; 50, pp. 1-26. ("A Japanese Translation of the
Prajñāpāramitopadeśa of Ratnākaraśānti with interpretations,"
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**INTRODUCTION, TEXTS,
AND
TRANSLATION**

INTRODUCTION

1. The Life of Ratnākaraśānti

At the time of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atīśa, 982-1054), Ācārya Dharmapāla was renowned throughout the Buddhist world. Ratnākaraśānti, one of the eighty four *siddhas* who had earned the title of *kalikālasarvajña* (omniscient being of the Kali Age), Jñānaśrimitra, and Ratnakīrti were Dharmapāla's disciples. Dīpaṃkara (Atīśa) met Dharmapāla at Vikramaśīla and no doubt learnt a lot from the disciples of Dharmapāla. Around 1030 when the Tibetan delegates came to see Dīpaṃkara with the prime purpose of inviting him to Tibet, he was already 57 or 58 years old. Upon receiving their invitation, he consulted Ratnākaraśānti, the Chief Abbot of Vikramaśīla Vihāra about the matter of going to Tibet. Ratnākaraśānti was reluctant to let him go. After overcoming numerous obstacles, however, Dīpaṃkara entered Tibet in 1042 and worked there until 1054 — the reported year of his death in the land of snow.¹

The Blue Annals enumerates the six gate-keeper *paṇḍitas* of Vikramaśīla: at the eastern (gate) Śānti-pa (= Ratnākaraśānti); at the southern gate Nāg-gi dbaṅ-phyug grags-pa (Vāgīśvarakīrti); at the western gate Śes-rab 'byuṅ-gnas blo-gros (Prajñākaramati); at the northern gate Nā-ro paṅ-chen; in the centre, Rin-chen rdo-rje (Ratnavajra), and Jñānaśrī(-mitra). A more detailed description of the six door-keeper scholars at Vikramaśīla is found in the *Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India*, although it prefers to place Vāgīśvarakīrti at the western gate and Prajñākaramati at the southern gate.²

The Blue Annals also relates that Nā-ro-pa was the guardian from whom both the Ācārya Śānti-pa (Ratnākaraśānti = Śāntipāda) and the Venerable Maitrī-pa heard the Tantra; and in turn, the

¹Rahul Sankrityayan[1964],.202-209.

²Roerich[1949], 206; Tāranātha 1970,.294-315.

Venerable Master (Atīśa) heard it from Śānti-pa.³ The same book, describing the spiritual lineage of Vajramālā, mentions the names of Ratnākaraśānti, Padmavajra, and Ratnakīrti, among others, in this order.⁴

From the description made by Rahula Sankrityayan on the basis of Tibetan history, and from the narrations in *the Blue Annals* and *Tāranātha's History*, we may gather that Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti were all contemporaries and that the three were the teachers of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atīśa) who lived between 982-1054. Although it is generally recognized that Ratnākaraśānti was the oldest, and Jñānaśrīmitra was senior to Ratnakīrti, there seems to have been very little difference in age among the three.

Rahul Sankrityayan mentions, however, that Tibetan delegates, when scholars congregated at Vikramaśīla, were able to see the scholars, especially Ratnakīrti, Tathāgatarakṣita and others, who worked under Atīśa.⁵ As Mimaki points out, *dPag bsam ljon bzang* says that Ratnākaraśānti learnt Buddhism, exoteric and esoteric, under Ratnakīrti and others.⁶ Thus, we cannot say that the seniors in age always taught the juniors. In fact, the more details we learn of Tibetan traditions, the more confused we become about the order of the three scholars.

Setting aside these Tibetan traditions, a modern critical view about the date of Ratnakīrti was first expressed by Satkari Mookerjee in the *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, published in 1935. Basing his argument only on a few texts by Ratnakīrti and Ratnākaraśānti published in the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit*, edited by Haraprasād Shāstri in 1910, he writes:

Ratnakīrti has criticised *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, Śaṅkara, probably the

³Roerich[1949], 380.

⁴Ibid., 800-801.

⁵Rahul Sankrityayan[1964], 206.

⁶Mimaki[1984], 220; PSJZ 1908 (Repr. Kyoto, 1984), 117.

same as śāṅkarasvāmin the Naiyāyika, quoted in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Trilocana and Vācaspati Miśra, but not Udayana. Had Ratnakīrti lived after Udayana, he could not have criticized him. We shall not, therefore, be wrong if we place Ratnakīrti before Udayana. M.M. Hara Prasad Sastri thinks Ratnakīrti to be a younger contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra, which is very probable. But the date of Vācaspati cannot be 898 Śaka era, as that learned antiquarian holds, since that will make him a contemporary of Udayana, who wrote his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* in the Śaka year 905. So we should think it to be in Saṃvat and this will remove Vācaspati from Udayana by 142 years, and Ratnakīrti being his junior contemporary will be separated from Udayana by almost a century. This tallies with the tradition current among the Pandits that Udayana gave the last blow to the Buddhists, and we do not hear much of any Buddhist philosopher after the tenth century.⁷

At the same time, however, Mookerjee thought that Ratnākaraśānti was Ratnakīrti's disciple, saying, "Later on Ratnakīrti and his worthy disciple, Ratnākaraśānti, more fully than the former, adopted this doctrine (i.e., the theory of *antarvyāpti*) and incorporated it into the corpus of Buddhist logic." Mookerjee regarded *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* used by Ratnākīrti as the same in essence as *antarvyāpti* adopted by Ratnākaraśānti.⁸

As Mookerjee argued as early as 1935, the clue to determine the dates of Ratnakīrti [and Jñānaśrīmitra] lies in the dates of Vācaspatimiśra who was criticized by the former two and Udayana who in turn criticized Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*. Recent scholars, however, disagree with Mookerjee about the dates of Vācaspati and Udayana. P.Hacker, D.Bhattacharya,

⁷Mookerjee[1935], 33, n2.

⁸Ibid. 399 and n.1.

A. Thakur and others, unlike Mookerjee, place Vācaspati's composition of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* in 976, construing 898, the date given in the manuscripts of his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, not as of Saṃvat but as of Śaka. As to Udayana, his date is given as 906 Śaka with a clear reference to the era in a manuscript of the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. But Bhattacharya and Thakur are of the opinion that the date, which is written only in a single manuscript dated so late as 1708 Saṃvat, should be reconsidered just as the date of Vācaspati had been. And Bhattacharya actually proposes 1025-1100 for Udayana's life.⁹

After mentioning that Vācaspati wrote his Nyāya works including the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* before his *Tattvakaumudī*, *Tattvavaiśārādī*, and *Bhāmatī*, Thakur says:

Thus it is not at all improbable that Jñānaśrīmitra in his young age could see Vācaspatimiśra in his full glory. Now Jñānaśrīmitra along with his pupil Ratnakīrti has been refuted in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayanācārya. We have shown that Ratnakīrti prepared easy summaries of the works of his preceptor, Jñānaśrīmitra. Udayana therefore can be a younger contemporary to both of them... Most probably the literary career of Jñānaśrīmitra falls in the first half of the eleventh century.¹⁰

In his Introduction to the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, Thakur also dates Ratnakīrti in the first half of the eleventh century.¹¹

Thakur compared the works of Ratnakīrti with those of Jñānaśrīmitra, and says:

Almost all the verses attributed to his *guru* by Ratnakīrti have been traced in the available works of Jñānaśrī... A close scrutiny

⁹Kajiyama[1998], 6-11 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 196-201).

¹⁰JNA, Introduction, 3.

¹¹RNA, Introduction, 5.

reveals that Ratnakīrti has summarised the works of his *guru* in many cases and the debt has also been eloquently acknowledged.

Thakur's arguments as to the relation between Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti demonstrated in his Introduction to the above work are persuasive enough, though I omit citing them here. It is certain that Jñānaśrīmitra was a teacher of Ratnakīrti, and was senior in age to the latter. I myself suggested an assessment that Jñānaśrīmitra had been active between 980 to 1030 and Ratnakīrti between 1000 to 1050 in the introduction to my former work, and I refer the readers to it for a detailed discussion on the chronology of Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti.¹² Although lacking substantial evidence, from descriptions in Tibetan traditions, we infer Ratnākaraśānti seems to have been older than Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.

2. Chronology of the Works of the Three Logicians

The order in age of the three scholars, Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti, however, does not necessarily mean the order of their works. We have seen before that Mookerjee regarded Ratnākaraśānti as a disciple of Ratnakīrti. It is only because Mookerjee thought that the theory of intrinsic (or internal) pervasion (or concomitance. *antarvyāpti*) introduced by Ratnākaraśānti was a natural and last development of the traditional Buddhist theory of external pervasion (*bahirvyāpti*) to which Ratnakīrti had still been attached. In fact some contemporary scholars think that Ratnākaraśānti wrote his *Antarvyāptisamarthana* after the works by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti had been completed, and others believe that Ratnākaraśānti wrote it before some works of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. Following Mookerjee, I myself was of the former opinion, believing that Ratnākaraśānti wrote the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* after Ratnakīrti had written the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. I now think, however,

¹²Kajiyama[1998]. 6-10 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 196-200).

that the problem of the sequence of the works in logic by the three logicians should be reconsidered, even if at present we are unable to provide a definite solution to it.

In 1976 K. Mimaki expressed an opinion to the following effect: With regard to the Tantric studies, one can establish the chronological order of the three logicians: Ratnākaraśānti—Jñānaśrīmitra—Ratnakīrti. In terms of logical studies, the order reverses and differs visibly. It was Jñānaśrīmitra who completed the Buddhist logic of the later period, and under his direction it was Ratnakīrti who developed certain theories typical of the later Buddhist logic such as that of the conceptual exclusion (*apoha*) and that of the inclusion (*vyāpti*). On the other hand, the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, the only logical treatise of Ratnākaraśānti which we know, clearly took account of the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti. Consequently, we can establish the chronological order of progress of logical studies: Jñānaśrīmitra—Ratnakīrti—Ratnākaraśānti.¹³

Mimaki keeps to the same view toward the problem in a Japanese paper published in 1984 (reprinted in 1996), refuting criticisms made by Seyfort Rugg and K. Bhattacharya against his book.¹⁴

Recently Tadashi Tani asserts, quite contrary to the hitherto maintained chronology, that Jñānaśrīmitra wrote his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* with the purpose of criticizing the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* by Ratnākaraśānti, and that accordingly Ratnākaraśānti's theory of *antarvyāpti* chronologically preceded Jñānaśrīmitra's theory of *bahirvyāpti*, which Tani calls a 'new theory of external concomitance.'¹⁵ In support of this new chronology Tani enumerates a great deal of evidence from which I mention here only those with historical bases: (1) Jñānaśrīmitra criticizes a logician or logicians for using a syllogism annulling [the probans] in the

¹³Mimaki[1976], 3.

¹⁴Mimaki[1984 = 1996], 219-220.

¹⁵Tani[1996], 152ff., [1966a], etc.

contrary [of the probandum which the proponent intends to prove] (*viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin*)¹⁶; according to Tani, the logician or logicians so called are none other than Ratnākaraśānti and his group. (2) Ratnākaraśānti's argument on the theory of knowledge without images such as blue (*nirākārajñānavāda*) asserted in his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* is cited and criticized in Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sākārasiddhi*. This is a historical fact which has been proven in my former work, and is now clearly attested when we compare Umino's Japanese translation of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* with the *Sākārasiddhi* in Sanskrit, although it does not necessarily mean that all the works of Ratnākaraśānti, including the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, preceded in time Jñānaśrīmitra's works.¹⁷ According to Tani, however, the above fact suggests that Jñānaśrīmitra, who propounded the theory of knowledge endowed with images (*sākārajñānavāda*), may also have criticized Ratnākaraśānti from a standpoint of logic.

The *Sākāra*- and *Nirākāra-jñānavāda* here refer to the two rival sub-schools of the Vijñānavāda school. The former says that when a person is emancipated his knowledge is endowed with images such as blue, etc., though they are devoid of conceptual constructions. On the basis of this theory of knowledge endowed with images Jñānaśrīmitra could use factual corroborative examples in his syllogistic arguments. On the contrary, Ratnākaraśānti belongs to the school asserting the theory of knowledge without images; and he, recognizing only the illumination (*prakāśamātra*) of knowledge as real, regarded images (*ākāra*) as unreal and false (*alīka*). Accordingly Ratnākaraśānti may have thought that examples illustrating the concomitance of a probans and a probandum are absolutely unnecessary, because they represent merely unreal images. We may think, however, that the problem as to whether true knowledge consists of pure illumination alone or is endowed also with images is concerned with an emancipated person's consciousness, but not with logic which after all belongs to

¹⁶JNA, 60,17; 62,19

¹⁷Kajiyama[1989a], 397-400; Umino[1991], No.42, 8-9.

human thinking in the conventional world.

Although Tani in numerous works, including a book, discusses many more logical arguments which distinguish Jñānaśrīmitra from Ratnākaraśānti, I refrain from going into detailed accounts of his theories, until publication of his dissertation in the near future.

3. Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660)

The teaching of the Buddha that all produced things are impermanent was understood by Buddhist philosophers to mean that all produced things (*saṃskāra*) are momentary (*kṣāṇika*), i.e., that all things which are originated as results of causes and conditions exist only for a moment, disappearing by their nature in the same moment. Theoretically, the produced things are classified only under the momentary and the non-momentary or permanent, the third alternative being inexistent.

We see that all things such as a jar, etc. are destroyed by conjunction with a hammer, etc. If the essential nature (*svabhāva*), by which the jar in its last moment perishes, is existent in the jar when it is just produced, then it should perish immediately after its production because of that essential nature. Therefore all things are evidently momentary. This is an inference based on the nature of spontaneous destruction, without depending on external things (*vināsitvānumāna*, see below). It may be contended that a thing is given by its own causes such an essential nature that it perishes after staying for a certain period of time. But it is not reasonable, because if so, a thing would not perish even when it is hit by a hammer, but continue to exist again for the given period of time, since such is its essential nature; again this may be the case when it receives another shock of the hammer, and thus it follows that it would not perish. Therefore, if a thing were produced so as to stay for two moments, it would, at the second moment just as at the first, stay for another two moments due to its being durable for two moments. In this way it would not cease to exist at the third moment because even then, it

still has the same nature.

I have taken the above argument from the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta (c.1050-1202).¹⁸ The same argument, however, appears in the *Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi* of Dharmottara (c.740-800¹⁹) which Frauwallner translated into German in 1935 and Tani into Japanese with detailed comments in 1997.²⁰ The *Tarkabhāṣā* continues:

Another opponent may contend: “A thing is so made by its own cause as to be durable; but it may be forcibly destroyed by an incompatible thing such as a hammer and the rest.” This is not correct. How is it reasonable that the destruction of a thing is caused by an incompatible power, while the same thing does not perish because of its being permanent. For this is as unreasonable as to say that Devadatta is dead while he is still living. In other words, if a thing perishes, how can you say that it is produced by its causes so as to be imperishable? ...We hold: A thing is produced by its own cause to be perishable, because perishing can by no means be connected with an imperishable thing, while the disappearance of a thing is actually experienced. Thus, it perishes at the very moment of its birth. In this way the theory of momentary destruction of every thing (*kṣaṇakṣayitva*) has been proved. We may formulate the discussion made above into the following syllogism:

Whatever is by nature perishable perishes immediately [after its birth as e.g. a jar at the last moment of its existence];
Material objects etc. are by nature perishable at the time of their birth;
[Therefore, material objects etc. perish immediately after their birth.]

¹⁸Kajiyama[1998], 87 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 274); for the date of Mokṣākara see *ibid.* 11(201).

¹⁹For the date of Dharmottara see Krasser[1989= 1992], 157; Ono[1996], 157.

²⁰Frauwallner[1935], II 2 b, *Kleine Schriften* 559-560; Tani[1997], 53.

Dharmakīrti developed a new inference called *sattvānumāna* which became the strongest weapon to prove the momentariness of all existent things. Though I cannot cover the entire system of his logic, I will briefly explain his new logical theories which he created in the comparatively later stage of his academic life, and that became presuppositions for the proof of the momentariness of all things on the grounds of ‘existence’ (*sattva*).

No one can exhaust all the cases of real things or events in all worlds and in all the three times; and one cognizes only a limited number of them by either perceptions or inferences. Thus, it is impossible for us to rely only on induction when we build a systematic view of the world. Dharmakīrti always pursued fundamental and a priori principles by which we can subsume the entire human experiences throughout all worlds and all times. Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition classified our conceptual or inferential cognitions under the principles of identity (*tādātmya*, *svabhāva*) and causality (*tadutpatti*, *kārya*). Dharmakīrti, however, says, “A probans (*hetu*. middle term) in inference makes a probandum (*sādhyadharmā*. major term) understood only by means of the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*). And the essential relation is twofold, that characterized by identity and that characterized by causality. It (the essential relation) is the same as inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*)...”²¹

The inseparable relation, or the twofold relation of identity and causality is expressed by pervasion or concomitance (*vyāpti*). The pervasion is also of two kinds, the pervasion in agreement (*anvaya*) and that in difference (*vyatireka*). The former is in the form of “whatever is A is B” in the case of identity, and “where there is A, there is B” in the case of causality; for example, “a *śiṃṣapā* is a tree,” and “where there is smoke, there is fire.” The latter, the pervasion in difference, is in the form of “whatever is not B is not A” in the

²¹PVSV 17, 12-14: *svabhāvapratibandhād eva heuḥ sādhyam gamayati, sa ca tadbhāvalakṣaṇaḥ tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā, sa evāvinābhāvo...*; Funayama[1989] 18 with n. 46; do.[1988], (17).

case of identity, and “where there is no B, there is no A” in the case of causality; for example, “whatever is not a tree is not a *śimśapā*,” and “where there is no fire, there is no smoke.” The pervasion in agreement and that in difference, together with *pakṣadharmatā* (probans being a property of the subject [*sādhyadharmīn*] of an inference), form the three necessary conditions of a probans.

In his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Dharmakīrti says to the effect that if one of the two kinds of pervasions is established the other is understood by presumption (*arthāpatti*), and it is enough if we state only one of them in a syllogism.²² His words mean that the pervasion in difference is the contraposition of the pervasion in agreement, and, vice versa, the latter is that of the former.

In his *Hetubindu*, Dharmakīrti clearly says that either the pervasion in agreement or that in difference (*anvaya-vyatireka*) shows ‘all-inclusive concomitance’ (*sarvopasambhārā vyāptih*). The term ‘all-inclusive concomitance’ means the pervasion or concomitance used in a syllogism can subsume all the concerned cases, and thus, it is a universal proposition.²³

In the above I have briefly explained three principles illustrating Dharmakīrti’s originality: (1) the essential relation (*svabhāva-pratibandha*) of a probans and a probandum; (2) equality in meaning of the pervasion in agreement (*anvaya*) and the pervasion in difference (*vyatireka*); and (3) the all-inclusive concomitance or pervasion. These three principles underlie the formulation by Dharmakīrti of his proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of all things by means of ‘existence’ (*sattva*) as the probans. The proof is usually called ‘inference by means of existence’ (*sattvānumāṇa*).

As early as 1935 Frauwallner²⁴ enumerated three Buddhist proofs of momentariness of all things: (1) Things are impermanent by their own nature, without depending on external causes (Frauwallner named

²²PVin II, Steinkellner[1973], Text, 7,7-12; do.[1979], Übersetzung, 37, 14-21.

²³HB II, Text, 5*; Bhattacharya[1991], 1-2.

²⁴Frauwallner[1935]; Kleine Schriften No.25, 530.

this inference *vināśitvānumāna*); this kind of inference had already been found in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, and Dharmakīrti also developed it, using new reasons. (2) 'The inference by means of existence' (*sattvānumāna*) was created by Dharmakīrti, and, in the following times, it came to the fore more and more, driving the *vināśitvānumāna* to the background. Many important Buddhist philosophers after Dharmakīrti contributed to the development of this inference, until Ratnākaraśānti introduced the theory of intrinsic or internal pervasion (*antarvyāpti*), applying it to this syllogism. (3) Proof of momentariness of things by means of sense perception, has become unpopular; and it is now less important in the field of logic, though Tani, in his studies of Jñānaśrīmitra's philosophy, appreciates its epistemological and ontological values.

Steinkellner located exact places of the *sattvānumāna* in the works of Dharmakīrti and translated the passages of the texts. Dharmakīrti defines 'existence' as capability of effective action (*arthakriyā-sāmarthyā*). In the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* Dharmakīrti first states the following meanings: non-momentary things cannot exist at all because they do not exist in making effective action (*arthakriyā*), the criterion of what is really existent. The non-momentary produces effective action neither successively (*kramaṇa*) nor simultaneously (*akramaṇa*). First, the permanent does not make effective action in succession, because it, being a subject that produces an effective action by its mere existence, without depending on other things, has no reason to delay its work. Also what was not the subject producing the effective action at a preceding time is unable to become the subject at a later time, because there is no change in its own being or essential nature (*svabhāva*). The permanent does not make the effective action simultaneously, because it is impossible that its essential nature which is workable becomes non-workable later on. Therefore, the permanent which lacks all capability of effective action transgresses the definition of the existent.²⁵

²⁵PVin II, Teil I, 29* (78); Teil II, 93; Akamatsu[1984], 207-208.

Although in the *Pramānaviniścaya* Dharmakīrti does not name the above argument, he, in his *Hetubindu*, calls the inference “valid proof annulling the probans in the contrary of the probandum [which the proponent wants to establish]” (*sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇam*; Steinkellner’s tr.: Erkenntnismittel, das den Grund im Gegenteil des zu Beweisenden aufhebt).²⁶

The most systematic formulation of the proof of momentariness of all things, however, is described in the *Vādanyāya*²⁷, Dharmakīrti’s last work, in which he first proposes the inference of momentariness of sound as follows:

(*anvaya*:) *yat sat kṛtakam vā, tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādih;*

(*pakṣadharmatva*:) *san kṛtako vā śabda iti.*

(Concomitance) Whatever is existent or produced, is all impermanent, e.g., a jar, etc.;

(Probans being a property of the subject:) Sound is existent or produced;

[(Conclusion:) Therefore, sound is impermanent.]

According to Dharmakīrti, a syllogistic formulation consists of only the statement of the pervasion in agreement or pervasion in difference (or a major premise) and that of a probans being a property of the subject of the syllogism (or minor premise), the conclusion being omitted as it is self-evident, though I add it here in my translation for the sake of convenience.

Then, Dharmakīrti produces a proof annulling the probans in the contrary of the probandum (*bādhakam pramāṇam* or more exactly *sādhyanasya sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*) in order to establish the positive concomitance of the above syllogism:

(*vyatireka*:) *yatra kramayaugapadyāyogaḥ, na tasya kvacit*

²⁶HB, Teil I, 4 (36 and 37); Teil II, 37.

²⁷VN, Teil I, 1,13-14; Teil II, 3,11-4,1.

sāmarthyam;

(pakṣadharmatva:) asti cākṣaṇike sa iti.

(Concomitance in difference:) That which is incapable of [effective action in] succession or simultaneity, is not capable [of any action];

(Probans being a property of the subject:) That [incapability in succession or simultaneity] is found in a non-momentary thing.

[(Conclusion:) Therefore, the non-momentary (or permanent) is incapable of any action, i.e., it is inexistent.]²⁸

4. Examination of *Viparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa*

The proof annulling the probans in the contrary of the probandum (*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam = viparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa*) formulated by Dharmakīrti has been restated by his successors in various ways, but has not been changed in essence. For example, Ratnakīrti reformulates it as follows:²⁹

yasya kramākramau na vidyete na tasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam;

yathā śaśaviṣāṇasya;

na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākramau.

(Whatever does not possess [effective action in] succession or simultaneity is not capable of effective action, as e.g., a rabbit's horn;

What is not momentary [permanent] does not possess succession or simultaneity;

[Therefore, it is not capable of effective action, i.e., not existent.]

The Naiyāyikas and other realists attacked this Buddhist inference, raising many problems. Here I mention three logical difficulties and briefly discuss each of them.

²⁸Ibid. Teil I, 2,13-14; Teil, II, 5, 12-15.

²⁹RNA, 83,12-14.

(1) The first difficulty is that the subject of the inference, ‘what is not momentary,’ or a permanent thing, is not recognized as real according to Buddhist doctrine, and therefore the inference may have a fallacy of an unreal subject (technically called *āśrayāsiddhahetu*). Even among Buddhist logicians the reality of the permanent was often made a subject of controversy, as Mokṣākaragupta said,³⁰ “[what is not momentary] is not definite as to its reality, and is regarded as real when considered to be established by self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) and as unreal when considered to be just imaginary.” The problem is dealt with in detail by Mookerjee,³¹ and we will come back to it in this Introduction. In any case the unreal subject does not satisfy the first condition of a probans, laid down by Dignāga (c.480-540) and recognized by Dharmakīrti in his earlier works, which says that the probans of an inference should be a property of a real subject. If the subject is unreal its property has no locus and thus becomes necessarily unreal. In the above *bādhakapramāṇa* syllogisms formulated by Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti the subject is ‘what is non-momentary (*akṣanika*)’. But it is unreal to all Buddhists.

(2) According to Dignāga and even to Dharmakīrti in his early stage, a probans, though it should be a real property of the subject of an inference, should not be a property of the subject alone, being common neither to similar things which share the same probandum with the subject, nor to dissimilar things which do not share the probandum. The uncommon probans is considered to be inconclusive (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*). For example, an inference that sound is eternal, because it is audible, has the fallacy of inconclusive reason, as audibility is a property of sound alone, nothing else sharing it. In early Buddhist logic, concomitance or pervasion, ‘what is audible is eternal,’ in this particular case, should be perceived in an example having a subject other than ‘sound’; but we know nothing audible except sound. As a result, the above inference only means that sound is eternal because

³⁰Kajiyama[1998], 112 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 299).

³¹Mookerjee[1935], 24ff.; Kajiyama[1998], 112 (=Kajiyama[1989a], 299, n.304).

it is sound; and thus we are not certain if sound is eternal or not. Inference is made in two steps: first, we remember the pervasion between a probans and a probandum (a major premise) which has been grasped outside the subject of our concern, the subject itself still remaining undetermined if it belongs to the class of the probandum or not; next, we come to confirm that the subject certainly shares the probans as its property with other things (a minor premise); and then, combining these two steps we derive the conclusion that the subject belongs to the class of the probandum.

In our present case, ‘having neither succession nor simultaneity’ belongs only to the non-momentary thing, because Buddhists divide all things into the momentary and the non-momentary; and the former alone has succession or/and simultaneity, and the latter, which is in fact non-existent, has neither succession nor simultaneity. There is no third class. Thus, the probans in the syllogism *bādhakapramāṇa* of which the subject is a non-momentary thing, is certainly inconclusive, because the reason, ‘incapability of [effective action in] succession or simultaneity’ is a property belonging only to the non-momentary thing.

(3) Dharmakīrti does not state any examples in his *bādhakapramāṇa*, though Ratnakīrti mentions as one ‘a rabbit’s horn,’ which is merely an imaginary, hypothetical object. In fact, even Dignāga mentioned ‘space’ (*ākāśa*) which is not real to Buddhists including himself, with the exception of the Sarvāstivādins, as a negative example in an inference using the pervasion in difference (*vyatireka*); and Dharmakīrti said that in an inference by means of the pervasion in difference no example is necessary.³² In the present inference for proving no effective action of non-momentary things, using the pervasion in difference, “a thing which is fit neither [for effective action] in succession nor in simultaneity is not capable of any action,” Dharmakīrti does not have to mention a negative example according to Buddhist idea. But the Naiyāyikas and other realistic opponents

³²PVSV, v.26.

do not allow the Buddhist practice, because if there is no negative example, there is no locus wherein to confirm the negative pervasion. Moreover, we have to give thought to the fact that Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti again used negative examples in the same *bādhakapramāṇa* many centuries after Dharmakīrti.

The above problems with regard to *bādhakapramāṇa* occur due to the fact that Indian logic, including the early stage of Buddhist logic, was firmly based on realistic epistemology and ontology; i.e., concomitance or pervasion had to be induced from perceptions of factual examples, neglecting the extension of concepts; the subject and the probans as well as the probandum had to be real things, validity of a hypothesis being totally rejected. As enumerated in Section 3 above, Dharmakīrti tried to reform such realistic and inductive tendency that had still remained in Dignāga's logic, and actually performed a historic turnabout by introducing appreciation for the values of deduction and conceptual extension into Buddhist logic. The problems suggest that the inference called *bādhakapramāṇa* may be understood as, or at least closely related to, a hypothetical inference, which in Buddhist logic and Indian logic in general was not considered to be a valid, independent inference; and the suggestion leads us to an examination of the development of hypothetical inferences, i.e., *prasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*), *prasaṅga-viparyaya* (*prasaṅga* reduced into an independent inference), and also the relation of the above two to *bādhakapramāṇa*.

Mimaki points out that the most striking remark about *bādhakapramāṇa* was made by Kamalaśīla (c.740-795³³) in his commentary on the *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita (c. 725-788), vv.392-394. In these verses Śāntarakṣita cites both the *sattvānumāna* and *bādhakapramāṇa*. And Kamalaśīla, while commenting on the latter inference, says to the effect that Buddhists do not formulate this syllogism [*bādhakapramāṇa*] as an independently valid proof

³³Funayama[1995], 58.

(*svātantryeṇa pramāṇatayā*), but as a *reductio ad absurdum* ..(*prasaṅgāpādana* = *prasaṅga-sādhana*) against an opponent. If the opponent asserts that space, time, God and so forth have permanent natures of their own, then he should not admit their capability of effective action because permanent things are fit neither for succession, nor for simultaneity. From the absence of the capability of effective action the absence of existence is derived.³⁴ Kamalaśīla's words show that even important Buddhist philosophers like him regarded *bādhakapramāṇa* as a hypothetical inference.

5. *Prasaṅga and Prasaṅgaviparyaya*

Mimaki enumerates three ideas which contributed to the accomplishment of Buddhist theory of the momentariness of all things: (1) introduction of the theory of internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*); (2) proof of the pervasion in agreement (*anvaya*) of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* by means of *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*) and its inversion into a normal, independent inference (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*); (3) Buddhist theory permitting the use of an unreal concept as the subject of *bādhakapramāṇa* which establishes the pervasion in difference (*vyatireka*).³⁵ In the following I will discuss the three points in the order of (2), (3) and (1).

As to *prasaṅga* Dharmakīrti said: *Prasaṅga* is applied to show that when two terms are necessarily connected, the absence of one of them [or the pervader]³⁶ implies the negation of the other [or the pervaded]. This half-verse means that when universal concomitance between a probans [or the pervaded] and a probandum [or the pervader] is recognized, if the pervader is not cognized [in a certain locus], the existence of the pervaded is not allowed there either. Dharmakīrti's original logical theories explained in Section 3 of this Introduction

³⁴Mimaki[1976], 61, with n. 239.

³⁵Mimaki[1976], 50-51.

³⁶PV iv, 12c-d.

strongly suggest that he must have highly evaluated the role of *prasaṅga*, though we are not sure if he regarded it as a valid inference. Buddhist philosophers after Dharmakīrti tended to recognize the *prasaṅga* as a legitimate inference, albeit it is in essence hypothetical. From 8th century on, words such as *prasaṅga-anumāna*, *prasaṅga-sādhana*, etc. began to appear; and these words indicate that Buddhists deemed *prasaṅga* to be a kind of valid inference.

Mokṣākaragupta defines *prasaṅga* as reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is undesirable to the opponent by means of a statement based on pervasion established by proof (*pramāṇa-prasiddha-vyāptikena vākyena parasyāniṣṭāpādanāya prasañjanam*).³⁷

Prasaṅga (*reductio ad absurdum*) or a destructive hypothetical syllogism was a popular method of argumentation used in ancient India and many examples of it are found in Pāli Nikāyas as well as literatures of anti-traditional Indian thinkers before the Christian era. Jayatilleke collected abundant materials of *prasaṅga* arguments.³⁸ It is also well known that Nāgārjuna (c.150-250), the founder of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, was skillful in using arguments by *prasaṅga*. Buddhapālita (c.470-540), while commenting on Nāgārjuna's verses in the *Madhyamakakārikā*, reformed tetralemmas and dilemmas of the latter into four and two *prasaṅgas*. Because of this method, Buddhapālita and his followers came to be called Prāsaṅgikas, meaning those who use *prasaṅga* argumentation for interpreting the philosophy of emptiness. On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka (c.500-570) criticized Buddhapālita for his addiction to *prasaṅga*. Considering it to be defective argumentation, Bhāvaviveka invented a new type of syllogism that he regarded as independent and categorical (*svatantra-anumāna*); and hence, he and his followers came to be called Svāntarikas. The new syllogism created by Bhāvaviveka is actually the same as the syllogistic form of *prasaṅga-viparyaya* of later times. I will discuss Bhāvaviveka's syllogism in due course.

³⁷TBh 48, 13-14; Kajiyama[1998], 114 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 301).

³⁸Jayatilleke[1963], 103ff. (Sec. 134 ff.); 409-415 (693-710).

The *Nyāyasūtra* and related treatises included *prasaṅga*, which the Naiyāyikas called *tarka* (reasoning). They classified it under erroneous knowledge, because *prasaṅga* or *tarka* was hypothetical reasoning and did not satisfy the conditions of their syllogism.

Here I illustrate a simple *prasaṅga*: When you, observing smoke rising from a mountain and recollecting the concomitance that where there is smoke there is fire, maintain that there is fire on the mountain, your opponent may object that there is no fire on the mountain. You can bring him into difficulty by (1) using the same concomitance “where there is smoke there is fire” or its contraposition “where there is no fire there is no smoke” as a major premise, (2) hypothetically adopting the opponent’s assertion or conclusion “there is no fire on that mountain” as a minor premise, (3) and deriving from the above two premises an absurd conclusion “there must not be smoke on the mountain” which is contradictory to the fact that you and the opponent alike are perceiving the smoke. To sum, in *prasaṅga* (i) a minor premise is not a fact, but a hypothesis, or the opponent’s opinion which you do not believe yourself; (ii) a conclusion derived is always false knowledge.

Setting aside Jñānaśrīmitra’s argumentation, I here introduce the *prasaṅga-sādhana* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya* formulated by Ratnakīrti in the first section (*Anvayātmikā*) of his *Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi*.³⁹ At the beginning of the work, Ratnakīrti displays Dharmakīrti’s syllogism proving the momentariness of all things in a slightly altered version: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ; santaś cāmī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthāḥ* (Whatever is existent is momentary, as e.g., a jar; these things which are made the subjects of controversy are existent). Then he formulates *prasaṅga-sādhana* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya* in order to prove the pervasion in Dharmakīrti’s syllogism. Ratnakīrti’s *prasaṅga* runs as follows:

yad yadā yaj jananaḥ vyavahārayogyam tat tadā taj janayaty eva,

³⁹RNA, 67 ff.

*yathā antyā kāraṇasāmagrī svakāryam;
atītānāgataksaṇabhāvīkāryajanavyavahārayogyaś cāyam ghaṭo
vartamāṇaksāṇabhāvīkāryakaraṇakāle sakalakriyātikramakāle
'pīti svabhāvahetu-prasaṅgaḥ.*

“A” which is fit for the expression that it produces “B” at a given moment definitely produces “B” at that time, as e.g. the totality of causes at its last [moment] produces its own effect; This jar, [if it were not momentary, or if it did not change its own nature of constantly producing its effect, as the opponent says], would be fit for the expression that it produces effects belonging to past and future times at the time when it makes an effect belonging to the present moment and even at the time when it has passed over all actions.

[Conclusion: The absurdity would follow that this jar produces past and future effects even at the time when it makes an effect belonging to the present moment and even at the time when it has passed over all actions].⁴⁰

Ratnakīrti says that the above *prasaṅga* is based on the logical mark (or the probans) of essential identity (*svabhāvahetu-prasaṅga*). The relation of the totality of causes at its last moment to its effect is that of identity, and not that of causality. When two things are causally related, we can only infer the cause from the effect, as in the case of fire being inferred from smoke. In the above case, however, the totality of causes, such as a rice seed, soil, water, sunshine, etc. at its last moment is by its own nature fit for the expression that it goes on to produce its effect, i.e., a rice sprout. On the contrary, the totality of a seed of millet and other causes, even at the final moment, is not fit for the expression that it produces a rice sprout. The word *vyavahāra-yogya* that I have rendered ‘expression’ actually means practical utilities, or pragmatic values, one of which is verbal expression. I will discuss this word again later.

⁴⁰RNA, 68, 17-20; Mimaki[1976], 56.

Next, Ratnakīrti demonstrates the ‘inversion of *prasaṅga* into normal inference’ (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*):

*yad yadā yan na karoti na tat tadā tatra samarthavyavahārayogyam,
yathā śālyāṅkuram akurvan kodravaḥ śālyāṅkure;
na karoti caiṣa ghaṭo vartamānakṣaṇabhāvīkāryakaraṇakāle
sakalakriyātikramakāle cātītānāgataḥṣaṇabhāvi kāryam iti.*

“A” which does not produce “B” at a time is not fit for the expression that it is capable of [producing] “B” at that time, as e.g. millet which does not produce a rice sprout [is not fit for producing] a rice sprout;

This jar, at the time when it produces an effect belonging to the present moment and at the time when it passes over all actions, does not produce effects belonging to past and future moments.

[Conclusion: Therefore, this jar is not capable of producing past and future effects at the present moment and after it is destroyed, i.e., it is not non-momentary (not permanent)].⁴¹

Dharmakīrti in the *Vādanyāya* formulated neither *prasaṅga* nor *prasaṅga-viparyaya* in order to prove the pervasion in agreement in his *sattvānumāna*, but directly used the *bādhakapramāṇa* which played the role of demonstrating the pervasion in difference that what is not fit [for effective action] either in succession or in simultaneity is not capable of any effective action. Ratnakīrti as well as Jñānaśrīmitra, however, believed that *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya* with a concrete subject such as a jar are necessary to substantiate the pervasion in agreement (*anvaya*) of Dharmakīrti’s *sattvānumāna*, that whatever is existent is momentary. In other words, they thought that all-inclusive, universal pervasion in agreement (*sarvopasaṃbhāravatī vyāptih*) should be grasped in a real example, say a jar. To grasp a pervasion or concomitance in an example is the attitude of those who stand on the

⁴¹RNA, 69, 11-13; Mimaki[1976], 57.

theory of external pervasion (*bahirvyāptivādin*). Ratnakīrti says, “In this way momentariness is established in a jar as an example by means of two reasons, i.e., *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, (*prasaṅga-prasaṅgaviparyayahetudvayabalato ghaṭe dṛṣṭānte kṣaṇabhāṅgaḥ siddhaḥ*).⁴² Both Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti used *bādhakapramāṇa* only to disprove the contradictory of the conclusion.

Mokṣākaragupta clarifies that the pervasion between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped by two proofs, *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* or by the proof which refutes [the probans in] the opposite of the assertion to be proved and which is aimed at excluding [action in] succession and simultaneity (*sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇena kramayaugapadyanivṛttilakṣaṇena*).⁴³ From these words we come to know that in 11th century there were two groups of logicians, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, on the one hand, who thought that *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya* were necessary to establish the pervasion in agreement of Dharmakīrti’s proof of the momentariness of all things and, on the other hand, Ratnākaraśānti who thought only one proof, *bādhakapramāṇa* was enough for the same purpose.

Summing up the theories of Dhamottara, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, Mokṣākaragupta describes a twofold object of valid cognition: An opponent (or Trilocana, the Naiyāyika), criticizing the Buddhist theory of direct perception, asks a question, “If only the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) can be the object of indeterminate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and not the universal (*sāmānya*), how then can you grasp by indeterminate knowledge the pervasion between the two universals of smoke and fire?” To this question Buddhist logicians reply:

“There is no fault of this kind, because what we mean is that the particular is really one of the objects of that [indeterminate knowledge] (*svalakṣaṇam tasya viśaya eva*), the non-connection [of the particular with the object] being excluded (*ayogavyavaccheda*), and not that the particular alone is its object (*svalakṣaṇam eva tasya viśayaḥ*),

⁴²RNA 69, 28.

⁴³TBh 47, 9-11; Kajiyama[1998], 112 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 299).

all other [than the particular] being excluded (*anyayogavyavaccheda*). What then follows is that the universal can be its object as well. The object of valid cognition is indeed twofold, the directly apprehended (*grāhya*) and the indirectly determined (*adhyavaseya*). Of these, the directly apprehended object of indeterminate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is the single moment of the individual characteristic that is seen. The indirectly determined [or envisaged] object is the universal which is manifested when the determining factor (*vikalpa*) occurs following indeterminate cognition.”⁴⁴

“This universal is again twofold: the concept of an individual (*ūrdhvatālakṣaṇam*, lit., vertical universal) and the concept of a class (*tiryaglākṣaṇam*, lit., horizontal universal). Of these, the universal of an individual is constructed through the accumulation of a series of moments of an individual object, say a jar, which is distinguished from the others of the same class; and this universal is the object of the perception ascertaining [an object] (*sādhana-pratyakṣa*). The universal of a class comprises [as the members] all the individuals [belonging to one class] which are distinguished from [those of] other classes; this universal is the object of the perception grasping pervasion (*vyāptigrāhaka-pratyakṣa*). [The opposite process is taken by] determinate knowledge, to which the universal (*sāmānya*) is the directly apprehended object (*grāhya*) and the indirectly apprehended object (*adhyavaseya*) is the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*).”⁴⁵

Ratnakīrti says: “A jar is composed of a collection of color, taste, smell and touch; but grasping only the specific color, we confirm by perception the existence of the totality of the jar, depending on empirically [or pragmatically] valid cognition (*sāṃvayavahārikā-pramāṇa*). In the same way, grasping only one thing which is discriminated from the dissimilar things (*ekasyātdadrūpaparāvṛtta*) we can possibly grasp pervasion between two universals (concepts) of a

⁴⁴TBh 21,13-18; Kajiyama[1998], 56-58 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 243-245), with notes 131-133. (RNA 102, 8-13; see 2nd ed. 109,13-18).

⁴⁵TBh 22, 2-7; Kajiyama[1998], 58-59 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 245-246), with notes 135,137 (RNA 136, 2-3; see 2nd ed., 143,13-14).

probans and a probandum, which are consisting of mere realities discriminated from the dissimilar forms, and which have become the two [conceptual] objects through the exclusion of non-connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*).”⁴⁶

The above passages of Ratnakīrti and Mokṣākaragupta show that Indian Buddhist logicians in the latest stage believed in the reality of concepts. Direct perception grasps a moment of a particular object, but it immediately produces a concept of that individual object and that of its class including all its members. By virtue of such conceptualization we are able to confirm the relation between two concepts, i.e., pervasion or concomitance. The fact also enables us to understand in an example, say a jar, the all-inclusive, universal pervasion between existence and momentariness. On the other hand, a concept makes us envisage a corresponding object which is given a kind of reality.

As is well known, Nāgārjuna said in the *Madhyamakakārikā*, I, v.1 that neither from self, nor from others, nor from both [self and others], nor without cause, is anything produced, anytime; anywhere. Buddhapālita, commenting on this verse, reduced each of the four alternatives of Nāgārjuna into a *prasaṅga*. Buddhapālita’s *prasaṅga* of “things not produced from themselves,” is as follows: Things are not produced from themselves, because their production will be useless, and because endless production will follow (*anavasthā-prasaṅgāt*). Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita’s argumentation, saying that it is unreasonable, as he states neither a reason nor an example, nor does he refute objections raised by opponents. Moreover, as the argument is merely *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga-vākya*), an assertion and reason which are contradictory to the doctrine established by Nāgārjuna will appear, i.e., the assertion that things are produced from others, and the reason that the production is useful, or that the production comes to an end. These are against the Madhyamaka doctrine [that

⁴⁶RNA (2nd ed.), 109,18-21.

things are not born from the four kinds of causes].⁴⁷

Bhāvaviveka himself created a new syllogistic form to ascertain Nāgārjuna's theory of emptiness. He regarded it as an independent, categorical syllogism. As to 'anything not being produced from self' his syllogism runs: In the highest truth (*paramārthatas*), the inner seats (*ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni*, five senses and mind) are not produced from themselves; because of already existing; as e. g. *Caitanya* (soul in the Sāṃkhya philosophy).⁴⁸ As Bhāvaviveka formulated the syllogism according to the style of Dignāga, I here rephrase it in the syllogistic form used since the days of Dharmakīrti:

Whatever is already existing is not produced from itself, as
e.g., *Caitanya*;
The inner seats are already existing;
Therefore, they are not produced from themselves.

At once we notice that this syllogism of Bhāvaviveka is none other than a *prasaṅga-viparyaya*.

Bhāvaviveka did not forget to add to his syllogism four conditions:

- (1) The words 'in the highest truth' is stated in all his syllogisms except those which are not concerned with the truth of emptiness.⁴⁹
- (2) The negation in the conclusion should be considered to be the negation of a proposition (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*), and not the negation of a term (*paryudāsa*).⁵⁰ This condition prohibits to obvert 'not from self' into 'from others, etc.'
- (3) No statement of the reason (probans) being excluded from the contrary to that which is to be proved (*asapakṣe ca asattvam*)

⁴⁷Kajiyama[1963], 50 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 430).

⁴⁸Kajiyama[1963], 49 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 429).

⁴⁹Kajiyama[1963], 51 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 431), with Sanskrit passage in the note.

⁵⁰Kajiyama[1963], 48(= Kajiyama[1989a], 428). See also n.11.

is necessary;⁵¹ an incompatible example is not to be mentioned either.

(4) The fallacy of inconclusive reason (*asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*) is discarded.⁵²

As the philosophy of emptiness of the Madhyamaka school recognizes no own being (*svabhāva*), nothing has a substance which is self-dependent, unchangeable and eternal; any and every thing in this world has no reality in the strict sense of the word. Nāgārjuna himself did not have any proposition to assert himself, but devoted himself to denying all theories maintained by others. This is why Buddhapālita relied only on *prasaṅga* argument which is fit for negating others' doctrines. Bhāvaviveka, though recognizing the value of logic in discussions with other scholars, had to keep his syllogism within the limits of the special conditions enumerated above, since he followed Nāgārjuna's views. These four conditions are paradoxical, although they give us a strong impression that his syllogism is very similar to *prasaṅga-viparyaya* and *bādhakapramāṇa* of the Buddhist logic in the latest stage.

The phrase 'in the highest truth' is enigmatic. If this phrase, though it appears in the conclusion of his syllogism, covers all the statements of his whole syllogism, the reason 'being already present' (*vidyamānatva*) cannot be established, because all things, including the inner seats as the subject, of which the reason is a property, are empty of own beings, and cannot be existent. If, on the contrary, Bhāvaviveka talks about 'being already existent' not in the highest truth, but in the conventional sense (*samvṛtita*), he commits an error of using one and the same term for two different meanings within a syllogism.

Apart from formal logic, however, distinction between the world of the highest truth or the world of emptiness and that of convention

⁵¹Kajiyama[1963], 49 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 429).

⁵²Kajiyama[1963], 51-52 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 431-432).

(*samvṛti*) is unavoidable in the Madhyamaka philosophy. Bhāvaviveka must have meant that the reason 'being already existent' is merely a conventional expression, which should be negated in the highest truth. Then, the pervasion (major premise) may mean that those things which are conventionally called 'already existing' are not produced from themselves in the highest truth; combining the major premise with the reason (minor premise) that what are called 'inner seats' are already existing, we derive the conclusion that in the highest truth they are not produced from themselves. The example, *Caitanya*, of course, does not exist from the standpoint of the Madhyamaka. Understood in this way, Bhāvaviveka's attitude is similar to Ratnakīrti, who added a restriction 'fit for the expression' to the terms of his syllogism.

Buddhist philosophers were well aware of the usage and merits of the twofold negation: *prasajya-pratiṣedha* (negation of a proposition, or absolute negation) and *paryudāsa* (negation of a term, or actually the affirmation of the obverse of the negated term). Madhyamaka philosophers usually used the former negation, as they held that nothing is really existent, and that all things are unreal as in a dream or magic. Buddhist logicians also used unreal examples such as a rabbit's horn, space, etc. in order to illustrate pervasion in difference. Ratnakīrti and other logicians of the latest stage believed that even a non-momentary thing, etc., though not actually existing, have a kind of reality, and they are established by the negation of a term, not by the negation of a proposition. We will see their arguments later.

The third of the three conditions of a reason (*hetu*) prescribed by Dignāga says that a probans must be absent in the dissimilar things or the contrary of the probandum. The pervasion that where there is smoke there is fire may be illustrated by a kitchen, and its contraposition that where there is no fire there is no smoke may be illustrated by a lake. But Dignāga who first fixed the three conditions of a reason (probans) used 'space' which is non-existent to him as a dissimilar example, and Dharmakīrti said that no example is necessary

for the pervasion in difference.

Regarding the alternative ‘not from others,’ Bhāvaviveka formulates a syllogism that the inner seats (*ādhyātmikāyatana*) are not produced from their causes which are other [than themselves], because [the inner seats are] other [than the causes], as e.g., a jar. An opponent raises an objection that the reason ‘being other’ is a part of the subject of inference ‘the inner seats’ which are thought to be other than the causes; thus the inference commits the fallacy of inconclusive reason (*asādhāraṇa-betu*). Bhāvaviveka says that even a part of the denotation of the subject of an inference can serve as a probans. The fallacy is usually illustrated by an inference, “sound is impermanent, because it is audible.” The reason ‘audibility’ is said to be inconclusive, as it is a property belonging only to sound. Bhāvaviveka, however, objects: when we say, “the sound of a hymn is impermanent, because it is sound, as e.g., the sound of a drum,” the reason is well established; and there is nothing to be criticized in the inference. The same argument as that of Bhāvaviveka appears in the *Antarvyāpti* of Ratnākaraśānti, although we are not sure if the latter owes his justification to the former or not.

6. *Viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*

We are now in a position to deal with the *bādhakapramāṇa*, which is the subject of Ratnākaraśānti’s *Antarvyāptisamarthana*. Here I cite the *Bādhakapramāṇa* formulated by Ratnakīrti (RNA 83,13-14):

*yasya kramākramau na vidyete na tasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam,
yathā śaśaviṣāṇasya;*

na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākramav iti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ.

That to which [operation in] succession and simultaneity do not belong is not capable of effective action, as e.g. a rabbit’s horn;

[Operation in] succession and simultaneity do not belong to the non-momentary [things];

[Therefore, the non-momentary is not capable of effective action, i.e., it does not exist].

This is an inference based on the [absence of the pervaded derived from] non-cognition of the pervader.

In Section 4 of this Introduction I enumerated three difficulties in the *viparyaye bādhaka-pramāṇam* formulated by Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti. Of these, (2) the difficulty of inconclusive reason (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*) has been partly answered by Bhāvaviveka; also as we will see, the problem is discussed fully in the *Antarvyāpti* by Ratnākaraśānti who eliminates the fallacy from later Buddhist logic; and (3) the difficulty of Buddhist use of fictitious, unsubstantial examples such as space, a rabbit's horn, etc. in a negative pervasion, has also been dealt with. Dignāga and Bhāvaviveka allowed an imaginary example to serve in the pervasion in difference; Dharmakīrti even said that no example is necessary for the pervasion in difference. Thus, only the first problem (1) is left to be discussed here.

Mookerjee in 1935 gave excellent interpretations of the later Buddhist logicians' ideas about imaginary subjects and negation that appear in the works of Śāntaraksita and Ratnakīrti. Having nothing to add in this regard, I refer directly to his work, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, and cite here some of the important Sanskrit texts with Mookerjee's interpretations:

tasmād vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānte neṣṭo'vaśyam ihāśrayaḥ, tadabhāve ca tan neti vacanād api tadgatih. (PV, I, v.25= TSP, p. 182)

[In reply to the elaborate criticism of the Naiyāyikas] the Buddhist points out that an imaginary, unsubstantial datum (*avastu*) is as much serviceable as a real fact. Besides in negative inference, a reference to the substratum or locus (*āśraya*) is not at all necessary — what is needed is to show that the negation of the more general concept necessarily implies the negation of the less general, which is included in the denotation

of the former. The non-existence of the tree necessarily connotes the non-existence of the *śimsapā*, a particular species of the former, on the general maxim that the exclusion of the container involves the exclusion of the contained, without any reference whatsoever to the place where such non-existence may be cognized.⁵³

yenaiva hi vacanenāvastuno dharmitvaṃ pratiśidhyate, tenaivāvastuno dharmitvābhāvena dharmena dharmitvaṃ abhyupagatam. paras tu pratiśidhyata iti vyaktam idam īśvaraceṣṭitam. (RNA 88, 9-11)

(M.H. Shastri emended a part of the manuscript when he edited the text in 1910. Mookerjee further amended Shastri's emended reading. The above is the same passage as it is edited by Thakur. Mookerjee's emendation shows no difference in meaning from Thakur's edition).

And if negation be supposed to contain a necessary reference to a substratum or locus, an imaginary substratum or locus will answer the purpose. Because the subject-predicate relation is found to be used as much in connection with a real entity as with an imaginary fiction. Thus, for instance, such propositions, as 'there is no sharpness in a rabbit's horn,' 'there is no fragrance in a sky-lotus' ... are as much allowable as the propositions, 'there is bovine nature in a cow,' 'there is whiteness in the cloth,' and the like. Moreover, your assertion that 'an unreal fiction cannot be a subject' does not militate against our position, if you mean that it cannot be the subject of a real predicate. But if your implication is that the unreal cannot be the subject even of an unreal predicate, you contradict yourself, because by denying all predication respecting an unreal fiction, you yourself make it the subject of your denial. Certainly it is sheer autocracy to forbid others from doing what you yourself

⁵³Mookerjee [1935], 28-29.

do.⁵⁴

tataś cātrāpi kramākramābhāvasya sādhanatve sattvābhāvasya ca sādhyatve sandigdhavastubhāvasyāvastvātmano vā kṣaṇīkasya dharmitvam kena pratiśidhyate. (RNA 88, 27-29)

It is established, therefore, that a syllogism, having the non-momentary, whether an unreality or doubtful reality, as the minor term and absence of succession and simultaneity as the middle term and non-existence as the major term, is a perfectly logical syllogism.⁵⁵

na hy abhāvaḥ kaścid vigrāhavān yaḥ sāksātkartavyo 'pi tu vyavahartavyaḥ. sa ca vyavahāro vikalpād api sidhyaty eva. (RNA 89, 12-14)

Certainly negation is no concrete reality, with a distinctive shape and form, that can be envisaged. But it is a concept which has a pragmatic value and this pragmatic value can be possessed by a purely subjective concept, visualized by pure imagination.⁵⁶

The pragmatic value of negation or absence is stressed by Mokṣākaragupta who says as follows:

But [the logical mark of] non-cognition is aimed at establishing practical activities concerning absence (*abhāva-vyavahāra*) [in order to convince] a stupefied person [of the absence of a certain thing]. For example, it is well known in the Sāṃkhya

⁵⁴Mookerjee[1935], 29. Discussing the probans in a *prasaṅgaviparyaya* syllogism, Dharmottara maintains, exactly in the same way as Ratnakīrti, that we cannot predicate a subject which is not actually existing of an affirmative, real property, but we can possibly predicate it of the absence of a property. According to Dharmottara, the absence in this case must be *prasaṅga-pratiśedha*. For detailed argument see Iwata[1993], 54-55.

⁵⁵Mookerjee[1935], 30. *kramākramābhāvasya* in RNA is corrected into *kramākramābhāvasya*. See SBNT, 64, 11.

⁵⁶Mookerjee[1935], 31.

[thought] that the three primordial qualities beginning with *rajas* are [permanently] existent; a certain follower [of the school] actually makes ordinary activities concerning the absence of things owing to their non-cognition; he, however, is so much inculcated in the doctrine of his own school proclaiming the existence of every thing at every place that he confusedly does not now judge the absence [of a jar] in one particular place or another even though the jar is not actually perceived. To this man three kinds of convincing activities (*vyavahāra*) are to be demonstrated by means of non-cognition: the physical activity consists in moving about the place without hesitation; the verbal activity consists in [the statement] that there is no jar; the mental activity is the internal thought (*antarjalpa*) of the same judgment.⁵⁷

Mokṣākaragupta seems to have written the above passage following Dharmottara who says in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*: *abhāvasya vyavahārah nāstīty evamākāraṃ jñānam, śabdaś caivamākārah, niḥśaṅkaṃ gamanāgamanalakṣaṇā ca pravṛttiḥ kāyiko abhāvavyavahārah*.⁵⁸ This passage has been translated by Steinkellner into German along with additional comments.⁵⁹

As introduced above, Ratnakīrti says:

“Your assertion that ‘an unreal fiction cannot be a subject’ does not militate against our position, if you mean that it cannot be the subject of a real predicate. But if your implication is that the unreal cannot be the subject even of an unreal predicate, you contradict yourself, because by denying all predication respecting an unreal fiction, you yourself make it

⁵⁷TBh 30, 2-9; Kajiyama[1998], 78-79 (= Kajiyama[1989a], 265-266), with n. 204 & n. 205.

⁵⁸NBT 174,28-30 = *Dharmottara-pradīpa*, ed. by D.Malvania, 122,1-2.

⁵⁹HB Teil II, 156,

the subject of your denial...”

Although I am not ready to discuss the contemporary logic here, I cannot resist the temptation to cite a passage from Bertrand Russell who says:

Thus ‘the present King of France is bald’ is certainly false; and ‘the present King of France is not bald’ is false if it means ‘There is an entity which is now King of France and is not bald,’ but is true if it means ‘It is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald.’⁶⁰

Russell’s negation ‘It is false that ...’ is the negation of a proposition, which is called ‘*prasajya-pratiṣedha*’ in Indian philosophical terminology.

7. The Theory of Internal Pervasion (*antarvyāpti*)

Mokṣākaragupta says: Regarding the *vyāpti* between ‘existence’ the probans as essential nature (*svabhāvavahetu*) and ‘momentariness’ some logicians are of the opinion that it is to be grasped in the subject of inference (*sādhya-dharmin*) itself; they maintain the theory of intrinsic pervasion (*antarvyāpti*). Others hold that the same *vyāpti* is to be grasped in the subject of an example (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*), say, a jar, by means of reasoning to an undesired conclusion (*prasaṅga*) and its reduction into a normal syllogism (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*); they maintain the theory of extrinsic pervasion (*bahirvyāpti*).⁶¹

The theory of *antarvyāpti* (intrinsic pervasion, internal concomitance) was created by the Jaina logicians. Siddhasena Divākara (6-7th c.), a Jaina logician, said in the *Nyāyāvātāra*, v.20: “Logicians know that as a probandum is proved only by *antarvyāpti*, an example

⁶⁰Bertrand Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, Essays 1901-1950, 53 (On Denoting). This opinion of Russell is quoted in Tani[1996], 176. In answer to my request Tani kindly sent me Russell’s book and other materials, for which I am deeply indebted.

⁶¹TBh 47, 3-6; Kajiyama[1998], 111-112 (=Kajiyama[1989a], 298-299).

outside [the subject of inference] will be useless, and that the same [uselessness of the example] will be pointed out when the [*antarvyāpti*] is not available.”⁶² The Jainas maintain that the quintessence of the relation between a probans and a probandum is the logical incompatibility of the contradictory supposition (*anyathānupapannatva*), and that when it is found, the threefold characteristic of reason or logical mark (*lingasya trairūpyam*) held by Buddhists is useless.

The theory of *antarvyāpti* turned out to be extremely effective for the Buddhist proof of the momentariness of all existent things, because the *sattvānumāna* and *bādhakapramāna* are syllogisms formulated on the basis of *anyathānupapannatva*, without depending on examples external to the subject of inference. In fact Dharmakīrti and many logicians in the later stage of Buddhist logic utilized the theory of *antarvyāpti*, although they did not expressly call themselves exponents of *antarvyāpti*. Only Ratnākaraśānti, however, openly adopted the theory of intrinsic concomitance and incorporated it into the corpus of Buddhist logic.

Interpretations of the Jaina theory of *antarvyāpti* and its adoption by Ratnākaraśānti into Buddhist logic are found in many previous studies, among which are Mookerjee’s detailed expositions of the controversy in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* between Pātrasvāmin, a Jaina logician, and Śāntarakṣita, and Mimaki’s succinct, precise, history of *antarvyāpti*.⁶³

Mookerjee says that Ratnakīrti has not expressly advocated the claims of *antarvyāpti*, but he has adopted the exact principle on which it is based and along the same line of argument as found in Ratnākaraśānti’s monograph.⁶⁴ He cites two passages from Ratnakīrti’s *Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi*. I agree with his opinion that Ratnakīrti actually

⁶²NA v.20 (p. 51): *antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher bahir udāhṛtiḥ / vyarthā syāt tadasadbhāve ’py evaṃ nyāyavido viduḥ //*; Mimaki[1976], 51-52, with n.194.

⁶³Mookerjee[1935], 378-398; Mimaki [1976], 51-54 with notes.

⁶⁴Mookerjee[1935], 399 with n. 1.

used the principle of *antarvyāpti*, although he remained an exponent of *bahirvyāpti*. I provide here further comments on the two passages quoted by Mookerjee.

As to the *sattvānumāna* displayed at the very beginning of Ratnakīrti's *Ḳṣanabhaṅgasiddhi* (*anvayātmikā*), an opponent criticizes, saying that momentariness is not proved in a jar, as a similar example, because we do not know by perception that the jar is momentary. Ratnakīrti, admitting the fact that it is not perceived as momentary, proposes *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya* as separate valid inferences proving the momentariness of a jar.⁶⁵ He is aware that there is no perceptive external example for showing that all existent things are momentary. His awareness is none other than that of an *antarvyāptivādin*.

When an opponent says that there must be some proof of momentariness in the subject itself of the inference, viz., things which have become topics of controversy (*vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthāḥ*), by means of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, Ratnakīrti replies: it is possible, provided the arguer has the energy to apply the *prasaṅga* (*yad yadā yaj jananavyavahārayogyam tat tadā taj janayatītyādīkam*) to each of the things included in the subject step by step. His reply, like that of Bhāvaviveka and Ratnākaraśānti, is actually the eradication of the fallacy of uncommon, inconclusive reason, which is typical to an *antarvyāptivādin*.⁶⁶

Ratnakīrti proved the *anvaya* of the *sattvānumāna* "whatever is existent is momentary" by *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, of which the subject is a jar, grasped by perception. When an opponent requests him to show also the *vyatireka* of the *sattvānumāna*, Ratnakīrti replies, saying: There is no difference in meaning between the two kinds of pervasions; and when one is understood the other is definitely indicated. Therefore, when the pervasion in the form of *anvaya* has

⁶⁵RNA 67, 20- 25: *nanu katham asya sapakṣatvam, pakṣavad atrāpi kṣanabhaṅgāsiddheḥ, na hy asya pratyakṣataḥ kṣanabhaṅgasiddhiḥ, tathātvenānīścayāt... ucyate, anumānāntaram eva prasaṅga-prasaṅgaviparyayātmakam ghaṭasya kṣanabhaṅgaprasādhakam pramānāntaram asti.*

⁶⁶RNA 70, 1-6.

been established by the power of the double reasoning, *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, even if we do not state ‘the proof annulling the reason in the contrary of what is to be proved’ (*viparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa*) [to prove the *vyatireka* of the *sattvānumāna*], there remains no uncertainty about the probans ‘*sattva*.’ Thus, the momentariness has been faultlessly established.⁶⁷

These words suggest that Ratnakīrti as well as Jñānaśrīmitra gives priority to *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, which can prove the *anvaya* of the *sattvānumāna*, over *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*, though he states the latter in the second section (*vyatirekātmikā*) of the *Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi*. Ratnākaraśānti, on the other hand, does not give importance to *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, and relied only on the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*, following the example of Dharmakīrti.

The *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam* formulated by Dharmakīrti, Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, etc., are in logical form the same as *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, which is a reduction of *prasaṅga* into an independent syllogism. I think that Kamalāsīla was quite right when he identified *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam* with a *prasaṅga*. The minor premise of the former, “Succession and simultaneity do not belong to the non-momentary things” means that the non-momentary has no change in its nature, ‘succession and simultaneity’ being none other than change; and the conclusion which is omitted in the formula is that the non-momentary is not capable of effective action or not existent. We find that the minor premise is actually an opponent’s opinion, which is here hypothetically adopted; and the conclusion derived is undesirable to the opponent. These two are the characteristics of a *prasaṅga*. With Kamalāsīla, I also regard *bādhakapramāṇa* as *prasaṅga* in essence.

I do not think that it is necessary here to go into detail of Ratnākaraśānti’s argument of internal pervasion, because it is all clear in my translation of the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* included in the present

⁶⁷RNA 70, 19-28.

work.

8. The Texts

In 1910 Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasād Shāstri edited and published the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit*, as Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, No.1226, Calcutta, which included, among others, the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (*Anvayātmikā* and *Vyatirekātmikā*) of Ratnakīrti, and the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* of Ratnākaraśānti. The copy of the latter text used for the edition was made by Paṇḍita Āśutoṣa Tarkatīrtha of the manuscript No.III 364B in the Durbar Library under H.Shāstri's supervision. Some mistakes and misprints seemed to have crept into that publication, but basically it is the same as the manuscript No. III 364, now kept in the National Archives, Kathmandu, which I have used in the present work. All different readings between H.Shāstri's edition and the Kathmandu manuscript are written down in the footnotes of our new editions of the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts. As mentioned in the preface, access to the microfiche of the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, brought from the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, and particularly the photographs in color of the same manuscript taken at the National Archives, Kathmandu eased my task considerably for the present work.

Portions of the manuscript used by Haraprasād Shāstri for his edition had been rewritten long before his time; thus there is little difference between the edited text and the Kathmandu manuscript, but to a great extent, the latter helped me in double-checking emendations of the former.

On the other hand, the Tibetan translation of our text shows great and often essential differences from the Sanskrit text. To mention a conspicuous example, the last half of the verse at the end of Sec. XVI of the Text, rendered into Tibetan imparts the very opposite meaning to the Sanskrit. All variant readings of the Tibetan version are included in the footnotes of 'the Sanskrit and Tibetan

texts,' and some in the footnotes of my English translation. I remain rather curious as to the source of the Tibetan text. It may have been a translation of a Sanskrit manuscript that differed from the extant one or the translators of the Tibetan work may have written it according to their own understanding. It is a joint work of Kumārakalaśa and Śākya 'od (Śākyaprabha). The name of Śākya 'od or Śākyaprabha appears in the *Blue Annals*, *Tāranātha's History*⁶⁸ and others. But I am neither able to determine his exact date nor his roots, i.e., whether he was of Tibetan or Indian tradition.

I have made a critical text of the Tibetan translation of the *Antarvyāpti (-samarthana)* by collating the versions of Peking, Derge, Narthang, and Cone; and juxtaposing it with the Sanskrit text. My English translation of the *Antarvyāpti(-samarthana)* is based on the Sanskrit text; wherever I have resorted to meanings in the Tibetan version corresponding remarks are made in the footnotes. Other information about the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts has been included to the section of Abbreviations and Bibliography.

⁶⁸*Tāranātha* mentions an Indian scholar named Śākyaprabha, who has been active during the period of King Gopāla (8th century ? See 258, n.4; 259, n.8. There are, however, three kings called Gopāla). Another Śākya 'od appears in the *Blue Annals*, I, 155, who seems to have been active around 15th century.

TRANSLITERATION OF THE MANUSCRIPT

Symbols:

- () restored akṣara
 [] damaged akṣara
 * virāma
 ○ punch hole
 ⊙ Decorative mark in the colophon

Rewritten portions are indicated in the notes of this Transliteration.
 For details see the section of Remarks on the Kathmandu Manuscript.

Folio 1 Reverse (=M 1)

- 1 [om] namo buddhāya // iha satvam arthakriyākāritvaṃ
 taditarasatvalakṣaṇāyogāt* / tac ca kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ
 vyāptam* / parasparavyavacchedalakṣaṇatvād anayoḥ
 prakārāntareṇa karaṇāsa[m]bha[vā]-
- 2 t* / kramayaugapadye cākṣaṇikatve na staḥ / pūrvvāparakālayor
 avicalitaikasvabhāvasya kartṛtvākartṛtva
 viruddhadharmadvayāyogāt* / tatra na tāvat* kramaḥ kramiṇam
 ekaikaṃ prati pūrvvāpa-
- 3 rakālayoḥ kartṛtvākartṛtvāpatteḥ / evaṃ sarvvakramā ○
 bhāvāt* kevalaṃ sakalakāryayaugapadyam avaśiṣyate / tatra ca
 sphuṭataraḥ pūrvvāparakālayoḥ kartṛtvākartṛ-
- 4 tvaprasaṅgaḥ / viruddhe ca kartṛtvākartṛtve ekadharmini na
 ○ sambhavataḥ / ekasvabhāvaś ca tāvatkālam akṣaṇika iti siddha
 etasmin* kramayaugapadyayor ayogaḥ / tad evaṃ akṣa-
- 5 ṇike vyāpakānupalabdhyā niśiddhaṃ satvaṃ kṣaṇika evāvati
 ○ ṣṭhata iti kṣaṇikatvena vyāptam* / tat tena vyāptam yat*
 yatra dharmini sidhyati tatra kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhayati / idam
 i-
- 6 dāniṃ vicāryate / kveyaṃ vyāptir grahītavyā drṣṭāntadharmini
 sādhyadharmini vā / kecid āhuḥ / drṣṭāntadharminy eva

- dhūmavat* / anyathā sādhanavaiphalyam syāt* /
 ubhayadharmasiddhināntariyaka-
 7 tvāt* vyāptisiddheḥ / na hi mahānasasiddhāyām agnidhūmayor
 vyāptau punar agnisiddhaye dhūmalīngam anviṣyata iti / tathā
 hi // dṛṣṭānte gṛhyate vyāptir ddharmayos tatra dṛṣṭayoḥ /
 hetumātrasya dr-

Folio 2 Obverse (=M 2)

- 1 ṣṭasya vyāptiḥ pakṣe tu gamyate // sā ca sarvvopasaṃhārāt*
 sāmānyam avalambate / tasya dharmini vṛttis tu
 pratiyētānumānataḥ // pratyakṣadrṣṭayor vahnidhūmayoḥ
 kāryakāraṇabhāvasi-
 2 ddhau tayor vyāptisiddhir iti pratyakṣasiddhe vahnau yuktam
 anumānavaiphalyam* / naivaṃ vyāptisiddheḥ prak*
 pramāṇāntarasiddham dharmini kṣaṇikatvam* /
 sādhanadharmam eva tu kevalam anupaśyantā
 3 viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa balāt tasya kṣaṇikatvena ○ vyāptim
 pratīmaḥ / tat kutaḥ sādhanavaiphalyam* / vaiphalyam eva
 kṣaṇikatvavyāptasya satvasya tathātvena dharmini prati-
 4 tau kṣaṇikatvasyāpi pratīter iti cet* / na / sarvvopa ○
 saṃhāravatī hi vyāptiḥ sādhyasiddher aṅgam* / tad iyam
 anapekṣitadharmiviśeṣaṃ sādhanadharmamātram avalambate
 / ta-
 5 d yathā / yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir iti / na punar yatra mahānase
 dhū ○ mas tatrāgnir iti / evam ihāpi yat* sat* tat* kṣaṇikam
 iti vyāptipratītau sādhanadharmasyāpi dharmini sattvaṃ
 nāntarbhā¹vati /
 6 kim punaḥ sādhyadharmasya / tasmāt* satvasāmānyasya
 sādhanadharmasya pakṣadharmatvaṃ vyāptiś caikaśaḥ
 pratipadya tadubhayasāmarthyāt sādhyadharmasya dharmini
 vṛttiḥ pratiyata iti ku-
 7 to 'numānavaiphalyam* / yady evaṃ vyāptipratītv asati

¹Rewritten: *ṇi sattvaṃ nāntarbhā*

dharmiṇi parāmarṣe sādhyadharmiṇi vyāptigrahaṇam iti /
kutaḥ / tatra dṛṣṭasya satvasya vyāptipratīteḥ / yathā
mahānasadrṣṭā-

Folio 2 Reverse (=M 3)

- 1 gnidhūmayor vyāptigrahe dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi vyāptigrahaṇam
ucyate / na hi vyāptigrahaṇe mahānasaparāmarṣo stūty uktam²
/ nanu vyāptipakṣadharmatvayor ekaśaḥ pratītāv api yasyaiva
pakṣadharmatvam ava-
- 2 gatan tasyaiva sādhyena vyāptir avasiteti sāmarchyāt
sādhyagatau³ kathanam avaiyarthyaṃ sādhanasya / nanu na
pakṣadharmatvagatiḥ sādhyagatiḥ sādhyadharmaśamsparśāt* /
nāpi vyāptipratītir eva sā-
- 3 dhyasiddhiḥ / sāmānyālabhanatayā dharmiviśeṣeṇa dharmayo
○ r anavacchedāt* / anyathā viśeṣayor vyāptiprasaṅgāt* / tad
ayaṃ vyastaviṣayaḥ sāmarchyād iti hetunirdeśaḥ / atha
- 4 hetos trairūpyaparichedasāmarchyāt* sādhyapratītir utpa ○
dyata ity ucyate / na tarhīdānīm vyartho hetuḥ /
svarūpaniścayena sādhyaniścayopajananāt*⁴ / na hi kvacid iyato
'dhikaṃ liṅgasya kartta-
- 5 vyam astīti / api ca / gṛhīte pakṣadharmatve sambandhe ca
smṛ ○ te 'numānaṃ bhavadbhir iṣyate⁵ / tadvad antarvyāptāv
apīṣyatām* / na hi bahirvyāptivādinām api vismṛtāyāṃ vyāptāv
anumānapravṛ-
- 6 ttir asti / tatra yasyaiva pakṣadharmatvam avagataṃ tasyaiva
sādhyadharmaṇa vyāptismṛteḥ kin na
sarvānumānavaiyarthyaṃ* / sādhyadharmiṇo 'parāmarṣeṇa
vyāpteḥ smaraṇād iti cet* / sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭā-

²Rewritten: *nasa parāmarṣo 'stūty uktam*

³Rewritten: *-yāt sādhyagatau*

⁴Rewritten: *svarūpaniścayena sādhyaniścayopajananāt*. The last syllable *nāt* seems to be indicated by a peculiar sign.

⁵Rewritten: *bhavadbhir iṣyate*

- 7 syasiva vyāptismaraṇe katham sādhyadharmiṇo 'parāmarśaḥ
sāmānyālambanatvād vyāpteḥ sādhyadharmiṇo 'navacchedād
iti cet* / nanu tatra dr̥ṣṭasya katham tenānavacchedaḥ /
tenāvacchinnasya vā 'sādhā-

Folio 3 Obverse (= M 4)

- 1 raṇatvāt* katham vyāptiḥ / ayogavyavacchedena viśeṣanān
nāsādhāraṇateti cet* / tathāpi kin na sādhyadharmī parāmṛśyate
/ yatra yatra parvate dhūmas tatra tatrāgnir yathā mahānasa
iti sāmā-
- 2 nyālambanāyām vyāptau dharmiviśeṣaparāmarśasyānaṅgatvād
iti cet* / yuktam etat* / sādhyadharmiṇā hy ayogavyavacchedaḥ
sādhanaadharmasya rūpāntaram eva pakṣadharmatvākhyam* /
na
- 3 tv ayaṃ vyāpter aṅgam* / tam antareṇāpi vyāpteḥ sāmā ○
nyālambanāyāḥ paricchedaparisaṃpṛteḥ katham anyathā
dr̥ṣṭāntadhar⁶miṇi vyāptigrahaṇavārttāpi tad idānīm pakṣa-
- 4 dharmatvāyogāt* / pakṣadharmatvāgrahaṇāt* / pakṣadha ○
rmatvagrahaṇe vā tadaiva sādhyam api sāmārthyād asiddham
siddha⁷m iti sarvvānumānavaiyarthya-prasaṅgaḥ /
paścātkālabhāvi-
- 5 līṅgajñānam api ca na smṛtir eva syāt* na pramāṇam* / ○
tasmāt* vyāpter anaṅgatvāt pakṣadharmatvam vyāptigrahaṇe
sad api nāntarbhavatīti pṛthaggr̥hītasṃṛtayoh pakṣadharmat-
- 6 tvavyāptyoh sāmārthyād anumeyagatir utpadyata iti / evam
avaiyartham sādhanānām eṣitavyam iti mānaphalatvāt* / tadvat
pṛthagbhūtayoh pakṣadharmatvavyāptyoh sāmārthyād anu-
- 7 mānotpattir antarvyāptāv api kin neśyate / tadiṣṭau vā katham
sādhana-vaiyarthyam* / traīrūpyagatisāmārthyād anumeyagatir
iti hi tadu⁸pādānaśaktir eva sāmārthyam ucyate / na tu traīrū-

⁶Rewritten: *ṣṭāntadha*

⁷Rewritten: *sāmārthyād asiddham siddham*.

⁸Rewritten: *hi tadu*

Folio 3 Reverse (=M 5)

- 1 pyapratīter antarbhāva iti sarvvaṃ samānam* / na sarvvaṃ samānam* / antaryyāptau hi vyāptiṃ prati gataiva pakṣadharmatvam avagatam* / anavagate pakṣadharmatve vyāpter apy anavagateḥ⁹ / tato vyāptipū-
- 2 rrvake sādhanavākye pakṣadharmavacanam anarthakam antaryyāptau / naivaṃ bahirvyāptau bahir eva vyāptigrahaṇāt* / atrāha // yena tena krameṇ ātra prayukte sādhanē sati / avetya pakṣa-
- 3 dharmatvaṃ paścād vyāptiḥ pratiyate // tvatpakṣa iva drṣṭā ○ nte tatra sety anyathā katham* / dvau drṣṭvā vidma iti ced vyāpṭeḥ prāk* dvayadrk katham* // vyāptipakṣadharmatve hi svavā-
- 4 kyābhyāṃ yena tena krameṇa prayuktābhyāṃ sūcyete / ○ na tu sākṣāt pratiyete/ vācaḥ svayam apramāṇatvāt* / yad āha // śaktasya sūcakam hetur vaco 'śaktam api sva-
- 5 yam iti // sūcitayos tu tayoh satve hetau prathama ○ tara pakṣadharmatvaviṣayam eva pramāṇam adhimukhībhavatu / tena pramāṇena dharminiṃ siddhasya satvasya paścād vyāpti-
- 6 pramāṇāntareṇa grhyata iti kasya vaiyarthyaṃ iti / tvatpakṣe pi drṣṭāntadharminiṃ prathamam hetur grhyate / paścād vyāptir ity eṣa eva kramah / anyathā drṣṭāntadharminiṃ vyāptir grhītety e-
- 7 tad eva na syāt* / drṣṭāntadharminy adrṣṭasyaiva hetor vyāptigrahaṇāt* / yady evaṃ sādhyadharmo pi vyāptigrahaṇādhikaraṇe dharminiṃ grahītavya eva yathā vahnidhūmayor iti cet* /

Folio 4 Obverse (=M 6)

- 1 na / tatra drṣṭasya hetor vipakṣe bādhakavṛttimātrād eva vyāptisiddheḥ / ātaś caivaṃ na khalu vyāptigrahaṇāt* prāk*

⁹Rewritten: *anavagate pakṣadharmatve vyāpter apy anavagateḥ*

- kṣaṇikasya kvacid api siddhir asti tasyānumeyatvāt* /
 asiddhāyāñ ca vyā-
- 2 ptāv anumānāpravṛtteḥ / sādhanāntarasya ca tadartham
 ananusaraṇāt* / anusaraṇe py anavasthā syāt* / avasthāne tāvat*
 prayāsasya vaiyarthyaṭ* / viparyaye vyāptibalād eva vyāptisi-
- 3 ddher avighātāt* / vahnidhūmayos tu nādṛṣṭayoḥ kārya ○
 kāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ / tatsiddhau na vipakṣe bādhakavṛttir iti
 dvayadarśanasavyapekṣā vahnidhūmayor vyāptisiddhiḥ /
- 4 satvākṣaṇikatvayos tu naivam* / yathoktanyāyena vyā ○
 ptyasiddheḥ / tasmāt satvamātrasya tatra dharṇiṇi siddhasya
 bādhakavaśād vyāptiḥ sidhyatīty eṣitavyam* / tadva¹⁰d antarvyā-
- 5 ptāv api / te ime vyāptipakṣadharmatve svasvapramāṇa ○
 vyavacchedya sādhanavākyena tu kevalam sūcayitavye / na
 cānyataravākyena śakyam ubhayaṃ sūcayitum iti kuto
- 6 'nyataravākyavaiyarthyaṃ* // ekasyaiva hi dharmasya kramāt
 trairūpyaniścayaḥ / vismṛtāv anumā bhāvāt tat kiṃ
 vyarthhānumākhileti saṅgrahaślokaḥ // api ca // bādhakāt
 sādhyasiddhiś ced vyartho hetvantaragrahaḥ / bādhakāt
 tadasiddhi(?)¹¹-
- 7 ś ced vyartho dharmyantaragrahaḥ / yadi hi dharṇiṇi vyāptiḥ
 sidhyanty eva sādhyasiddhim antarbhāvayati / nanu lābha
 evaiṣa¹² labdhaḥ¹³ / vyāptiprasādhakād eva pramāṇāt*
 sādhyasiddheḥ satvahetvapāśraya-

Folio 4 Reverse (=M 7)

- 1 ṇaprayāsasya nirasanāt* / na hi vyasanam evaital
 liṅgāntarānusaraṇaṃ nāma / atha na¹⁴ vyāptisādhakāt

¹⁰Rewritten: *tadva-*

¹¹Rewritten: *tat kiṃ vyarthhānumākhilā // iti saṅgrahaślokaḥ // api ca // bādhakāt sādhyasiddhiś
 ced vyartho hetvantaragrahaḥ / bādhakāt tadasiddhi*

¹²Rewritten: *evaiṣa*. Original reading is *evauṣa*.

¹³Cancellation sign on this *labdhaḥ*.

¹⁴Rewritten: *atha na*. Original reading is *atha*.

- sādhyasiddhiḥ / na tarhy antarvyāptau hetuvaiyarthyam iti kim
akāṇḍakātaratayā bahutaram āyāsa-
- 2 m āviśasi / dvayaṃ hi bhavataḥ sādhyam dṛṣṭāntadharmini
vṛttiḥ sādhyadharmini ca / yathākramam
vyāptipakṣadharmatvayoḥ siddhyartham* / nanu yadā
pratiniyate dharmini vivādaḥ / tadbahirbhūte ca dharmini
- 3 vyāptigrahaṇam tadānīm bhaved vaiyarthyam* / yadā tu
vastumātre ○ vivādaḥ / tadā sarvvavastuḥ hetor vṛttis tvayāpi
sādhyā mayāpi ceti katamasmin dharmini hetor vṛttisādhanam
mama vyartha¹⁵ṃ bhavi-
- 4 ṣyati / katham idānīm bahirvyāptir vivādādihikaraṇabhūta
evānya ○ tamasmin* vyāptisādhanāt* / tāvanmātralakṣaṇatvāc
ca sādhyadha¹⁶rmiṇaḥ / bādhakam pramāṇam pravarttamānam
antarggatam api dharmiṇam
- 5 baḥiṣkarotīti cet* / etad eva katham bhavatu bādhakena pra
○ varttamānenaiva tasmin* sādhyasādhanāt* /
sādhyasamśayāpagame sādhyadharmini lakṣaṇāpagamād iti cet
/ ayukta-
- 6 m etat* / bādhakamātrān na sādhyasiddhir ity asmin* pakṣe
dharmyantaraparigrahavaiyarthyaḥbhidhānāt* / bādhakāt
sādhyasiddhir ity asmimś tu pakṣe sādhanavaiyarthyam
āpāditaṃ / tasmād bādhakamātre-
- 7 ṇasādhyasiddhau na kvacit* samdeha nivṛttiḥ / sandehā nivṛttau
na baḥiṣkaraṇam abahīṣkṛtāś ca sādhyadharmy eveti tatra
vyāptir antarvyāptir eva nedānīm bahirvyāpter vārttāpi / tad
iyaṃ bahirvyāptir amu-

Folio 5 Obverse (=M 8)

- 1 ṣmin* pakṣe katham bhavati / yadi pratiniyate dharmini vivādaḥ
/ tadaba¹⁷hir bhūte ca dharmini vyāptigrahaṇam bhavati / tatra

¹⁵Rewritten: *vyartha*

¹⁶Rewritten: *sādhyadha-*

¹⁷Rewritten: *tadaba*

- ca duruddha¹⁸ro dharmyantaraparigrahavaiyarthyaśoṣaḥ /
 bādhakamātreṇa tu sādhyasiddhau hetvantara-
 2 m eva vyartham* / api ca / satvahetor viśeṣeṇa na
 bahirvyāptisambhavaḥ / asiddhe dharmināḥ satve
 vivādānavatārataḥ // tatra siddhasya ca vyāptigrahaṇe
 sādhyadharmiṇi / vyāptigrahaḥ katham na syād dr̥ṣṭānte pi na
 vā bha-
 3 vet* / yatra hi dharmiṇi dr̥ṣṭasya hetor vyāptiḥ pratīyate ta ○
 tra tasya vyāptigrahaṇam ākhyāyate / dr̥ṣṭāñ ca sādhyadharmiṇi
 satvam anyathā vimatyayogād iti katham nāntarvyāptiḥ /
 tathāpi sādha-
 4 na vaiyarthyanīśedhāya bahir eva gr̥hṇīma iti cet* / tat kim i
 ○ dānīm tvadicchānurodhād dharmiṇi hetor daśanam
 adarśanam astu / darśanāviśeṣe vā bahir eva
 vyāptigrahaṇavyavasthāstu / u-
 5 bhayatra dr̥ṣṭasya vyā¹⁹ptigrahaṇe py asti bahirvyāptibhāga iti
 cet* / ○ nanu kim artham iyān* bhāgo yatnena samrakṣyate /
 mā bhūd dhetu vaiyarthyam iti cet* / nanu yadi
 bādhakavṛttimātreṇa vyāptigra-
 6 haṇādhikaraṇe dharmiṇi sādhyasiddheḥ / sādhanavaiyarthyam
 antarvyāptau tad eva tad bahirvyāptāv api tulyam* / tasmād
 vyasanamātraṃ bahirvyāptigrahaṇe viśeṣeṇa satva hetau
 kevalam jaḍadhiyām eva
 7 niyamena dr̥ṣṭāntasāpekṣaḥ sādhanaprayogaḥ paritoṣāya
 jā²⁰yate / teṣām evānugrahārtham ācāryodr̥ṣṭāntam upādatte /
 yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṃ yathā ghaṭa iti / paṭumatayas tu naivam
 dr̥ṣṭānta-

Folio 5 Reverse (=M 9)

- 1 m apekṣante // tasmād dr̥ṣṭāntaraktebhyo ghaṭam dr̥ṣṭāntam

¹⁸Rewritten: *ruddha*

¹⁹Rewritten: *bhayatra dr̥ṣṭasya vyā*

²⁰Rewritten: *jā-*

- abravīt* / tathāmāniṣv avaiyarthyād antarvyāptāv apīṣyatām*
 // ity antaraślokaḥ // katham idānīm anumeye satvam eva
 sapakṣa eva satvam asapakṣe vāsa-
- 2 tvam eva niścitam iti hetos trairūpyam avagantavyam* // matau
 sapakṣāsapakṣau sādhyadharmayutāyutau / satvāsatve tatra
 hetos te grāhye yatra tatra vā // sādhyadharmayuktaḥ sarvvaḥ
 sāmānyena sapakṣaḥ
- 3 atadyuktaś cāsapakṣa iti / tasmin sapakṣa eva satvam asa ○
 pakṣe cāsatvam eva yathākramam anvayavyatirekau / tau punar
 yatra tatra vā dharmiṇi grahītavyau yatra śakyau grahītum* /
 ta-
- 4 d iha satvasya sarvvato 'kṣaṇikād vyāvṛttau bādhakabalāt si ○
 ddhāyām yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eveti / anvayaḥ sādhyadharminy
 eva gr̥hyate / tatra dṛṣṭasya hetor vyāptigrahaṇāt* / dharmya-
 ntarāsambhavāt* / sambhave pi tadanusaraṇavaiyarthyāt* / ya
- 5 ○ dy evam asādhāraṇo nāma katham anaikāntika uktaḥ //
 asādhāraṇatām hetudoṣam mūḍhavyapekṣayā / abravīd agra-
- 6 hād vyāpter naivam sarvopasaṃhṛtau // uktam etaj jaḍadhiyo
 dharmyantara eva vyāptigrahaṇam pratipannāḥ /
 tadabhimānāpekṣayā 'sādhāraṇam a²¹naikāntikam āha
 śrāvaṇatvam dṛṣṭāntābhāvāt* / sā-
- 7 dhyadharmini ca vyāpter aniṣṭer agrhītāyām vyāptau
 saṃdigdhobhayatayā 'niścayakaravāt* / atha vā /
 asādhāraṇataiva śrāvaṇatvasya mūḍhābhimānopakalpita /
 dṛṣṭaiva hi śabdavyaktir²² ddha-

Folio 6 Obverse (=M 10)

- 1 rmiṇi vivādādhikaraṇāt* / anyathā dharmyasiddhiprasaṅgāc ca
 / dṛṣṭādṛṣṭāśabdavyaktisādhāraṇaṅ ca śrāvaṇatvam hetuḥ /
 dhūmasāmānyavat* / tataḥ sarvvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ
 sambhavāt* (/) sa-

²¹Rewritten: *raṇam a*²²Rewritten: *śabdavyaktir*

- 2 tvādivad adu²³ṣṭam eva sādhanam śrāvaṇatvākhyam* /
 kramayaugapadyānupalambha eva cātra bādhakam pramāṇam*
 / śrotrajñānanakatvam eva hi śrāvaṇatvam* / tasmān mū
 dhavyapekṣayā 'sādhāra-
- 3 ṇatvāt* / asādhāraṇasya sarvopasaṃhārāyogā ○ t* /
 sādhyadharmini vyāptipratītāv eva sādhyapratīteḥ
 sādhanavaiphalyaṃ syād eva / tan mā bhūd vaiphalyaṃ iti
 naiva
- 4 vyāptir grahītavyā / tasyām agrhītāyāṃ sandigdghobhaya ○
 tayā syād anaikāntikatvam* / sarvopasaṃhāreṇa tu
 vyāptigrahaṇe yathoktanyāyena sādhanavaiphalyaḥbhāvāt* /
 adu-
- 5 ṣṭam satvādisādhanam eveti veditavyam* / tad evam ubhayathā
 ○ mūdhajanā 'pekṣayā 'sādhāraṇam anaikāntikam uktam* /
 samānañ caitad bahirvyāptivādinām api / yadi hi mūdhamatāpe-
- 6 kṣā na syāt* / syād eva śrāvaṇatvam aduṣṭo hetuḥ / satvādivan
 niyataśabdeṣu hi vivāde śabdāntaram syāt* / drṣṭāntaḥ
 sarvvaśabdeṣu vimatau bādhakam pramāṇam
 pravartta²⁴mānam* / adrṣṭānta-
- 7 m api tatraikam drṣṭāntayatīti katham asādhāraṇam
 anaikāntikatvam veti // © Antarvyāptisamarthanam samāptam
 iti // © // kṛtir iyaṃ Ratnākaraśāntipādānām iti // © //

²³Rewritten: *vad adu*

²⁴Rewritten: *vartha*

REMARKS ON THE KATHMANDU MANUSCRIPT

I. Orthographical Peculiarities

The manuscript is written by the script of, according to Śāstri's catalogue (II, p. 43) Newari and Gupta mixed. It has peculiarities in spellings such as the following:

- (1) consonant duplication after -r, e.g., sarvva-, pūrvv-a, karttṛ-, -rdd(h)-, -rgg-, but it is not kept in the case of dharma-.
- (2) -tv- for -ttv-, as in the case of sattva-.
- (3) avagraha is sometimes missing, though other times not.
- (4) nasal assimilation, e.g., -ṃ ca > -ñ ca, -ṃg- > -ṅg-.

II. Rewritten Portions in the Manuscript

While reading the photographs in color of the manuscript, we notice that many portions in it are revised by a hand different from the original scribe. Sometimes too many words are rewritten and inserted into a short space originally meant for fewer words, and other times, vice versa, only a few words are found, having a gap. Comparing the manuscript with the Sanskrit edition by Haraprasād Shāstri, however, we come to know that the manuscript had already been revised before Shāstri edited the Sanskrit text. After all, we are not able to read the original Sanskrit text itself prior to the revision, because the Kathmandu manuscript is the only extant one. Mr. Kudō, my collaborator, has made a remark in the footnote of the Transliteration of the Manuscript, wherever he found a rewritten portion. The following is a collection of all rewritten portions in the manuscript, probably revised by a hand later than the original scribe. [Headline of the rewritten portions shows the section number of the Sanskrit Text, the number and the line of the Manuscript and the page of Shāstri's text.]

V. M 2.5; S 105

dharmiṇi sattvaṃ nāntarbhavati

This portion has 6 rewritten letters in originally 5 letters' space.

VI. M 3.1-2; S 105

na hi vyāptigrahaṇe mahānasaparāmarśo 'stīty uktam / nanu
vyāptipakṣadharmatvayor ekaśaḥ pratītāv api yasyaiiva
pakṣadharmatvam ava(M 3.2) gatam tasyaiiva sādhyena vyāptir avasiteti
sāmarthyāt sādhyagatiḥ katham¹ avaiyarthyaṃ sādhanasya" /

In this long sentence, first portion contains 9 rewritten letters in 8 letters' space and the second 5 in the space for 5.

VII. M 3.4; S 105

na (S 106) tarhīdānīm vyartho hetuḥ / svarūpaniścayena
sādhyaniścayopajananāt / na hi kvacid iyattādhikam līngasya karta(M
3.5)vyam astīti /

This portion has 16 rewritten letters in 12 letters' space.

VIIa.M 3.5; S 106

api ca / grhīte pakṣadharmatve sambandhe ca smṛte 'numānam
bhavadbhir iṣyate, tadvad antarvyāptāv apīṣyatām /

7 letters in 6 letters' space.

The word *bhavadbhir* is found only in SM, but not in T. This word is rewritten in the space of two letters.

VIII. M 4.3; S 107

katham anyathā dr̥ṣtāntadharmini vyāptigrahaṇavārttāpi tadānīm²
pakṣa (M 4.4) dharmatvāyogāt / pakṣadharmatvāgrahaṇāt /

3 letters in 2 letters' space.

VIII. M 4.4; S 107

¹S *sādhyasattākathanam*.

²S *tadedānīm*, M *tad idānīm* (But akṣara -di- in *tad idānīm* has a cancelling sign on it.)

tadaiiva sādhyam api sāmarthyād asiddham siddham iti sarvānumānavaiarthyaḥ /

8 letters in 6 letters' space.

This rewritten portion inserts the word *asiddham* which is only found in SM, but not in T.

IX. M 4.7; S 107

trairūpyagatisāmarthyād anumeyagatir iti hi tadupādānaśaktir eva sāmartyam ucyate

3 letters in 4 letters' space. In the margin we found an indication of this rewriting.

X. M 5.1; S 107

anavagate pakṣadharmatve vyāpter apy ana vagateḥ

In both portions, 2 letters are rewritten each in one letter's space.

XII. M 6.4; S 109

tadvad antarvyā(M 6.5)ptāv api /

2 letters for one letter's space.

XII-XIII. M 6.6-7; S 109

ekasyaiva hi dharmasya kramāt trairūpyaniścayaḥ / vismṛtāv anumābhāvāt tat kiṃ vāyarthānumākhilā // iti saṃgrahaślokaḥ // api ca³ // bādhakāt sādhyasiddhiś ced vāyartho hetvantaragrahaḥ / bādhakāt tadasiddhi⁴(M 6.7)ś ced vāyartho dharmyantaragrahaḥ /

This long passage (51 letters) is rewritten in the space of 37 letters.

XIII. M 6.7; S 109

nanu lābha evaiṣa labdhaḥ /

The portion *evaiṣa* is originally *evauṣa*. The word *labdhaḥ* has a

³S *api ca saṃgrahaślokaḥ*

⁴In the right margin of this line, *akṣara-ddhi-(?)* or *dva-(?)* is found. Though not specified, it seems to be added to the last word *si-*.

cancelling sign on it.

Ibid. M 7.1; S 110

atha na vyāptisādhakāt sādhyasiddhiḥ

3 letters in two letters' space. Original writing is *atha*.

XIV. M 7.3; S 110

*yadā tu vastumātre vivādaḥ / tadā sarvavastuṣu hetor vṛttis tvayāpi
sādhyā mayāpi ceti katamasmin dharmiṇi hetor vṛttisādhanaṃ mama
vyartham bhavi(M 7.4)ṣyati /*

In the lower margin, an indication of rewriting for *vyartha* is found.

XIV M 7.4; S 110

tāvanmātralakṣaṇatvāc ca sādhyadharmināḥ

Ibid. M 8.1; S 111

*yadi pratiniyate dharmiṇi vivādaḥ / tadabahirbhūte ca dharmiṇi
vyāptigrahaṇaṃ bhavati / tatra ca duruddhāro
dharmyantaraparigrahavaiyarthyaśoḥ /*

The first portion has 3 letters in two letters' space.

XVI. M 8.5; S 111

*“u(M 8.5)bhayatra dr̥ṣṭasya vyāptigrahaṇe 'py asti bahirvyāptibhāga”
iti cet.*

8 letters in 6 letters' space.

Ibid. M 8.7; S 112

sādhanaḥ paritoṣāya jāyate /

The rewritten letters are given in the lower margin.

XVIII. M 9.6; S 113

*tadabbimānāpekṣayā 'sādhāraṇam anaikāntikam āha śrāvaṇatvam,
dr̥ṣṭāntābhāvāt*

3 letters in 2 letters' space. We found a rewrite-indication in the lower margin.

Ibid. M 9.7; S 113

dṛṣṭaiva hi śabdavyaktir⁵ dha(M 10.1)rmiṇū vivādādhikaraṇāt

The *akṣara śa-* is apparently in *devānāgarī* script and there is one letter's gap between *śabda-* and *-vyakti*.

Ibid. M 10.2; S 113

*tataḥ sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ sambhavāt sa(M 10.2)tvādivad
aduṣṭam⁶ eva sādhanam śrūvaṇatvākhyam /*

3 letters in 2 letters' space.

Ibid. M 10.6; S 114

sarvaśabdeṣu vimatau⁷ bādhakam pramāṇam pravarttamānam /

2 letters in one letter's space.

⁵S *vyakti-*

⁶S *adṛṣṭam*, T *aduṣṭam*

⁷S *vigatau*, T *vigatau*

A NEW EDITION OF THE SANSKRIT TEXT
JUXTAPOSED WITH
A COLLATED TEXT OF THE TIBETAN VERSIONS

Omit words in ().

Add words in [].

Antarvyāptisamarthanam¹

(M 1.1; S 103) om̐ namo buddhāya //

I iha sattvam arthakriyākāritvaṃ taditarasattvalakṣaṇāyogāt /
 tac ca kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ vyāptam /
 parasparavyavacchedalakṣaṇatvād anayoḥ prakārāntareṇa
 karaṇāsambhavā(M 1.2)² / kramayaugapadye³ cākṣaṇikatve na staḥ /
 pūrvāparakālayor avicalitaikasvabhāvasya kartṛtvākartṛtva⁴-
 viruddhadharmadvayāyogāt / tatra na tāvat kramaḥ kramiṇam
 (kramiṇām ?)⁵ ekaikaṃ prati pūrvāpa(M 1.3)rakālayoḥ
 kartṛtvākartṛtvāpatteḥ /

¹SM *Antarvyāptisamarthanam*, T *Antarvyāptiḥ*

²T *prakārāntarāsambhavāt*

³T *rim dang cig car gyi don byed pa med do* (= *kramayaugapadyārthakriye*).

⁴S *-ākartṛtve viruddha-*, MT *-ākartṛtvaviruddha-*.

⁵S *kramāṇām*, T *rim pa dang bcas pa*.

Nang gi khyab pa

C 303b3; D 309b4; N 338b6; P 329b7

I 'dir yod pa don bya ba byed pa yin te / de⁶ las gzhan yod pa'i
 mtshan nyid du mi^{C4} rigs pa'i phyir ro // de yang rim dang^{D5} cig car
 dag^{N338a1} gis khyab pa yin te / de dag phan tshun mam par^{P8} gcod
 pa'i mtshan nyid yin pa nyid kyis na mam pa gzhan mi srid pa'i phyir
 ro // skad cig ma ma yin pa la rim⁷ dang cig car gyi don byed pa med
 do // dus snga phyir^{N2} 'gyur ba med⁸ pa'i rang bzhin^{C5} gcig pa ni
 byed pa po nyid dang byed pa po ma yin pa^{P330a1} nyid 'gal ba'i^{D6}
 chos gnyis mi rigs pa yin no // de la re zhig rim gyis ma yin te / rim⁹
 pa dang bcas pa re re dus snga phyi la byed pa po dang byed pa po
 ma yin^{N3} pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba' i phyir ro //

⁶NP omit *de*

⁷N *rim pa*

⁸P *mad*

⁹N *rims* ? Illegible.

evam sarvakramābhāvāt kevalam sakalakāryayugapadyam avaśiṣyate¹⁰
/ tatra ca sphuṭatarah pūrvāparakālayoḥ kartṛtvākartṛ(M
1.4)tvaprasaṅgaḥ / viruddhe ca kartṛtvākartṛtva ekadharmini na
sambhavataḥ / ekasvabhāvaś ca tāvatkālam akṣaṇika iti siddhaḥ, etasmin
kramayugapadyayor ayogaḥ / tad evam akṣa(M 1.5)ṇike
vyāpakānupalabdhyā niṣiddham sattvaṃ kṣaṇika evāvatiṣṭhata iti
kṣaṇikatvena vyāptam / tat tena vyāptam yad yatra dharmini sidhyati
tatra kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhayati /

¹⁰T sakalakāryam yugapad vartamāne 'vaśiṣyate (?)

^{P2} de lta bas na thams cad du rim pa med pa'i ^{C6} phyir bya ba thams
 cad la cig car 'ba' zhig tu da ltar bar gnas pa yin te / ^{D7} de la dus snga
 phyir byed pa po nyid dang byed pa po nyid ma yin par shin du¹¹ 'gal
^{N4} bar thal bar 'gyur ro // ^{P3} byed pa po nyid dang byed pa po nyid
 ma yin pa 'gal bas¹² chos can gcig la mi srid pa'i phyir ro // ngo bo
 gcig pa yang ^{C7} dus de srid kyi bar du skad cig ma [ma]¹³ yin pa'i
 phyir 'di la rim dang cig car 'brel ^{D310a1} ba med par ^{N5} 'grub po // de¹⁴
 ltar na ^{P4} skad cig ma ma¹⁵ yin pa la khyab par byed pa mi dmigs
 pa[s]¹⁶ yod pa nyid bkag pas skad cig ma nyid du gnas pa'i phyir skad
 cig ma nyid kyi khyab pa yin te / de la des khyab ^{C304a1} par chos can
 gang la grub pa der skad ^{N6} cig [ma]¹⁷ nyid du grub par byed do //

¹¹NP *tu*

¹²NP *ba*

¹³CDNP omit [*ma*].

¹⁴P *da*

¹⁵NP omit.

¹⁶CDNP *pa*

¹⁷CDNP omit [*ma*].

II idam eve(M 1.6)dānīm¹⁸ (S 104) vicāryate / kveyam¹⁹ vyāptir
 grahītavyā dṛṣṭāntadharminī sādhyadharminī vā ? kecid āhuḥ /
 “dṛṣṭāntadharminy eva dhūmavat / anyathā sādhanavaiphalyam syāt /
 ubhayadharmaśiddhināntarīyaka(M 1.7)tvāt²⁰ vyāptisiddheḥ / na hi
 mahānasasiddhāyām agnidhūmayor vyāptāv [agneḥ siddhatvāt]²¹ punar
 agnisiddhaye dhūmaliṅgam²² anviṣyata” iti /

¹⁸MT omit *eva* (i.e., *idam idānīm*).

¹⁹M kveyam. S gives both readings: *keyam* (*kveyam*), T *gang las 'dir* (= *kveha*).

²⁰S *siddhi(ddhe)r anāntarīyakatvāt*, M *siddhināntarīyakatvāt*.

²¹T alone has *me grub pa na* (= *agneḥ siddhatvāt*).

²²T *dhūmaliṅgajānumānam*

II ^{P5} da ni 'di ^{D2} dpyad par bya ste / dpe' i chos can nam bsgrub
 par bya ba' i chos can gang las 'dir khyab pa 'dzhin zhes²³ na /²⁴ kha
 cig ni dpe' i chos can las du ba bzhin no zhes zer ro // gzhan du na
 sgrub par ^{N7} byed pa don med ^{C2} pa'i phyir ^{P6} dang / khyab pa grub
 pas chos gnyis grub pa med na mi 'byung ba'i phyir /²⁵ gang gi phyir
 tshang bang ^{D3} du me dang du ba'i khyab pa grub pa na me grub pa
 na /²⁶ yang me grub pa'i phyir rtags du ba las skyes pa'i rjes²⁷ su dpag
 pa tshol bar mi ^{N339b1} byed ^{P7} do //

²³CD *zbe*

²⁴CDNP omit.

²⁵NP omit.

²⁶N omits.

²⁷N *rje*

III [visadr̥ṣopanyāsaḥ,]²⁸ tathā hi //

dr̥ṣtānte gr̥hyate vyāptir dharmayos tatra dr̥ṣṭayoḥ /
 hetumātrasya dr̥(M 2.1)ṣṭasya vyāptiḥ pakṣe tu gamyate //
 sā ca sarvopasaṃhārāt sāmānyam avalambate /
 tasya dharṃiṇi vṛttis tu pratīyetānumānataḥ //

pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭayor vahnidhūmayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvasi(M 2.2)ddhau
 tayor vyāptisiddhir iti pratyakṣasiddhe vahnau yuktaṃ²⁹
 anumānavaiphalyam / naivaṃ vyāptisiddheḥ prāk
 pramāṇāntarasiddhaṃ dharṃiṇi kṣaṇikatvam / ³⁰ sādhanadharmam
 eva tu kevalam anupaśyanto³¹ (M 2.3) viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa³²balāt
 tasya kṣaṇikatvena vyāptim pratīmaḥ / tat kutaḥ³³ sādhanavaiphalyam
 /

²⁸T alone has *mi 'dra bar bkod pa yin te* (= *visadr̥ṣopanyāsaḥ*).

²⁹T *me dang ldan par* (= *vahnivyukte*).

³⁰T adds *'dir* (= *iha*).

³¹M *anupaśyantā*. In the right margin, at the end of this line, a sort of correction sign is seen, but no corrected form is found.

³²T omits *pramāṇa*.

³³S *tat tataḥ*. T *de la gang gis na* (= *tatra kutaḥ*).

III mi 'dra bar bkod³⁴ pa yin te 'di ltar /
 /³⁵ de la chos gnyis^{C3} mthong ba yis /
 /³⁶ dpe la khyab pa 'dzin pa yin /³⁷
 /³⁸ gtan tshigs tsam ni mthong ba yis /
 /³⁹ phyogs^{D4} la khyab pa 'dzin pa yin /
 / de yang thams cad nyer bsdus pas⁴⁰ /
 /⁴¹ P⁸ spyi nyid la ni^{N2} dmigs pa ste /
 / de ni chos can la 'jug pas /
 / rjes su dpag pas rtogs pa yin //

mngon sum gvis⁴² thong⁴³ ba^{C4} dag gis me dang du ba rgyu dang
 'bras bu'i ngo bor grub na de gnyis kyi⁴⁴ khyab pa 'grub ste / mngon
 sum^{P330b1/D5} gvis me dang ldan par 'grub pa⁴⁵ ni rjes su^{N3} dpag pa
 'bras bu med pa yin no // khyab pa grub pa'i snga rol du⁴⁶ tshad ma
 gzhan gyi[s]⁴⁷ chos can la skad cig ma nyid du grub pa ma yin te / 'dir
 sgrub^{C5} par byed pa'i chos 'di kho na 'ba'^{P2} zhigh mthong bas bzlog
 na gnod pa can gyi stobs kyis de la skad^{N4} cig ma [nyid]⁴⁸ kyis^{D6}
 khyab par rtogs so // de la gang gis na sgrub par byed pa de don med
 pa yin /

³⁴C *bgod*

³⁵N omits /. C /

³⁶P omits /

³⁷NP omit /

³⁸NP omit /

³⁹P omits /

⁴⁰NP *pa*

⁴¹P omits /

⁴²NP *gyi*

⁴³CDN *mtbong*

⁴⁴N *kyis*

⁴⁵CD 'grub pa, NP grub

⁴⁶N *tu*

⁴⁷CDNP *gyi*

⁴⁸CDNP *gnyis*

IV vaiphalyam eva kṣaṇikatvavyāptasya sattvasya tathātvena dharminī pratī(M 2.4)tau kṣaṇikatvasyāpi pratīter iti cet /

V na / sarvopasaṃhāravatī hi vyāptiḥ sādhyasiddher aṅgam / tad iyam anapekṣitadharmiviśeṣaṃ sādhanadharmamātram avalambate / ta(M 2.5)dyathā, (S 105) yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir iti / na punar yatra mahānase dhūmas tatrāgnir iti / evam ihāpi yat sat tat kṣaṇikam iti vyāptipratītau sādhanadharmasyāpi dharminī sattvaṃ nāntarbhavati / (M 2.6) kiṃ punaḥ sādhyadharmasya / tasmāt sattvasāmānyasya sādhanadharmasya pakṣadharmatvaṃ vyāptiś caikaśaḥ pratipadya⁴⁹ tadubhayasāmarthyāt sādhyadharmasya dharminī vṛttiḥ pratīyata iti ku(M 2.7)to 'numānavaiphalyam /

⁴⁹S *pratipādyā*, MT *pratipadya*

IV don med pa nyid yin te /⁵⁰ skad cig ma nyid kyis khyab ^{P3} pa yod pa de bzhin du chos can la ^{C6} rtogs na skad cig ma ⁵¹ nyid du yang rtogs so zhes zer na /

V ^{N5} ma yin te / thams cad bsdus pa dang ldan pa'i khyab pa ni bsgrub⁵² par bya ba 'grub pa'i ^{D7} yan lag yin la / de bas na 'di ni chos ^{P4} can gyi khyad par la ltos⁵³ pa med par sgrub par byed pa'i chos tsam dmigs pa ste / gang na du ba yod pa ^{C7} de na me yod do ^{N6} zhes bya ba bzhin no // yang gang na⁵⁴ tshang bang⁵⁵ gi du ba yod pa de na me yod do zhes bya ba ni ma yin no // ^{P5} de bzhin du 'dir yang gang yod pa de ni skad cig ma ^{D310b1} yin no zhes bya bas khyap pa rtogs na sgrub par byed pa'i chos kyang chos can la yod ^{N7} pa'i nang du mi 'du na bsgrub par bya ba'i ^{C304b1} chos lta ci smos / de lta bas na yod pa'i spyi sgrub ^{P6} par byed pa'i chos phyogs kyi chos nyid [dang]⁵⁶ khyab pa so sor rtogs nas de gnyis kyi⁵⁷ nus pas bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can la 'jug pa'i phyir ^{D2} gang gis na ^{N340a1} rjes su dpag pa 'bras bu med pa yin⁵⁸ /

⁵⁰CD omit /

⁵¹N *ba*

⁵²NP *sgrub*

⁵³NP *ltos*

⁵⁴NP *yang na gang*

⁵⁵N *dang(?)*. *tshang bang* = *tshang mang*.

⁵⁶CDNP omit [*dang*].

⁵⁷NP *kyis*

⁵⁸CD *yin te*

VI “yady evaṃ vyāptipratītāv asati dharṃiṇi parāmarśe (sādhyadharmiṇi)⁵⁹ vyāptigrahaṇam iti / kutaḥ / tatra dṛṣṭasya sattvasya vyāptipratīteḥ⁶⁰ / yathā mahānasadrṣṭā(M 3.1)gnidhūmayor vyāptigrahe⁶¹ dṛṣṭāntadharṃiṇi vyāptigrahaṇam ucyate⁶² / na hi vyāptigrahaṇe mahānasaparāmarśo ’stūty uktaṃ / nanu vyāptipakṣadharmatvayor ekaśaḥ pratītāv api yasyaiva pakṣadharmatvam ava(M 3.2)gataṃ tasyaiva sādhyena vyāptir avasiteti sāmartyāt sādhyagatiḥ katham⁶³ avaiyarthyaṃ sādhanasya” /

⁵⁹T omits *sādhyadharmiṇi*. Read as T.

⁶⁰SM *vyāptipratīteḥ*; T *de la mtshong ba'i yod pa'i khyab pa gang du rtogs te= kutra tatra dṛṣṭasya vyāptipratīti ḥ*.

⁶¹T adds *na* after *vyāptigrahe* (*khyab pa gzung ba ma yin no*).

⁶²T *zhes zer na ma yin no* (= *iti ced / na /*).

⁶³S *sādhyasattākathanam*, M *sādhyagatau kathanam*

VI gal te de lta bu'i khyab pa rtogs^{P7} na chos can la mchog tu 'dzin pa^{C2} med pas khyab pa 'dzin na de la mthong ba'i yod pa'i khyab pa gang du rtogs te / dper na tshang bang^{N2} du mthong bas me dang du ba'i khyab pa gzung bas dpe'i chos can la khyab pa gzung ba (ma)⁶⁴ yin no^{D3} zhes^{P8} zer na ma yin te / khyab par 'dzin pa ni⁶⁵ tshang bang la mchog tu 'dzin pa med do zhes bstan to // khyab pa dang phyogs^{C3} kyi chos gnyis so sor^{N3} rtogs pas kyang⁶⁶ gang la phyogs kyi chos nyid rtogs pa de nyid la bsgrub par bya bas⁶⁷ khyab par^{P331a1} rtogs pa'i phyir shugs kyis bsgrub par bya ba rtogs pa ma yin^{D4} nam / ji ltar bsgrub⁶⁸ par byed pa don med pa ma yin /

⁶⁴CDNP have *ma*. To be omitted.

⁶⁵NP omit *pa ni*.

⁶⁶CD /

⁶⁷NP *ba*, but N illegible.

⁶⁸CD *sgrub*

VII nanu⁶⁹ na pakṣadharmatvagatiḥ sādhyagatiḥ
 sādhyadharmāsamsparśāt⁷⁰ / nāpi vyāptipratītir eva sām(M
 3.3)dhyasiddhiḥ / sāmānyālambanatayā dharmaviśeṣeṇa dharmayor
 anavacchedāt / anyathā viśeṣayor vyāptiprasaṅgāt / tad⁷¹ ayaṃ
 vyasta⁷²viṣayaḥ sāmārthyād iti⁷³ hetunirdeśaḥ / atha (M 3.4) hetos
 trairūpyaparicchedasāmārthyāt sādhyapratītir utpadyata ity ucyate⁷⁴ /
 na (S 106) tarhīdānīm vyartho hetuḥ⁷⁵ / svarūpaniścayena
 sādhyaniścayopajananāt / na hi kvacid iyattādhikaṃ⁷⁶ liṅgasya karta(M
 3.5)⁷⁷vyam astīti /

VIIa api ca /
 grhīte pakṣadharmatve sambandhe ca smṛte 'numā(naṃ) [/]
 bhavadbhir⁷⁸ iṣyate tadvad antarvyāptāv apīṣyatām⁷⁹ /
 na hi bahirvyāptivādinām api vismṛtāyāṃ vyāptāv anumānapravṛ(M
 3.6)ttir asti /

⁶⁹T 'on kyang (= api tu ?).

⁷⁰SM sādhyadharmāsamsparśāt, T bsgrub par bya ba'i chos la ma reg pa'i phyir ro (= sādhyadharmāsamsparśāt). Read as T.

⁷¹T de lta bas na (= tena, tasmāt).

⁷²SM vyasta-, T khyab pa'i yul (= vyāpti-).

⁷³SM have iti.

⁷⁴This sentence "atha ... ity ucyate" is read in T as "gal te ... zhes zer na."

⁷⁵T de lta na khyod kyi yang gtan tshigs don med pa yin te (= tathā sati tvayāpi vyartho hetuḥ).

⁷⁶M iyato 'dhikaṃ

⁷⁷At the beginning of this line of M, there is a correction sign, but no indication of what is to be corrected.

⁷⁸T rjes su dpag pa byed 'na (no word for bhavadbhir).

⁷⁹In T grhīte ... iṣyatām is in verse. 'numānam is hypermetrical; read 'numā.

VII 'on kyang phyogs kyi^{N4} chos nyid rtogs pas bsgrub par bya ba rtogs pa^{C4} ma yin te /⁸⁰ bsgrub^{P2} par bya ba'i chos la ma reg pa'i phyir ro // khyab pa rtogs pa nyid kyang bsgrub par bya ba grub pa ni ma yin te / spyi la dmigs pa nyid kyi[s]⁸¹ chos can gyi⁸² khyad par gyi[s]⁸³ N⁵ chos^{D5} dag yongs su mi gcod pa'i phyir ro // gzhan du na^{P3} khyad par gyi chos dag gi(s)⁸⁴ khyab par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // ^{C5} de lta bas na khyab pa'i yul 'dis shugs kyi[s] [zhes]⁸⁵ gtan tshigs bstan to // gal te gtan tshigs kyi tshul^{N6} gsum yongs su bcad pa'i shugs kyi[s] bsgrub^{P4} par bya ba rtogs pa^{D6} 'byung ngo zhes zer na / de lta na khyod kyi yang gtan tshigs don med pa yin te / rang gi ngo bo nges pas bsgrub par bya ba nges pa bskyed pa'i phyir^{C6} ro // de tsam las rtags^{N7} kyi bya ba 'ga' yang med do //

VIIa gzhan^{P5} yang /
 phyogs kyi chos nyid gzung ba las /
 / 'brel pa yang⁸⁶ ni dran pa yis /
 / rjes su^{D7} dpag pa byed 'dod na /
 / de bzhin nang khyab⁸⁷ kyang 'dod kyi[s] //
 phyi'i khyab pa smra ba la yang khyab pa^{N340b1} brjed⁸⁸ pas rjes su dpag pas 'jug^{P6} pa med do //

⁸⁰NP omit.

⁸¹CDNP *kyi*

⁸²NP *gyis*

⁸³CDP *gyi*, N *gyis*

⁸⁴CDNP *gis*

⁸⁵CDNP omit *zhes*.

⁸⁶NP *yi*

⁸⁷NP *khyab pa* for *nang khyab*.

⁸⁸CNP *brjed*

VIII “tatra yasyaiva pakṣadharmatvam avagataṃ tasyaiva
sādhyadharmeṇa vyāptismṛteḥ kiṃ na⁸⁹ sarvānumānavaiyarthyaṃ /
sādhyadharmino 'parāmarśeṇa vyāpteḥ smaraṇād iti cet /
sādhyadharmini dṛṣṭa(M 3.7)syaiva vyāptismaraṇe kathaṃ
sādhyadharmino 'parāmarśaḥ [/]
sāmānyālambanatvād vyāpteḥ sādhyadharmino 'navacchedād
iti cet / nanu tatra dṛṣṭasya kathaṃ tenānavacchedaḥ ? tenāvacchinnasya
vāsādhā(M 4.1)raṇatvāt kathaṃ vyāptiḥ ? /
ayogavyavacchedena viśeṣaṇān nāsādhāraṇateti cet / tathāpi
kiṃ na sādhyadharmi parāmrśyate ? yatra yatra parvate dhūmas tatra
tatrāgnir yathā mahānasa iti /

⁸⁹T *ci'i phyir*

VIII de la gang gyi⁹⁰ phyogs kyi chos^{C7} nyid rtogs⁹¹ pas de la bsgrub⁹² par bya ba'i chos kyi[s]⁹³ khyab pa dran pa'i phyir /⁹⁴ ci'i phyir rjes su dpag pa thams cad don med pa^{D311a1} ma yin /

bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can^{N2} la mchog tu mi 'dzin pas^{P7} khyab pa dran pa'i phyir ro zhes zer na / bsgrub par⁹⁵ bya ba'i chos can la mthong ba nyid kyis khyab pa dran pa'i phyir ji^{C305a1} ltar bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can la mchog tu mi 'dzin pa yin /

khyab pa spyi la dmigs^{N3} pa yin pa'i^{D2} phyir bsgrub par^{P8} bya ba'i⁹⁶ chos can yongs su mi gcod do zhes zer na / de la mthong bas ma yin nam ji ltar des yongs⁹⁷ su mi gcod /⁹⁸ des yongs⁹⁹ su gcod na yang thun mong ma^{C2} yin pa'i phyir ji ltar khyab /

ma 'brel ba mam par gcod^{N4} pa'i khyad par yin^{P331b1} pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa ma yin no zhes zer^{D3} na / de ltar na yang [ci'i phyir] bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can la mchog tu mi 'dzin //¹⁰⁰ gang dang gang na¹⁰¹ ri'i du ba yod pa de dang de na me yod do¹⁰² /¹⁰³ dper na tshang bang bzhin no zhes bya ba^{N5} lta bu'o //

⁹⁰P *gi*

⁹¹D *rtag*

⁹²N *sgrub*

⁹³CDP *kyi*, N *kyis*

⁹⁴NP omit.

⁹⁵C *pa'i*

⁹⁶NP *bya'i* for *bya ba'i*, but N illegible.

⁹⁷N *yong*

⁹⁸NP omit.

⁹⁹N *yong*

¹⁰⁰CDN /. CDNP lack *ci'i phyir*.

¹⁰¹NP *ni*

¹⁰²NP *de*

¹⁰³CD //

sāmā(M 4.2)nyālambanāyām vyāptau
 dharmiviśeṣaparāmarśasyānaṅgatvād iti cet, yuktam etat /
 sādhyadharmiṇā hy ayogavyavacchedaḥ sādhanadharmasya
 rūpāntaram eva pakṣadharmatvākhyam, na (M 4.3) tv ayaṃ vyāpter
 aṅgam / tam antareṇāpi vyāpteḥ sāmānyālambanāyāḥ pari(S
 107)cchedaparisaṃmāpteḥ / katham anyathā dṛṣṭāntadharmini
 vyāptigrahaṇavārttāpi tadānīm¹⁰⁴ (pakṣa (M 4.4)dharmatvāyogāt)¹⁰⁵ /
 pakṣadharmatvāgrahaṇāt /

pakṣadharmatvagrahaṇe vā tadaiva sādhyam api sāmartyād
 asiddham siddham¹⁰⁶ iti sarvānumānavaiyarthya-prasaṅgaḥ /
 paścāt-kālabhāvi(M 4.5)liṅgi¹⁰⁷jñānam api ca¹⁰⁸ smṛtir eva syāt, na
 pramāṇam / tasmād vyāpter anaṅgatvāt pakṣadharmatvaṃ
 vyāptigrahaṇe [sad api]¹⁰⁹ nāntarbhavatīti pṛthaggrhītasṃṛtayoḥ
 pakṣadharmatvāvyāptyoḥ sāmartyād anumeyagatir utpadyata
 iti / evam avaiyarthyaṃ sādhanānām eṣitavyaṃ, anumānasya
 phalavattvāt”¹¹⁰/

¹⁰⁴S *tadēdānīm*, M *tad idānīm* (But *akṣara -di-* in *tad idānīm* has cancelling sign on it).

¹⁰⁵T omits *pakṣadharmatvāyogāt*.

¹⁰⁶SM *sāmartyād asiddham siddham* (This portion of M is rewritten.) T omits *asiddham*.

¹⁰⁷T *rtaḥ ca* (= *liṅgin*). Read as T.

¹⁰⁸M *na* after *api ca*, but has a cancelling sign on the *akṣara na*.

¹⁰⁹SM add *sad api*. T omits. cf. English Translation, VIII, n.15.

¹¹⁰SM *iti mānaphalavāt*, T *rjes su dpag pa 'bras bu bcas pa'i phyir ro* (= *anumānasya phalavattvāt*). Read as T.

^{P2} spyi la ^{C3} 'dzin pa'i khyab pa yod na chos can gyi khyad par la mchog tu 'dzin pa'i yan lag ma yin pa'i¹¹¹ phyir zhes zer na / 'di ^{D4} ni rigs te¹¹² bsgrub pa[r bya ba]'i¹¹³ chos can dang ma 'brel pa rnarn par gcod pa dang / sgrub par byed pa'i chos kyi ngo bo ^{N6/P3} gzhan nyid phyogs kyi chos nyid du bshad¹¹⁴ pa yin gyi / de la khyab pa'i ^{C4} yan lag ma yin te / de med pas kyang spyi la dmigs pa'i khyab pa yongs¹¹⁵ su gcod pa grub pa'i phyir ro // gzhan du na dpe'i ^{D5} chos can la khyab pa 'dzin ^{P4} pa'i gтам¹¹⁶ du¹¹⁷ ^{N7} ji ltar 'gyur te de'i tshe phyogs kyi chos nyid mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro //

phyogs kyi chos nyid 'dzin na yang de nyid kyi tshe bsgrub ^{C5} par bya ba yang shugs kyis grub pa'i phyir rjes¹¹⁸ su dpag pa thams cad don med par thal ^{P5} bar 'gyur ro // dus phyis byung ba'i ^{N341a1} rtags can gyi¹¹⁹ ^{D6} shes pa yang dran pa nyid yin gyi tshad ma ni ma yin no // de bas na khyab pa'i yan lag ma yin pa'i phyir phyogs kyi chos nyid khyab¹²⁰ par 'dzin pa'i nang du ^{C6} 'du bar mi 'gyur ba'i ^{P6} phyir tha dad par 'dzin ^{N2} pa dang / dran pa'i phyogs kyi chos nyid dang khyab pa dag gi(s)¹²¹ shugs kyis rjes¹²² su dpag par bya ba'i ^{D7} shes pa 'byung ngo // de lta bas na sgrub par byed pa rnams don med par 'dod par¹²³ mi bya ste / rjes¹²⁴ su dpag pa 'bras bu bcas pa'i phyir ro //

¹¹¹NP omit.

¹¹²N rigs ste; P rig ste for rigs te.

¹¹³CDNP pa'i. Read pa[r bya ba]'i.

¹¹⁴NP bcad

¹¹⁵N yong

¹¹⁶CD gтан

¹¹⁷C tu

¹¹⁸N rje

¹¹⁹P gyis

¹²⁰CD khyab, P khyad, N illegible.

¹²¹CDNP gis

¹²²N rje

¹²³CD pa

¹²⁴N rje

IX tadvat pṛthaggrhītasṃṛtayoḥ¹²⁵ pakṣadharmatvavyāptyoḥ¹²⁶ sāmārthyād anu(M 4.7)mānotpattir antarvyāptāv api kiṃ ne¹²⁷ṣyate / tadiṣṭau vā katham sādhanavaiyarthyam / trairūpyagatisāmārthyād anumeyagatir iti hi¹²⁸ tadu[t]pādana¹²⁹śaktir eva sāmārthyam ucyate, na tu trairū(M 5.1)pya[pratītau sādhyā]¹³⁰pratīter antarbhāva iti sarvaṃ samānam /

X “na sarvaṃ samānam / antarvyāptau hi vyāptiṃ prati gatyai¹³¹ pakṣadharmatvam avagatam / anavagate pakṣadharmatve vyāpter apy anavagateḥ / tato vyāptipū(M 5.2)rvake sādhanavākye¹³² pakṣadharmavacanam anarthakam antar¹³³vyāptau / naivaṃ bahirvyāptau bahir eva vyāptigrahaṇāt” /

¹²⁵SM *pṛthagbhūtayoh*, T *pṛthaggrhītayoh*.

¹²⁶T *-sṃṛtiḥ*

¹²⁷T omits *na*.

¹²⁸SM *hi*, T *ced*

¹²⁹SM *tadupādāna-*, T *de bskyed* (= *tadupādāna-*). Read as T.

¹³⁰SM omits *pratītau sādhyā-*.

¹³¹M *gataiva*

¹³²S *-vāhye* (Misprint).

¹³³S *anantavyāptau*, M *antarvyāptau* = T *nang gi khyab pa la*. Read as MT.

IX ^{N3} de bzhin du tha ^{C7} dad par 'dzin pa dang / dran pa'i phyogs
 ky¹³⁴ chos nyid dang / [khyab]¹³⁵ pa'i shugs kyis rjes su dpag pa
 'byung ba nang gi khyab pa la yang ci'i phyir [mi]¹³⁶ ^{D311b1} 'dod // ¹³⁷
 yang de 'dod na sgrub par byed ^{P8} pa ji ltar don med pa yin / tshul ^{N4}
 gsum rtogs pa'i shugs kyis rjes ¹³⁸ su dpag par bya ba rtogs she¹³⁹ na /
 de bskyed¹⁴⁰ pa'i ^{C305b1} nus pa nyid las shugs zhes bshad do // tshul
 gsum pa¹⁴¹ rtogs pa'i nang du bsgrub par bya ba rtogs pa ^{P332a1} 'du ba
 ma yin no zhes bya bar thams ^{D2} cad ^{N5} mtshungs so //

X mtshungs pa ma yin te / nang gi khyab pa la / khyab pa
 rtogs pa nyid kyis phyogs ky¹⁴² chos nyid rtogs ¹⁴² pa yin te / phyogs ky¹⁴²
 chos nyid ^{C2} ma rtogs na¹⁴³ khyab pa ^{P2} yang mi rtogs pa'i phyir ro //
 de bas na nang gi khyab ^{N6} pa la khyab pa [sngon]¹⁴⁴ du 'gro ba'i
 sgrub par byed pa'i tshig la phyogs ky¹⁴⁵ chos ^{D3} don med pa yin gyi
 spyi'i¹⁴⁵ khyab pa ni de lta ma yin te / phyi rol nyid ky¹⁴⁵ khyab pa
 'dzin pa'i phyir ro zhe na /

¹³⁴N *kyis*

¹³⁵CDNP *dran*. Read *khyab*.

¹³⁶CDNP omit. Added by the editor.

¹³⁷CD /

¹³⁸N *rje*

¹³⁹NP *zhe*

¹⁴⁰CDN *skyed*

¹⁴¹NP omit.

¹⁴²N *stog par*, P *rtog*

¹⁴³P omits *rtogs na*

¹⁴⁴CDNP *nang*. Read *sngon*.

¹⁴⁵D *phyi'i*

XI atrāha //

yena tena krameṇātra prayukte sādhanē sati /

(S 108) avetya pakṣa (M 5.3) dharmatvaṃ paścād vyāptiḥ
pratīyate //

tvatpakṣa iva¹⁴⁶ drṣṭānte tatra sety anyathā katham /

dvau drṣṭvā vidma iti ced vyāpṭeḥ prāk dvayadṛk katham
//

vyāptipakṣadharmatve hi svavā (M 5.4) kyābhyāṃ yena tena krameṇa¹⁴⁷
prayuktābhyāṃ sūcyete / na tu sāksāt pratīyete, vācaḥ svayam
apramāṇatvāt /

¹⁴⁶S *pratyakṣa iva*, M *tvatpakṣa iva* = T *khyad phyogs bzhin du*. Read as MT. See
fn.158.

¹⁴⁷S omits *krameṇa*, MT (*yena tena krameṇa* = *rim pa gang yang rung bas*) have.
Read as MT.

XI 'dir^{P3} smras pa /

rim pa gang yang rung bas 'dir /
 /^{N7} sgrub byed rab^{C3} tu sbyor gyur na /
 / phyogs kyi chos nyid shes pa yis /
 / phyis ni khyab pa rtogs par 'gyur /
 / khyod phyogs bzhin du dpe la ni /
 /^{D4} de las de gzhan ji lta bu /
 /^{P4} gnyis mthong nas ni shes she na /
 / khyab sngon gnyis mthong ji^{N341b1} ltar yin //

khyab pa dang phyogs kyi chos rim¹⁴⁸ pa gang yang rung bas rab tu
 sbyor ba'i¹⁴⁹ ^{C4} rang gi tshig dag gis bstan gyi¹⁵⁰ /¹⁵¹ de dag¹⁵² mngon
 du rtogs pa ni ma yin^{P5} te tshig gi bdag nyid ni tshad ma [ma]¹⁵³ yin
 pa'i phyr ro /

¹⁴⁸P *rim*s

¹⁴⁹P *ba* yis

¹⁵⁰NP *gyis* //

¹⁵¹P //

¹⁵²NP omit *de dag*.

¹⁵³CDNP omit. Read *tshad ma ma yin* ...

yad āha //

śaktasya sūcakam hetuvaco¹⁵⁴ 'śaktam api sva(M 5.5)yam
iti // <PV IV, 17; PVin III, 5cd, 198>

sūcitayos tu¹⁵⁵ tayoh sattve hetau prathamataram¹⁵⁶
pakṣadharmatvaviṣayam eva pramāṇam abhimukhībhavatu / tena
pramāṇena dharmiṇi siddhasya sattvasya paścād vyāptiḥ¹⁵⁷ (M 5.6)
pramāṇāntareṇa gr̥hyata iti kasya vaiyarthyam iti /

tvatpakṣe 'pi¹⁵⁸ dr̥ṣṭāntadharmini prathamam hetur gr̥hyate,
paścād vyāptir ity eṣa eva kramaḥ / anyathā dr̥ṣṭāntadharmini vyāptir
gr̥hītety e(M 5.7)tad eva na syāt, dr̥ṣṭāntadharminy adr̥ṣṭasyaiva hetor
vyāptigrahaṇāt /

¹⁵⁴SM *hetur vaco*, but PV IV, 17cd reads *hetuvaco*.

¹⁵⁵S *sūcitayo 'stu*, but MT read *sūcitayos tu*. Read as MT.

¹⁵⁶SM *-tara-*, T *dang po*. Corrected by the editor.

¹⁵⁷M *vyāpti-*

¹⁵⁸S *pratyakṣe 'pi*, but MT (*khyod kyi phyogs la yang*) read *tvatpakṣe 'pi*. See also

/ rang nyid^{D5} nus pa med na yang /
 / gtan^{N2} tshigs kyi ni nus pa ston //¹⁵⁹

zhes gsungs pa yin no // de dag brjod pas kyang dang po yod pa'i
 gtan tshigs la¹⁶⁰ phyogs kyi chos kyi^{C5/P6} yul can nyid kyi tshad ma
 mngon du 'gyur ba yin te / tshad ma des chos can la yod pa grub na
 phyis khyab pa^{N3} tshad ma gzhan gyis 'dzin to^{D6} zhes gang gis na
 don med pa yin / khyod kyi phyogs la yang / dpe'i chos can la dang
 po gtan^{P7} tshigs 'dzin cing phyis ni khyab pa'o zhes bya ba'i rim pa
 'di^{C6} yin no // gzhan du dpe'i chos can las^{N4} khyab pa 'dzin to //¹⁶¹
 zhes bya ba der mi 'gyur te / dpe'i chos can ma mthong [ba'i]¹⁶² gtan
 tshigs kyi¹⁶³ khyab pa 'dzin^{D7} pa'i phyir ro //

¹⁵⁹NP omit //. This verse is PV IV, 17cd (= PVin III, 5cd): / gtan tshigs brjod pa
 rang nyid la // nus pa med kyang nus ston byed /

¹⁶⁰C adds //, D /

¹⁶¹CD omit.

¹⁶²CD *bas*, NP omit *bas*. Read *ba'i*.

¹⁶³CD *kyi*

XII “yady evaṃ sādhyadharmo ’pi vyāptigrahaṇādhikaraṇe dharṃiṇi grahītavya eva, yathā vahnidhūmayor” iti cet / (M 6.1) na / tatra dṛṣṭasya hetor vipakṣe bādhakavṛttimātrād eva vyāptisiddheḥ¹⁶⁴ / ātaś caivaṃ¹⁶⁵ na khalu vyāptigrahaṇāt prakṣaṇika[tva]sya¹⁶⁶ kvacid api siddhir asti tasyānumeyatvāt / asiddhāyāṃ ca vyā(M 6.2)ptāv anumānāpravṛtteḥ¹⁶⁷ / sādhanāntarasya ca tadartham¹⁶⁸ ananu(S 109)saraṇāt, anusaraṇe ’py anavasthā syāt / avasthāne tāvat prayāsasya vaiyarthya / viparyaye [bādhaka]¹⁶⁹balād eva vyāptisi(M 6.3)ddher avighātāt /

vahnidhūmayos tu nādrṣṭayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ¹⁷⁰ / tatsiddhau na¹⁷¹ [viparyaye]¹⁷² bādhakavṛttir iti¹⁷³ dvayadarśanavyapekṣā¹⁷⁴ vahnidhūmayor vyāptisiddhiḥ /

(M 6.4) sattvaṣṇikatvayos tu naivam, yathoktanyāyena vyāptyasiddheḥ¹⁷⁵ / tasmāt sattvamātrasya tatra dharṃiṇi siddhasya bādhakavaśād vyāptiḥ¹⁷⁶ sidhyatīty¹⁷⁷ eṣitavyam /

¹⁶⁴M has a correction-sign on this *akṣara -ddheḥ* but no alternative reading is given.

¹⁶⁵S *jñātaś caivam*, M *ātaś caivaṃ* for which T has *de has na yang (ataś ca)*. See fn. 18 of the English Translation.

¹⁶⁶SM *kṣaṇikasya*

¹⁶⁷T seems to have *-asiddhatvāt*.

¹⁶⁸T omits *artham*.

¹⁶⁹SM *vyāpti-* instead of *bādhaka-*, but T has *bzlog na gnod pa can gyi stobs nyid (= bādhaka-)*. Read as T.

¹⁷⁰S *siddheḥ*, MT *siddhiḥ*

¹⁷¹T omits *na*.

¹⁷²SM *vipakṣe*, T *viparyaye*. Tis a usual form, but SM is also correct in meaning.

¹⁷³T omits *iti*.

¹⁷⁴S *-darśanavyapekṣā*, M *-darśanasavyapekṣā*

¹⁷⁵S *vyāptisiddheḥ*, M *vyāptyasiddheḥ*, T omits *vyāpti*.

¹⁷⁶T *khyab pa grub pa'i stobs kyis (= vyāptisiddhivaśād)* for *bādhakavaśād vyāptiḥ*.

¹⁷⁷S *setsyatīty*, M *sidhyati*

XII ^{P8} gal te de ltar na khyab pa 'dzin pa'i rten chos can 'dzin na / bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyang 'dzin pa nyid de / ^{N5} me dang du ^{C7} ba bzhin no zhes zer na / ¹⁷⁸ ma yin te / de la mthong ba'i gtan tshigs mi mthun pa'i phyogs la gnod pa can ^{P332b1} zhugs pa tsam nyid kysis khyab pa grub pa'i phyir ro // de bas na ^{D312a1} yang khyab pa 'dzin pa'i sngon du skad cig ma nyid du nam yang ^{N6} grub pa med de / de rjes su dpag par bya ba'i phyir dang / ^{C306a1} khyab pa ma grub na rjes su dpag par mi 'grub ^{P2} pa'i phyir dang / sgrub par byed pa gzhan yang de'i rjes su mi 'brang ba'i phyir dang / rjes su 'brang na yang thug pa med par ¹⁷⁹ thal ^{D2} bar ^{N7} 'gyur ba'i phyir dang / thug pa yod na yang de tsam gyis rtsol ba don med pa'i phyir dang / ¹⁸⁰ ^{C3/P3} bzlog na gnod pa can gyi stobs nyid kysis khyab pa grub pa ¹⁸¹ la gnod pa med pa'i phyir ro //

me dang du ba ma mthong bar yang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i ngo bo grub ^{N342a1} pa ¹⁸² med do // de grub pas bzlog na gnod pa can 'jug pa [med pa'i phyir] ¹⁸³ gnyis ^{D3} mthong ba la ltos ¹⁸⁴ pa ^{P4} me dang du ba'i khyab pa grub bo //

yod pa dang skad cig ma ^{C3} gnyis ni de ltar ma yin te / ji skad du bstan pa'i rigs pas ¹⁸⁵ ^{N2} grub pa'i phyir ro // de bas na yod pa tsam chos can de la grub pas [gnod pa'i stob kysis khyab pa grub par] ¹⁸⁶ 'dod par ^{P5} bya'o //

¹⁷⁸N omits.

¹⁷⁹D *por*

¹⁸⁰NP //

¹⁸¹NP omit *grub pa*.

¹⁸²NP *par*

¹⁸³CDNP omit. Read *med pa'i phyir*.

¹⁸⁴NP *ltos*

¹⁸⁵N *rig par*, P *rigs par*

¹⁸⁶CD *khyab pa grub pa'i stobs kysis grub par*; NP *khyab pa'i stobs kysis grub par*. Read *gnod pa'i stobs kysis khyab pa grub par*.

tadvad antarvyā(M 6.5)ptāv api / ta ime¹⁸⁷
 vyāptipakṣadharmatve¹⁸⁸ svasvapramāṇavyavacchedya¹⁸⁹ sādhanā-
 vākyena¹⁹⁰ (tu)¹⁹¹ kevalam sūcayitavye¹⁹² / na cānyataravākyena śakyam
 ubhayaṃ sūcayitum iti kuto (M 6.6) 'nyataravākyavaiyartham //
 ekasyaiva hi dharmasya kramāt trairūpyaniścayaḥ /
 vismṛtāv anumābhāvāt tat kiṃ vyarthānumākhilā //
 iti saṃgrahaślokaḥ¹⁹³ //

¹⁸⁷T *tatrāpi* for *ta ime*.

¹⁸⁸T construes *-tve* as locative (*khyab pa dang phyogs kyi chos de la yang*).

¹⁸⁹T *-paricchedya-* instead of *vyavacchedya*.

¹⁹⁰S *-vākye na*; M has a punctuation mark after *-vākye*, i.e., *-vākye, na*. T *sgrub par byed pa'i*.

¹⁹¹SM insert *tu*. To be omitted.

¹⁹²T *ngag gis nges pa 'ba' zbig bstan par bya ba yin no* (*kevalam niścayaḥ sūcayitavyaḥ* ?).

¹⁹³S *iti*, M *iti saṃgrahaślokaḥ //* = T *zhes bya ba ni bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'o //*
 Read as MT.

de bzhin du nang gi khyab pa la yang ^{D4} yin no // khyab pa
dang phyogs kyi chos de la yang / rang rang gi tshad mas ^{C4/N3}
yongs¹⁹⁴ su gcod par byed pa'i sgrub¹⁹⁵ par byed pa'i ngag gis nges pa
'ba' zhig bstan par bya ba yin no // ^{P6} ngag gcig gis gnyi ga bstan par
mi nus pas / gang gis na ngag gzhan don med pa yin /
gcig nyid kyis ^{D5} ni gang ^{N4} phyir chos /
/¹⁹⁶ rim¹⁹⁷ bzhin tshul gsum nges pa yis /
/ brjed¹⁹⁸ pas rjes ^{C5} dpag med pa'i phyir /
/ de cis¹⁹⁹ ^{P7} rjes dpag don med yin //
zhes bya ba ni bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'o //

¹⁹⁴N *yong*

¹⁹⁵NP *bsgrub*

¹⁹⁶N omits.

¹⁹⁷NP *rims*

¹⁹⁸P *brjed*

¹⁹⁹NP *cas*

XIII *api ca*²⁰⁰ //

bādhakāt sādhyasiddhiś ced vyartha hetvantaragrahaḥ /
bādhakāt tadasiddhi(M 6.7)ś ced vyartha
dharmy²⁰¹antaragrahaḥ /

yadi hi dharmiṇi vyāptiḥ sidhyanty eva sādhyasiddhim²⁰²
antarbhāvayati, nanu lābha evaiṣa(labdha)ḥ²⁰³ / vyāptiprasādhakād eva
pramāṇāt sādhyasiddheḥ sattvahetvapāśraya(M 7.1)ṇaprayāsasya (S 110)
nirasanāt / na hi vyasanam evaital līngāntarā²⁰⁴ nusaraṇam nāma /

atha na vyāptisādhakāt sādhyasiddhiḥ, na tarhy antarvyāptau
hetuvaiyarthyam iti kim akāṇḍakātaratayā²⁰⁵ bahutaram āyāsa(M 7.2)m
āviśasi /

²⁰⁰S *api ca samgrahaslokaḥ*

²⁰¹SM *dharmyantara-*, T *dharmāntara-* (*chos gzhan*).

²⁰²T omits *siddhim*.

²⁰³S *eṣaḥ*, omitting *labdhaḥ*; MT have it, but M has cancelling sign on the word *labdhaḥ*.

²⁰⁴T omits *antara*.

²⁰⁵T *sdang ba* (= *dveṣa*) for *sdar* (= *kātaratā*).

XIII gzhan yang /²⁰⁶

gnod pas bsgrub²⁰⁷ bya^{N5} grub ce²⁰⁸ na /
 /²⁰⁹ gtan tshigs gzhan gzung don med yin /
 / gnod pas de ma^{D6} grub ce²¹⁰ na /
 / chos gzhan gzung ba^{P8} don med yin //

gal te chos can la khyab^{C6} pa grub pa nyid kyis bsgrub par bya ba
 nang du 'du bar 'gyur²¹¹ na / rnyed^{N6} pa thob pa ma yin nam //²¹²
 khyab pa sgrubs²¹³ par byed pa nyid kyi tshad ma las bsgrub bya grub
 pa'i phyir dang / yod pa'i^{P333a1} gtan tshigs kyi rten gyi 'bad pa sel^{D7}
 ba'i phyir ro // gang gi phyir rtags kyi rjes su 'brang ba zhes bya ba
 N7 zhen pa ni ma^{C7} yin no //

'on te khyab pa sgrub par byed pa las bsgrub bya ma grub na
 / de'i tshe nang gi khyab pa'i^{P2} gtan tshigs don med pa ma yin pas
 skabs ma yin pa la sdang ba nyid kyi[s]²¹⁴ shin tu sdug bsngal ba
 mang po la^{N342b1} ci'i phyir 'jug /²¹⁵

²⁰⁶N //, P omit

²⁰⁷C *sgrub*

²⁰⁸NP *zbe*

²⁰⁹N omits.

²¹⁰P *ca* ?

²¹¹N *gyub*

²¹²CD /

²¹³CD *sgrub*, P *bsgrub*, N illegible.

²¹⁴CDNP *kyi*

²¹⁵D //

XIV dvayaṃ hi bhavataḥ sādhyam dṛṣṭāntadharṃiṇi vṛttiḥ
 sādhyadharmṃiṇi ca / yathākramam vyāptipakṣadharmatvayoḥ
 siddhyartham / nanu yadā²¹⁶ pratiniyate dharṃiṇi vivādaḥ
 tadbahirbhūte ca dharṃiṇi (M 7.3) vyāptigrahaṇam, tadānīm bhaved
 vaiyarthyam / yadā tu vastumātre vivādaḥ, tadā sarvavastuṣu hetor
 vṛttis tvayāpi sādhyā mayāpi ceti katamasmin dharṃiṇi hetor
 vṛttisādhanam mama vyartham²¹⁷ bhavi (M 7.4)ṣyati / katham idānīm
 bahirvyāptir, vivādādhikaraṇabhūta²¹⁸ evānyatamasmin vyāptisādhanāt
 / ²¹⁹tāvanmātralakṣaṇatvāc ca sādhyadharmṃiṇaḥ /

²¹⁶T adds *khyod* (= *tava*).

²¹⁷T adds *anyatamasmin* (instead of *katamasmin*) ... *katham*.

²¹⁸S -*karaṇam bhūta*-, M -*karaṇabhūta*-. M has a small spot on -*na*-, but it is not likely to be *anusvāra*.

²¹⁹T adds *a*-.

XIV khyed kyi ^{D312b1} bsgrub par bya ba gnyis yin te / dpe'i chos can la 'jug pa ^{C306b1} dang / bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can ^{220 P3} la 'jug pa ²²¹ ste / rim pa ji lta ba bzhin du khyab pa dang / phyogs kyi chos nyid dag grub pa'i phyir ro // yang khyod la so sor ^{N2} nges pa'i chos can la rtsod pa de las phyi rol du gyur pa'i yang chos can la khyab ^{D2} pa 'dzin pa ni ²²² de'i tshe don med ^{P4} par 'gyur ro // gang gi tshe yang dngos po ^{C2} tsam la rtsod pa de'i tshe / dngos po thams cad la gtan tshigs 'jug pa ni khyod dang ^{N3} bdag gis kyang bsgrub par bya ba'i phyir chos can 'ga' zbig la gtan tshigs 'jug pa sgrub ²²³ par byed pa [b]dag ^{224 P5} la don med par ji ltar ²²⁵ 'gyur / ²²⁶ re zbig ^{D3} ji ltar phyi'i khyab pa yin (zhe na) ²²⁷ / rtsod pa'i gzhir gyur pa nyid las (gzhan) ²²⁸ gang yang ^{C3/N4} rung ba la ²²⁹ khyab pa sgrub par byed pa'i phyir / ²³⁰ [bsgrub par bya ba'i] ²³¹ chos can de tsam gyi(s) ²³² mtshan nyid (ma) ²³³ yin pa'i phyir [/] ²³⁴

²²⁰NP omit but N illegible.

²²¹NP omit but N illegible.

²²²NP *na*

²²³NP *bsgrub*

²²⁴CDNP *dag*. Read *bdag*.

²²⁵CDNP *ji ltar* in relation to 'ga' zbig la above.

²²⁶NP omit.

²²⁷CDNP have *zhe na*. To be omitted.

²²⁸CDNP *gzhan*

²²⁹*gzhan gang yang rung ba la* stands for *anyatamasmin*.

²³⁰NP omit.

²³¹CDNP *sgrub par byed pa'i*. Read *bsgrub par bya ba'i*.

²³²CDNP *gyis*. Read *gyi*.

²³³CDNP *ma*. To be omitted.

²³⁴CDNP omit /

“bādhakam pramāṇam pravartamānam antargatam api
dharminam (M 7.5) bahiṣkarotīti” cet /

etat eva katham bhavatu bādhakena pravartamānenaiva
tasmin²³⁵ sādhyasāadhanāt /

“sādhyasamśayāpagame²³⁶ sādhyadharmiṇi
lakṣaṇāpagamād²³⁷” iti cet /

ayukta(M 7.6)m etat / bādhakamātrān na sādhyasiddhir ity asmin
pakṣe dharmy²³⁸ antaraparigrahavaiyarthyaḥhidhānāt / bādhakāt
sādhyasiddhir ity asmiṃs tu pakṣe sādhanāntara²³⁹vaiyarthyam
āpāditam / tasmād bādhakamātre(M 7.7)ṇa sādhyasiddhau²⁴⁰ na kvacit
saṃdeha²⁴¹ nivṛttiḥ / saṃde(S 111)hā²⁴²nivṛttau na bahiṣkaraṇam
abahiṣkrtaś ca sādhyadharmy²⁴³ eveti tatra vyāptir antarvyāptir eva
nedānīm bahirvyāpter vārttāpi / tad iyaṃ bahirvyāptir amu(M
8.1)ṣmin²⁴⁴ pakṣe katham bhavati /

²³⁵T *chos can de la* (tasmin dharmiṇi).

²³⁶S *sādhyasamśayāpagame*, M *sādhyasamśayāpagame*, T *bsgrub par bya ba'i rang gi ngo bo rtogs na* (= *sādhyasvabhāvopagame*).

²³⁷S *lakṣaṇopagamād*, M *-ṇāpagamād*

²³⁸T *gzhan* (omitting *dharmy-*).

²³⁹T omit *-antara-*.

²⁴⁰SM *sādhyāsiddhau* (M adds a sign indicating a long vowel). T *bsgrub bya grub na 'ga' la*. Read as T.

²⁴¹SM *saṃdehanivṛttiḥ*, T *the tshom mi*. Read as SM.

²⁴²SM *saṃdehanivṛttau*, T *the tshom log na* (*saṃdehanivṛttau*). Read as SM.

²⁴³SM *sādhyadharmy* (Nom.), but T *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can las*.

²⁴⁴S *amusmin*

gnod ^{P6} pa can gyi tshad ma 'jug pas nang du chud pa'i yang
chos can yang phyi rol du byed do zhes zer na /

de de ^{D4} nyid yin par ^{N5} ji ltar 'gyur / gnod pa can zhugs pa
nyid kyis²⁴⁵ chos can de la bsgrub par bya ba ^{C4} sgrub par byed pa'i
phyir (dang)²⁴⁶ /

bsgrub ^{P7} par bya ba'i rang gi ngo bo rtogs na bsgrub par bya
ba'i chos can gyi mtshan nyid las 'das pa'i phyir ro zhe na /

de ni rigs pa ^{247 N6} ma yin te / gnod pa can tsam gyis bsgrub ^{D5}
par bya ba ma grub po²⁴⁸ zhes bya ba phyogs 'di²⁴⁹ la gzhan yongs su
'dzin ^{P8} pa don med do²⁵⁰ zhes brjod pa'i ^{C5} phyir ro // gnod pa can
gyis²⁵¹ bsgrub bya grub po zhes bya ba'i phyogs 'di la yang ^{N7} sgrub²⁵²
par byed pa don med do zhes bstan zin to // de lta bas na gnod pa
can tsam gyis bsgrub bya grub na 'ga' ^{P333b1} la yang²⁵³ the ^{D6} tshom
(mi)²⁵⁴ ldog par mi 'gyur ro // the tshom log na phyi rol du²⁵⁵ byed
pa 'ng ma yin dang / bsgrub par bya ba'i ^{C6} chos ^{N343a1} can las kyang
phyi rol du byas pa ma yin pas de la khyab pa ni²⁵⁶ nang gi khyab pa
nyid de / da ni phyi'i khyab pa brjod ^{P2} pa tsam yang med do²⁵⁷ /²⁵⁸
de bas na phyi'i khyab pa 'di'i phyogs su ji ltar 'gyur //²⁵⁹

²⁴⁵CDN *kyi*

²⁴⁶CDNP *dang*. To be omitted.

²⁴⁷NP omit.

²⁴⁸NP omit.

²⁴⁹C *zhin*

²⁵⁰NP adds //.

²⁵¹P *gyi*

²⁵²NP *bsgrub*

²⁵³NP omit.

²⁵⁴SM *samdehanivrttib*. Omit *mi*.

²⁵⁵NP *tu*, but N illegible.

²⁵⁶NP omit.

²⁵⁷N illegible, P *de*

²⁵⁸C //, DNP /

²⁵⁹CD /, NP //

yadi pratiniyate dharṁiṁ vivādaḥ, tadbahir²⁶⁰ bhūte ca
dharṁiṁ vyāptigrahaṇaṁ bhavati / tatra ca duruddharo
dharmyantara²⁶¹ parigrahavaiarthyaḥ / bādhakamātreṇa tu
sādhyasiddhau hetv²⁶² antara (M 8.2)m eva vyartham //

²⁶⁰M *tadabahir-*

²⁶¹SM *dharmy-*, T *chos gzhan (=dharmāntara-)*. Read as SM.

²⁶²S *hety-* (misprint), M *hetv-*, T *gtan tshigs gzhan (=hetvantaram)*.

^{D7} gal te yang so sor ^{N2} nges pa'i chos can la rtsod pa dang /
 de las phyi rol du gyur pa'i chos can la khyab pa 'dzin ^{C7} par 'gyur na
 / de la yang chos ²⁶³ P3 gzhan yongs ²⁶⁴ su 'dzin pa ²⁶⁵ don med pa'i nyes
 pa bsal ba'i dka' ²⁶⁶ ste / gnod pa can tsam gyis bsgrub bya grub na ^{N3}
 gtan tshigs gzhan don med pa kho na'o //

²⁶³SM *dharmy-* (= *chos can*); CDNP *chos (dharma-)*.

²⁶⁴N *yong*

²⁶⁵NP *na*

²⁶⁶CD *bka'*

XV api ca /

sattvahetor viśeṣeṇa na bahirvyāptisambhavaḥ²⁶⁷ /
 asiddhe dharmināḥ sattve vivādānavatārataḥ //
 tatra siddhasya²⁶⁸ ca vyāptigrahaṇe sādhyadharmini /
 vyāptigrahaḥ kathaṃ na syād dr̥ṣṭānte 'pi na vā bha(M
 8.3)vet //

yatra hi dharmini dr̥ṣṭasya hetor vyāptiḥ pratīyate tatra tasya
 vyāptigrahaṇam ākhyāyate / dr̥ṣṭaṃ ca sādhyadharmini sattvam,²⁶⁹
 anyathā vimatyayogād iti kathaṃ nāntarvyāptiḥ²⁷⁰ /

²⁶⁷In S this ab *pāda* is not in verse.

²⁶⁸S *tatrāsiddhasya*, M *tatra siddhasya* = T *de la grub pas*. Read as MT.

²⁶⁹SM *sattvam*, T *khyab pa* (= *vyāptiḥ*). Read as SM.

²⁷⁰SM *nāntarvyāptiḥ*, T *phyi'i khyab pa yin* (= *bahirvyāptiḥ*). Read as SM.

XV

D313a1 gzhan yang /

yod pa'i gtan tshigs khyad par gyis /

/ phyi yi khyab^{P4} pa mi srid do²⁷¹ // chos can yod pa^{C307a1} mi srid²⁷² na //²⁷³ rtsod pa 'jug par mi 'gyur ro /

/ de la grub pas khyab pa yang /

/ ^{N4} 'dzin na bsgrub bya'i chos can la // khyab pa²⁷⁴ 'dzin par cis mi 'gyur // yang na dpe la ^{D2} 'gyur ma yin /²⁷⁵^{P5} chos can 'ga' zhig la mthong ba'i gtan tshigs kyi khyab pa rtogs pade la de'i khyab pa ^{C2} 'dzin par bstan to // bsgrub par bya ba'i ^{N5} choscan la yang khyab pa mthong ste / gzhan du na²⁷⁶ log par rtog²⁷⁷ pami rigs pa'i phyir ji ltar phyi'i khyab pa ^{P6} yin /²⁷⁸

²⁷¹CD *de*²⁷²CD *grub*²⁷³N omits.²⁷⁴C *par*²⁷⁵CDN //²⁷⁶NP omit²⁷⁷CD *rtogs*, NP *rtog*²⁷⁸C omits.

XVI “tathāpi sādha(M 8.4)navaiyarthyanīṣedhāya²⁷⁹ bahir eva gr̥hṇīma” iti cet, tat kim idānīm tvadicchānurodhād dharminī hetor (darśanam)²⁸⁰ adarśanam [vā]²⁸¹ astu / darśanāviśeṣe²⁸² vā bahir eva vyāptigrahaṇavyavasthāstu /

“u(M 8.5)bhayatra dṛṣṭasya vyāptigrahaṇe ’py asti bahirvyāptibhāga” iti cet, nanu kim artham iyān bhāgo²⁸³ yatnena saṃrakṣyate²⁸⁴ ?

(S 112) mā bhūd dhetuvaiyarthyam iti cet / nanu yadi bādhakavṛttimātreṇa vyāptigra(M 8.6)haṇādihikaraṇe dharminī sādhyasiddheḥ / sādhanavaiyarthyam antarvyāptau [iti cet]²⁸⁵, tad e(vai)tad²⁸⁶ (antarvyāptau)²⁸⁷ bahirvyāptāv api tulyam²⁸⁸ /

²⁷⁹T *sgrub par byed pa don med pas (sādhnavaiyarthiyāi)*.

²⁸⁰M *darśanam* (miswriting !), T omits.

²⁸¹SM omit.

²⁸²S *darśanaviśeṣe*, MT *darśanāviśeṣe (mtbong ba la khyad par med na)*. Read as MT.

²⁸³SM *bhāgo*, T *khyab pa*. Read as SM (*khyad par*).

²⁸⁴M has a correction mark on this *akṣara -te* but no alternative is given.

²⁸⁵T adds *zhe na (iti cet)*.

²⁸⁶S omits *eva*, M *tad eva tad*, but cancelling sign on *-va-*. T *tad eva*.

²⁸⁷SM omit but T has *nang gi ... khyab pa la*.

²⁸⁸T *atulyam*

XVI de ltar²⁸⁹ na yang sgrub par byed pa don^{D3} med pas phyi rol nyid kyi khyab pa gzung bar bya'o zhe na / de bas na da ltar gyi khyod^{N6} kyi 'dod pa'i ngor^{C3} chos can la gtan tshigs ma mthong bar ji ltar 'gyur / yang na mthong ba la khyad par^{P7} med na yang /

phyi rol nyid kyi khyab pa gzung bar mnam par bzhag²⁹⁰ gnyi ga la mthong bar²⁹¹ khyab pa 'dzin pa yang phyi^{D4} rol gyi khyab pa'i^{N7} cha yod do zhe na / ci'i phyir khyab pa²⁹² [khyad par ?] tsam 'bad pas srung / gtan tshigs^{C4} don med par ma gyur cig^{P8} ces smon²⁹³ te / gnod pa can zhugs pa tsam gyi khyab pa 'dzin pa'i gzhi chos can la bsgrub bya sgrub pa'i phyir nang gi khyab pa la^{N343b1} sgrub par byed pa don med pa ma yin nam zhe na / de ni nang gi²⁹⁴ dang^{D5} phyi'i khyab pa la yang mtshungs pa ma yin [nam]²⁹⁵//

²⁸⁹CD *lta*

²⁹⁰CDN *gzbag /*, P *gzbag* (?)

²⁹¹CD *ba'i*

²⁹²Read *khyad par*.

²⁹³C *smos*

²⁹⁴NP omit.

²⁹⁵CDNP *no*. Read *nam*.

tasmād vyasanamātram bahirvyāptigrahaṇam²⁹⁶ (∧)²⁹⁷ viśeṣeṇa
 sattvahetau [/] kevalam jaḍadhīyām eva (M 8.7) niyamena
 dṛṣṭāntasāpekṣaḥ sādhanaprayogaḥ paritoṣāya jāyate / teṣām
 evānugrahārtham ācāryo dṛṣṭāntam upādatte, yat sat tat kṣaṇikam
 yathā ghaṭa iti / paṭumatayas tu naivam dṛṣṭānta(M 9.1)m apeksante //
 tasmād dṛṣṭāntaraktebhyo²⁹⁸ ghaṭam dṛṣṭāntam abravīt /
 tathāmāniṣv²⁹⁹ avaiyarthyaḍ antarvyāptāv apīṣyatām //
 ity antaraślokaḥ³⁰⁰ //

²⁹⁶SM -*grahaṇe*, T -*grahaṇam*

²⁹⁷M has a small mark for punctuation.

²⁹⁸S *dṛṣṭāntaroktebhyo*, MT *dṛṣṭāntaraktebhyo* (*dpe la chags rnams la*). Read as MT.

²⁹⁹S *tathā māneṣv*, T *de mi dgos la don med yin* (*tathāmāniṣv*).

³⁰⁰T *bar skabs kyi tshigs su gcad pa'o* (= *antaraślokaḥ*).

P334a1 de bas na phyi'i khyab pa ^{C5} 'dzin pa ni yod pa'i gtan tshigs kyi
 khyad par la zhen pa tsam mo // dpe la bltos³⁰¹ pa'i sgrub par byed
 pa'i sbyor ba ^{N2} ni rmongs pa'i blo can 'ba' zhig kho na nges par³⁰²
 dga' bskyed pa yin no // de dag rjes su ^{P2} gzung ba'i don du slob
 dpon gyis /³⁰³ ^{D6} gang yod pa de ni skad cig ma yin te / bum pa ^{C6}
 bzhin no zhes dpe nye bar bstan to // blo³⁰⁴ g-yer bag can ni yang
 dpe'i sbyor ba ^{N3} la bltos³⁰⁵ pa ma yin no//

/ de phyir dpe la chags rnams la /

/³⁰⁶ ^{P3} bum pa'i dpe ni bstan pa mdzad /

/³⁰⁷ de mi dgos la don med yin /

/ nang gi khyab pa blo ldan la'o //

zhes bya ba ni bar skabs ^{D7} kyi tshigs su gcad³⁰⁸ pa'o //

³⁰¹CD *ltos*

³⁰²NP omits *nges par*.

³⁰³CD omit.

³⁰⁴N illegible, P *bla*

³⁰⁵CD *ltos*

³⁰⁶P omits.

³⁰⁷P omits.

³⁰⁸CD *bcad*

XVII “katham idānīm anumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam
asapakṣe vāsa(M 9.2)ttvam eva niścitam iti hetos trairūpyam³⁰⁹
avagantavyam ?” /

matau sapakṣāsapakṣau sādhyadharmayutāyutau /
sattvāsattve tatra hetos te grāhye yatra tatra vā //
sādhyadharmayuktaḥ sarvaḥ sāmānyena sapakṣaḥ,³¹⁰ (M 9.3) atadyuktaś
cāsapakṣa iti / tasmin sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva
yathākramam anvayavyatirekau, tau punar yatra tatra vā dharminī
grahītavyau yatra śakyau grahītum /

³⁰⁹Cf. NB II s. 5 (ed. D. Malvania): *trairūpyam punar liṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva, sapakṣa eva sattvam, asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam //*

³¹⁰M *sapakṣaḥ* (*visarga* is added from the right margin of this line.)

XVII da ni ^{C7} ji ltar rjes su dpag ^{N4} par bya ba la yod pa nyid dang
 / mthun ^{P4} pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang / mi mthun pa'i phyogs la
 med pa nyid du nges zhes bya ba ji ltar rtogs par bya zhe na /

bsgrub bya'i chos ldan mi ldan las /

/ mthun ^{N5} phyogs mi mthun phyogs su 'dod /

/ de la ^{D313b1} gtan tshigs ^{P5} yod med ni /

/ gang yin ^{C307b1} de ru gzung bar bya //

bsgrub³¹¹ par bya ba'i chos dang ldan pa thams cad ni spyir³¹² mthun
 pa'i phyogs yin la de dang mi ldan³¹³ pa ni mi mthun³¹⁴ pa'i phyogs
 yin no // mthun ^{N6} pa'i phyogs de nyid la yod pa dang / ^{P6} mi mthun
 pa'i phyogs la med pa nyid de / rim pa ji lta ba bzhin du ^{D2} rjes su
 'gro ba dang ldog pa dag yin no // de ^{C2} dag kyang gang yang rung
 ba'i chos can der gzung bar bya ste / gang du gzung bar nus par ro //

³¹¹N *sgrub*

³¹²NP *phyis*

³¹³NP *mthun*

³¹⁴NP *ldan*

(S 113) ta(M 9.4)d iha sattvasya sarvato 'kṣaṇikād vyāvṛttau
bādhaka[pramāṇa]³¹⁵balāt siddhāyām yat sat tat kṣaṇikam evety³¹⁶
anvayaḥ sādhyadharmiṇy eva gr̥hyate³¹⁷ / tatra dṛṣṭasya hetor
vyāptigrahaṇāt / dharmy³¹⁸a(M 9.5)ntarāsambhavāt / sambhave 'pi
tadanusaraṇavaiyarthya³¹⁹ //

³¹⁵SM *bādhakabalāt*, T *gnod pa can gyi tshad ma'i stobs (bādhakapramāṇabalāt)*. Read
as T.

³¹⁶SM *-eti /*

³¹⁷S *avagr̥hyate*, M *eva gr̥hyate*

³¹⁸SM *dharmy-* (M has originally *dharmā-*, but this is rewritten as *dharmya-*), T
dharmā-.

³¹⁹T *don med pa (-avaiyarthya)*.

gang^{N7} 'dir yod^{P7} pa skad cig ma ma yin pa thams cad las log
 par³²⁰ gnod pa can gyi³²¹ tshad ma'i stobs grub na gang yod pa de ni
 skad cig ma³²² nyid yin no³²³ zhes bya ba'i^{D3} rjes³²⁴ su 'gro ba³²⁵
 bsgrub [par bya ba'i]³²⁶ chos can la bzung³²⁷ ba^{C3} yin te / de la^{N344a1}
 mthong^{P8} ba'i gtan tshigs kyi khyab pa gzung ba'i phyir dang / chos
 [can]³²⁸ gzhan mi srid pa'i phyir dang / srid na yang de'i rjes³²⁹ su
 'brang ba'i don³³⁰ [med]³³¹ pa'i phyir ro //

³²⁰NP *pa*

³²¹C *kyi*

³²²N illegible.

³²³NP adds //

³²⁴NP *phyogs*

³²⁵CD omit.

³²⁶CDNP *pa'i*. Read [*par bya*] *ba'i*.

³²⁷NP *gzung*

³²⁸CDNP omit *can*. Read *chos* [*can*] (*dharmy*-).

³²⁹N *rje*

³³⁰P illegible.

³³¹CDNP *yod*. Read *med*.

XVIII “yady evam asādhāraṇo nāma katham anaikāntika uktaḥ ?” /
 asādhāraṇatāṃ hetudoṣam mūḍhavyapekṣayā /
 abravīd agra(M 9.6)hād vyāpter³³² naivam³³³
 sarvopasaṃhṛtau //
 uktam etat, jaḍadhīyo dharmy³³⁴antara eva vyāptigrahaṇam³³⁵
 pratipannāḥ / tadabhimānāpekṣayā ’sādhāraṇam anaikāntikam āha
 śrāvaṇatvam, dr̥ṣṭāntābhāvāt / sā(M 9.7)dhyadharmini ca vyāpter³³⁶
 aniṣṭer agrhītāyāṃ vyāptau saṃdigdhobhayatayā ’niścayakaravāt /

³³²S gives alternative reading as *vyāpti(pte)r*.

³³³T omits *evam*.

³³⁴SM *dharmy-*, T *chos (dharma-)*. Read as SM.

³³⁵T omits *vyāptigrahaṇam*.

³³⁶S *vyāptir*

XVIII gal te de ltar na thun mong ma yin pa'i ma nges pa yin^{N2}
par ji skad smra /

^{P334b1} thun mong ma yin^{D4} gtan tshigs kyi /

/ nyes pa rmongs la bltos^{337 C4} pa yin /

/ khyab pa mi 'dzin phyir bstan bya'i /

/ thams cad bsdu la³³⁸ ma yin no //

'di skad bstan te / blo³³⁹ rmongs pa dag chos³⁴⁰ [can]³⁴¹ gzhan nyid la

[khyab pa gzung bar]^{342 P2} zhugs pa de'i^{N3} mngon pa'i nga rgyal la

bltos³⁴³ nas / mnyan par bya ba yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba thun mong

ma yin pa'i ma^{344 D5} nges pa yin par bstan^{C5} to // dpe med pa'i phyir

dang / bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can la khyab pa^{P3} mi 'dod pa'i phyir

dang / khyab pa ma^{N4} bzung³⁴⁵ na gnyi ga the tshom za bas ma nges

par byed³⁴⁶ pa' i phyir ro //

³³⁷CD *ltos*

³³⁸C *la sdus la* for *bsdus la*.

³³⁹NP *blos*

³⁴⁰NP omit.

³⁴¹CDNP omit *can*. Read *chos* [can] (*dharmy-*).

³⁴²CDNP omit *khyab pa gzung bar* (*vyāptigrahaṇam*). Read as SM.

³⁴³CD *ltos*

³⁴⁴NP *pa'i 'am*

³⁴⁵NP *gzung*

³⁴⁶NP omit *par byed*.

atha vā / asādhāraṇataiva śrāvaṇatvasya
 mūḍhābhīmānopakalpita / dṛṣṭaiva hi śabdavyaktir³⁴⁷ dha(M
 10.1) rmiṇī³⁴⁸ vivādādhikaraṇāt / anyathā dharmyasiddhiprasaṅgāc ca³⁴⁹
 / dṛṣṭādrṣṭaśabdavyaktisādhāraṇam³⁵⁰ ca śrāvaṇatvaṃ hetuḥ /
 dhūmasāmānyavat³⁵¹ / tataḥ sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ sambhavāt
 sa(M 10.2) ttvādivad aduṣṭam³⁵² eva sādhanam śrāvaṇatvākhyam /

³⁴⁷S *vyakti-*

³⁴⁸SM *dharmiṇī*, T *chos can la (dharmiṇī)*. Read as SM.

³⁴⁹T omits *ca*.

³⁵⁰T *ubhayam* for *sādhāraṇam*.

³⁵¹T omits *bzhin (-vat)*.

³⁵²S *aduṣṭam*, M *aduṣṭam* = T *skyon med par bshad do*. Read as MT.

yang na mnyan par bya ba nyid kyi thun mong ma yin pa
 nyid du rmongs pa'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyis bstan pa yin^{D6} te /
 gang gi phyir chos^{C6/P4} can la sgra'i gsal ba nyid mthong ba nyid
 rtsod pa'i^{N5} gzhi yin pa'i phyir ro // gzhan du na chos can ma grub
 par thal bar 'gyur ro // mthong ba dang ma mthong ba'i sgra'i gsal
 ba gnyis mnyan³⁵³ pa'i gtan tshigs yin te /³⁵⁴ P⁵ du ba'i spyi yin
 [bzhin]³⁵⁵ no // de bas na thams cad bsdu pa dang ldan pa'i³⁵⁶ D⁷
 khyab^{N6} pa srid pa'i^{C7} phyir yod pa la sogs pa bzhin du mnyan par
 bya ba nyid sgrub par byed pa skyon med par bshad do //

³⁵³NP *mnyam*

³⁵⁴CD omit.

³⁵⁵SM has *-vat* (= *bzhin*). CDNP omit *bzhin*.

³⁵⁶NP *pa*

kramayaugapadyānupalambha eva cātra bādhakam
 pramāṇam / śrotrajñānanakatvam eva hi śrāvaṇatvam / tasmān
 mūdhavyapeksayā [śrāvaṇatvasya]³⁵⁷ asādhāra(M 10.3)ṇatvāt /
 asādhāraṇasya sarvopasaṃhārāyogāt / sādhyā(S 114)dharmiṇi
 vyāptipratītāv eva sādhyapratīteḥ, sādhanavaiphalyam syād eva / tan
 mā bhūt, vaiphalyam iti [āśāyām]³⁵⁸ naiva (M 10.4) vyāptir grahītavyā /
 tasyām agrhītāyām saṃdigdhobhayatayā syād anaikāntikatvam /
 sarvopasaṃhāreṇa tu vyāptigrahaṇe yathoktanyāyena
 sādhanavaiphalyābhāvāt / adu(M 10.5)ṣṭam sattvādisāadhanam eveti
 veditavyam / tad evam ubhayathā mūdhajanāpekṣayā³⁵⁹ 'sādhāraṇam
 anaikāntikam uktam /

³⁵⁷SM omit , but T has *mnyan par bya ba nyid*. Read as T.

³⁵⁸Only T has *smon pas (āśāyām)*.

³⁵⁹M *mūdhajanā'pekṣayā*, T omits *mūdhajanāpekṣayā*.

'dir rim pa³⁶⁰ dang cig car mi dmigs pa nyid^{P6} gnod pa can
 gyi tshad ma yin la / mnyan pa'i shes pa skyed³⁶¹ par byed pa nyid^{N7}
 ni mnyan par bya ba nyid do // de lta bas na rmongs pa bltos³⁶² na
 mnyan par bya ba^{D314a1} nyid thun mong^{C308a1} ma yin pa'i phyir dang
 / thun mong ma yin pa la yang^{P7} thams cad nye bar bsdus pa mi rigs
 pa'i phyir dang / bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can [la]³⁶³ khyab pa^{364 N344b1}
 rtogs pas bsgrub bya rtogs pa'i phyir sgrub par byed pa don med pa
 nyid du 'gyur ro // 'bras bu med par ma gyur cig ces^{D2} smon³⁶⁵ pas^{P8}
 khyab pa mi^{C2} 'dzin no // de ma bzung³⁶⁶ na gnyi³⁶⁷ ga la the tshom
 za bas ma nges pa nyid du 'gyur ro // thams cad nye^{N2} bar bsdus pas
 khyab pa bzung na ji skad bstan pa'i rigs pas sgrub³⁶⁸ par byed pa³⁶⁹
 'bras bu yod pa'i phyir yod pa la^{P335a1} sogs pa'i sgrub par byed pa'i
 skyon med par³⁷⁰ rig par bya'o // de ltar na^{D3} rnam pa^{C3} gnyis kyis³⁷¹
 thun mong ma yin pa'i ma nges pa [rmongs pa'i skye bo rnam la
 bltos nas]^{372 N3} bstan to //

³⁶⁰CDNP omit.

³⁶¹NP *bskyed*

³⁶²CD *ltos*

³⁶³CDNP omit.

³⁶⁴P *par*

³⁶⁵CD *smos*

³⁶⁶P *bzung*

³⁶⁷N *gnyis*

³⁶⁸N *bsgrub*

³⁶⁹NP *par*

³⁷⁰D *pa*

³⁷¹NP *kyi*

³⁷²Read [*rmongs pa'i skye bo rnam la bltos nas*] (*mūḍhajanāpekṣayā*) . CDNP omit.

samānaṃ caitat (sādhanaṃ)³⁷³ bahirvyāptivādinām api / yadi
 hi mūdhamatāpe(M 10.6)kṣā na syāt³⁷⁴ / syād eva śrāvaṇatvam aduṣṭo
 hetuḥ (/) sattvādivat, niyataśabdeṣu hi vivāde śabdāntaraṃ syāt (/)
 dṛṣṭāntaḥ, sarvaśabdeṣu vimatau³⁷⁵ bādhakam pramāṇam
 pravarttamānam / adṛṣṭānta(M 10.7)m api tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭāntayatī³⁷⁶
 katham asādhāraṇam anaikāntika[tva]ṃ veti³⁷⁷ //

Antarvyāptisamarthanaṃ samāptam iti /
 kṛtir iyaṃ Ratnākaraśāntipādānām iti //

³⁷³SM omit, but T has *sgrub par*. Read as SM.

³⁷⁴T *mi rmongs ... (amūdhamatāpeksayā)* for *mūdhamatāpekṣā na syāt*.

³⁷⁵M *vigatau* (?)

³⁷⁶T *dṛṣṭāntābhāvāt tatra ko dṛṣṭāntaḥ sthāpayitavyaḥ / bādhake pramāṇe pravartamāne*
 for *bādhakam pramāṇam pravartamānam / adṛṣṭāntam api tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭāntayatī*.

³⁷⁷S *anaikāntikaṃ veti*, M *anaikāntikatvaṃ veti* (but a cancelling sign on *-tva-*), T
thun mong ma yin pa'i ma nges pa (anaikāntikam).

phyi rol khyab par smra ba la yang sgrub par byed pa de
 nyid yin no // ^{P2} gal te mi rmongs pa'i bsam pa³⁷⁸ la bltos³⁷⁹ nas
 mnyan par bya ba nyid kyi gtan tshigs skyon med pa yin te / yod pa
 la ...sogs pa bzhin no // nges pa dang ldan pa'i ^{N4} sgra rnams la ^{C4}
 [brtsod]³⁸⁰ na sgra ^{D4} gzhan dpe yin no // sgra thams cad ^{P3} la yang
 log par rtogs³⁸¹ pa yod na / dpe med pa'i phyir de la dpe gang zhig
 bzhag³⁸² par bya / gnod pa can gyi³⁸³ tshad ma zhugs pas ji ltar thun
 mong ma yin pa'i ma nges pa yin /

^{N5} Nang gi khyab pa slob dpon chen po mkhas pa dpal³⁸⁴
 Rin chen ^{P4} 'byung gnas ^{C5} zhi ba'i zhal ^{D5} snga nas mdzad pa rdzogs
 so //

// rgya gar gyi mkhan po Ku mā ra ka la sha dang / dge
 slong Śā kya 'od kyis³⁸⁵ bsgyur ba'o //

³⁷⁸NP *bsal ba* for *bsam pa*.

³⁷⁹CD *ltos*

³⁸⁰CDNP *brtson*

³⁸¹NP *rtog*

³⁸²CD *gzhag*

³⁸³P *gyis*

³⁸⁴NP omit.

³⁸⁵NP *kyi*

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
of
THE *Anatarvyāptisamarthana*

Establishment of Internal Pervasion

I Here 'existence' (*sattva*) means 'making effective action' (*arthakriyā-kāritva*), because no other definition of existence is applicable. And it is pervaded by 'succession and / or simultaneity' (*kramayaugapadya*), because these two [alternatives] are characterized as being mutually excluded, and thus another case [as a way] of action is not possible.

[Effective actions in] succession and simultaneity do not exist in what is not momentary [permanent], for that which has a single, unchanging nature throughout the preceding and succeeding times cannot possess two contradictory properties, viz., being an agent of action and non-agent. Of these two, first, succession is impossible [in the permanent], since, each and every thing making action in succession will have [the difficulty] that it is the agent [of a particular action] and the non-agent [of it] in the preceding and succeeding [times] respectively. Thus, all successive [actions] being impossible [in the permanent], now it only remains possible that all actions would be [made] simultaneously [in the permanent]. In this case, [however], the absolute contradiction would follow that [the permanent] is the agent [of all the actions] and the non-agent [of those actions] in the preceding and succeeding times respectively. As agency and non-agency are contradictory to each other, they are not possibly existent in one and the same locus (*dharmīn*).

The permanent is known as what maintains one and the same nature during a given time, and it is proved to be impossible to possess succession and simultaneity. As said above, existence [i.e., ability of effective action], being negated in the permanent through non-cognition of its pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) [i.e., succession and simultaneity], abides only in the momentary. It means that existence is pervaded by momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*). Thus one can prove that a locus (*dharmīn*), in which it [or, existence] is proved to be pervaded

by momentariness, is momentary too.

II Now we will examine the [above inference]. Where is the pervasion (*vyāpti*) [between existence and momentariness] to be grasped, in the locus of an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta-dharmin*) or in the locus to be proven (*sādhya-dharmin*) ?

[Objection:] Some say, “[Pervasion] has to be grasped only in the locus of an example, just as ‘smoke’ [is grasped as pervaded by fire in a kitchen, an example, which is different from ‘a mountain,’ the locus to be proven]; otherwise, [i.e., if it is grasped in the locus to be proven itself,] an inference [as consisting of a probans being a property of the locus to be proven (*pakṣadharmitva*) and the former being pervaded by the probandum or the property to be proven (*vyāpti*)] will be useless, because proof of pervasion is inherent (*nāntarīyakatvāt*) in the fact that two properties [viz., probans (*sādhana-dharma, hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya-dharma*)] have been established [in the locus to be proven]. For when the pervasion between smoke [the probans] and fire [the probandum] is established in the kitchen [and accordingly fire is also established there]¹, no one seeks after [an inference born from]² smoke as the probans in order to prove the existence of fire again.”

III [It is an inaccurate statement,]³ for [it is said:]

Pervasion of two properties which are perceived in an example is grasped there [i.e., in the example]; when a probans alone is perceived, however, its pervasion is grasped in a locus of inference. As this [pervasion] sums up all individual cases (*sarvopasaṃhāra*), it depends upon the universals, and its existence in the locus of inference is to be known through

¹The words within brackets [] are found only in T. When T is different from SM, I add a translation of T within brackets with a note number, or translate the part in a separate footnote.

²T only adds the words within brackets.

³T only adds the words within brackets.

inference.

If [as in your illustration of a kitchen] causal relation is proved between fire and smoke which are experienced by perception, pervasion between the two things is [also] established. Thus, inference will be useless when it is applied to fire that has been established by perception.

[In the case of our proof of momentariness, however,] the momentariness is, unlike the above, not yet established by another valid cognition in the locus of inference prior to the establishment of the pervasion [between existence and momentariness.] Here we are perceiving only the probans [or existence], and come to know its being pervaded by the momentariness by virtue of cognition annulling the probans in the contrary of the probandum (*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*). Why then is the inference (*sādhana*) useless ?

IV [Objection:] “Useless it is indeed ! For when ‘existence’ which is pervaded by ‘momentariness’ is understood as such in the locus (*dharmin*), the momentariness is also understood [there.]”

V [Answer:] Not so. For pervasion summing up all individual cases is [not the whole, but] part of the function proving what is to be proved (*sādhya*). Thus, it [pervasion] rests on a probans (proving property) alone, without regard to a particular locus of inference. For example, [pervasion is formulated as:] wheresoever there is smoke there is fire, but not as: in a kitchen where there is smoke there is fire there [in the kitchen].

[It holds good for our present case,] even if the pervasion that whatever is existent is momentary is known, the existence of the probans in the locus of inference is not yet included in it, much less the property to be proved. Therefore we understand that existence in general as the probans is a property of the locus of inference and that it is pervaded [by the momentariness, or the probandum] one by one, and then, by virtue of both [premises], we come to know the occurrence of the probandum in the locus of inference. Why then is the inference

useless ?

VI [Objection:] “If you, in comprehending pervasion in this way, grasp pervasion without referring to a locus⁴, how [is it possible] ?⁵ For you [actually] grasp the pervasion regarding ‘existence’ which you have seen there [i.e., in the locus of inference]. For example, we say that pervasion is grasped in the locus of an example, when we grasp the pervasion between fire and smoke which we perceive in a kitchen.⁶ You have indeed said that you have no consideration of the kitchen upon grasping the pervasion. Certainly it is as follows: Even if you comprehend the pervasion and a probans’ subsistence in the locus of inference one by one, you [after all] ascertain that one and the same probans which is known as subsisting in the locus of inference is pervaded by the probandum, and you necessarily come to understand the probandum [as a property of the locus of inference]. How then is [such an] inference not useless ?⁷”

VII [Answer:] Knowledge of subsistence [of a probans] in a locus of inference (*pakṣadharmatva*) is certainly not the knowledge of a probandum (*sādhyā*), because the property to be proved (= probandum) is not referred to [in the former], nor is understanding of pervasion the same as proof of the probandum [i.e., its being a property also of the locus of inference]. For the two properties [constituting the pervasion], being dependent on universals, are not particularized by a specific locus. Otherwise it would follow that pervasion is a relation of two particular things. Therefore, we state the probans [being a property of the subject of inference], in order to show that this is an

⁴T omits *sādhyadharmiṇi*.

⁵*kutaḥ/tatra ... vyāptipratīteḥ* is changed in T into *kutra tatra ... pratītiḥ*, i.e. Where do you grasp the pervasion regarding the existence which you have seen there?

⁶T differs much from S. Read T omitting *ma* and *na ma yin te*, and adding *ro* after *zer*.

⁷I follow T. I take S *sādhyasattākathanam* and M *sādhyagatau kathanam* to mean: *sādhyagatau katham*.

object separated⁸ [from the probans in the pervasion] through the force of circumstances.

Moreover, it is said that comprehension of what is to be proved is produced by force of the determination of the threefold characteristic of a probans. In that case, then, [the statement of] a probans is not useless.⁹ For the determination of what is to be proved [probandum] is produced by the determination of the essential characteristics [of a probans]. Indeed, the probans has nothing more to do than that.

VIIa Moreover,

When the subsistence [of a probans] in the locus of an inference is grasped and necessary relation [or pervasion] is remembered, inference is possible according to you [who maintain the theory of external pervasion]. The same [process] should be recognized in internal pervasion too.¹⁰

For even to those who advocate external pervasion, inference does not take place in case they forget pervasion.

VIII [Objection:] “In that case, that [the probans] which you understand to belong to a locus of inference (*pakṣadharmatva*) is the same [probans] which you remember to be pervaded by a property to be proved (*sādhyadharmeṇa vyāpti-smṛteḥ*), how then can you say that all inferences are not useless ?

You say that [your inference is not useless,] because the pervasion is remembered without a locus being considered. How is the locus not considered, when the pervasion is remembered of that [probans] which is perceived in the locus?

⁸T has *khyab pa (vyāpti)* instead of SM *vyasta-*.

⁹T *gal te ... don med pa yin te* (If it is said that comprehension of what is to be proved is produced by force of the determination of the threefold characteristic of a probans, then in that case, the probans will be useless even for you). It seems to me inadequate.

¹⁰T translates the passage in the form of a verse. S '*numānam* is hypermetrical. Read '*numā*.

You contend that the locus is not discriminated, as the pervasion depends merely on [the two] universal concepts [of the probans and probandum]. Is it not, however, that [the pervasion is remembered] of the [probans] perceived in it [viz., the locus] ? How then is [the probans] not particularized by the [locus] ? If [, on the other hand,] it is particularized by it, how can you establish universal pervasion, since the probans [belonging only to the locus,] is uncommon [to all other things]?

You may say that there is no fallacy of the uncommon probans because that [probans] is characterized by the exclusion of non-connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*) [i.e., the probans is not limited to the locus alone].¹¹ Even if it is so, how [can you say that] the locus is not considered at all, because [the relation of your pervasion and the locus] is the same as when one says that whatever mountain having smoke has also fire as in the case of a kitchen ?

You say that [a locus is not referred to when pervasion is remembered] because consideration of a particular locus is not the part of pervasion which depends only on universals. This is right [in a sense]. It is not a part of pervasion, but merely another characteristic of a probans, which is called 'being a property belonging to the locus of inference' (*pakṣadharmatva*) that it [probans] is related to the locus by the exclusion of non-connection. Because, apart from the [locus], the pervasion depending on universals is determined completely. Otherwise, what talk can there be about grasping pervasion in the locus of an example, since '[the probans] being a property belonging to the locus of inference' is not grasped at that time ?¹²

On the other hand, however, when '[the probans] being a property belonging to the locus of inference' is grasped, the probandum is also by necessity proven¹³ at the same moment. Thus, uselessness

¹¹As to the *ayogavyavaccheda*, see Kajiyama [1989a], 155ff., "Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy."

¹²T omits *pakṣadharmatvāyogāt*. Read the phrase: *tadā pakṣadharmatvāgrahaṇāt*.

¹³*Asiddham* just before *siddham* seems to be redundant. T omits it. Or, if it is included, the sentence may mean: the probandum, though its subsistence in the locus of

of inference in general would follow. If the probandum¹⁴ is known [again] at a later time, it will be only a memory, and therefore not valid cognition. Therefore, '[the probans] being a property belonging to the locus of inference' is not part of pervasion and is not included¹⁵ in the grasping of the pervasion. Accordingly, it should be said that knowledge of what is to be inferred [i.e., the connection of a locus of inference with a probandum] is produced by force of '[the probans] being a property belonging to the locus of inference' and pervasion [of the probans by the probandum] which are separately grasped and remembered respectively. In this way only are inferences are recognized not to be useless; as inference comes to be fruitful."

IX [Answer:] Why do you not allow in the same way that inference is produced by force of '[the probans] being a property of the locus of inference' and 'pervasion' [of the probans by its probandum], which are separately grasped and remembered respectively, in the case of internal pervasion too ? And if it is so allowed, how is inference useless ? It is said that what is to be inferred (*anumeya*) is understood by force of the understanding of the three characteristics [of a probans]. 'Force' (*sāmarthya*) [, however,] means capacity producing¹⁶ that [which is to be inferred]. But it is not meant that the knowledge of a probandum is already included in the knowledge of the three characteristics [of a probans]. Therefore all are the same [in the theory of internal pervasion as in that of external pervasion].

X [Objection:] "You cannot say that all are the same. In internal

inference has not been established, now becomes proven.

¹⁴T has *rtags can* (= *liṅgin*) instead of *SM liṅga-*. Read as T.

¹⁵SM have *sad api* between *vyāptigrahaṇe* and *nāntarbbhavatīti*, but T omits it. Including the two words, we may understand it to mean: the probans being a property belonging to the locus of inference, though it is actually existent, is not included in the grasping of pervasion.

¹⁶SM *upādāna* is to be read as *utpādana* (producing) according to T.

pervasion, '[the probans] being a property of the locus of inference' is comprehended by the same knowledge regarding 'pervasion.' When [, on the other hand,] '[the probans] being a property of the locus of inference' is not comprehended, pervasion is not comprehended either. Therefore, in the case of internal pervasion, the statement of '[the probans] being a property of the locus of inference' becomes purposeless in the formulation of a syllogism, in which pervasion regarding the probans has been stated first of all.¹⁷ In the case of external pervasion, on the contrary, the situation is different, because pervasion is grasped only [in an example which is] external [to the locus of inference]."

XI [Answer:] To this we reply:

When [premises of] a syllogism are stated in a certain order, '[a probans] being a property of the locus of inference' having been known, 'pervasion' is understood later.

Otherwise, how do you know that it [pervasion] is seen in such and such an example, as in your theory [of external pervasion]? If you say that you know [pervasion] after having seen the two entities [such as smoke and fire], how can you see the two before you know the pervasion ?

For 'pervasion' and '[a probans] being a property of the locus of inference' are pointed out by respective verbal statements formulated in a certain order. It does not mean, however, that they are directly understood, because words are not valid cognition by themselves.

The following is said [by Dharmakīrti]:

A word denoting a probans, though inefficient by itself, points out what is [really] effective.

Of the two [cognitions] pointed out [by the words], valid cognition concerning '[the probans] being a property of the locus of inference' has to be first paid attention to in the case of 'existence' as a probans; and then, pervasion regarding 'existence' which has been established

¹⁷T *nang du* should be read *sngon du* (= *pūrvake*) as in SM.

in the locus of inference by the above cognition is later to be grasped by another cognition [viz., cognition annulling the probans in the contrary of the probandum]. Thus, what will be useless ?

In your theory [of external pervasion] too, the order [of cognitions] is that you first grasp a probans in the locus of an example, and later pervasion. Otherwise, you will be unable to say that you have grasped pervasion in the locus of an example, because it will follow that you grasp pervasion of a probans which you have not seen in the locus of an example.

XII [Objection:] “If it is so, even a probandum (*sādhyadharmā*, property to be proven) should be grasped in the [same] locus or the subject of inference in which you grasp pervasion [in the theory of internal pervasion], just as fire and smoke [are grasped in the locus of an example in the theory of external pervasion].”

[Answer:] Not so. Because [when we prove that every thing, say sound, is momentary, because it is existent,] the probans [or ‘existence’] is seen there [in the locus, ‘sound’], but the pervasion [that what is existent is momentary] is established by means of occurrence of [cognition] annulling the probans [or existence] in the contrary of the probandum (*vipakṣa*) [or, what is not momentary]. And this for the following reason¹⁸: In this way, momentariness has in no place been proven before pervasion is grasped, indeed, because it [viz., momentariness] is what is to be inferred (*anumeya*). And so long as the pervasion is not established, inference will not take place, because no other proof will follow for the sake of establishing the [pervasion]. Even if a proof follows, an endless series of proofs will

¹⁸Although S has *jñātaś caiva*, M clearly reads *ātaś caivam*. For the words *ātaś ca*, see: Monier Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, 134c; R.Schmidt, ed., *Nachträge zum Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung von Otto Böthlingk*, 93a (*ātas*: *ā* + *atas*); L.Renou, *Grammaire Sanscrite*, Sec. 126c (164); W.Caland, *Kleine Schriften*, (hrsg. von M.Witzel) “Eine zweite Mitteilung über das Vādhūlasūtra,” 156 (291): *ātaḥ* (d.h. *ā ataḥ*). I have not come across the words in Buddhist texts, but I retain them, because they are used in the *Mahābhārata* and M is too clear to change.

have to occur [one after another] (*anavasthā*). On the other hand, if [the series of proofs is] discontinued, all efforts which have been made up to that time [of discontinuation] will be useless. [On the contrary,] there is no hindrance when the pervasion is proven only by force of the single [cognition which annuls the probans in] the contrary [of the probandum].

In the case of fire and smoke, however, the relation of cause and effect is not established until both [fire and smoke] are perceived. Once that [causal relation] has been established, however, no occurrence of [cognition] annulling [the probans] in the contrary [of the probandum] is necessary. Therefore, the establishment of pervasion between fire and smoke depends on the perception of the two things [i.e., fire and smoke].

As to 'existence' and 'momentariness,' however, the matter is different, because the pervasion [between them] is not established by the above said method. Accordingly, it should be recognized that the pervasion with regard to 'existence,' which alone has been established in the locus of inference, is proven by force of the annulling [the probans in the contrary of the probandum].

The same holds true in internal pervasion too. These two [premises concerning] pervasion and [a probans] being a property of the locus of inference, however, having been discriminated by their respective valid cognitions, should be merely pointed out by a syllogistic statement (*sādhnavākya*).¹⁹ As neither of these two singly can point out both premises, how is either of the two statements useless ?

Here is a summarizing stanza:

Of one and the same probans the three characteristics are
determined one after another;

If one of them is forgot, no inference is possible. How then,
[can you say,] all inferences are useless ?

¹⁹T *khyab pa dang phyogs kyi chos ...bstan par bya ba yin no* seems to be confused.

XIII Moreover:

If the probandum is proven by annulling [the probans in the contrary of the probandum], it is useless to seek another reason [*hetu*, probans].

If the same probandum is not proven by the same annullment, it is also useless to seek another locus of the inference.²⁰

For, if pervasion which is being proven in the locus of inference can alone imply also proof of its probandum, then have we not profited as well? As the probandum is proven only by the valid cognition establishing the pervasion, we can get rid of effort for having recourse to the probans 'existence.' For we are not addicted to pursuing another logical mark (*liṅga*) [or probans].

If, on the other hand, the probandum is not proven [only] by the proof of the pervasion, then it means that the probans [i.e., its being a property of the locus of inference] is not useless even in the case of internal pervasion. Why then are you involved in great troubles, being frightened²¹ causelessly?

XIV You have two things to prove: occurrence [of a probans] in the locus of an example and the same in the locus of inference. They are meant for establishing pervasion and a probans being a property of the locus of inference respectively. When you dispute about a particular subject [locus] and then you grasp pervasion in a locus external to the former, it will be certainly useless. When entities in general are under dispute, however, occurrence of the probans in all things has to be proven by you as well as by me; then, how will it be useless for me to establish the occurrence of the probans in any of the things? How in this case is external pervasion possible, because it establishes the pervasion in a certain thing among those subjects under discussion? Because the locus to be proven [in this case] is

²⁰T has *chos* (*dharmā*) instead of MS *dharmy(-antara)*. I follow MS. cf. XIV.

²¹T has *sdang ba* (= *dveṣa*, hatred) for SM *kātaratā*.

characterized only to such an extent.

[Objection:] “The valid cognition annulling [the probans in the contrary of the probandum], which is taking place, externalizes the locus [of the inference], though originally internal [to it].”

[Answer:] How can it be true ? Because I prove the probandum in the same [locus of the inference] by means of the very annulling proof that is taking place.

[Objection:] “[I say that the internal locus is made external], because when doubt as to the property to be proven vanishes, the locus to be proven loses its characteristic [of a locus to be proven].”

[Answer:] It is not correct. We have said²² that taking up another locus is useless in the theory [of yours] that the probandum is not proven only by the annulling proof. On the other hand, in the theory [of ours] that the probandum is proven by the annulling proof, [taking up another] probans is brought to be useless. Therefore, even when the probandum is proven only by the annulment, doubt [about the locus of inference] still remains unremoved at some place. And when the doubt has not disappeared, [the internal locus] is not made external; and as the locus to be proven is not externalized, the pervasion grasped in it is indeed internal pervasion. There is now not even talk of external pervasion. Hence, how can there be external pervasion in this assertion of ours ?

If dispute takes place about a particular locus, pervasion may be grasped in a locus external to it; and even in this case, the fault of uselessly taking up another locus is difficult to be removed. When the probandum is proven only by the annulment, then another probans is indeed useless.

XV Again,

External pervasion is not possible especially in the case of the probans ‘existence,’ because when ‘existence’ is not established

²²Cf. XIII.

in the locus of inference²³, debate will not be started.

When pervasion is grasped [of the probans] established there, how is the pervasion not grasped in the locus to be proven ? It does not matter if [pervasion] may not be [grasped] also in an example.

[In our theory of internal pervasion] pervasion is known of a probans which is perceived in a locus of inference; and thus pervasion is said to have been grasped of that [probans which has been seen] in that [locus]. And thus the 'existence' is seen in the locus to be proven. Otherwise, no difference in opinion will be possible. How then is it not internal pervasion ?

XVI [Objection:] "Nevertheless, we grasp [pervasion] only outside [a locus of inference] in order to prevent inference from becoming useless."

[Answer:] Does it now mean that a probans is [seen or] not seen in the locus of inference in compliance only with your own wish ? Or do you [want to] confine the grasping of pervasion only outside [the locus of inference], even when [your] perception [of a probans in the locus of inference] is without a special distinction?

[Objection:] "Even if we grasp pervasion of the probans which is seen in both loci [i.e., the locus of inference and that of an example], external pervasion can be established [at least] partially."

[Answer:] Why do you adhere so strenuously to that part²⁴ ?

[Objection:] "We want a probans [or inference] not to be useless."

[Answer:] If you mean that inference is useless in the case of internal pervasion because a probandum is [also] established in a locus of inference as a substratum, in which pervasion is grasped, only by occurrence of annulling proof, the situation is the same²⁵ in

²³Mookerjee [1935], 389, n.1 suggests correction of *dharmiṇaḥ* into *dharmiṇi*.

²⁴T has *khyab pa* (= *vyāpti*), which has to be corrected into *khyad par* (= *bhāga*).

²⁵T *mtsbungs pa ma yin no*. Read *ma yin nam*? T: Is it not the same in both

the theory of external pervasion. Therefore, it is merely fruitless effort for you to grasp pervasion externally, especially when the probans 'existence' is concerned. A syllogism depending on an example is customarily stated only to satisfy dull-minded persons alone. The master [Dharmakīrti] used an example only to benefit those people, stating "whatever is existent is momentary, as e.g. a jar." On the contrary, the sharp-witted never rely on an example.

Here is an intermediate verse:

[The master] thus stated the example of a jar for those who are attached to an example. As it is not [absolutely] useless for those who esteem it in that way, it should be also accepted [even] in internal pervasion.²⁶

XVII [Objection:] "How then are the three characteristics of a probans²⁷, viz., its definite occurrence in a locus of inference, its definite occurrence only in the similar cases, and its definite non-occurrence in the dissimilar cases, to be understood?"

[Answer:]

What is possessed of a probandum is regarded to be a similar case, and what is not possessed of it a dissimilar case; occurrence and non-occurrence of a probans in the respective cases should be grasped in a locus or another.

All things having the property to be proven (probandum) are similar cases in general, and those without it are dissimilar cases. The occurrence [of the probans] only in those similar cases and its definite non-occurrence in the dissimilar cases form positive pervasion (*anvaya*) and negative pervasion (*vyatireka*) respectively. These two kinds of pervasions are to be grasped in a locus or another in which they can be grasped.

Thus, in our present issue, when it is established by force of internal pervasion and external pervasion ?

²⁶T is different in c-d of this verse, which is translated: As it is useless for those who do not esteem it in that way, internal pervasion is meant for the knowledgeable.

²⁷T omits the words corresponding to MS *hetos trairūpyam*.

annulling proof that ‘existence’ is turned away from all ‘non-momentary things’, the positive pervasion that whatsoever is existent is momentary is comprehended in a locus to be proven. This is possible because the pervasion is grasped with regard to the probans that is perceived in the [locus to be proven]. For there are possibly no other loci. Even if there is [another locus], pursuing it is useless.

XVIII [Objection:] “If so, why is the fallacy of inconclusiveness due to a probans being uncommon [i.e., subsistent only in a locus of inference] taught [by Buddhist logicians] ?”

[Answer:]

[The master Dignāga] taught uncommonness as a fallacy of probans in consideration of less intelligent people, because they are unable to grasp pervasion. It is not [fallacious] when [pervasion] sums up all cases (*sarvopasamḃhṛti*).

The following is meant. Less intelligent people are convinced that they have to grasp pervasion only in a locus other than [the locus of inference]. Considering their conception, [Dignāga] said that [the probans] ‘being heard’ [for proving the impermanency of sound] is inconclusive due to its being uncommon [to things other than sound, i.e., subsistent only in sound], because there is no example [which, being heard, is impermanent, and which is external to sound]. For [in the theory of external pervasion] grasping pervasion in the locus to be proven [i.e., sound itself] is not allowed. When pervasion is not grasped, [the probans] is inconclusive, as it is doubtful as to which of the two [i.e., permanency and impermanency] should be determined.

Or, [we should argue as follows]. The uncommonness of ‘audibility’ is set up to serve the conception of the less intelligent. For a specific, particular sound is perceived as having the property of the locus [of inference], because it is the subject of dispute, and also because otherwise the fallacy of unreality of the locus of inference would follow. On the other hand, ‘audibility’ [which is here adopted]

as the probans is common to individual sounds perceived and not perceived, just as smoke common [to a perceived mountain and a kitchen which is not perceived]. Therefore, the probans named 'audibility,' possessing all-inclusive pervasion, is no erroneous proof as in the case of 'existence,' etc.

Here [in the case of the proof of momentariness] non-cognition of succession and simultaneity alone forms annulling cognition. Producing auditory cognition, [on the other hand,] is the very audibility. Therefore, the uncommonness [of audibility] is [prescribed] in consideration of the less intelligent, because the uncommon [probans] cannot include all cases.

You think that [our] inference [based on internal pervasion] will be useless because the probandum is known at the same time as pervasion is known in the locus to be proven. If you wish, however, to avoid the uselessness, then you are never able to grasp pervasion. And when [pervasion] is not grasped, inconclusiveness will follow because of doubt as to both [the probandum and its contradictory]. On the contrary, when we grasp pervasion which sums up all cases by the above said manner, there is no uselessness of inference at all; thus, the probans 'existence' or the like should be known to have no error. In this way, therefore, [the fallacy of] inconclusiveness of the uncommon [probans] in both cases [i.e., audibility and existence] is prescribed in consideration of the less intelligent.

The [inferential] situation is the same even to the followers of the theory of external pervasion. If belief of the less intelligent is out of consideration, audibility will be a valid probans like existence, etc. For when a particular sound is [the locus of] dispute, another kind of sound will serve as an example. When opinions are divided with regard to all sounds, the annulling cognition which is taking place, though having no example, adduces one of [all sounds] as an example. How then is [the probans] inconclusive or uncommon ?

Here ends
the “Establishment of Internal Pervasion”
written by the Holy Ratnākaraśānti.

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