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at Soka University
for the Academic Year 1999

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東京・2000・八王子

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目次

● 研究報告

他人は存在するか

付：ラトナキールティ『他人の心流の論破』試訳・・・梶山雄一・・・（3）

パーリ語・仏教梵語研究ノート・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・辛嶋静志・・・（37）

A Preliminary Study on Meditation and the Beginnings of Mahāyāna Buddhism
・・・・・・・・Florin DELEANU・・・（65）

A Sanskrit Fragment of the *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-vyākhyā* of
Haribhadra: A Romanized Text・・・・・・・・Zhongxin JIANG・・・（115）

A Comparison of Zhiyi's 智顓 and Jizang's 吉藏 Views of the *Lotus Sūtra*: Did Zhiyi,
after all, Advocate a "Lotus Absolutism"?・・・Hiroshi KAN'NO・・・（125）

The *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* and the *Karmavibhaṅgasūtra* (2): Transliterations of the Original
Manuscripts Preserved in the National Archives of Nepal
・・・・・・・・Noriyuki KUDO・・・（149）

An *Uṣṇīṣa-Vijayā Dhāraṇī* Text from Nepal・・・・・・・・Akira YUYAMA・・・（165）

A Mahāyānist Criticism of *Arthaśāstra*: The Chapter on Royal Ethics in the *Bodhisattva-*
gocaropāya-viśaya-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa-sūtra
・・・・・・・・Michael ZIMMERMANN・・・（177）

Brief Communications:

Identification of Some Buddhist Sanskrit Fragments from Central Asia
・・・・・・・・Seishi KARASHIMA・・・（213）

Identification of a Quotation in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti*
・・・・・・・・Michael ZIMMERMANN・・・（215）

● 彙報

国際仏教学高等研究所の活動報告・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・（217）

国際仏教学高等研究所所員の著作・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・（219）

国際仏教学高等研究所受贈受入雑誌・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・（221）

●

執筆者紹介・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・（222）

編集後記・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・（222）

Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhism
(ARIRIAB)
at Soka University for the Academic Year 1999
Vol. 3

CONTENTS

● *RESEARCH ARTICLES:*

Yuichi KAJIYAMA:

Do Other People's Minds Exist?

With a Japanese Translation of Ratnakīrti's *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa* 3

Seishi KARASHIMA:

Notes on Some Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit Words 37

Florin DELEANU:

A Preliminary Study on Meditation and the Beginnings of Mahāyāna Buddhism..... 65

Zhongxin JIANG:

A Sanskrit Fragment of the *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-vyākhyā* of
Haribhadra: A Romanized Text 115

Hiroshi KAN'NO:

A Comparison of Zhiyi's 智顓 and Jizang's 吉藏 Views of the *Lotus Sūtra*: Did Zhiyi,
after all, Advocate a "Lotus Absolutism"?..... 125

Noriyuki KUDO:

The *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* and the *Karmavibhaṅgasūtra* (2): Transliterations of the Original
Manuscripts Preserved in the National Archives of Nepal 149

Akira YUYAMA:

An *Uṣṇīṣa-Vijayā Dhāraṇī* Text from Nepal 165

Michael ZIMMERMANN:

A Mahāyānist Criticism of *Arthaśāstra*: The Chapter on Royal Ethics in the *Bodhisattva-*
gocaropāya-viśaya-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa-sūtra 177

Brief Communications:

Seishi KARASHIMA:

Identification of Some Buddhist Sanskrit Fragments from Central Asia 213

Michael ZIMMERMANN:

Identification of a Quotation in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti* 215

● *IRIAB BULLETIN:*

IRIAB Activities 217

List of Publications of the IRIAB Fellows 219

Journals Received 221



Contributors to this Issue 222

Editorial Notes 222

他人は存在するか

付：ラトナキールティ『他人の心流の論破』試訳

梶山雄一

主観的観念論 世間には、自分では確信できないけれども、常識に従って思い込んでいることが数多くある。他人が存在する、ということもそのような思い込みの一つである。仏陀のような例外はあるとしても、一般に人はこの世に他人が存在すると確実に知ることはできない。たしかに、近くにいる他人の身体は直接的に知覚できるから、他人の身体は、犬や猫や山川草木が存在するようにあるに違いないと思える。しかし、他人というときに、私たちは、その身体を問題にするよりも、その心を、人格を問うているのである。その他人の心は誰にも見えない。見えないものがある、と信じることはあまり合理的ではない。だから、他人という時になによりもその心を意味するならば、他人は存在しない、という方が正しい。

見えないものでも私たちはその存在を推理することはできる、というかも知れない。しかしこれはたいへん疑わしいことである。たとえば、遠方の山に煙が立ち昇っているからその山に火がある、というのは正確な推理である。けれども私たちは、その推理によって、火がある、という限りのことは知ることができても、それはあくまでも一般的な結論であって、その火がどのような種類と状態の火であるかは分からない。たかだか、見えないけれども火があるらしい、と知ることができるだけで、知覚のような具体性も確実性もそこにはない。山火事ならば、どんなに遠くても、そこまで歩いて行って目で見ることもできようが、世の中には理論的には確かそうに思えても、実験で確かめるわけにゆかないことが多すぎる。科学の世界では、理論的に推定されたことが、のちに実験で確認されることがある。しかし、理論的推定がついに実験で発見されないことの方がより多いであろう。所詮、推理というものとはただ一般的なものにのみ関わるもので、知覚に比べれば二次的な認識にすぎないのである。

煙があれば火がある、ということが一般的に正しい因果関係を表す命題である、ということがいえるのは、私たちが眼に見える場所において、火が生じるとそこに煙が立ち昇り、しばらく火と煙とが共存したのちに、火が消えるとやがて煙もなくなってしまうことを確実に知ることができるからである。その関係を現在の遠方の山にあてはめて、あの山に煙があるから火もある、と理解することはできる。このさい、重要なことは、火と煙との関係の知識は、自分の近傍において確実に見られ

る、直接に知覚できるという前提の上になりたっていることである。もし眼に見えないもの、たとえば、須弥山とか未来の転輪聖王マन्दラーターとか幽霊とかいう空間的・時間的・本性的に知覚できないものであれば、私たちはその存在を推理によって肯定することも、否定することもできない。他人の心というものは、かりに向かい合っている人の心であっても、私たちには見えない。その見えないものの存在は、推理によって否定もできないけれども、肯定もできない。

他人の心の存在を推理によって証明できるかどうかは決着がつかない。人間の思惟が直接的あるいは間接的に外界の事物に依存することを認める実在論においては、他人の心は推理によって証明できるかもしれない。しかし主観的・一元論的観念論の立場に立つと、他人の心も、外界の事物もすべて自分の認識の表象にすぎない、つまり、自分の認識の内容としてのみ存在することになる。私自身の心の存在は疑えないとしても、そのほかのものは、すべて、わたしの心の外に、独立に存在するのではない。その立場では、他人というものも自分の心に含まれてしまう。

インド仏教の学派でいえば、私たちの認識は外界に実在する対象と感覚（認識）器官と意識とが同一瞬間に並列的に存在するときに行われる、外界の模写である、と考える説一切有部の実在論的認識論や、あるいは外界の対象そのものは知覚できないが、何ものかが外界にあるにちがいない、と私たちは推理できるとする表象主義的実在論のもとに外界の実在を認める経量部においては、外界の対象の存在は肯定される。しかし、唯識派のように、外界の対象はいっさい存在せず、それは私の認識の表象にすぎない、と考えると、主観的観念論を主張する立場では、外界のあらゆるものは、夢や幻のなかの認識のように、私の表象にすぎないことになる。その場合、外界の対象というものが他人をも含むか否かが大きな問題となった。

瑜伽行唯識派 大乘仏教においてインドで確立された学派は中観派と瑜伽行唯識派（以下、唯識派あるいは唯心論者という）との二つである。このうち、後者の唯識派はわれわれの普通の認識である、眼・耳・鼻・舌・身・意の六識を支持する根元的認識としてアーラヤ識という潜在意識の存在を主張した。さらに、このアーラヤ識を誤って自我（靈魂）として執着する汚染された自己意識（マナ識）を第六の意識と別に認めて第七識とした。こうしてすべてで八種類の認識を立てたことになる。そして、世界のあらゆるものは、私の認識の表象にすぎないという観念論を主張した。したがって、われわれが自分とは別に存在すると考えている外界の事物は、要するに私の認識の表象にすぎないもので、夢や幻のなかの事物のように、私自身の認識を離れて存在するわけではない、というのである。

しかし、ここで重要なことは、世界のあらゆるものは自分の認識の表象であるとする、その認識の根源であるアーラヤ識はひとりひとりの人に具わっている個別的なものである、ということである。いいかえれば、人間〔正確には地獄・餓鬼・畜生・阿修羅・人間・天人と数えられる有情〕の数だけのアーラヤ識がある、ということである。このアーラヤ識の複数性は唯識思想に二つの道を示した。第一の道は、外界の事物として顕現するものは存在せず、あらゆるものは私の表象にすぎないが、他人〔有情〕は無数に存在する、という考え方である。第二の道は、外界の事物はもちろん、他人も外界の事物に他ならないから、世界とは私一個の認識、いいかえれば、私のアーラヤ識から顕現した表象のみである、とする考え方である。

第一の考え方によれば、あらゆる人々はそれぞれの表象としての世界をもっていて、同一の世界にいるのではないが、みなが前世において同じような行為（業）を積んだ結果として同類の人間として生まれた以上は、人々のそれぞれの表象のあいだに相互的な関係が生じていて、そのために人々の外界の表象の間にある種の共通性が存在することになる。たとえば、ある一人が森の木を切り倒すと、他の人々までがその木がなくなったという表象をもつようになる。

しかし、第二の考え方によるとそもそも他人というものは存在しないから、他人が森の木を切り倒すなどということはない。それは夢の中での事件や変化のように、私の表象としての他人が木を伐ったように見えるだけで、夢がさめないかぎり、伐られた木はそのままに横たわっている。夢がさめるとは、私が基本的無知である無明を滅して、涅槃を得て、人間的認識を超越することである。

この第二の考え方によると、世界とは私のアーラヤ識から顕現した私の表象だけから成るものであるということになる。そうすると、唯識思想というものは、他人をも含めて、外界の一切の事物は私と別個に独立した存在ではなくて、私の認識の表象にすぎない、という独我論 (solipsism) になってしまう恐れがある。恐れがある、といったけれども、独我論が誤っているわけではない。それは、一元的、主観的認識論を守る立場からすれば、論理的に最も正しい帰結である。ただ、その極端な見解が世人の共感を得がたいだけである。

私の認識、基本的には私のアーラヤ識から顕現する表象は内外のあらゆるものを含むが、その最も簡潔な記述はマイトレーヤ（弥勒菩薩）に帰せられる『中辺分別論』I. v. 3にある。そこではアーラヤ識からは、外界の対象 (artha)・有情 (sattva)・自我 (ātman)・六種の認識表象 (vijñapti)の四種が顕現するが、その四通りの対象は実には

存在しない、ことが語られている¹。ヴァスバンドゥ（世親、400-480ころ）の注釈によれば、外界の対象とは色形・音声・香り・味・触れられるもの・考えられるもの、という六種としての把握され方(ākāra)をもって顕現するものである。有情としての顕現とは、自分や他人の身体において五種の感覚器官（眼・耳・鼻・舌・身体の五根）として顕現するものであり、自我としての顕現とは、無知・我見・我慢・愛着という汚れた煩惱をともなったマナ識（自我意識）が顕現することであり、六種の認識とは眼識・耳識・鼻識・舌識・身識・意識としての顕現である。そして、外界の対象と有情としての顕現との二つは対象の捉え方が誤っている（anākāra）から実在しないのであり、自我と六種の表象とは真実でない顕現であるから実在しない、という。

ここでは、外界の対象（器世間）と有情（有情世間）との二つを物質的な世界とし、自我意識と表象とを精神的な世界と見なしているように思える。有情については、自分および他人の身体といて、いずれの場合も、五種の感覚器官を具えた身体という物質的なもののみをあげているから、自己の身体をも物質的なものと見ているのであろう。自己および他人の身体は物質的なものと考えられていて、他人の心を含まないように思える。だから、『中辺分別論』およびヴァスバンドゥはここでは他人の心の独立した存在性を認めていなかったと考えられる。それに対して自我意識と六種の表象とは精神的、内的なもので、したがって私自身の心であろう。

アーラヤ識は六識から顕現した表象という他者的なものに依存しながら、たえず変化しつつ相続する流れに他ならないから、それを自立、不変、恒常な実体としての自我(ātman)として執着する自我意識（汚染されたマナ識、kliṣṭa-manas）が倒錯したものであることは明白である。六種の認識表象は外界にその表象と相応する実在をもたないものであるから、これも倒錯したものである。

外界の対象 外界の対象が実在でないことは、唯識の諸論書に詳しく書かれているが、外界の実在性を否定する理由のもっとも簡潔なものとして、まずアサンガ（無著、395-470ころ）の『摂大乘論』II.14Aの内容を要約しておこう²。（1）外界の対象の捉えられ方は相互に矛盾した知識を生ずる。例えば餓鬼や動物や人間や神々によって、同一の事物の上に別々の表象が見られる。[このことは、程度の差こそあれ、同じ人間の間にも妥当する。]（2）過去や未来や夢や[鏡の]影像などの実在でない

¹ MAVBh. I.v.3.(p.18); 『世親論集』、中央公論社、1976、221-222。

² Nagao[1982-1987] 上、315-317。

ものの表象が得られる。(3)もし外界が実在ならば、外界を認識する知識は倒錯なきものとなり、努力をしないでも真実が見られ[さとりが得られ]ることになってしまう。(4a)心が自在となることを得た菩薩や禅定者たちにおいては、彼らの意欲の力によって、それらの外界の事物がその欲したように現れる。(4b)心の静寂(止)を得た修行者が(経典などの)法の観察(観)に努めるときは、ただ思考を集中しただけで、対象が現れる。(4c)すでに無分別智を獲得した人々、またその中にある人々[すなわち仏陀や高位の菩薩たち]にとっては、外界の対象はすべて現れることがない。

ヴァスバンドゥ(世親)の『唯識二十論』は外界の対象が心の顕現にすぎないことについて詳細な議論をしていて、きわめて興味深い。この書については多くの翻訳や解説があるので³、ここではその論点の要約を紹介するに止める。外界の対象は、あたかも眼病者が実在しない網のような毛を見るように、実在しない対象が顕現するだけのことで、人の表象のみのものである、という唯識論者に対して、実在論者は「表象はかならず外界の対象によって起こるものであって、もしそうでなければ、それが空間的、および時間的に限定されていること、対象の認識がある人の心だけに限定されないで大勢の人々に共通して見られること、実際に効用を果たすことが説明できない、という疑問をあげて抗議する(第1、2偈)。ある樹木などの表象が外界の対象なくして起こるのであれば、その表象がすべての場所と時間において起こらないで、ある特定の場所と特定の時間においてしか起こらないのはなぜか。しかもその樹木はただ一人に見られるのではなくて、その場所にその時に居合わせる人々すべてに起こるのはなぜか。蜃気楼の城は城としての効用を果たさないが、実在する城には効用があるのはなぜか」(「」内は意識である。以下同じ)というわけである。

この質問に対してヴァスバンドゥは答える。それらは夢と同じようである、と説明できる(第3偈ab)。夢のなかには実在する対象はないけれども、人はすべての場所と時間においてではなくて、特定の場所と時間において村や園や男や女を見る。また特定の人に限定されないことは餓鬼などが、みなそろって膿の川を見るようなものである(第3偈bcd)。餓鬼たちは前世で行った共通の行為(業)が成熟した結果として、一人だけではなくて、みなが川が膿や尿や汚物で満ちていると見てしまう。さらに効用を果たすことは夢のなかで精子を漏出する過ちがあるように(第4偈ab)

³ 例えば、『世親論集』、5-30を参照。

外界の対象がなくても効用を果たすことはある。

第4偈から第7偈にわたって展開される地獄の罪人をめぐる対論には説一切有部・経量部の外界実在論と唯識論者の外界表象論とのそれぞれの立場が鮮明に現れている。「諸地獄の罪人たちは特定の時と場所において、一人だけでなくすべての者が守衛に迫害されたり、犬や烏や鉄山が行ったり来りするのを見る。それは地獄が実在するわけではなくて、彼ら地獄の住人が前世において行った共通の行為の成熟の結果である」。このような唯識論者の考えに対して、外界実在論者〔ヴィニータデーヴァ（調伏天）の釈疏によれば、説一切有部〕は、「地獄の守衛や犬や烏が外界に実在する生き物であるとなぜ認めないのか」と反論する。ヴァスバンドゥはそれは不合理であるとして、こういう。「地獄の守衛は罪人たちのように地獄の苦しみを受けはしない。だから守衛は実際に地獄に生まれているわけではない。天上には鳥などの動物が存在するが、彼らはその環境の与える快楽を感じるに至るような善い行為によって天上に生まれているのであるが、動物たちは天上界に生まれるようには地獄に生まれられないし、餓鬼たちも地獄には生まれられない。彼らは地獄の苦しみを受けるわけではないからである」。

ここで経量部が登場する。経量部は「地獄の罪人たちが為した行為によって特殊な色・形・量・力を伴ったある種の物質要素が生じ、その諸要素が転変して、手を振り上げるなどの動作をしているように見え、地獄の守衛という名称を得るにいたる。また羊の形をした山が行ったりきたりし、鉄でできたシャルマリー樹では、その刺が下を向いたり上に向いたりして、その樹に登ったり降りたりする地獄の住人を苦しめるように見える。それらはその形態のままに実在するのではないが、またまったく実在しないのでもない」という。

ヴァスバンドゥは答えている。経量部が、地獄の罪人の過去における行為によって地獄に物質要素が生じ、それが変化するというのは、行為の〈潜在余力〉(vāsanā, 熏習)とその果報とが別々の場所にある、つまり前者は心であり、果報は地獄という外界にある、と認めているのであって、合理的でない。潜在余力のあるその場所、すなわち、心に果報もある、と認めるべきである、という。行為の潜在余力が心であり、果報としての転変も心にある、ということ認めれば、すべては表象であることになる。

『唯識二十論』においてヴァスバンドゥは、外界の対象が実には存在しないこと、を主張している。しかし、この論書においては彼は一般的には他人の存在をも認めているように見える。

他心の存在 『唯識二十論』には、六種の認識器官（眼・耳・鼻・舌・身・意）とその六種の対象（色・声・香・味・触・法）という十二部門（十二処）が、ある対象として顕現する表象とそれが生じるもとである種子（潜在余力）という、心から現れたものに他ならない、といて、人には自我がなく、また事物に実体のないことを教え（第9、10偈）、主観・客観（grāhya-grāhaka）という仮構によって構想された形としては事物は存在しない、というのが＜表象のみであること＞（唯記識）といわれるのであるという。またついで第11から15偈までには現代の素粒子物理学にも通じる優れた原子批判が展開されている。第16－17偈の経量部の表象主義的外界实在論との対論も重要であるが、本論文の主題と直接に関わるとはいえないので、ただちに第18偈以下に現れる他人の心の問題に視点を移すことにする。

第18偈の直前では、反論者が、「もし自分の心の流れの特殊な変化だけから対象の形をもった表象が生じるのであって、特定の対象が外界に実在することによるのではないとするならば、悪友や善友とまじわったり、正しい教えや悪い教えを聞いたりして、人々の認識が善くあるいは悪く規定されることもあり得ない、善友も悪友も教えも無いからである」という。仏教では自我という精神的実体の存在を認めないで、心とは各瞬間に変化しながら相次いで継起する認識の流れ（相続、saṃtāna）であると考えている。以後、心を＜心流＞と呼ぶことにする。

上の反論に対して第18偈の前半でヴァスバンドゥはいう。ある人の心流に特殊な表象が生じると、他の人の心流の上に特殊な表象が生じるように、心流と心流との間に、交互に影響を及ぼすことがあって、相互に認識が限定しあう、のである。それは、特殊な対象があるからではない、と。

第18偈後半では、「もし目覚めている場合にも、夢のなかでと同じように、表象が外界の対象をもたないのであれば、善・悪の行為は覚醒中に為したのと夢中に為したのとの区別もなく、未来において幸・不幸の結果を生ずることになってしまうであろう」という反論に対して、ヴァスバンドゥは、睡眠中には心が眠けによって鈍っているから、覚醒時と等しい結果は生じない、と答えている。

第19－20偈の直前では、「もしすべてのものが単なる表象にすぎず、誰も実在としての身体や言語をもたないとするならば、屠殺者などに追いかけて羊などが殺されるということがどうして起こるのか」という反論がなされている。それに対してヴァスバンドゥは第19－20偈において、その死はある人の特殊な表象にもとづいて起こる変化であって、あたかも鬼霊などの心力によって、他の人々に記憶の喪

失、夢見、悪霊にとりつかれることなどの異変が起こるようなものである、という。ヴァスバンドゥはこの個所で、他の多くの史伝や伝説をもあげて、ある人の表象の影響によって他の人々に命根を害するような異変が生じ、死、すなわち一生にわたる同質の心流が断絶する現象が起こるのである、といて、心の暴力が大罪であることを論じている。この第18偈－20偈においても、彼は自分の心流とともに他人の心流の存在を是認しているのである。

瑜伽行者の他心の知覚 仏教ではヨーガ行者などは他人の心流を知る知覚 (*paracittajñāna*) をもっていると信じられている。そこで反論がなされる。

[反論] 「もしこの世界のすべてのものが表象にすぎないのであれば、その他心を知る者 (*paracittavid*) たちは実際に他心を知るのか、知らないのか。そこでどうなるかという、もし彼らが実は他心を知るのではないとすれば、他心を知る者といわれるいわれはない。もし実際に知るとすれば、他人の心を知る者の知識は如何にして対象の真実のままのものでないのか」と。

[答論] 「自分の心を知る知識 [が真実のままでない] ように。 [なぜ自心知が如実でないのかという] 仏陀がその認識領域 [を知るようには] 知らないからである。(第21偈)

それは、表現されない自体として (*nirabhiḥlāpyātmanā*) 仏陀たちの認識領域となっている。そのようには [他人の心を知るといわれる者は] それを知らないから、 [彼らの自心知も他心知も] 二つながら対象の真実のままではない。如実でない顕現として、主観・客観 (能取・所取) の分岐がまだ断じられていないからである。」

この分節で、反論の最後の部分はサンスクリット及びチベット文では「もし実際に知るとすれば、他人の心を知る者の知識は如何にして対象の真実のままのものでないのか」となっているが、玄奘の漢訳 (大正, xxxi, 77a19-20) では、「若し能く知らば、唯識まさに成らざるべし」となっている。山部能誼氏は文脈から見ても、漢訳の方が合理的であると考えている⁴。ヴィニータデーヴァ (*Vinitadeva*, 調伏天) の釈疏のなかにも 「もし他人の心を知るならば、そのときには主観と客観とを是認しているから、表象のみなることは害せられてしまう」⁵ ということばがあるので、玄奘

⁴ Yamabe [[1998], 28

⁵ VT, 194a6-7: gal te gzhan gyi sems shes na de'i tshe gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par khas blangs pas rnam par rig pa nyid nyam par 'gyur ro.

訳のような理解をすることも十分にできる。もちろんサンスクリット文のままでは理解が困難であるというわけでもないが。

いずれにしても、この第21偈とそのヴァスバンドウ釈においては、一般人が他人の心を知る場合はもとより、ヨーガ行者の他心智といわれるものも、如実の認識ではない。ヴィニータデーヴァの喩えでは、瓶の色と相似した布をもって瓶を覆うとき、そこでは布を見るのであるけれども、諸人〔もヨーガ行者も〕瓶を見ると考えるようなものである⁶。それは、仏陀たちが、主観・客観の分岐を離れ、「表現されない自体」として認識領域を知るようではないからである、という。したがって、主観・客観の分別を離れ、表現されない自体としての仏陀の認識領域においては、自心も他心もあるとはいえない、というのである。このいわば最高の真理（勝義諦）としての仏陀たちの認識領域はわれわれの思惟を超えている、というのである。ここまでくると、『唯識二十論』でも、世俗の真理としていったんは是認されていた他人の心流の存在も、そして自分の心流の存在も、最高の真理の立場ではともに否定されてしまう。

ダルマキールティ 仏教の認識論と論理学を大成したダルマキールティ (Dharmakīrti, 法称、600–660ころ) は『他人の心流の証明』(*Samtānāntarasiddhi*) という論文を書いている。これはチベット訳としてのみ現存する。チベット訳テキストは、ヴィニータデーヴァ (調伏天) の注釈などとともに Th.Stcherbatsky によって校訂出版され、北川秀則氏による英訳、桂紹隆氏によるきわめて優れた和訳などがあり、さらに最近には、J.S.Negi, M.R.Chinchore 両氏によってサンスクリット語への還元も試みられている (文献略号参照)。ここでは、私もこれらの労作を参照した上で、重要な部分のみを紹介してゆく。ここに紹介できないダルマキールティの議論については桂氏の和訳を参照されたい。引用文にはテキストのストラ番号を丸括弧内に示してあるが、常に正確な翻訳とは限らず、大意をとっているものもある。

この論文の冒頭にダルマキールティは、経量部が、他人の心流の存在を証明するために行った推論を紹介した上で、全く同じ形の推論が唯心論者にも妥当する、と述べている。すなわち、

もし自分自身について動作 (bya ba) と言葉 (brjod pa) とが <心の動き> (sems kyi g-yo ba) を先行させることを観察した後、他人について両者を観察することに

⁶ Yamaguchi[1953]、126。

より、[心の] <動き>を推理するのなら、この論法は唯心論においても同じである。したがって、唯心論者も他心(gzhan gyi sems) の存在を推理しうる(S.1)。彼も他人の知の特別な<動き>がないかぎり、動作や言葉(lus dang ngag gi rnam par rig byed 身表業・語表業)としてあらわれる知がそのようなものとして[自分自身の心に]あることを認めない(S.2)。

実在論を主張する経量部の用いた推理は、自分について、<心の動き>が身体的動作や言語活動という、形象をもって外部にあらわれ、知覚される行為(表業)を引き起すという因果関係を確認し、その<動作や言葉は心の動きを先行させる>ということが大前提とし、<他人の動作や言語という行為が知覚される>ことを小前提として、<他人の心の動きがある>という結論を引き出すものである。この推理によって<他人の心の存在>が証明されるとする。ダルマキールティはすでに、この経量部の他心の推理を『知識論評釈』(Pramāṇavārttika)III,v.68⁷ に述べている。この『他人の心流の証明』においては、この推理は唯心(唯識)論者(citta-mātravādin)も他人の心流の存在を証明するために用いることができる、とダルマキールティはいう。もっとも、ダルマキールティ自身を含む唯心論者にとっては、他人の動作や言葉というものも、実在論者にとってのように外界に実在する対象ではなくて、他人の言語や動作として自分の認識表象にあらわれている知に他ならない、という相違はある。

ある反論者は「他人の知の働き(byed pa) [すなわち、心の動き]は知覚されないから、他人の知の存在を推理するのは不合理である」という(S.3)。この反論の内容に近いことは造論者ダルマキールティ自身がその認識論・論理学の体系のなかで主張したこともある。直接知覚は存在するものみに肯定的にかかわるから、直接知覚の対象は<見られるもの>(dr̥śya, 知覚可能なもの)でなければならない。<見られるもの>とは、ある特定の個人がその対象を見ようと注意を集中しているときに、知覚のための諸特徴[諸条件]がすべて具わっていること(upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta)、すなわち、光とか健康な視力とかの当該の対象以外の諸条件が具わり、当該の対象自体が<空間的、時間的、本性的に遠くかけ離れ(deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa)ていないもの>でなければならない。対象が空間的に知覚できないほど遠方にあつたり、未来の存在のように時間的に知覚不可能であつたり、対象の性質がほんらい知覚されないものであつたりしてはならない。たとえば、須彌山や未来の転輪聖王マンダターや

⁷ PV, 136 ; Tosaki[1979-1985], I, 138. テキストは戸崎本の読みに従う。

幽霊などは知覚の条件を具えていない。これらは「見られるもの」ではない。

直接知覚は存在する個物の肯定にのみかかわるといことは、存在の否定は推理されねばならない、ということである。しかしある対象の存在を否定できるのは、これも、ある特定の場所において、知覚のための諸特徴〔諸条件〕がすべてとどつていて、当該の対象以外のもの、たとえば地面とか、テーブルとかが見えているときに、当該の対象、たとえば花瓶、がもし存在するならば必ず知覚されるであろうという形で、〈知覚されるもの〉(drśya)として仮定された上で、それが認識されないときにのみ成立つわけである。ところが、他人の心流というものは、本性的に知覚を超えたもの、であるから、その存在も非存在も推理によって確実に決定できない⁸。

ダルマキールティはこの反論に対しては、「対論者〔すなわち実在論者〕といえどもそれら(=他人の動作や言葉)が他人の知を先行させるのを決して観察したことはないのだから、彼も後者(=他人の知)を知ることはないであろう」(S.4)と、軽くかわしている。更に対論を交わした後に、彼は動作や言葉という、ある形象をもって外部にあらわれる知(表業)には、「私が歩く」「私が話す」というような内的なもの、いいかえれば、自分自身から切り離されずにあらわれるもの>と、「彼が歩く」「彼が話す」というような外的なもの、いいかえれば、自分自身から切り離されてあらわれるもの>とがあるが、「切り離されて、もしくは、切り離されずにあらわれることによる相違は、知の原因である〔心の〕〈動き〉をそれぞれ別々に判断するものではない〔すなわち、いずれの場合にも言語・動作は心の動きを同じように先行させる〕」(S.14)という。しかも、自分自身から切り離されて、外的にあらわれる知にも、自分の〈心の動き〉を先行させる特定の行為もある。例えば、自分が放った矢や石、自分が動かした機械、仕掛けた魔法、引き起した他人の振動などのようなものである。逆に、他人が引き起こした自分自身の動きなどは、自分から切り離されない、内的なものであるが、自分の〈心の動き〉を先行させないで、むしろ他人の心の動きによる。こうしてみると、自分の心の動きから他人の動作や言葉が起こり、他人の心の動きから自分の動作や言葉が起こることもある。「したがって、特定の行為一般が特定の〔心の〕動き一般の存在を知らしめるのである」(S.22).

⁸ NB, II, s.28: anyathā cānupalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpṭeṣu deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭeṣv ātma-pratyakṣa-nivṛtṭer abhāvaniścayābhāvāt; Kimura[1987],255 ; その他。

このように、自他の区別を超えて、行為一般という結果が心の動き一般という原因を知らしめる、というところに、唯心論者が他人の心流を推理するための原理があるようである。身体的動作や言語活動という行為があるからそれに心の動きが先行する、という因果関係、同時に推理の大前提にあたるものを、自他に共通する一般的命題としなければ、唯心論の立場から他人の心流を推理することは不可能となるからである。

たとえば、近傍の場所において火と煙との因果関係を知覚したのちに、遠方の山に煙が立ち昇っているのを見て、あの山に火あり、と推理するときには、私たちはその遠方の山の火を知覚できないけれども、火一般がそこにあることを推理できる。それと同じように、自分自身において言語・動作が心の動きを先行させることを知覚したのちに、他人の言語・動作を見て、他人の心の動き一般を推理することは可能である、というのがダルマキールティの見解である。

後に見るように、ラトナキールティは自他に共通する〈心一般〉という概念を厳しく批判した。ダルマキールティは〈一般〉という語に *spyi* (= *sāmānya*) をあて、ラトナキールティは *mātra* という語を用いるが、意味は等しい。ダルマキールティはのちに、「単なる [心の] 〈動き〉一般が動作や言葉一般の原因であるから、結果 (=後者) により原因 (=前者) が知られるのである」と再度いう (S.48)。

自分の動作や言語という知覚される行為が自分の心の動きを先行させる、ということは自覚すなわち自己認識 (*svasamvedana*) という仏教の認識論において知覚の一種として認められている認識手段によって確認できる。しかし、他人の言語・動作という知覚されるものは、唯心論者にとっては、自分の心とは別に外部に独立してあるものではなくて、やはり他人の行為としてあらわれる自分の表象にすぎない。ダルマキールティはもちろんそれを意識しているから、身体的動作や言語活動という形象をもつ知を「引き起こす心はそれらの [自分に属する動作や言葉の表象の] 質料因に他ならず、他人に属する [言葉や動作の] 知にとっては間接的統御因 (*bdag po'i rkyen=adhipatipratyaya*) である。 [自己の] 表象の質料因 (=自己の心) より生じ、それら (他人の行為) と結びつく [知] も、譬喩的に表業と呼ばれるであろう。自他それぞれに自分自身の〈あらわれ〉を直接経験 (*nyams su myong*) しているのだが、あたかも二人の眼病者が [同じく] 二つの月を見るように、そのような (=異なる二物を同一物と捉える) 知の原因にある、潜在印象の生起を本質とする〈特殊性〉は、無始時以来 [異なる二物を] 同一物と捉えるように決定付けられているからである」 (S.63-65) という。

唯心論者に与えられている事実は、自分の心の表象である他人の行為にもとづいて他人の心の存在を推理する、ということだけである。ダルマキールティは、自分と他人とはそれぞれに自分自身の心からの〈あらわれ〉を直接経験しているのだが、無限の過去からそれぞれのアーラヤ識に植え込まれた熏習（潜在印象、習慣性）によって、二つの異なったものを同一と捉えるのだ、といている。それはその通りであるが、このいい方を違った側面から見れば、自分自身の心のあらわれにすぎない、自分と他人の行為、つまりいわば同一のものを、自と他との二つとして捉える熏習が私の心にある、ということになる。少なくとも、世間一般では他心の存在を是認するのであるが、自分自身の表象を自と他の二者として捉える習性もわれわれにはあるのである。私には、ダルマキールティのいい方が、他人の行為や心を前提しているように思えてならない。

実在論者はこう反論する。「結果である〈動作などとしてあらわれる知〉という証相 (linga, 理由となる目印) から生じる〈他心の知〉、それは他心を対象とするのか、しないのか？もし対象とするなら、[自分の心とは] 別の対象があることになる。[したがって、これらのあらゆるものは表象のみ、という唯心論は成立しない。] もし対象としないのなら、知は他人の心があるとどうして知るのか？それ自体が知られずして、それが立証されることはありえないから」という(S.66).

この反論は『唯識二十論』以来、つねに実在論者が唯心論に対して投げかけるものであるから、ここに再論しない。ダルマキールティは、推理はあくまでも普遍を捉えるものであるから、知覚と違って、他心の知は他心の形象までを捉えはしない (S.71-74参照) といった後に、推理は「意図された対象について欺かないから (mi slu ba =avisamvāda) 認識手段なのである」(S. 76 参照) などと、詳しく推理と知覚との相違を説明する。そして、「他心の推理にも、意図された対象について欺かないことは必ずある。活動者はそれによって、他の生命体が存在することを知った後、繰り返し諸々の日常活動を行うなら、彼 (=他の生命体) によって生じた [言葉を交わすなどの] 効用を得るから」(S.79)という。さらに、「人は、[火などの知覚の] 後に [焼くなどの] 特別な効用としてあらわれる知を直接経験してはじめて、[火ではないという] 懸念がなくなるから」(S.81)という。

この最後の第81ストロはきわめて興味深い。さすがにダルマキールティはこのように不用意なことはいわなかった。このストロのなかで角括弧に入れた語句はダルマキールティのものではなくて、注釈者ヴィニーターデーヴァがうっかり書いたものである。〈火〉とか〈焼く〉という効用とかは知覚できるものについて知るこ

とができるが、いま問題になっている<他人の心>は決して知覚できないものであるから、火の焼く効用を喩えとすべきではない。したがって、このスートラは角括弧のなかの語句を消して読まなくてはならない。しかし、ダルマキールティがその喩えを出さなかったにしても、このスートラとその前後のいい方は穏当ではない。なぜなら、われわれは他人の心も、他の生命体の心もいまだかつて見たことはないからである。ダルマキールティはこの直後に、「先の知 [欺かない推理によって知られた他心の知] が日常活動を達成するから、まさに効果的作用の故に<認識手段>である」(S. 82)ともいう。効果的作用 (don byas pa= arthakriyā) は、<欺かない>こととともに、確実な認識手段の条件である。けれども、他心自体が知覚されていないときに、日常活動の達成という効果的作用が見たこともない他心の作用である、と、いかにして知ることができようか。唯心論的には、それは他人の作用として現れる自分自身の表象なのである。

『唯識二十論』において扱われていた他心を知る人、すなわちヨーガ行者の直接知覚の問題については、さきに第66スートラからもうかがえたことであるが、ダルマキールティは第89スートラ以下でさらに詳細に論じている。ここでの反論者は「他心を直接知る [ヨーガの修行] 者たちは、いかにして [他心を] 知るのであるか? (i) もし 他心それ自体を直接知るのであれば、彼の捉えたものは [自心とは] 別のものであることになろう。(ii) もし知らないのであれば、彼らはどうして [他心を] 直接知る者であろうか? (S.88)。又、直接知覚が対象それ自体を捉えないことがどうしてあろうか? もし捉えないならば、どうして<認識手段>であろうか」(S. 89) という。ダルマキールティ はそれに対していう。「悟りに達していない (未転依、gnas ma gyur pa) から、主客を区別する概念知 (gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa 所取・能取の分別) を捨てていないヨーガの修行者たちは、他心を知るとしても、[それ自体を捉えるからではなく、] 日常活動において欺かないから、<認識手段>である。ちょうど<色>(gzugs いろかたち) などの知覚のように (S. 90)。ヨーガ (瞑想) の力により、他心の特別な形象と極似するものが明瞭にあらわれる知が、彼らには生じるのである。ちょうど、業や神などの威神力に依って、正夢を見るように (S.91)。彼らにも他心 [それ自体] を対象とする知が生じることはない。それ (=他心) と形象が同じであるにすぎない、自分自身の心の<あらわれ>を知る時、「他心を知る者」と明確に呼ばれるのである (S.92)。それが直接知覚であるのは、その [他心の] 形

9 ヨーガ行者の知(yogijñāna)については、たとえば NB, I. s. 11 参照。

象と極似するものが明瞭にあらわれるからであり、欺かないから<認識手段>と認めるのである(S.93)。「仏」世尊があらゆるものをご存知であることは、「われわれの」理解を超えている。仏知は「われわれの」知識や言語の領域を超えているから(S.94)」と。

仏陀にも他心智はあるが、仏陀の認識領域はわれわれの思惟や言語を超越しているから、記述できない。ヨーガ行者はなお転依 (āśrayaparāvṛtti)を完成していないので、さとの境地に達していない。だからその他心知はなお主観・客観の分岐を離れていないから、純粋な直接知覚とはいえないで、その知に他心自体の形象があらわれるのではない。それが直接知覚といわれるのはただ第二次的な呼称にすぎない。

仏陀の直観知の境界は<表現されない自体として> (nirabhilāpyātmanā)現れていて、私たちの理解の及ぶ所ではない。ヨーガ行者が他心を知覚するといっても、それはなお主観と客観の分別を超えてはいないから、真実ではない、とダルマキールティはいう。その仏陀の直観知を最高の真理 (paramārthasatya, 勝義諦) とすれば、ダルマキールティの<他人の心流の証明>は依然として、世俗の真理 (saṃvṛtisatya, 世俗諦) においてのことである。

ラトナキールティ

ヴァスバンドゥにせよ、ダルマキールティにせよ、その他人の心流の議論は二義的なものである。彼らは一方で他人の心の存在を肯定しながらも、他方では、仏陀の直観による認識は私たちの理解を超越しているから、真実の世界での他心の存否は私たちには分らない、という。人間の認識は基本的な無知である<無明>によって全体的に迷乱させられているものであるから、仏陀という覚者の言語表現を超えた直観においては他心もそして自心すらも私たちの認識とは異なっている、と彼らは認めている(上記『二十論』第21偈、ダルマキールティ『他相続の存在論証』S.58参照)。

このような二義性は勝義的な立場から『他人の心流の論破』を書いたラトナキールティにおいても存在していた。モークシャーカーラグプタ(12世紀ころ)は、その『論理のことば』においてラトナキールティの<他心の存在の証明>をかなり改訂した形で引用している¹⁰。この分節の原文に相当するものはラトナキールティの『自在

¹⁰ Kajiyama[1998], 20.2.4 (p.106) and n.289. ただし、p.107 のサンスクリット還元テキスト中の nantarbhāvād は anantarbhāvād に訂正。

神論証の批判』(Īśvarasādhana)に存在する¹¹。外教の有神論者は、世界の一切の事物は結果と見なされるから、有知なる作者である神を原因としている、と主張するのであるが、その有知なる神は見ることのできないものであり、その神の存在はすべて結果は有知なる者を原因としてもつ、という理由の上に論証されようとする。見えないものを見る結果の原因として推理することは、仏教における他人の心流の証明と揆を一にする。そのため有神論者は彼らの推論を批判する仏教者は他人の心の存在を証明できない、と反論する。ラトナキールティはそれに対して、世界の原因である見えない神は存在しないが、見えないけれども他人の心流の存在は推理することができる、というのである。しかも、その彼は別に『他人の心流の論破』(Santānāntaradūṣaṇa)¹²を書いて、他人の心の存在しないことを証明しているのである。ラトナキールティの議論のこのような二義性をどのように理解したらよいのであろうか。長年月にわたる著作活動のあいだには人はその思想を変更することがある、というべきか。あるいは、同じ仏教のなかでも、外界実在論の立場に立つ時と唯心論の立場に立つ時とでは、論旨が異なってくる、というべきであろうか。

とにかく、『自在神論証の批判』のなかの有神論者とラトナキールティとの論争を、一、二原文のテキストに不安定なところがあるにもかかわらず、あえてここに訳出しておこう。

[有神論者が反論している。]「もし見られるものである火一般と煙一般との間のように、見られる二つの事物である結果一般と原因一般との二つの間の遍充(vyāpti, たとえば、煙あれば火あり、という大前提の命題)が知覚と無知覚を媒介にしてなりたつというならば、[仏教者の主張する]他人の心の推理は誤りとなってしまふ。自と他の心流に共通した、見ることのできない心一般と[言語や動作などの]知覚によって見られる対象との(-viśayād はviśayasyaに訂正¹³)間に遍充を把握することは不可能であるからである」と。

[答論]しかしそのようにいってはならない。というのは、外界の対象が存在するという立場では、自と他との心流に共通する心一般はその本性において見られるものではないけれども、見られる身体とともに一つの全体とし

¹¹ RNA, 45,13- 23.

¹² RNA, 145-149.

¹³ テキスト45, n.2 に、Ms. には kasyasya という意味不明の語がある、という。これは viśayād が viśayasya であったことを暗示するかもしれない。

て結合しているのだから、それには不可分割的存在性がある。したがって、たとえば壺を対象とする知覚がその形の一部分について起こっていても、逸脱性がないから、壺の全体を想定させるように、そのように、身体を把握するだけの知覚は身体と不可分割に起こる、自心と他心に共通する心一般を〔身体の〕動作などの能遍 (vyāpaka) であると知る。したがってこのように、見られるもの自体、あるいは見られるものと不可分割にある事物は実用的な、鋭い知覚によって成立するし、遍充の把握も可能である。しかし、そのような状態を離れた、〔神その他の〕見られないものに共通した心一般についてはそうはいかない。こうして他人の心流の推理は妥当なものである。それゆえにもし知覚と無知覚とによって遍充が把握されるとすれば、見られるものと見られるものとの間にのみ可能であることになる。

この文章にある〈外界の対象が存在するという立場では〉 (bāhyārthasthitau) とか、〈実用的な〉 (vyāvahārika) とかという語は、ラトナキールティがこれを経量部的な実在論の立場、すなわち世俗諦の立場で書いていることを思わせる。それに反して、『他人の心流の論破』は勝義諦の立場で書かれている。そのなかでラトナキールティは「勝義諦の立場でこの理解を教示する」といっている¹⁴ことからそれは分かる。したがって、彼の議論の二義性は世俗と勝義との二義にもとづくものである、というよいと思う。

ラトナキールティの『他人の心流の論破』の前提になっている理論は、あらゆる事物は知識と共に不可分のものとして認識されるのであるから、知的でない外界の対象というものは存在しない、という唯識の理論と、その自己の心の顕現に他ならない、知的な世界は青や黄や種々なものから成るが、それらは多様なままに唯一の不可分なものとして知によって照らされる、という〈多様一元論〉とである。

前者はすでにダルマキールティの著名な理論から出ている。それは「青〔などの対象〕と知との二つは、一緒に認識されるから、区別がない。その知覚自体が〔自己認識によって〕認識されていない限り、対象を見ることは成立しない」 (sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nilataddhiyoḥ / apratīyakṣopālabhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati // PVin, I, v.55)。ダルマキールティは、直接知覚や概念知など、一切の心と心作用とには自己認識 (自証, svasaṃvedana) といわれる自覚があり、それも四種に分類される直接知覚の一つである、といったが、その自己認識は後期の仏教認識論でも重視された。上

¹⁴ SAD, 149,12-13.

記のPVinにあるダルマキールティの詩節と同意ではあるが別文の詩節はPV,III, vv. 387-388ab (テキストによっては388-389ab)¹⁵にもあって、その388abは「[対象と知との] 区別は迷乱した知をもつ者によって見られるであろう、たとえば[眼病者がただ]一つの月を[二つと]見るように」(bhedaś ca bhrāntivijñānair dṛṣyetendāv ivādvaye)となっている。そのためにPVin. v.55abとPV,III,388abとを連合させて一詩として引用されることもある(例えばSDS, 32)。

私たちの知覚領域には山・川・森その他の様々なものがある。しかしそれらはみな私の知覚と切り離すことはできないから、その知識を離れて対象が別に外界にあるわけではない。しかも種々様々な知覚内容のうちから、たとえば川だけをとり出して、山や森などと区別することも私たちにはできない。そうであれば、私たちの知は、多様なものを唯一の全体として照明(prakāśa)し、見ていることになる。これが<多様一元照明論>といわれる後期唯識の理論である。

『他人の心流の論破』の始めにラトナキールティは、ダルマキールティが『他人の心流の証明』の冒頭に掲げた経量部の<他心証明の推理>、さらには恐らく同じ推理を唯心論的に解釈したダルマキールティ自身の推理をも含めて、より詳しく紹介した後に、それを分析し批判する。ここで問題となっていることは、他人の言語・動作などの結果がその人の心の動き、いいかえれば、<欲求心>を原因として先行させるかどうか、である。

ラトナキールティは、その推理によって証明されようとしている<欲求心>というものが、推理者にとって見ることのできるものか、あるいは見る、見られないという限定を顧慮しない、欲求一般(icchā-mātra)であるのかを詳細に検討する。まず、第一の選言肢として、欲求心が見られるものであるならば、他人の心流、いいかえれば、他人の欲求心は推理するときに、本来見られるものであるにかかわらず、認識されていないのであるから、それは無存在なのであって、推理を始めることはできない。もし、その他人の欲求心がいま見えるというならば、それだけで目的は達成されたのであるから、推理の必要はまったくないわけである。

また、第二の選言肢として、自分および他人に共通した、見られる、見られない、という限定を必要としない欲求心一般が言語・動作などの原因である、という場合を検討しよう。いま推理の大前提として必要なことは<言語・動作などの顕現は欲求心一般がないときにはない>ということである。しかし、自他に共通した欲求心

¹⁵ Tosaki[1979-1985], II, 20-71 ; PV, 235.

一般というものは自己認識 (svasaṃvedana) あるいはその他の認識によって確認できない。たとえば、胃中の消化の火とか、絵に描かれた火というものとも共通する火一般というものは実在として確認できないように、他人と共通した欲求心一般も、もしここにあるならば必ず私に認識できるであろう、と知ることはできない。因果関係の推理においては、欲求心がなければ言語・動作はあり得ない、という否定的必然性(vyatireka) がなりたつことが前提となるのだが、それがここではなりたたない。本性的に認識を超越した(svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa)心一般というものを議論の対象とすることはできないのである。

また過去および未来のものについては<時間的にかけ離れている>ということもあるが、他人の心は現在するから、それが時間的に認識を超えることはない。また他人の心が空間的にかけ離れていて、認識できないということも不合理である。いつでも見えない他人の心は空間的に認識を超えるとはいふことができない。他人の心はただ本性的に認識を超越しているのである。

たとえば悪魔は見られないと考えられているが、同じ種類の他の悪魔には見られるであろうし、ヨーガ行者には見えるかもしれない。だから、認識者である個人との結合を度外視して心一般という言い方をしてはならない。ダルモッタラもダルマキールティの知覚の定義について、それは個々の理解者に関してのみなされるものだ、といっている¹⁶。見られるものとは、もしこの場所、この時に、壺などがあるならば、それらは私の眼識のみの対象となるであろう、という限定のもとに、見られるものといわれねばならない。特定の欲求心というものは、自分の心流に存在するもので、推理する人にとって見られるものである。しかし他人の心に属する欲求心についてはそうはいえない。それは見られるべきものの無認識によって拒否される。

たとえば白い貝がある場所において、白い形相として顕現する自分の心は自己認識によって知られる。しかしその同じ場所に黄色の形相として顕現している他人の心が知られることはない。自分の心はけっして他人の心から区別されたものとして見られることはない。自分の心と他人の心との間にはなんらの限界もないのであるから。結局、多様な形相として顕現している私の知覚領域は、多様なままに、ただひとつの私の自己認識の世界なのである。

『他人の心流の論破』のなかに含まれる他の議論は、後に掲げる和訳において明

¹⁶ DhP, 104,5-6.

白になるであろうから、いまここで紹介する必要はないであろう。ダルマキールティは、自分の表象に含まれる他人の言語・動作という結果からその原因である見えない他人の心の動きを推理しているのであるが、他人の言語・動作というものも要するに自分の表象に他ならないとすれば、それは自分の心の顕現以外のなにものでもない。それは、夢の中で他人がことばをしゃべったり、身体を動かしたりしても、それを根拠にして自分の心と別に独立した他人が存在するとはいえない、のと同じであろう。少なくとも認識論・論理学の領域内においては、ラトナキールティの議論の方が正しいように、私には思える。

釈迦牟尼仏は人を始めとする有情に精神的実体としての自我(ātman)は存在しないと宣言し、それによって自他の無差別と平等を説いた。これが仏教の実践倫理としての慈悲の理論的根拠になったのである。ラトナキールティは唯識思想に立って他人の心流の存在を否定し、有情も自然的世界も一切が自分の心にあることを宣言し、それによって自他の無差別と平等と慈悲を説こうとしているのである。

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- ISD *Īśvarasādhyanadūṣaṇa* of Ratnakīrti. Included in RNA.
- JNA *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*, ed. by Anantalal Thakur, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1959.
- Kajiyama[1965] Buddhist Solipsism, a free translation of Ratnakīrti's *Samtānāntaradūṣaṇa*, IBK (『日本印度学仏教学研究』) XIII,1, 1965.
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- MAVBh *Madhyāntavibhāḡabhāṣya*, ed. by Gadjin M. Nagao, Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo 1964.
- MAVT *Madhyāntavibhāḡaṭikā de Sthiramati*, ed. by Susumu Yamaguchi, Librairie Hajinkaku, Nagoya 1934.
- MAVT(tr.) 山口益 (Susumu Yamaguchi), 『中辺分別論釈疏』、鈴木学術財団、1966(MAVTの日本語訳)。
- MAVS *Madhyāntavibhāḡasāstra*, ed. by R.C.Pandeya, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi 1971 (Maitreya's *kārikās*, Vasubandhu's *bhāṣya*, and Sthiramati's *ṭikā*).
- Nagao[1982-1987] 長尾雅人 『攝大乘論一和訳と注解』上下、講談社 (チベット訳・漢訳テキスト、序論・日本語訳・注解を含む)。
- NB *Nyāyabindu* by Dharmakīrti. Included in DhP.
- NBT *Nyāyabinduṭikā* of Dharmottara. Included in DhP.
- PV *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin*, ed. by Rāhula Sāṃkrṭyāyana, ed. with Manorathanandin's *vṛtti*, Patna, 1937. ただしPVの章順は I. Svārtha-anumāna, II. Pramāṇa-siddhi, III. Pratyakṣa, IV. Parārtha-anumāna として統一する。
- PVBh *Pramāṇvārttikabhāṣya* of Prajñākaragupta, ed. by R.Sāṃkrṭyāyana, Kashi Prasad Jayawal Research Institute, Patna 1953.
- PVin *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ* by Tilmann Vetter, I. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung. Wien 1966.
- RNA *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali*, deciphered and edited by Anantalal Thakur, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1975 (Second revised edition).
- SAD *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa* of Ratnakīrti. Included in RNA.
- SAS *Dharmakīrti's Saṃtānāntarasiddhi and Vinītadeva's Saṃtānāntarasiddhiṭika*, Tibetan texts ed. by Th.Stcherbatsky, Bibliotheca Buddhica, XIX, 1916.
- SAS [Negi] *Santānāntarasiddhiḥ of Ācārya Dharmakīrti and Santānāntarasiddhiḥ Ṭikā of Ācārya Vinītadeva*, Restored and edited by J.S.Negi, Bibliotheca Indo Tibetica Series-XXXVII, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnatha, Varanasi 1997.
- SAS [Chinchore] *Santānāntarasiddhiḥ and Santānāntarasiddhi Ṭikā*, Restored by M.R. Chinchore, Bibliotheca Indo Tibetica Series-XXXVIII, Central Institute of

- Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi 1997.
- SDS V.S.Abhyankar, ed. , *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1951.
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- Vst *Vimśatikā*, Included in *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, ed. by Sylvain Lévi, Paris,1925.
- VT Vinitadeva's *ṭikā* on the *Vimśatikā*(Tibetan tr.), デルゲ版 『チベット大蔵経』論疏部、世界聖典刊行協会、東京 1981、唯識部第14巻。
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ラトナキールティ 『他人の心流の論破』

(145、3) さて、ここで、「[知の] 照明と共に認識されるから (prakāśasahopalambha-) などの証明¹⁷の力によって、一切の知的でない諸事物 [の存在] が否認され、自己の心の顕現を本性とする、青や黄などのあらゆる事物の類いが、夢・幻などのように、不二の相(advayarūpa)をもつことが証明されている¹⁸ときに他人の心流 (santānāntara)が存在するのか存在しないのかを考察するために、この [論文が] 書き始められる。

[反論] (145、6) ある人々はこういう。「推理によって、他人の心流は、

17 本文19-20ページ参照。RatnakīrtiもRNA, 129,17-18 に sahopalambha-niyamād ityādinaḥ pūrvam eva nilādinām sākāravijñānatvasādhanaḥ ([知識とその対象とが] 一緒に認識されることが決定しているから、などといって、先にすでに、青など [の対象] が形象をもった知識そのものに他ならないことを証明しているから) という。sahopalambhaniyamād(我々のテキストではprakāśasahopalambha- となっている) の偈は後期の仏教論理學者によってしばしば引用される。

18 直接知覚の対象領域は多様であると同時に唯一・不二である、という「多様不二照明論」citrādvaitaprakāśavāda がこの論文の前提となっている。Ratnakīrti 自身の同名の論文はRNA,129ff.にある。多様不二を証明する推論式は本稿注36に引用している。

まさしく存在すると知られる。というのは、言語活動 (vyāhāra)・行動 (vyavahāra) などはそうしようという欲求心の直後に顕現することが経験されるからであり、その欲求心がない時には [言語・行動なども] 見られないからである。それが認識されるか認識されないかによって成立する、肯定的随伴性 (anvaya) と否定的随伴性 (vyatireka)¹⁹を本体とする因果関係(kāryakāraṇabhāva)が欲求心(icchācitta)と言語活動などの顕現との間にあることを、自分の心において確認したのちに、[自分に] 欲求心が認められない時にも [自分と] 切り離された [外部に] 言語活動などが現れるのが見られるから、その原因である [他人の] 欲求心が存在すると推理される。したがって、他人の心があると確認されるのである」と。

【答論】(145、12) この点について、次のように考察される。その言語などの現れる原因であると決め込まれている欲求心というものは、推理する人にとって見ること(直接知覚)ができるものなのか、あるいは、見られる・見られないという限定(drśyādrśyaviśeṣaṇa)を顧慮されない、欲求一般(icchāmātra)であるのか。

(145、13) もし、とにかく、第一の選言肢である時には、[その欲求心は] 推理者に見られるものであるから、その欲求心(icchācitta)を推理するという時に、それが認識されていないということは、その無存在をこそ理解させるのであって、[本来見られるものが] 認識されない、という知覚によって拒斥されているのであるから(anupalambhākhyā-pratyakṣabādhitatvāt)、どこに推理の余地があろうか。またもし、欲求心が推理のときに感受(anu-bhū)されているとすれば、その推理は何の役にたつのであるか。

【反論】(145、16) 「もしそのようであれば、火と煙との間の因果関係が証明された直後に、[遠方の] 山の雑木林に煙が立つのを見ている人は、また火をも推理はしないであろう。その場合にも、火は無認識によって拒斥されているからである。逆に[火が] 認識されているならば、推理は無用であるからである。」

【答論】(145、18) そういうわけではない。推理をする時に、空間的に

19 因果関係の決定の場合に用いられるanvaya(肯定的随伴性)、vyatireka(否定的随伴性)の二語は、推理における媒名辞と大名辞との関係について用いられる同じサンスクリット語とやや意味を異にしている。たとえば、火も煙もない所に、「火が生じると煙が起る」(肯定的随伴性)、ついで「火が消えると煙も滅する」(否定的随伴性)という過程によって火と煙の因果関係は決定され、それぞれがanvaya, vyatireka とよばれる。推理の場合のanvaya (肯定的必然性)は「煙あれば火あり」であり、vyatireka (否定的必然性)は「火なければ煙なし」である。以下の拙論参照。Trikaṇḍakacintā, Development of the Buddhist Theory on the Determination of Causality, Y.Kajiyama, *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, ed., by K.Mimaki et al, Rinsen Book Co. Kyoto 1989, pp.475-489.

遠方にある火は見るができないのであるから、見られるものの無認識 (dṛśyā-nupalabdhi)を離れているのであり、また本来見られないものの無認識(adṛśyānupalambha) が無存在を証明するということが矛盾しているからである²⁰。しかし、欲求心というものは [いま見られるものと設定されているのであるから] 空間的に遠く離れているということはない。というのは、欲求心というものは自分と結びついているのだから、推理する者にとって見る (知覚する) ことができるものである。それが空間的に遠く離れているというのは、常識的でない。

(145、23) あるいは [先の二つの選言肢のうちの] 第二の選言肢を取るならば、その際には、自分および他人に共通していて、見られる・見られないという限定を必要としない、欲求心一般が、言語活動などとしての顕現に対して原因であると確認されることになる。しかしその確認はいかなる認識手段によってなされるのであるか。言語活動などの顕現は欲求心一般がない時にはない、ということを知って、因果関係の証明をしようと欲しているわけであるが、その自分および他人に共通した欲求心一般の無存在は、自己認識(svasaṃvedana)²¹あるいはその他の認識によって理解することはできない。

(145、27) たとえば、空間的・時間的に遠方にある火一般というものでさえも、煙の生じている場所および時にそれがあろうならば、私はそれを認識できるであろう、というように、可能的に設定された [火] は、推理する人の感官的知覚によって、煙の生じる前には存在しない、と確認されるのであって、それは [煙と火との間の] 因果関係の証明を成立させ得るのである。こうして空間的・時間的に遠方にある火は、煙一般に対して原因であることが、確認される。

(146、2) しかし、本性において [人間の認識を] 超越した(svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa)もの、たとえば胃中にある [消化の火] などと共通する [火] は、推理する人がその無存在を知ることが全面的にできないものであって、[火と煙との間の] 遍充(vyāpti)の外にあるのである。それと同じように、いまの場合の、他人の心とも共通している欲求心というものも、もしここにあるであろうならば必ず私に認識できるであろう、と可能的に設定されることができれば、その限りに於て、その否

²⁰ 本来見られないもの (adṛśya,svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa),例えば鬼霊などはそれが見られないからといって、その存在を否定することはできない。知覚領域にあれば見られるはずのものが見られない時のみ、その存在の否定が推理によって成立つ。

²¹ 自己認識 (自証) svasaṃvedana は四種の直接知覚の一つで、知覚、概念知 (推理) を問わず、あらゆる知識は必ずそれ自身が直接知覚される、という仏教認識論の理論。

定的遍充 (vyatireka. 欲求心がなければ言語・行動もないという必然性) が成立つことを介して、[それが言語・行動などの活動の] 原因であると確定されるのである。けれども、まったく本性的に超越的な(svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa)心一般であるならば、[それはわれわれの認識を超えたものであるから] この議論はもう終わるのである。

(146、7) また、他人の心というものは時間的に遠く離れることはない、それは現在するものであるから。われわれは過去および未来のものについてのみ「時間的に超越している」というのであるから。またそれ [他人の心] は空間的に遠方にあるわけでもない。というのは、白い貝などがある場所において、白い形相として顕現する自分の心が自己認識によって知られるが²²、その同じ場所に、黄色の形相として顕現している、[黄疸を病む] 他人の心流(parasantāna)に属する心が知られるわけではない。[他人の心はいつでも見えないのであるから] それが [時として] 空間的に遠方にあるなどということはないのである。

[反論] (146、12) この点について次の反論がなされるであろう。「欲求心一般というものは、自己認識一般に関していえば、本性的に [認識を] 超越しているわけではない。というのは、一つの火はある感官知によって見られるとしても、まさにその「感官知」によって、それ以外の火も見られるわけではない²³。その場合にも、火一般は視覚一般に依って見られる、と定められる。そのように、いまの場合にも、自己および他人の心に共通している欲求心一般は、自己認識一般に依って見られるというべきである」と。

[答論] (146、16) これについてはこう答えよう。いったい、〈一般〉という言葉によって、推理する人との結合・不結合によって特殊化されていない、誰かある人の、感官知であって、事物を対象とするものとはいうものの、その [事物の] 見られるべき様相を心に描いてみても形相なきものが考えられているのであるか²⁴。もしそうであれば、悪魔 (piśāca) などさえも、見られるもの(drśya) となるであろう。というのは、それもヨーガ行者などの誰かある人、あるいは同じ種類の他の悪魔にとっては感官知の対象であるということになるから、いかなるものも

²² 唯識思想によれば、あらゆるものは自分の心の表象に他ならない。白い貝も外界に存在する対象ではなくて、自分の表象であり、いいかえれば、自分の心の顕現である。

²³ drśyam は drśyaḥ とよむ。テキスト脚注 146,1 参照。

²⁴ RNA[1975] : drśyatāsambhāve 'pi nānimittam abhīmatam; Ed. in 1957: drśyatā-sambhāvan 'pi nānimittam abhīmatam. いまはdrśyatāsambhāvan 'py ānimittam abhīmatam と読む。

本性的に認識されないものとはならないであろう。そういうわけで、推理する人との結合を無視しないで、知識のそれぞれの特徴などの違いを除外するだけが目的である場合にのみ、一般(mātra) [=のみ] という語が用いられるのである。このことを懸念して、ダルモッタはいった：

この直接知覚の定義は個々の理解者に関してなされている²⁵

云々と。

それゆえに、見られ得るものの想定(sambhāvanā)は次のようになされる。もし、この場所、この時に、壺などがあるならば、それらは必ず認識されるであろう、私の眼識のみの対象となるであろう、と。けれども、他人の心については、もし他人の心がここにあるならば、必ず私の自己認識のみの対象²⁶となるであろう、というような「形で、想定をする」ことはできない。

(146、26) もし欲求心一般が、[それと言語・動作などとの間の] 因果関係を把握する時に見られるものとして想定されるべきである、というのであれば、推理の時にも見られ得るものとして想定して、それが認識されないことによってその無存在が証明されてしまう場合に、[それ以上に] どうして推理を行うためにこの[努力] が始められるのか。知覚だけによって[欲求心が存在するという] 主張は拒否されるのであるから。また、「時を異にすることによって、[欲求心は] 本性的に認識を超えることもあるし、そうでないこともある」というとしても、それは本質的なことではない。

(146、29) それゆえに、自分および他人の心に共通する欲求心一般というものは見られ得るものとして想定することができないのであるから、言語活動²⁷などの生じる以前には認識もされないのであるし、存在もしないことになるのである。したがって、それが存在しない時にはその無存在と結びついた言語活動なども存在しないことが知られるのである。したがって、[欲求心一般が言語活動などの] 原因であることがいかにして証明されようか。もしそう[証明されるの] であれば、[言語活動などという] 結果の原因であるという仕方でも[欲求心が] 推理されるであろうが。

(146、32) けれど特定の欲求心(icchācitta-viśeṣa)というものは、自分の心流

²⁵ NBT(=DhP), 104, Com. on II,s.14; Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, 65.

²⁶ 改訂本ではviṣayiとなっているが、今は初版に従ってviśayaḥと読む。

²⁷ 初版ではvyavahāra, 改訂版ではvyahāraであるが、今はvyahāraと読む。

に存在するもの(svasantānabhāvin)であって、推理する人にとって見られるものことである²⁸。けれども、それは見られるべきものの無認識によって、知ろうとされている特定の主辞〔すなわち、他人の心〕においては拒斥されているのであるから、どうして推理がなりたとうか、といわれるのである。

(147、1) このようにして、(1) 特定の欲求心、すなわち自分の心流に属する〔欲求心〕が証明されるべきものであるとすれば、〔目下の〕推理の主題〔pakṣa.他人の欲求心〕は知覚によって拒斥される。(2) 自分および他人に共通する欲求心一般が証明されるべきものであるとすれば、(2a) 「見られるものの」という限定と無関係に、無認識のみによって〔欲求心のない時には言語活動などもない、という否定的〕必然関係を証明しようとしても、それがあり得ないことが知られる。その時には主張されている主辞 (pakṣikṛte dharminī すなわち、他人の心) においてもそうである〔つまり否定的必然性がなりたたない〕から、その誤りがあることになる。(2b) もしその〔否定的必然性〕が知られない時には、言語活動など〔の存在〕は否定的必然性が疑わしいもの(sandigdavyatireka)という誤った理由となる、と決定される。

〔反論〕(147、6) 「そうであるならば、他人〔の存在〕を証明するものもなく、またそれを拒斥するいかなるものも見られないから、それについては疑いが残るだけである」とある人々はいう。

〔答論〕彼らはこれから述べられる〔われわれの〕拒斥を聞くべきである。

もし他人の心流があるとすれば、それと区別されるものとして、自分の心流が必ずあるべきであろう。そうでなければ、輝いている(prakāśamāna) 自分の心流からのその他人の心流と思われているものの区別もないであろう。けれども、〔自分と他人の心流の〕二つには区別がないのではない。というわけで、自分の心流からの区別と無区別との両者によって除外されてしまう〔すなわち、自分の心流から区別されもしないし、同一でもない〕他人の心流は、一般者(種概念)や兎の角のように、まさしく実在しないことになるのであるから²⁹、どうして疑われる〔だけ〕

²⁸ 初版、改訂版ともにna (139, 26及び146, 32)をもつが、文脈から見て除く方がよい。

²⁹ 兎角や種概念はいずれも無存在の喩。自分の心流からの区別と無区別(=同一)の両者によって除外されるもの、とは兎角や種概念のようにまったく存在しないものことである。ここのsvasantānād bhedābhedābhyām abādhyasya parasantānasya の abādhyā- は bādhyā- と読むべきである。同じ意味の言い方は147,27 : bhedābhedayor abhāva- ; 147,28 : bhedābhedābhāva; 148, 32:bhedābhedābhyām avācyatvam などに表れ、最後の語はつねに否定を意味している。こども bādhyasya と読まないと同じ意味にならない。

といえようか。そういうわけで、他人の心流と対比して〔のみ〕自分の心流の区別も必ずあることになるべきである。そしてその区別は心流の本性であって、自分の心流が顕現している時には必然的に顕現するであろう。そうでなければ、どうして、見ると見えないという特徴をもつ、二つの矛盾した性質が付着している時に、自分の心流の他人の心流からの区別が本性となることを得ようか。

(147、15) けれども〔実際には〕この区別は顕現しない。というのは、区別の顕現が得られている時には、その限界(avadhi)をなしている他人の心流の顕現も隠しがたいはずであろうから。

それから異なっている、ということが自分の心の本性であるならば、これが限界をもつことも現れるであろう。さもなければ、それ自体として把握されているのではない³⁰。

異なっているとしても、他のものの一部分さえもないならば、何から異なっているのであるか³¹。

[ジュンナーナシュリーミトラの] 『教えの灯火である吉祥なる有相〔唯識〕綱要』(Pravacanapradīpaśrī-sākārasaṅgraha)などの、上記を始めとするすべてのことばが思い出されねばならない。

(147、21) ちょうど自分の心流のみが現れている時には、現れてもいない兔の角からの区別は見られないように、顕現することのない他人の心流からの区別も現れない。実に、他人の心流と較べて自分の心流のどんな僅かな特殊性も明らかにならないのは、兔の角と較べても違いがないのと同じである。そして兔の角と他人の心流との二つと較べて、同一の自分の心流が現れている時に、兔の角と較べて区別も無区別もともに現れていないのに、他人の心流と較べると区別のみが現れる、と確定することはできないのである。

(147、27) 区別と無区別の両者の無存在〔すなわち兔角のように全く存在しないもの〕を否定すること(bhedābhedayor abhāvaparīhāra)によって、区別が確定されるように、そのように区別の顕現も区別と無区別の無存在の顕現と異なっている時にのみあり得るのである。しかしそのようには感受(領納、anubhava)されない。

³⁰ JNA, *Sākārasiddhi*, 458; *Sākārasaṅgraha*, 570 (v.149). Jñānaśrīmitra のテキストでは svasya cetasāḥ の代わりに grāhyavastunaḥ となっている。

³¹ JNA, *Sākārasiddhi*, 456, 23; *Sākārasaṅgraha*, v.185c. JNA の neti と bhinnattu との2語はRNAでは naiti, bhinnāḥ に変っている。

それでも相違が現れる、というのはでっちあげた言いまわし(vacana)にすぎない。この点については、『区別の顕現の批判』³²における「バーシュヤの作者」(プラージュニャーカラグプタ)の論理を詳しく理解すべきである。

〔反論〕(148、1) もし「限界の顕現がないとしても、この[自分の心流が他人の心流から]区別をもって現れることは、他心の後に[引き続いて起こる]行為によって³³[推理されると]許さなければならない」というならば、

〔答論〕[それならば同じように唯識者である君にとって]外界の対象の無存在はどのようにして成立するのか。その点についても疑いをさしはさむことができる。

〔反論〕「外界の対象はいかなる人にも顕現しないが、ある人の心流は他の人に顕現することもある。したがって後者について疑いがあるが、外界の対象については[疑いは]ない」というならば、

〔答論〕この[説明も]すべて疑わしい。ある人の心流は他の人にならず顕現するわけではない。ある時にはそれは存在しないし、またそれは顕現もしない、ともいうこともできるのである³⁴。

(148、7) また外界の対象はいかなる人にも顕現しないでしょう。けれども、その[外界の対象の]無存在なることは、[外界の対象はないが他人の心流はあるという]区別の顕現を是認する論者(bhedapratibhāsābhyupagamavādin)たちにとって、いかにしてなりたつのか、というこのことこそがここでいわれようとしている。この点についてはいかなる誤りもない。それゆえに、他人の心流は外界の対象と共通しているのであるから、どうして[君と私という同じ]唯識論者たちにとっても同じ意見があることになろうか。

(148、10) また、区別の顕現を説く論者(bhedapratibhāsavādin)によっては二つの知識の間の因果関係(kāryakāraṇabhāva)も斥けることはできない。というのは、[因果関係が成立するためには]前に存在する知識は、[その]限界の顕現が

³² 『区別の顕現の批判』(Bhedapratibhāsādūṣaṇa) はテキスト校訂者によって固有名詞と見なされているが、Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya と別個な書物とも思われぬ。しかし同書のどの部分を指すかも分からない。

³³ テキスト、148、注1によれば、写本にはparacittānukriyā とあるようである。校訂者の訂正のようにparacittānu(kampayā) と読めば、「他心に対する同情によって」と訳せる。しかしこれはparacittānukriyayā と読むべきものと思われる。この反論は本稿本文18-19に現れる、心は身体とともに不可分の存在をなす、という考え方と意味が同じであるように思える。

³⁴ 改訂版では文末にśakteḥ とあるが、初版本ではsaktah である。後者の方が普通の用法である。

ない場合にも、後の知識に対して、自己の先在性という区別を把握し、後に存在する知識も、先の知識に対して自己が後であるという区別を理解する〔ことがなければならぬ〕。それは〔自分の心流の限界が顕現しないのに〕他人の心流〔との相違を理解する〕ごとくである。

先後の決定した関係である因果関係が顕現しつつあり、また青などの多様な形相のごとくに確認されている場合には、

〔因果関係などは〕世俗によって〔考えられる〕べきであると〔というならば、〕それはその通りである³⁵。

という、尊き(bhagavat) ヴァールティカの作者(ダルマキールティ)のことは、このような考えに対してどうして実のりあるものとなろうか。

(148、17) 「多様な形相をもつ領域」(citrākāracakra)という主辞(有法、dharmin)において唯一性(不二, advaita)を証明するために用いられた「照明していること」(prakāśamānatva)などの理由(hetu)には区別を把握する知覚が取り除かれた対象がある、とわれわれはいう³⁶。その〔君の〕対論者〔われわれ〕から、〔知覚に〕区別の把握があると主張している君は、他人の心流〔の存在〕への疑惑をもつことなしにどうして逃れることができようか。

〔反論〕(148、21) 「そうではあっても、他人の心流が存在しないことはいかなる認識手段(pramāṇa)によって証明されるのか。とにかく、知覚によってではない。それは存在する対象の肯定的〔認識〕(vidhiviśaya)であって、否定を証明する資格はないからである³⁷。また推理によってでもない。それは知覚し得るものの無存在(drśyābhāva)を証明することに決定しているのであって、感官を超えた(atīndriya)他人の心の無存在を証明することには適していないからである」。

〔答論〕(148、23) この点についてわれわれはいう。他人の心流があるとすれば、それは限定された存在であって、自分の心流はそれから異なったもので

³⁵ Dharmakīrti は PV, III, v.4 において、種子には芽を生ずる効力がある、というが、中観派が「勝義的には、すべてのものに効力などない、種子が芽を生ずるというのも世俗として認められるだけである」というのに対して、因果関係の設定は世俗的な、概念知の立場でのみあり得ることを認めている。cf. Tosaki[1979-1985], I, 62; I, 90 (III, v. 26).

³⁶ RNA, *Citrādvaitapraśavāda*, 129, 19-20: yat prakāśate tad ekam, yathā citrākāracakra-madhyavartī nilākārah; prakāśate cedam gaura-gandhāra-madhura-surabhi-sukumāra-sātetarādi-vicitrākāra-kadamḥbakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.

³⁷ Dharmakīrti の認識論では、知覚、厳密には直接知覚は存在するもののみかわる。存在しないものは知覚されないからである。存在の否定はすべて推理の領域においてなされる。

ある。自分の心流から区別がないとすれば、他人の心流だけがあることになる。[われわれの推論式は次のように構成される。]

A が B の形相として現れないならば、A は B の形相として存在すると表現できない、たとえば青が黄の形相として [存在すると表現できない] ように。

認識されている自分の心流は他人の心流から異なった形相としては認識されない。

[ゆえに、自分の心流は他人の心流から別異なものとして存在すると表現できない。³⁸]

これは別異なものが自分の心流と同一なもの (tādātmiya) であることを否定する場合には、「知覚し得るもの」という限定語を用いることによらない、「それ自体の非認識 (svabhāvanupalabdhi)」³⁹ [の推論式である]。

(148、29) また [この推論式には] 不成 (asiddhi, 理由の非実在性) の誤謬もない。区別が顕現するときにはその限界も顕現することになるからである。限界が顕現しない時には区別の顕現がないことは、兔の角の区別が顕現することがないように、成立するのである。このように、この認識手段によって、他人の心流の自分の心流に対する区別が斥けられ、[他人の心流の自分の心流に対する] 無区別性もおのずからあり得ない時には、[他人の心流が] 区別・無区別の両者によって語られ得ないことが証明された⁴⁰。一般者 (sāmānya, 種概念) などのように実在性の除かれたものにすぎない。どうして、拒斥するものがないから他人の心流については疑い [のみ] が残るといわれようか。以上は [権威ある] 論書に書かれている認識の結果を思い出させる要点を少しばかり書き記したにすぎない。その他は君が自分で検討すべきことである。

(149、3) また、君はとにかく他人の心流についての世間的な見解をもつ人々の疑問⁴¹ に同意している。しかし、世尊 [のことば] からは何が立証されるのか。

³⁸ 148、25-27: yad upalabhyamānam yena rūpeṇa na bhāsate na tat tena rūpeṇa sadvyavahārayogyam yathā nīlam pītarūpeṇa; nopalabhyate ca svacittam upalabhyamānam parasantānād bhinne [na] rūpeṇeti.

³⁹ Dharmakīrti は否定的推理を種々に分類するが、NB では8種類の否定的推理の第1形式が svabhāvanupalabdhi である。

⁴⁰ 148,32: bhedābhedābhyām avācyaṭvam については本稿注29 (p.24) 参照。

⁴¹ テキスト校訂者によれば、これ以後の部分は急いで筆写され、諸処に読み取れない文字がある。

疑問だけが提出されるのであれば、どうして彼の全智者性があり得ようか。いかなる時にも世尊によって他人の心流が現に存在すると確認されてはいない。しかも彼は全智者であるとしていえるのか。他人の心流を対象とした推理はすでに先に考察された。けれども、推理によって何かを知ったとしても、それでは全智者性であることはできない。知覚によって他人の心流が知られたとしても、世尊の心と他人の心流との間に認識するものと認識されるものとの関係(*grāhyagrāhakabhāva*)が存在することになるから、外界の対象の〔存在を認める〕議論が間接的に承認されたことになるであろう。どうしてそのような議論に惑わされようか。

(149、9) けれどもわれわれの見解では、他人の心流は決して存在しないと確認しているのであって、世尊の全智者性が害われるという誤りはない。世間一般の知識(*saṃvṛti*)⁴²というものが、区別を把握する誤った考えから成る限り、〔世人は〕他人の心流について疑問をもっている。だから、それを悟らせるためにことばなども起こされるのであるから、自語と矛盾すること(*svavacanavirodha*) はありはしない。われわれに、他人の心流を対象とする疑惑があらゆる形で存在しない、という見解があるのではない。そうではなくて、最高の真理(勝義、*paramārtha*)の立場でのこの理解を教示したのである。というのは、この他人の心流の無存在の論証は〔多様な形相をもつ視界が同時に〕不二であることの論証と共通しているので、自語などとの矛盾〔の指摘〕あるいはそれへの反論も一定している⁴³。『パーシュヤ』の作者〔ブラジュニャーカラグプタ〕は多様な形相の存在だけによってヴェーダーンタ派〔とまがう〕暗さからの脱出を示している。

すなわち、

〔外界の対象ではなくて〕その〔青などの形相〕自体が感受である。そして他のいかなるもののそれ(感受)でもない⁴⁴。

などの『ブラマーナ・ヴァールテイカ』の詩節を解釈する『パーシュヤ』〔が参照されねばならない〕。

⁴² 改訂版テキストでは、*saṃvṛstti* (149,10) であるが、初版本では *saṃvṛtis* である。初版本をとる。

⁴³ テキストは両版ともに *naikaniyataḥ* であるが、文脈から見て、*ekaniyataḥ* である可能性が強い。いまは後者によって読んだ。

⁴⁴ PV, III,v.327(326) a-b. *Bhāṣya* は注釈して「青などの自体こそが感受である」といい、さらに「自己のみが感受される。心だけが感受される」などという。*Bhāṣya*,352,21-22参照。また Tosaki[1979-1985] II、9-10参照。

【反論】（149、18） 「そうであれば【君の思想は】自我論 (ātmavāda) に陥ってしまう」というならば、

【答論】 そうではない。【知覚の世界は不二ではあるが、同時に】多様な形相が感覚されているのだから」⁴⁵.....

⁴⁵ PVBh, 352,26: nanvātmavādah prasaktaḥ, na , citrākārasaṃvedanāt... RNA 校訂者は149,17の vyākhyāna 以下の写本の最後の行は殆ど読めないという。とにかくテキストの最後の三行ほどは十分に意味が取れないので、和訳は省略する。

パーリ語・仏教梵語研究ノート

辛嶋静志

はじめに⁽¹⁾

筆者は北京大学留学中の1989年冬、指導教授の季羨林教授を通じて、当時、中国民族文化宮図書館に保存されていたMahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin (大衆部説出世間部)の律文献*Abbisamācārikā*(あるいは*Ābbisamācārikā*)の写真のコピーを頂いた。その後、1992年春までにローマ字転写を終えた。爾来、八年あまり、この仏教梵語で書かれた文献及び対応する漢訳『摩訶僧祇律』「威儀法」の訳注及び研究を進めている。

この文献は、同じく大衆部説出世間部の文献である*Mahāvastu*や*Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya*などとともにEdgertonの分類でいう仏教梵語文献の「第一グループ」に属しており(BHSG p. xxv)、中期インド語で伝承されていた仏典が仏教梵語に置き換えられ始めた段階の言語の様相を示している。従って、原始仏教・部派仏教文献としての研究価値だけではなく、本来中期インド語で伝えられていたものが徐々に梵語化されたと推定される幾つかの初期大乘梵語仏典——『法華経』もその一つだが——の研究にとっても重要な意味をもつ。

*Abbisamācārikā*など新出の文献を参考にすることで、パーリ語・仏教梵語の中の難語の意味や語源が明らかになる例も少なくない。あるいは逆に平明と思われていた語句の意味が、新しい文献での用例に照らし合わせてみると、実は別の意味であると分かった場合もある。また、仏教梵語の文献の梵語の語句の中には、本来中期インド語で伝承されていた表現を無理に梵語に置き換えた結果、本来の姿と似ても似つかぬ形になったものもある。これら誤った梵語化

⁽¹⁾ 本論文で使用する記号は次の通り： BHS = Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit ; Pā = Pāli; Pkt = Prākṛit; Skt = Sanskrit; A > B = AはBに音変化した; A ⇌ B = 語形Aは誤解によってBに変化した; * = 文献上確認されていない、想定された語形。例えば、**Vevacitti*; ~ = 梵語の語幹。例えば、*dharmā-*; ° = (梵語で) この記号の前あるいは後ろの部分は、直前に挙げた語と同じことを示す; 写本のローマ字転写の際に使用した標記： {A} = Aは削除すべし; [A] = Aは不明確; <A> = Aを補う。

引用した文献の略号は末尾の文献目録を参照。なお、本論文では、パーリ文献はすべてThe Pali Text Societyで出版された版から引用した。

(hypersanskritism)も、*Abbisamācārikā*など新出文献を参照することでその過程が明らかになる場合がある。

パーリ文献を研究するのに、パーリ文献だけを見ていては問題が見えてこない。逆に梵語仏典の研究といえども、(仏教)梵語の知識だけでは不十分なであり、古くからの伝承が梵語仏典の中でひそかに衣替えしていても、中期インド語の知識なしではそれに気付かない。要するに、パーリ文献、仏教梵語文献のそれぞれを正確に読んだ上で、総合的に考察する必要があるのである。

以下には、筆者が*Abbisamācārikā*やその他の仏教梵語文献の解読を進める間に会った幾つもの問題点のうち、パーリ文献と仏教梵語文献の双方に類似の表現があって、それらを総合的に考察してはじめて問題点が見えてきたものを取りあげることにする。

1. *muñcati* “flees, escapes from”

1. 1. *Dhammapada* 389

まず、パーリ『法句経』(*Dhammapada*)の第389偈をとりあげる。

na brāhmaṇassa pabareyya nāssa muñcetha brāhmaṇo
dhī brāhmaṇassa hantāraṃ tato dhī y' assa muñcati

この偈の第二、第四詩節はいささか問題で、解釈が分かれている。類似した偈が、仏教梵語、ガンダーラ語の文献にも見えるので、まずそれらを挙げよう。

Gāndhārī Dharmapada 11⁽²⁾:

na brahmaṇasa pabare'a nasa muje'a brahmaṇi
dhī brahmaṇasa hadara tada vi dhī yo na mujadi

Patna Dharmapada 46⁽³⁾:

na brāhmaṇassa pabare nāssa mucceya brāhmaṇo
dhī brāhmaṇassa hantāraṃ ya ssa vā su na muccati⁽⁴⁾

⁽²⁾ Brough 1962: 120.

⁽³⁾ Cone 1989: 115.

⁽⁴⁾ 第四詩節は、パーリ『法句経』の *y' assa muñcati* とガンダーラ語『法句経』の *yo na* (< skt. *enam*; cf. Pāli *na*³) *mujadi* (< skt. *muñcati*) とが混じった様な形になっていて、難解だが、*y' assa* (< skt. *asyā*) *cā su* (< *ca ssu* < skt. *ca sma*; cf. Norman 1969: 168) *na* (“indeed?”; cf. PTSD, s.v., *na*³; BHSD, s.v. *nam*) *mucati* と読むべきであろう。なお、*cā* と *vā* は書体が似ているため、しばしば混同される(本論文の§5.7を参照)。

Udānavarga 33. 63:

na brāhmaṇasya prabharen na ca muñceta brāhmaṇaḥ
dbig brāhmaṇasya hantāraṃ dbik taṃ yaś ca pramuñcati⁽⁵⁾

Abhisamācārikā(以下、Abhiと略す) 35A4 (= Jinananda 1969: 159.2-3)

na brāhmaṇasya prabhareya nāsyamuñceya brāhmaṇo
dbig brāhmaṇasya hantāraṃ taṃ pi dbik yo ^{ca} sya muñcati

1. 2. √ *muc* の解釈

パーリ『法句経』の偈は、例えばある和訳では次の様に訳されている。

「バラモンを打つな。バラモンはかれ (= 打つ人) にたいして怒りを放つな。バラモンを打つものには禍がある。しかし (打たれて) 怒る者にはさらに禍がある」⁽⁶⁾

第二、第四詩節の *assa muñcetha, assa muñcati* が「かれに怒りを放つ」「怒る」と訳されているが、これは、パーリ語の注釈が、*veraṃ* (“敵意”) を補い、「敵意を彼に (*assa*) 放つなかれ、彼に対して怒りをもつな」と解釈している⁽⁷⁾ のに基づく。他の日本語訳や英独仏の諸訳も概ね、パーリ語注釈の解釈に基づいた訳をしている⁽⁸⁾。し

⁽⁵⁾ なお、この *Udānavarga* の偈は漢訳とチベット訳がある。『出曜経』卷三十: 「不捶梵志 不放梵志 咄捶梵志 放者亦咄」(大正4, 774c25-26); 『阿毘達磨發智論』卷二十: 「不應害梵志 亦復不應捨 若害彼或捨 俱世智所訶」(大正26, 1029b28-29); *gang zbig bram ze rdeg pa blun / skrod par byed pa de ngan pas // bram ze rnam la brdeg mi bya / bram ze bskrad par mi byao //* (Beckh 1911: 153; *Udānavarga* III, 437). また、*Dharmatrāta* による注釈が漢訳とチベット語訳で残っている。漢訳で引けば、『出曜経』卷三十: 「不捶梵志 不放梵志 咄捶梵志 放者亦咄」所謂“梵志”者，得阿羅漢道。不得以手捲・刀杖加彼真人。“不放梵志”者，此是真人恆當供養衣被服・飯食・床臥具・病瘦醫藥・四事供養，令不減少。“咄捶梵志”，行惡之人。“放者亦咄”，復是惡人，不留供養飲食・床臥具・病瘦醫藥。能具此行，故名爲“梵志”。是故說曰：“不捶梵志 不放梵志 咄捶梵志 放者亦咄”(大正4, 774c25f.)。この偈は『阿毘達磨發智論』卷二十にも引かれ、解釈されている: 「不應害梵志 亦復不應捨 若害彼或捨 俱世智所訶」“不應害梵志”者，“梵志”即阿羅漢，謂不應以手塊・刀杖害阿羅漢。“亦復不應捨”者，謂於阿羅漢應以衣服・飲食・臥具・醫藥及餘資具恭敬供養，不應棄捨。“若害彼或捨 俱世智所訶”者，謂於阿羅漢，若以手塊等害，或復棄捨，而不敬養，俱爲世間諸有智者訶責毀訾」(大正26, 1029b28f.)

⁽⁶⁾ 中村元『真理のことば 感興のことば』岩波文庫，1978，p. 65.

⁽⁷⁾ *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā. The Commentary on the Dhammapada*, ed. by H. C. Norman, London 1914, PTS, vol. IV, p. 148, 1-3. “*nāssa muñcethā*” *ti so pi pabaṭo khīnāsavabrāhmaṇo assa pabaritvā ṭhitassa veraṃ na muñcetha tasmim kopam na kareyyā ti attho.*

⁽⁸⁾ 例えば、最も新しい英訳には次のようにある。“A brahman should not strike a brahman, nor should he release (angry words) against him. Woe to the killer of a brahman, and woe to him who releases (angry words) against him.” (Norman 1997: 55).

かし、この解釈は、諸訳者が注記で認めているように無理がある。

この \sqrt{muc} に関して、パーリ語注釈の解釈とは異なる見解もいくつかある。

例えば、Weberは“losstürzen, angreifen”(“襲う”)の意味と解釈している⁽⁹⁾。また、Broughはこの \sqrt{muc} を“uttering words”の意味と解釈し、第一、第二詩節を“A (true) Brahman should not strike a Brahman nor revile him”と訳している⁽¹⁰⁾。

さらに、Rothは、*Patna Dharmapada*第四詩節を $y' assa cāsuna mu[m]cati$ と読み、この $Dasuna$ は asu (“命”)の複数・対格の俗語形とみて、 \sqrt{muc} との結びつきで「命をとる、殺す」の意味であると解釈し、同じ解釈は $asuna$ に対応する語のないパーリ『法句経』にもあてはまると考える。そして、パーリ『法句経』の第二、第四詩節を“A Brahman should not deprive him of his life”, “but also shame on him (the Brahman), who deprives him (the other one, the non-Brahman) of his life”と訳している⁽¹¹⁾。しかし、このRothの解釈には勿論、無理がある⁽¹²⁾。

これらの諸説を踏まえて、Carter/Palihawadanaは、パーリ『法句経』の偈はこのままでは訳しようがないとまでいう⁽¹³⁾。

果たして本当に解釈不可能であろうか。

1. 3. *muñcati* “flees, escapes from”

従来のいずれの解釈も、属格 $assa$ (Skt. *asya*)と \sqrt{muc} との結びつきの理解に無理があった。ところで、 \sqrt{muc} の反射態(middle voice)は従格(ablative)や属格(genitive)を伴って「(～から)逃げる」(“frees one’s self, escapes from”)の意味になることがある⁽¹⁴⁾。第二詩節にある、願望法(optative)反射態の $muñcetha$ はこの意味で解釈できる。第四詩節の $muñcati$ は、能動態(active voice)が反射態の働きをもった例の一つと考えられる⁽¹⁵⁾。同様の例は、*Mahāvastu*にも見られる。すなわち、*Mahāvastu* I 308 8-9. *vyādbhitā vyādbhito muñcanti* (「病人は病気から回復した」字義通りには「病人は病気

⁽⁹⁾ Weber 1860: 82, 注3.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Brough 1962: 179-180. Broughは $brāhmano$ を第一、第二詩節両方の主語と解釈している。

⁽¹¹⁾ Roth 1980: 88-89 = 1986: 299-300.

⁽¹²⁾ *Patna Dharmapada*第四詩節については注(4)を見よ。

⁽¹³⁾ “When one translates the words as they are in the Pali version, one gets neither an adequate sense, nor even anything really like the traditional explanation that the commentary gives.” (Carter/Palihawadana 1987: 507-508).

⁽¹⁴⁾ Cf. MW, s.v. *muc*.

⁽¹⁵⁾ 能動態(active voice)の動詞が反射態(middle voice)の働きを持つ例は、仏教梵語文献には少なくない。Cf. BHS §37.10ff.

から逃れた」)⁽¹⁶⁾。

従って、パーリ『法句経』第389偈は、「バラモンを襲ってはならぬ。バラモンは彼から逃げてはならぬ。浅ましいかな、バラモンを殺す者は。浅ましいかな、彼から逃げる者もまた」⁽¹⁷⁾と解釈すべきであろう⁽¹⁸⁾。また、上に挙げたガンダーラ語『法句経』なども同じ意味であると考えられる⁽¹⁹⁾。

上に挙げた*Abhisamācārikā*では、ある故事の末尾に、「『法句経』に曰く」として、この偈を引いている。その故事とは、—— ある大金持ちの家を盗賊が襲った。その家の両親は家中の者をつれて出かけており、七才の子供だけが留守番をしていた。盗賊が財宝のありかを問うと、子供は「僕も知らない。この家には誰もいない。捜して、見つけたものを持って行くがいい」と応えた。盗賊たちは家の中から財宝を捜し集め、中庭に宝の山を築いていった。やがて盗賊の首領が、喉が乾いたので、飲み物を求めると、子供は器を磨き、手と器をきれいに洗い、水を入れると、ランプの許に行き、水の中に葉っぱや虫が入ってないか確かめて、盗賊の首領に渡した。子供のこの立派な態度に感動した首領は、その家の財宝をすべて彼に返し、手下と出ていった——というものである⁽²⁰⁾。この子供の態度が、『法句経』の襲われても襲い手から逃げない婆羅門に例えられていると考えられる。

⁽¹⁶⁾ Edgertonは、この例は能動態が受動態の意味で使われた例だと解釈し、“the sick are freed from sickness”と訳しているが(BHSG §37.16)、受動態の意味でとる必要はなからう。

⁽¹⁷⁾ 英訳すれば、“One should not attack a brahman. A brahman should not flee from him. Woe to the killer of a brahman, and woe to him who flees from him.”

⁽¹⁸⁾ 実は、百年以上前、*Dhammapada*をドイツ語に訳したNeumannも同じ解釈をしている。

“Man greife keinen Heiligen an,
Doch, angegriffen, flieh' er nicht;
Weh' Dem, der einen Heiligen schlägt,
Und Weh' auch ihm, der jenen flieht” (Neumann: 1893: 97).

⁽¹⁹⁾ 注(5)に挙げた*Udānavarga*の偈は漢訳とチベット訳では、梵本*Udānavarga*の√*muç*が「放」、「捨」、「skrod par byed」、「bskrad par ... bya」と訳され、「捨てる、追い払う」の意味で解釈されていたことが分かる。これは、勿論誤った理解である。

⁽²⁰⁾ Abhi. 34B1- 35A4.

2. Pā. *puttabatāya putta* / Pā. *puttamatāya putta* / BHS. *putramoṭikāputra* “foundling, bastard”

パーリ文献には人を罵る言葉として、“*puttabatāya putta*”ないし“*puttamatāya putta*”という表現が出る。すなわち、

2.1. Pā. *puttabatāya putta*

Jātaka I 355.6-9:

yato viluttā ca batā ca gāvo daḍḍhāni gebhāni jano ca nīto
athāgamā puttabatāya putto kharassaraṃ deṇḍimaṃ vādayanto

(“牛を盗んで殺し 家を焼いて人を連れ去り 銅鑼をガンガンならしながら *puttabatāya putta*は帰ってくる”)⁽²¹⁾

Sārattba-ppakāsini I 338, 14-15. *Sakko* “*gaṇhatha putta-batāya putte*⁽²²⁾” *ti te pādesu gabetvā Sineru-pāde khipāpesi*⁽²³⁾ (“帝釈は「*puttabatāya putta*たちを捕らえよ」と言って、彼らの足をつかんで*Sineru*山の麓に投げ落とした”)

do. I 346, 15-20. *te devehi parājītā palāyantā isīnaṃ assama-padena gacchantā*⁽²⁴⁾ “*Sakko imehi saddhiṃ mantetvā ambe nāseti. gaṇhatha putta-batāya putte*⁽²⁵⁾” *ti kupitā assama-pade pāṇīyaghaṭa-cankamaṇa-sālādīni*⁽²⁶⁾ *viddhamṣenti*⁽²⁷⁾ (“彼ら[阿修羅たち]は神々に負けて逃げるときに仙人たちの隠棲処を通りながら「帝釈は彼らと相談して我らを滅ぼす。 *puttabatāya putta*たちを捕らえよ」と怒って隠棲処の水瓶や経行処や建物などを壊した”)

2.2. Pā. *puttamatāya putta*

Majjhima-Nikāya I 524, 1-2. *ime pan’ ājīvika puttamatāya puttā attānañ c’eva ukkaṃsenti*

(21) 例えば、Dutoitは“Nachdem geraubt die Kühe und getötet, verbrannt die Häuser, weggeführt die Menschen, da kommt zurück der Sohn zum Tod des Sohnes, indem er laut die Trommel läßt erschallen”と訳している(*Jātakam* I 350)。

(22) 校訂本の“*sutta-batāya sutte*”をいくつかの写本の読みに基づいて改める。

(23) この文は*Sārasaṅgaha*にも引かれている(p. 326, ll. 25-27)。なお、この話は*Jātaka* I 202にも見えるが、そこでは問題の表現は使われていない。

(24) 校訂本の“*gacchanto*”をいくつかの写本の読みに基づいて改める。*Sārasaṅgaha*にも“*gacchanto*”で引かれている。しかし、単数形にして次の*Sakko*に懸けるのは文脈上おかしい。具格と√*gam*で經由する道を表すことは、例えば、Hinüber 1968: §125を参照。

(25) 校訂本の“*sutta-batāya sutte*”をいくつかの写本の読みに基づいて改める。

(26) *Sārasaṅgaha*には、“*sāla*”でなく“*paṃṣāsāla*”(“草庵”)とある。これの方が分かりやすい。

(27) この文は*Sārasaṅgaha*にも引かれている(p. 330, ll. 9-13)。

pare ca vambbenti (“しかるにこれら邪命外道のものたち、*puttamatāya puttā*は、自分たちを讃え、他人を貶す”)⁽²⁸⁾

2.3. 伝統的解釈

これらの語義と語源はまだはっきりしておらず、従来の解釈も満足のいくものではない⁽²⁹⁾。上に引いた*Jātaka*と*Majjhima-Nikāya*の文に対するパーリの注釈者の説明もかなり苦しいものになっている。すなわち、

Jātaka I 355, 12-14. “*puttabatāya putto*” *ti hataputtāya putto nillajjo ti attbo. cbinnabirottappassa hi mātā nāma n’ attbi iti, so tassā jīvanto pi hataputtatṭhāne tiṭṭhatīti* “*hataputtāya putto*” *nāma boti* (“*puttabatāya putto*’というの、息子が殺された女の息子で、恥知らずという意味である。慚愧を捨てた者には母親という者はいない。彼が生きていようと、彼女にとっては、殺された息子も同然だから、「息子が殺された女の息子」というのだ”)

Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā III 235, 6-7. *ājīvikā matā nāma tesam mātā puttamatā boti iti “ājīvikā puttamatāya puttā” nāma bonti* (“[この説法を聞いて、邪命外道たちは死んだも同然と考えた。] 邪命外道たちが死んだのだから、彼らの母親は息子たちに死なれた者ということになる。だから、「邪命外道たちは、息子たちに死なれた者の息子たち」というのだ”)

2.4. BHS. *putramotikāputra*

さて、仏教梵語の典籍に目を向けると、所謂*Mūlasarvāstivādin*の『衣事』(*Cīvaravastu*)には、—— *Viśākhā*が世尊と弟子たちを招待することになり、食事の準備が出来たことを知らせるため、下女を僧院へ遣わした。下女は僧院について、扉のすきまから、比丘たちが裸になって水浴びしているのを見て、「もう聖者たちは出立され、この僧院は*putramotikāputra*の邪命外道に占拠されているのだ」と思った——という話があり(MSV[D] II 83)、“*putramotikāputra*”という表現が⁽³⁰⁾、上で見た*Majjhima-Nikāya*の“*puttamatāya puttā*”と同じく、邪命外道を形容している。

また、*Divyāvadāna*の*Cūdāpaksāvadāna*という物語には、——三ヶ月かかっても一偈も覚えられないような愚かな*Cūdāpantbaka*が比丘尼たちの説教師として来るこ

⁽²⁸⁾ 例えば、*Nāṇamoli*は“*But these Ājīvakas, those mothers’ dead sons, laud themselves and disparage others*”と訳している(1995: 628)。

⁽²⁹⁾ Cf. *Dutoit*, *Jātaka* I, p. 350, n. 1; *Sārattha-ppakāsini* I 338, n. 3.; *Nāṇamoli* 1995: 1281, n. 760; 浪花 1998: 548-549, n. 13.

⁽³⁰⁾ MSV[D] II 83, 19以外にも、*do.* 84, 2; *do.* 85, 17に出る。なお、『十誦律』卷二十七の対応部分では「無慚愧人」と訳されている(大正23, 195c5)。また、チベット訳には“*nal pbrug*”(台北版『西藏大藏經』1, p. 205, 85B6)とある。“*nal pbrug*”とは「私生児」の意味である。

とに腹を立てた十二人の比丘尼は、大きな高座を設え、市民を沢山呼んで、彼に説法させようと相談した。そして、「こうすれば、学の無い *putramoṭikāputra* は比丘尼たちに説教することなどできるはずがない」と考えた——という話があり (Divy. 493, 12f.)、ここでは *Cūḍapantbaka* が *putramoṭikāputra* と貶されている⁽³¹⁾。

Edgertonはこの表現に関して、*moṭikā*は「籠」の意味であり⁽³²⁾、*putramoṭikāputra*は字義通りには「子供籠の子」すなわち「捨て子」(“foundling”)の意味であると推定している (BHSD, s.v.)。周知のごとく、*Mahāpantbaka*と*Cūḍapantbaka*(周利般特)の兄弟は、道(*pantba*)に捨てられた子供であったので、*Pantbaka*と名付けられた⁽³³⁾。従って、Edgertonの解釈は納得のゆくものである。『衣事』(*Cīvaravastu*)の故事では、「捨て子」という意味のこの語が、邪命外道を侮蔑する表現として使われているのである。

2.5. *putra-muṭa + putra > Pā. *puttamātāya putta* ⇔ Pā. *puttabatāya putta*

*Cīvaravastu*と同じく、邪命外道を侮蔑する表現として現れる *Majjhima-Nikāya*の“*puttamātāya putta*”も、BHS. *putramoṭikāputra*と同じ語源と意味を有する可能性が高い。おそらく、**putra-muṭa*(“子供を容れる籠”)あるいはその派生語(例えば *putramoṭikā*)の中期インド語形が出発点であろう。この *muṭa*はSkt. *mṛta*(“死んだ”)の中期インド語形と誤解され⁽³⁴⁾、Skt. *mṛta*の別の中期インド語形 *mata*に置き換えられ、*puttamata*(あるいは**putta-matiyā*)という形が出来たに違いない。そして、その語形が、おそらくPā. *mātar*(“母”)の属格形 *mātāya*(“母の”)の影響を受け、*puttamātāya*という語形になったと考えられる。そして、さらに *mata*(“死んだ”)を類義の *hata*(“殺された”)に置き換えてしまい、最終的に *puttabatāya*という本来の語形と語義とは似ても似つかぬ形ができたと考えられる。

要するに、“*puttamātāya putta*”も“*puttabatāya putta*”も本来は「捨て子」という意味の侮蔑の言葉であったわけである。

⁽³¹⁾ Divy. 493, 20. なお、チベット訳には“*bu zan mo'i bu*”(台北版『西藏大藏經』1, p. 537, 69B2)とある。「子供を食べる女の子供」の意味である。漢訳には、この表現に対応する語がない(義浄訳『根本説一切有部毘奈耶』卷三十一、大正23, 797c3)。

⁽³²⁾ Cf. BHSD, s.vv. *muṭa*, *mūṭa*, *mūḍha*, *moṭa*, *moṭaka*, *moṭikā*; CDIAL, 10233. *mūta*, *mūṭa* “basket”. これらの語はドラヴィダ語に由来するので(cf. EWAia, s.v. *mūta*)、語形が様々である。

⁽³³⁾ Cf. DPPN, s.v. *Cūḍapantbaka Thera*; 赤沼, s.v. *Cūḍapantbaka*.

⁽³⁴⁾ Cf. ShāhbāzgarhīのAśoka碑文. *muṭa* < Skt. *mṛta*; Pkt. *mua* < Skt. *mṛta*.

3. Skt. *Vipracitti* > Pā. *Vepacitti* > BHS. *Vemacitrin*

パーリ聖典には、神々と阿修羅が戦い、*Vepacitti*という阿修羅王が神々に捕まえられたという話がある⁽³⁵⁾。この阿修羅王の名前は、仏教梵語文献では *Vemacitrin*, *Vemacitra*, *Vaimacitra*という名前で現れる⁽³⁶⁾。また、*Mahābhārata*などインド叙事詩に描かれる神々と阿修羅の戦いでは、*Vipracitti*という名前で現れ、彼は神々の王*Indra*に殺されたという⁽³⁷⁾。

これらの語形の関係について、つとにPrzyluskiが論じている⁽³⁸⁾。彼は、これらの語はイラン語の**vaēma-čiθra*（“岩から生まれた”）に由来し、それが*Vemacitra*などになり、さらにPā. *Vepacitti*となり、最終的にSkt. *Vipracitti*になったと考えている。さらに彼は、この名前は、石から生まれたとされるMithra神の別名と考えている。

しかし、*Vipracitti*（あるいはその壊れた形*Viprajitti*）という名前は「鋭い機智をもった」という意味の形容詞として、あるいは、ある師の名前としてUpaniṣadやBrāhmaṇa文献にも出る(PW, s.vv.)。「鋭い機智をもった」という意味をもつ語が阿修羅王の名前として使われても決して不思議ではない。Przyluskiの推定とは逆に、著者は*Vipracitti*が出発点と考える。すなわち、Skt. *Vipracitti* > **Vippacitti* >⁽³⁹⁾ **Vēppacitti* > Pā. *Vepacitti* >⁽⁴⁰⁾ **Vevacitti* >⁽⁴¹⁾ **Vemacitti* ∋ BHS. *Vemacitrin*, *Vemacitra*, *Vaimacitra*と変化したと推定される⁽⁴²⁾。これら仏教梵語形はいずれも誤った梵語化の所産(hypersanskritism)である。

⁽³⁵⁾ SNI 221; DN II 259, vs.12.

⁽³⁶⁾ Cf. BHSD, s.vv.; Lévi 1925: 17-26.

⁽³⁷⁾ *Mahābhārata* 12.99.49; do. 9.30.11 etc. Cf. Hopkins 1915: 48-50.

⁽³⁸⁾ Przyluski: 1931.

⁽³⁹⁾ Cf. Skt. *piṣṭa* > Pkt. *peṭṭha*; Skt. *niṣka* > Pā. *nekkha*; Hinüber 1986: §114; Norman 1990: 21f.; do. 1995: 279.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ *-p-* > *-v-*は中期インド語で一般的な変化。Cf. Hinüber 1986: §181.

⁽⁴¹⁾ この場合の*-v-* > *-m-*は異化(dissimilation)による。中期インド語で広く見られる*-v-* > *-m-*という変化に関しては、Hinüber 1981: 66; do. 1986: §§208-211を参照。また本例のように、*-p-* > *-v-* > *-m-*という変化を示す中期インド語の例も少なくない(cf. Konow 1929: civ; Brough 1962: §§36, 71; Hinüber 1986: §211)。

⁽⁴²⁾ 多分、Kernも同じ方向で考えていたようだ(1884: 6, fn.)。

4. Pā. *vijanavāda* / Pā. *vijanavāta* / BHS. *vigata-janapada* / BHS. *vigata-jana-pāpaka*
 Pā. *manussa-rābaseyyaka* / BHS. *maṇṣya-rabaśayyaka, m°-rabasayyaka,*
m°-rabas-sevita

4.1.

パーリ文献には次の様な定型句がある。

Aṅguttara-Nikāya IV 88.3~5. *senāsanāni appasaddāni appanigghosāni vijanavātāni*
manussarābaseyyakāni paṭisallānasārubbāni⁽⁴³⁾⁽⁴⁴⁾

Dīgha-Nikāya III 38.3~6. *araññe vanapatthāni pantāni senāsanāni paṭisevati appasaddāni*
appanigghosāni vijanavātāni manussarābaseyyakāni (read: °*rābaseyyakāni*)
paṭisallānasārubbāni⁽⁴⁵⁾⁽⁴⁶⁾

Vinayapiṭaka I 39.9~12. *idaṃ uyyānaṃ divā appākiṇṇaṃ rattim appasaddaṃ*
appanigghosaṃ vijanavātaṃ manussarābaseyyakaṃ paṭisallānasārubbāṃ⁽⁴⁷⁾⁽⁴⁸⁾

この表現は他のパーリ文献にも見える⁽⁴⁹⁾。

また、大衆部説出世間部の律文献 *Abbisamācārikā* にも類似の表現がある。

Abhi. 32A7. *āraṇyakāni seyyāsanāni prāntāni viviktāni vigatajanapadāni*
manusyarābaśayyakāni pratisaṃlayanāsāropyaṇi (“辺鄙な、離れた、人のいない、
人に隠れて寝ることができ、一人瞑想するに相応しい、森の中の房舎[に棲む

⁽⁴³⁾ 例えば、Nyanatilokaは“Doch was es da an Behausungen gibt, dem Lärm und Geräusch unzugänglich, von kühlen Winden umweht, den Menschen entzogen, zur Loslösung geeignet: ... ”と訳している(Nyanatiloka 1969: IV 49)。

⁽⁴⁴⁾ *Mahāniddeśa* 142.32~34, 145.4~7, 157.4~7, 212.1~3, 337.20~22, 345.14~16, 377.8~10, 455.4~6, 467.17~18, 480.21~23, 509.20~22にもほぼ同文が見える。

⁽⁴⁵⁾ 例えば、Rhys Davidsは、“the lonely and remote recesses of the forest, where noise, where sound there hardly is, where the breezes from the pastures blow, yet which are hidden from the eyes of men, suitable for self-communing.”(DN[tr.] III, p.35)と訳している。

⁽⁴⁶⁾ DN III 54.11~14, 195.15~18, SN IV 36.25~28にもほぼ同文が見える。

⁽⁴⁷⁾ 例えば、Hornerは、“this ... a pleasure park, ... not crowded by day, having little noise at night, little sound, without folk’s breath, haunts of privacy, suitable for seclusion.” (BD IV, p. 51)と訳している。

⁽⁴⁸⁾ = Vin II 158.32; ≡ Vin. I 39.6~7, II 158.26~30.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ *Majjhima-Nikāya* III 13.15~17. *Veḷuvanaṃ appasaddaṃ ca appanigghosaṃ ca vijanavātaṃ*
manussarābaseyyakaṃ paṭisallānasārubbāṃ; do. II 118.17~19. rukkhamaḷāni vijanavātāni
manussarābaseyyakāni paṭisallānasārubbāni .

のは容易ならぬこと]”)

さらに同じ大衆部説出世間部の文献 *Mahāvastu* や大乘論書 *Bodhisattvabhūmi* にも見える。

Mvu III 200.16~17. *āraṇyakāni śayyāsamāny ... prāntāni viviktāni <vi>gatajanapadāni manūṣya-rabaseyyakāni pratisaṃlayana-sāropyāni*⁽⁵⁰⁾

Bbh. 8.23~25. *araṇya-vana-prasthānāni ca prāntāni śayanāsanāni manūṣya-rabas-sevitāni vigata-jana-pāpakāni*⁽⁵¹⁾ *pratisaṃlayana-sārūpyakāni*⁽⁵²⁾

4.2. Pā. *vijanavāda* / Pā. *vijanavāta* / BHS. *vigata-janapada* / BHS. *vigata-jana-pāpaka*

4.2.1. Pā. *vijanavāda* / Pā. *vijanavāta* / Pā. *vijanapāta*

Pā. *vijanavāta* の語源と語義に関しては、色々議論がある。例えば、Kern は **vi-jana-vrāta* (“人々の集団から離れた”) に由来すると見ている⁽⁵³⁾。Rhys Davids 夫妻は、**vrjana-vāta* (“牧場からの風が吹く”)⁽⁵⁴⁾、あるいは、*vi-jana-vāta* (“人々の呼気のない”)⁽⁵⁵⁾ に由来すると見、この見解は Horner も踏襲している⁽⁵⁶⁾。これらを踏まえて、PTSD の編者は、*vijana-vāta* “pervaded by loneliness, having an atmosphere of loneliness” という解釈を提示している (PTSD, s.v. *vāta* 3.)。

パーリの注釈家たちは、*vijanavāta* という読み以外に *vijanavāda* と *vijanapāta* という

⁽⁵⁰⁾ その他、Mvu II 123.17~19. *vrkṣamūlāni prāsādikāni darśanīyāni prāntāni viviktāni vigatavyasanāni vigatajanapadāni manojña-bradasayyakāni* (MSS. *manuṣa-bradasayyakāni*; read: *manuṣya-rabaseyyakāni*) *pratisaṃlayane ārūpyāni*; III 143.12~13. *āśramapadam sātantaṃ* (read: *prāntam* ?) *viviktam vigatajanapadam manuṣyarah<as>eya{m}kaṃ pratisaṃlayanasāropyam*.

⁽⁵¹⁾ Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana がチベットで撮った写本の写真に基づいてテキストを校勘した Dutt (1966: 5, fn. 8) に依れば、その写本には、*vigatapāyayākāni* とあるという。彼は *vigatapāpakāni* に改めている。この写本では *pa* と *ya* は非常によく似ている。

⁽⁵²⁾ 諸漢訳には次のように訳されている。玄奘訳『瑜伽師地論』菩薩地「阿練若處，山巖林藪，邊際臥具，人不狎習，離惡衆生，隨順寂默」(大正30, 479c21-22); 曇無讖訳『菩薩地持經』「山巖林藪，離諸憤亂，隨順寂默」(大正30, 889a15); 求那跋摩訳『菩薩善戒經』には「樂住寂靜及無人處，樂離惡人，增長善法」(大正30, 963c12-13)。チベット訳には “*dgon pa nags tshal gyi gnas, bas mtha'i gnas mal, mi rnam kyis dben par gyur pa, sdig pa'i skye bo med pa, nang du yang dag 'jog dang 'tsham pa dag*” (台北版『西藏大藏經』39, p. 296, 5B4-5) とある。

⁽⁵³⁾ Kern 1916, s.v. *vāta*.

⁽⁵⁴⁾ “where the breezes from the pastures blow”. DN(tr.) III 35, fn. 1.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ “clean of the smell of people” (VinT I, p.143).

⁽⁵⁶⁾ “without folk's breath” (BD IV, p. 51).

読みを知っており、それらを「人間の体の臭いが無い」「人々の会話が無い」「人々が歩き回ることが無い」と解釈している⁽⁵⁷⁾。

他方、Windischは上に引いた*Vimayapitaka*の文を独訳するさい、パーリの注釈の伝える*vijanavāda*(“人々の話[声]がない”)という読みが本来的と考え、“ohne Geschwätz der Leute”と訳している(1895: 242)。筆者も文脈からみてこの読みが本来的だと考える。*vijanavāda*は伝承の過程で*vijanavāta*と発音され⁽⁵⁸⁾、それが、*-p- > -v-*の中期インド語一般の音変化を知る者によって、*vijanapāta*と誤った形に復元されたのであろう⁽⁵⁹⁾。

4.2.2. BHS. *vigata-janapada* / BHS. *vigata-jana-pāpaka*

パーリ聖典の*senāsanāni appasaddāni appaniggbosāni vijanavātāni manussarāhaseyyakāni patisallānasāruppāni*というフレーズは、5音節+5音節+6音節+6音節+9音節+9音節というリズムがあり、口承で伝えられていたのに相応しい。ところが、仏教梵語の*Abhisamācārikā*, *Mahāvastu*になると、そのリズムがやや失われている。従って*vigata-janapada*という読みは本来的ではなく、おそらく、*vi-janavāda*(“人々の話[声]がない”)

⁽⁵⁷⁾ Sp. 974. 7-10.*vijanavātan*(*ad.* Vin I 39.6) ti anusañcaraṇajanassa sarīravātena virahitaṃ. *vijanavādan* ti pi pāṭho, anto {pi} janavādena rahitaṃ ti attho. *vijanapātan* ti pi pāṭho, janasañcāravirahitaṃ ti attho; *Saddhammapajjotikā* I 267.12-16.*vijanavātāni*(*ad.* *Mahāniddeśa* 142.33) ti anto sañcaranakajanaṣṣa sarīravātena virahitāni. *vijanavādāni* ti pi pāṭho, anto janavādena virahitāni ti attho. *vijanavanāni*(read “*vijanapātāni*” with Chatṭha Saṅgāyana Edition) ti pi pāṭho, janasañcāravirahitāni ti attho; *Sammoha-vinodanī* 368.4-6.*vijanavātan*(*ad.* *Vibhaṅga* 244.15) ti anusañcaraṇajanassa (read: *anto sañ*°) sarīravātena virahitaṃ. *vijanavādan* ti pi pāṭho, anto janavādena rahitaṃ ti attho; *Sumaṅgala-vilāsini* 833.22. *vijanavātāni*(*ad.* *Dīgha-Nikāya* III 38.5) ti anto-sañcārino janassa vātena(*v.l.* vādena) *vigata-vātāni* (cf. *Linattbavaṇṇanā* III 19.6. *vigatavātāni* [*v.l.* °vādānīti; *ad.* Sv.833.22] ti *vigatasaddāni*); *Sārattha-ppakāsini* II 367.7.*vijanavātāni*(*ad.* *Samyutta-Nikāya* IV 36.27) ti sañcaraṇajanassa sarīravātavirahitāni; *Papañcasūdanī* III 350.9. *vijanavātāni*(*ad.* *Majjhima-Nikāya* II 118.18) ti *vigatajanavātāni*; *Pācītyādīyojanā*, 13. Bimbisārasamāgamakathā, §59.tisu pāthesu pāṭhamena pāṭhena tena virahitaṃ *vijanavātan* ti vikappaṃ dasseti. dutiyena janassa vādo janavādo, tena virahitaṃ *vijanavādan* ti vikappaṃ dasseti. tatiyena janassa pāto sañcaraṇaṃ janapāto, tena virahitaṃ *vijanapātan* ti vikappaṃ dasseti.

⁽⁵⁸⁾ パーリ聖典に見える *-t- / -d-* の交替に関しては、Lüders 1954: §§94-98, §§141-143; Norman 1995: 186; Smith 1955: 113; v. Hinüber 1994: 160, 225 を参照。Lüders は、仏典が出現した東インドの方言で *-t- > -d-* の音変化があつて、それから逆に *-d- > -t-* と backformation したと考えている。それに対して Smith は Mahāvihāra 派で *-t- / -d-* の区別があまりなかったと考えている。v. Hinüber も *-t- / -d-* の区別があまりないところで伝承されている間に、この交替が生じたと考えている。なお、Smith は、筆者とは逆に、*vijanavāta* が本来的で *vijanavāda* がこそ誤った形と見ている(1955: 113)。

⁽⁵⁹⁾ Cf. Lüders 1954: §§144-147; Smith 1955: 113; v. Hinüber 1986: §181. Smith は Mahāvihāra 派で *-p- / -v-* の区別が弱かったと見ている。

が伝承の途上で誤って**vijanavāda*となり、それを**vi-janapada*(“人がいない”)と曲解して⁽⁶⁰⁾、*vigata-janapada*(“人がいない”)と梵語化したのであろう。

*Bodhisattvabhūmi*の*vigata-jana-pāpakāni*⁽⁶¹⁾がどう生じたか明確には分からないが、やはり*vijanavāda*から出発した中期インド語を基にした誤った梵語化の結果であろう⁽⁶²⁾。

4.3 Pā. *manussa-rābaseyyaka* / BHS. *manuṣya-rabaśayyaka*, *m°-rabasayyaka*, *m°-rabas-sevita*

4.3.1 Pā. *manussa-rābaseyyaka*

§4.1に挙げた文に出るPā. *manussa-rābaseyyaka*をPTSDの編者は、Skt. *manuṣya* (“人”) + *rabas* (“隠れた所”) + *śayyā* (“寝ること”)からなる複合語と解釈して“fit to lie undisturbed by men”と訳している(PTSD, s.v. *rābaseyyaka*)。

ところが、パーリの注釈家たちは、Skt. *manuṣya* (“人”) と *rabasya* (“秘密の”)の派生語との複合語で「人が隠れるのに相応しい」という意味だと解釈している⁽⁶³⁾。

Helmer Smithは、*rābaseyyaka*を*rabas* (“隠れた所”)のLocative *rabasi*の第二次派生語(*Taddhita*)と考えている(1955: 112)。

筆者は、Skt. *rabasya* (“秘密の、秘密”)の中期インド語形**rabaseyya* (< **rabasiyya* < *rabasiya* [= Pkt] < Skt. *rabasya*)⁽⁶⁴⁾から*rābaseyyaka*という派生語が生じたと考える。従って、Pā. *manussa-rābaseyyaka*は「人々(の目)から隠れた」という意味になる⁽⁶⁵⁾。

⁽⁶⁰⁾ 前の注を参照。

⁽⁶¹⁾ 注(52)に記したように、玄奘訳には「離惡衆生」、求那跋摩訳には「樂離惡人」と訳されている。チベット訳には“*sdig pa'i skye bo med pa*”とある。いずれも*vigata-jana-pāpakāni*に対応する。しかし、*jana-pāpaka*を「悪い人々」と解釈するのは無理があろう。他方、曇無讖訳「離諸憤亂」は*vi-janavāda*に対応するのかもしれない。

⁽⁶²⁾ *vijanavāda*が**vijanavāya*に変化し、glide consonant *y*が同じくglide consonantの*v*に交替して**vijanavāva*となり、これを*vijanapāpa(ka)*と梵語化したのであろうか。

⁽⁶³⁾ Sp. 974. 10~11.*manussa-rābaseyyakan*(v.l. °*rāhasseyyakam*; ad. Vin I 39.6) ti manussānaṃ rahassakiriyaṭṭhāniyaṃ (= Vibh-a. 368.10); Sv. 833.24.*manussa-rabaseyyakāni*(ad. DN III 38.5) ti manussānaṃ rahassakaraṇassa yuttāni anucchavikāni; Spk II 367.8.*manussa-rābaseyyakāni*(ad. SN IV 36.27) ti manussānaṃ raha-kammaṃ anucchavikāni.

⁽⁶⁴⁾ Oskar von Hinüber教授のご教示によれば、同様の变化を示すパーリ語に、Pā. *ādhīpatteyya* < Skt. *ādhīpatya*, Pā. *dūteyya* < Skt. *dūtya*, Pā. *kāveyya* < Skt. *kāvya*などがある。

⁽⁶⁵⁾ WindischとRhys Davids夫妻は、語源解釈をしていないが、正しく訳している。“in Verborgenheit vor den Menschen”(Windisch 1895: 242), “hidden from men”(VinT I, 143), “hidden from

4.3.2 BHS. *manuṣya-rabaśayyaka, m°-rabasayyaka, m°-rabas-sevita*

Pā. *manussa-rābaseyyaka*は、§4.1に挙げた仏教梵語の*Abbisamācārikā*や*Mahāvastu*では次の様な梵語形になっている：Abhi. 32A7. *manuṣya-rabaśayyakāni*; Mvu III 200.17. *manuṣya-rabaseyyakāni*(v.l. °*rabeśayyākāni*); Mvu II 123.18. *manuṣa-bradasayyakāni* (read: *manuṣya-rabasayyakāni*); Mvu III 143.12. *manuṣya-rab<as>eya{m}kaṃ*. Edgertonは、PTSDの編者と同様に、*manuṣya* + *rabas* + *sayyā*からなる複合語と解釈し、“providing sleeping-places secluded from men”と訳している(BHSD, s.v. *manuṣya-raba-śayyāka, °sayyaka, °seyyāka*)。

上に挙げた梵語形のうち-*rabaseyyakāni*という*Mahāvastu*に見える語形は、本来の中期インド語形を保存している様だが、その異本に見える-*rabeśayyākāni*や*Abbisamācārikā*に見える-*rabaśayyakāni*は誤った梵語化の所産(hypersanskritism)である。おそらく、Skt. *śayyā* >⁽⁶⁶⁾ Pā. *seyyā*という変化を知っていたものが、-*rabaseyyaka*から、間違っこの様な形を造ったのであろう。*Mahāvastu*の別の個所に見える-*bradasayyakāni*という形は、Pā. *rabada*(< Skt. *brada* “湖”)が頭にあつて、-*rabaseyyaka*の-*raha*の部分の誤って*brada*としたのであろうか。

*Bodhisattvabhūmi*の*manuṣya-rabas-sevita*は、-*rabaseyyaka*の後半部-*seyyaka*が√*śī* (“横たわる”)の過去分詞形*śayita*に置き換えられ、さらに類義語*sevita* (“住んだ”)に取り替えられたか、あるいは-y-, -v-の交替を介して*śayita*から*sevita*に変わったのかも知れない。いずれにせよ、間違っ梵語化(hypersanskritism)である。

5. *cārayati* (*cāreti*, -*cāraka*~, -*cāraṇa*~)

or *vārayati* (*vāreti*, -*vāraka*~, -*vāraṇa*~)? “gives; distributes”

パーリ文献や仏教梵語文献では次のように、*śalākā*(札)⁽⁶⁷⁾などを「配る」あるいは「与える」の意味で、*cārayati*もしくは*vārayati*およびそれらの派生語が使われる例が多く見られる。まずは、用例を見てみよう。

5.1. パーリ文献の *cāreti* / *vāreti*

Jātaka I 239, 27-28. *te kālakāṇṇisalākāṃ vāresuṃ. sattakkhattuṃ Mittavindakass’ eva*

the eyes of men”(DN[tr.] III 35).

⁽⁶⁶⁾ Cf. *śayyā* > BHS. *śeyyā*, pkt. *sejyā*. 母音の口蓋音化(palatalization of vowels)に関しては, Norman 1975/76 = 1990: 220-237を参照。

⁽⁶⁷⁾ *śalākā*とは、投票のときや人数を数えるために配られる札である。Cf. Hubert Durt, “The Counting Stick (Śalākā) and the Majority/Minority Rule in the Buddhist Community” 印度学佛教学研究 XXIII, 1 (1974), pp. 470-464; *Hōbōgirin*, s.v. Chū 籌。

pāpuṇi (“彼らは、凶[をもたらした人を捜す]札をひかせた⁽⁶⁸⁾。Mittavindakaばかり七度、凶の札を]ひいた”)

do. IV 2, 22-23. *kālakannisalākā vāriyamānā* (v.l. *cāri°*, *kari°* etc.) *Mittavindakass' eva hatthe tikkhattuṃ pati* (“彼らは、凶札をひかせたらMittavindakaばかり三度ひいた”)

Petavattbu-Atṭhakatthā 272.1. *kālakannisalākāṃ vicāresuṃ. amanussiddhiyā yāva tatiyaṃ tassā eva itthiyā pāpuṇi*(“[「なぜ船が進まぬのか」と思って、凶札をひかせた。超自然の力で三度もその女性がひいた”)

なお、*Jātaka*の二例に関して、PTSDとBHSDは、*cāresuṃ*, *cāriyamānā*に改めている(PTSD, s.v. *cāreti*, *vāreti*; BHSD, s.v. *cārayati*)。その当否については後で検討する。

5.2. *Mabāvastu*の *cāreti* / *vāreti*

Mvu II 442, 1-2. *so dāni brāhmaṇo modakāni krīṇiya brāhmaṇāṃ sabdāvitvā modakāni vāreti* (“そこでその婆羅門はお菓子を買って婆羅門たちを呼んでお菓子を配った”)⁽⁶⁹⁾

Mvu III 176, 9-11. “*śalākāni cāretha*(MSS. *dhāretha*) *kathaṃ yobbūyena Śākyagaṇasya utpadyatu pravrajitūṃ Śākyakumārā*”. *kulapuruṣakeṇa tatra śalākāni cāriyanti* (v.l. *vāri°*), *yobbūyena Śākyagaṇasya utpadyati yadā*(read *yathā*) *rājñā Śuddhodaṇena āṇattam* “*pravrajantu Śākyakumārā kulapuruṣakeṇa. yo ca ekaputrako so mucyatu*” (“[浄飯王は言った]「投票で決めよ[lit. 籌を配れ]。釈迦族の大勢は釈迦族の若者を出家させることに関してどう考えるかを。」そこで各家族一人ずつ投票して[lit. 籌が配られ]、釈迦族の大勢は、浄飯王の命令——「各家族一人ずつ釈迦族の若者を出家させよ。一人息子の家は免除する」——に同意した”)⁽⁷⁰⁾

5.3. *Divyāvadāna*の *cārayati* / *vārayati*

*Divy.*180, 13-14. “*vatsa bhikṣūnāṃ cāraya*” *sa bhikṣūnāṃ cāra<yi>tum ārabdhap. bhikṣavo na pratigrhṇanti* (“[Svāgataが沢山の青蓮華をもって来ると、世尊は彼に言った]「君。比丘たちに[青蓮華を]配れ」と。彼は比丘たちに配り始めた。比丘たちは受け取らなかった”)

do. 462, 4-5. “*cāraya mahābrāhmaṇa peyām*” *sa cārayitum ārabdhap* (“[世尊は婆羅門に言っ

⁽⁶⁸⁾ くじとして札を配って不運をもたらした人を捜した、という意味であろう。*kālakannī* (BHS. *kālakarṇī*)に関しては、PTSD, s.v.; BHSD, s.v.; Agrawala 1966: 69-70を参照。

⁽⁶⁹⁾ Jonesは*modakāni vāreti*を“asked them choose some”と訳し、注を付けているが(Mvu[II] II 394)、選ばせたのではなく、配ったのであろう。

⁽⁷⁰⁾ この文は難解。*yadā*が*yathā*の誤りと仮定して、理解が可能になる。Jonesの訳は全く異なる(Mvu[III] III 171)。*utpadyati*の意味に関しては、BHSD, s.v.を参照。

た]「大婆羅門よ。粥を配れ」と。彼は配り始めた”)

do. 184, 15-26. “... śalākāṃ cāraya yo yuṣmākam utsabate Asvatīrthikam nāgaṃ vinetum sa śalākāṃ grbhāt” iti. Ānando ... bhikṣusamghe śalākāṃ cārayitum ārabdhah. bhgavatā śalākā na grbhātā tena ... śalākā grbhātā (“[世尊は阿難に命じた]「……札を配れ。汝らの中でAsvatīrthika 竜を制することができるものは札をとれ。」と。阿難は……比丘僧伽に札を配り始めた。世尊は札をとらなかった。……彼 [i.e. Svāgata 比丘]は……札をとった”)

5.4. Avadānaśataka に出る cārayati の例

Avadānaśataka II 87, 6-12. “vatsāttat pāṇīyam saṅghe cārayē”ti. sa tad udakam saṅghe cāritavān yāvat sarvasaṅghe cāritam tadāpi na kṣīyate dvādaśa varśasahasrāṇi tena saṅghe pāṇīyam cāritam (“[師は、老いぼれた出家者に水を満たした水瓶を渡して、言った]「君。この水を僧たちに配れ」と。…… 彼はその水を僧たちに配りはじめた。…… 僧たち全員に配り終えても、[水は]尽きなかった。彼は一万二千年間、僧たちに水を配った”)

5.5. 所謂 Mūlasarvāstivādīn の Vinayavastu に出る cārayati の例

5.5.1. Cīvaravastu に出る cārayati の例

MSV(D) ii. 105.17-106.2. “bhikṣusamgḥam bhojayitvā pratyekam ekaikam bhikṣum patenācchādāyīṣyāmi”ti grhapatir bhikṣusamgḥam bhojayitvā cārayati (“[ある居士は思った]「比丘たちに食事を出し、一人一人の比丘に綿布を差し上げよう」と。…… 居士は比丘たちに食事を出し、[綿布を]配った”)

5.5.2. Śayanāsanavastu に出る cārayati の例

Gnoli 1978: 52.4-5. yan na grbhātam pūrvavahāre tac ced aparimitam cāryate grabhāvayam (“[生活が困難になって他の僧院に行った比丘たちが、そこの比丘たちが食べているのを見たが、犯戒を恐れて食べなかった。それを知った世尊は言った]「前の僧院で得られなかった物が、もしたくさんあるのなら、配って与えられるべし。」”)

do. 55.22-25 には、vihārōddeśaka (“僧室の割り当て係”), bhaktōddeśaka (“食事の割り当て係”), khādyaka-bhājaka (“固形食の分配係”)などと並んで yavāgū-cāraka (“粥の分配係”)⁽⁷¹⁾, yatkimcic-cāraka (“小物の分配係”)⁽⁷²⁾ という役職名が出る⁽⁷³⁾。

5.5.3. Adbikaraṇavastu に出る cārayati の例

⁽⁷¹⁾ Cf. Vin II 176.29. yāgu-bhājaka (“粥の分配係”).

⁽⁷²⁾ Cf. Vin II 177.1. appamattaka-vissajjaka (“小物の分配係”).

⁽⁷³⁾ これら役職名は Mvy. 9056f. に採られている。

*Abhikaraṇavastu*には、僧伽における *śalākā*(札、票)を使った採決の方法について詳細に述べられている個所がある(Gnoli 1978: 88-95)。それによると、札を配る (*śalākām cārayati*)比丘は、*śalākā-cāraka*とよばれ⁽⁷⁴⁾、また四種の配り方(*śalākā-cāraṇa*)があるという。

5.6. *Abhisamācārikā*に出る *cārayati* / *vārayati*の例

大衆部説出世間部の律文献*Abhisamācārikā*では、次のように、*śalākā*(“札”)だけではなく、*pānīya*(“水”)、*dīpa*(“灯”)、*yaṣṭi*(“禅杖”)、*geṇḍuka*(“禅毬”)が、*cārayati/vārayati*と結び付いている。

5.6.1. *śalākā*(“札”) + *cārayati*

Abhi. 1B7-2A1. *saṃghasthavireṇa [jānitavya]ṃ ko śalākām cāra[y]iṣyati ko praticchīyati ko prātimokṣasūtram uddiṣīyati yo pratibalo bhavati so adhyeṣitavyo “ayaṃ sānaṃ śalākām cāreṣi” “vaṃ śalākām praticchīyati” “vaṃ prātimokṣasūtram uddiṣeṣi” tena yathādhyeṣṭena śalākā cārayitavyā dvitīyena praticchitavyā* (“僧伽の長老は、誰が札を配るのか、誰が受け取るのか、誰が波羅提木叉を説くか、……を知っていなければならぬ。[それぞれ]出来る者に頼むべし。「君は(?)札を配れ」「君はくじを受け取れ」「君は波羅提木叉を説け」……と。頼まれた者は札を配るべし。二人めは[札を]受け取るべし”) ≡ 2B6-7; 3B6-7

etc.⁽⁷⁵⁾

5.6.2. *pānīya*(“水”) + *cārayati* / *vārayati*

- ① Abhi. 9A5. *piṇḍapāto ukkadhitavyo piṇḍapāta upanāmayitavyo. bhūñjantasya pānīyaṃ cāritavyaṃ. vījanavāto dātavyo* (“[弟子は]施食を煮て、施食を[師に]差し上げるべし。食べている[師に]水を渡すべし。うちわで[師を]扇ぐべし”)
- ② Abhi. 33A3. *bhaktāgreṇa pānīyaṃ vārentena hastāṃ sunirmmāditāṃ kṛtvā bhājanam sunirmmāditāṃ kṛtvā cauksam pānīyaṃ vāretavyam* (“食堂で水を配るものは手をよく洗い、器をよく洗って、きれいな水を配れ”)
- ③ Abhi. 33A7. *ekena madhyama<ṃ> vārake sthitakena vāretavyam* (“ひとりが中央、水おけのわきに立ち、[水を]配るべし”)

etc.⁽⁷⁶⁾

⁽⁷⁴⁾ Cf. Vin II 84.25. *śalākagāhāpaka*(札の分配係”).

⁽⁷⁵⁾ この他にも、Abhi. 2A1-2.[n]āpi [*kṣa*]mati *śalākām cārayantena anirmmādiya hastāṃ śalākām cārayitum. atha khalu hastāṃ nirmmādiya oguṇṭhikāṃ apāniya upānāhāṃ omuñciya ekāmsakṛtena śalākā cārayitavyā* (“札を配るものは手を洗わずに札を配ってはならぬ。むしろ、手を洗い、頭の被りものを取り、履物を脱ぎ、一方の肩を露にし、札を配るべし”) ≡ 2B7-3A1; 3B7-4A1; do. 2A2-3. *yaṃ kālam śalākā cāritā bhavanti bhikṣū gaṇitā bhavanti sāmāgrī ārocitā bhavati ...* (“札を配り終え、[それで]比丘たちを数え終わり、全員が集まっていることが告げられたら、……”) ≡ 3A1; 4A1.

5.6.3. *dīpa*(“灯”) + *cārayati* / *vārayati*

また、坐禅する比丘が居眠りをはじめたら、灯係りの比丘(*dīpavārika*)が、その比丘に灯を与えて眠気を払わせるという文例があるが、具体的には、灯火を顔の近くに近付けるという意味であろうか。

- ① Abhi. 45A6-7. *yaṃ kālaṃ bhikṣusaṃgho prabhāṇe upaviṣṭo bhavati, tato dīpavārikena dīpako vārayitavyo mā tarhi koci pracalāyatīti. yadi tāva koci pracalāyati acchaṭīkaṃ kariya utthāpayitavyo. vaktavyaṃ “āyusman{a} tarva dīpo prāpuṇati” ti. tena sa cārayitavyo* (“比丘僧伽が禅堂に入ったときは、誰もそこで居眠りしないようにと、灯の係りは灯を[眠気を抱いた比丘に]近付けるべし(lit.与えるべし)。もし誰かがコックリコックリしたら、指を弾いて起こし、言うべし「具寿、灯はあなたが受ける番ですよ」[こう言って]彼はそれを[比丘に]近付けるべし(lit.与えるべし)”)
- ② Abhi. 45A7-45B1. *atha dāni bhikṣu śrāddhako bhavati, āha “suvidita(MS. suvidita), āsa tvaṃ. ahaṃ cārayiṣyan” ti dātavyo. nāpi kṣamati tena upārambhaṇābbiprāyeṇa dīpo cārayitum* (“[禅堂でコックリコックリするものが]敬虔な比丘のときは、「親愛なるものよ。[きちんと]坐って[?]。私は近付けますよ(lit.与えますよ)」と言って、与えるべし。彼[i.e. 灯の係り]は決して好き嫌いで灯を近付けてはならない”)

etc.

5.6.4. *yaṣṭi*(“禅杖”) + *cārayati* / *vārayati*

また、同じく坐禅中に居眠りする比丘に禅杖を与えて眠気を払わせるという文例があるが、具体的には、禅杖で叩くの意味であろう。

- ① Abhi. 46A1. *te dāni bhikṣuḥ prabhāṇe pracalāyaṃti ... bhagavān āha “tena hi yaṣṭi nāma cārayitavyā”⁽⁷⁷⁾* (“さて比丘たち禅坊でコックリコックリした。……世尊は言った「これからは禅杖というものを与えよ」[「禅杖で叩け」の意味]と。”)
- ② Abhi. 46B1. *ṣaḍāya<ta>na manasikarentena cāretavyā. yadi koci pracalāyati tasya dātavyā* (“六処に精神を集中しながら叩くべし。誰かがコックリコックリしたら、叩け”)
- ③ Abhi. 46B1. *atha dāni śrāddhako bhikṣur bhavati, āha “sagotrīmātā, āsa tvaṃ. ahaṃ*

⁽⁷⁶⁾ この他にも、Abhi. 33A4. *pānīyaṃ vārentena upalakṣayitavyaṃ* (“水を配るものは、[比丘たちが水を飲むのを]観察するべし”); 33A5. *paścādbhaktam pānīyaṃ cārentena* (“食後に水を配るものは……”); 33A6. *jentāke cārentena* (“浴室で[水を]配るものは……”); 33A6. *prabhāṇe cārentena* (“禅坊で[水を]配るものは……”); 33A7. *ekena cāretavyaṃ* (“ひとりで[水を]配るべし”).

⁽⁷⁷⁾ 所謂MūlasarvāstivādinのPoṣadhavastuに“bhagavān āha yaṣṭis sārāyitavyā”という表現が出るが

cārayiṣyami”, dātavyā (「敬虔な比丘のときは、「同胞よ。[きちんと]坐って。私は叩きますよ」と言って、叩け”)

etc.⁽⁷⁸⁾

5.6.5. geṇḍuka(“禅毬”) + cārayati

geṇḍuka(禅毬、まり)とは、坐禅する比丘が居眠りをはじめたら、目の前に投げつけ、眠気を払わせるためのもののである。

① Abhi. 46B4. te dāni āyusmanto ṣaḍvarggikāḥ geṇḍukam cārayantā iṣṭakhaṇḍam lenkāṭakakhaṇḍena veṣṭayitvā cārenti (「さて、かの具寿六群比丘たちが禅毬を投げつける[lit. 与える]のに、瓦の破片を布切れで包んだものを投げつけた[lit. 与えた]”)

② Abhi. 47A1. atha dāni śrāddhako bhikṣur bhavati, āha “sagotrīmātā āsa tvam. aham cārayiṣyan” ti dātavyam (「敬虔な比丘のときは、「同胞よ。[きちんと]坐って。私は[禅毬を]投げますよ」と言って、与えよ。”)

etc.⁽⁷⁹⁾

5.7. cārayatiか、vārayatiか

これらcārayati乃至vārayati及びその派生語には、結び付く語や文脈によってその意味に差異がある。

(1) §5.1から§5.6.1に挙げた全ての文例と§5.6.2の②③は、複数の人に(札や食べ物や水を)「配る」(“distributes”)の意味である。

(2) §5.6.2の①と§5.6.3から§5.6.5の例は、一人の比丘に(水、灯、禅杖、禅毬を)「与える、渡す」(“gives”)の意味である。禅杖、禅毬の場合は、具体的には、(禅杖で)「叩く」(禅毬を)「投げ付ける」という行為を意味する。灯の場合は明確では

(Haiyan Hu-von Hünüber 1994: 276 §11.3)、この“sārayitavyā”も“cārayitavyā”乃至“vārayitavyā”の誤った伝承であろうか。

⁽⁷⁸⁾ この他にも、Abhi. 46A2. yaṣṭi vārentāyo yeva(MS. yeca) bhikṣu pracalāyati (「禅杖で叩いている最中、比丘がコックリコックリした”); 46A3-4. yaṣṭi dāni cārentena na dāni oguṇṭhitaṣīrṣeṇa vā cāretavyā. obitabastena vā upānabārūḍhena vā yaṣṭi cāretavyā. atha khalu ekāṃsikṛtena cārayitavyā (「さて禅杖で叩くときは、頭に被りものをして叩いてはならぬ。[服に]手を入れて、あるいは履物をはいて禅杖で叩いてはならぬ。むしろ一方の肩を露にし、叩くべし”。

⁽⁷⁹⁾ この他にも、Abhi. 46B5-6. nāpi kṣamati āghātacittena vā duṣṭacittena vā geṇḍukam cārayitum. atha khalu maitracittena hitacittena geṇḍuko caritavyo(sic.). nāpi kṣamati geṇḍukam cārayantasya cittam pradūṣayitum (「決して害しようという気持ちや悪意をもって禅毬を投げつけてはならない。むしろ慈しみや善意で禅毬を投げるべし。禅毬を投げつけるものに対して、決して怒りを抱いてはならない”); 46B6. eso dāni bhikṣuḥ pracalāyati acchaṭikāye utthāpayitavyo vaktavyam “āyusman* tava geṇḍuko prāpuṇati. ” uttbehi cārehi” iti(MS. nti). imena cāra[ṣ]itavyo (「さてある比丘がコックリコックリしたら、……弾指で起こして、言うべし「具寿、禅毬はあなたが[受ける]番になりましたよ。」と。「さあ、投げなさ

ないが、灯を顔に近付けて眠気を醒まさせるのではなかろうか。これらの例文で、*cārayati*乃至*vārayati*が「与える、渡す」の意味であることは、*dīpa*の②、*yaṣṭi*の②③、*geṇḍuka*の②で√*dā*(“与える”)で置き換えられていることからわかる。

さて、では、以上の例文でなぜ、*cārayati*と*vārayati*が同じ意味をもつのであろうか。換言すれば、二つの動詞がなぜ混同されるのであろうか。それは、*ca*と*va*の文字が、*Brāhmī*書体及びそれを受け継ぐ書体では、とても似ているからである。この二つの文字(さらには*dba*も)の混同例は枚挙に暇がない⁽⁸⁰⁾。

では、*cārayati*と*vārayati*のどちらが正しいのであろうか。これは、難しい問題である。§5.1で触れたように、パーリの用例に関して、PTSDとBHSDの著者たちは*cāreti*が正しいと考えている。一方で、BHSDの著者は、*cārayati*と*vārayati*を別々の項目として挙げ、同じ意味(“distributes, hands out”)を与えてながら、この二つの語形を関連付けていない。また、BHSDの*cārayati*の項では、単に√*car*(“動く、行う”)の使役形と記しているのみだが、*vārayati*の項では、√*vr̥*(“選ぶ”)の使役形か、あるいは*vāra*(“順番”)の動詞化したものと推定している。

しかし、手許の梵語・中期インド語・現代インド語の辞典類を見る限り、語根√*car*(“動く、行う”)から「配る、与える」という意味を導き出すことは難しい⁽⁸¹⁾。

では、*vārayati*はどうか。*vāra*(“順番”)の動詞化したものかというEdgertonの推測も一理あるが、「配る」の意味だけではなく「与える」の意味があるので、むしろ*vara*(“贈り物”)と関係あるのではないだろうか。Skt. *varayati*, °*tel*は、√*vr̥*(“選ぶ”)の使役形とされているが、実は*vara*の動詞化したもの(denominative)と考えられ(PW, s.v.)、「選ぶ、求める」の意味をもつ。おそらくこのdenominativeから、使役形であることを示すように長母音化した⁽⁸²⁾*vārayati*という使役形が造られたのではなかろうか⁽⁸³⁾。そして「選ばせる、好きなものをとらせる」という原義から「与える」⁽⁸⁴⁾、

い」。彼は投げるべし”。

⁽⁸⁰⁾ Cf. Norman 1971: 59(vs. 12); *do.* 1995: 146-147(vs. 38); *do.* 1997: 74(vs. 50). この混同は、*Brāhmī*書体で書かれた*Asoka*王碑文にも見える(Norman 1990: 169, 215)。

⁽⁸¹⁾ 使役形*cārayati*は“causes to move; sends, directs; drives away; grazes”(cf. MW, s.v.)の意味をもつ。

⁽⁸²⁾ Cf. BHSG §38.14f.

⁽⁸³⁾ この形に対応するPā. *vāreti*は、「(例えば男の親戚が、女性に彼の)妻になるように求める」の意味である。

⁽⁸⁴⁾ √*vr̥*が「恩寵を与える」の意味で使われた例がある(PW, VI, p. 707左下)。ā√*vr̥*にも「与える」の意味の例がある(*do.* p. 707右)。また、BHS. *pravārayati*, Pā. *pavāreti*は「～に(Ac.)～を(Inst.まれにAc.)に差し上げる」の意味になる。

あるいは「複数の人に与える」すなわち「配る」を意味ようになったのではなからうか。

しかし、*vārayati/cārayati*に相当する部分が、漢訳で「行」とあり⁽⁸⁵⁾、明らかに *cārayati*の直訳であること、また§5.5.2で触れた *yatkimcid-cāraka*という語形⁽⁸⁶⁾が出ることから、かなり早い時期から、書き誤られた形 *cārayati*及びその派生形が市民権を得ていたようである⁽⁸⁷⁾。

6. -vārika or -cārika

次も *va* と *ca* の文字の混同によって、単語の解釈に混乱をきたしている例である。

6.1. *upadbi-vārika, bhājana-vārika etc.*

Guṇaprabha の *Vinayasūtra* の臥具に関する部分 (*Śayanāsanavastu*) には、*upadbi-vārika* (“僧院生活の監督係”), *bhājana-v*^o (“食器を管理する者”), *pānīya-v*^o (“水の管理者”), *prāsādaka-v*^o (“装飾の係”), *pariṣandā-v*^o⁽⁸⁸⁾ (“階次を司る者”), *śayanāsana-v*^o (“臥具を管理する者”), *muṇḍaśayanāsana-v*^o (“臥具を敷くことの責任者[?]”), *chaṇḍikā-v*^o (“勝手口の門を管理する人”) という僧伽内の役職名が列挙されている (Sankrityayana 1981: 111.23-31)。このリストは *Mahāvīyutpatti* にも見える (Mvy.9067~9075)⁽⁸⁹⁾。これらの役職には、

⁽⁸⁵⁾ 例えば、§5.4. の *Avadānasataka* の文に対応する『撰集百緣經』には「『今可取我瓶中水，至僧中行。』……………『汝今當於衆僧之中行好淨水。』……………彼比丘……即便僧中常行淨水，經二萬歲」(大正4巻，246c7-15)。また、§5.5.3に引いた *Adhikaraṇavastu* の文に対応する『十誦律』「諍事法」では、壽を配ることを「行壽」、配る比丘を「行壽人」と訳している(大正23巻，254b8f.)。また、*Abhisamācārikā* に対応する『摩訶僧祇律』「威儀法」では、*salāka* を配ることは「行舍羅」(大正22，499b14)「行壽」(499b20)、水を配ることは「行水」(508c6，18)、禪杖で打つことは「行禪杖」(513a7)「行杖」(513a17)、禪毬を投げつけることは「行丸」(513b4)と表現している。漢語の「行」は先秦の文献や『漢書』に「賜う」という意味で使われた例があるが(HD.3.885b[25])、東漢代以降の文献での用例は見つからない。上に挙げた仏典の「行」は、古代漢語での「賜う」という意味を意識して用いたのではなく、原典で *cārayati* (本義は“行わせる”) とあったのを直訳したものであろう。

⁽⁸⁶⁾ もし、*vāraka* であれば、**yatkimcid-vāraka* というかなり別の形になる。

⁽⁸⁷⁾ *vārayati* (もしくは *vāreti*) という語形が、 \sqrt{vr} (“覆う、塞ぐ”) の使役形 *vārayati* (*vāreti* “阻止する、禁じる”) と同じ形になり、混乱を招きかねないことも、この語形を避ける要因だったかもしれない。

⁽⁸⁸⁾ *pariṣandā-v*^o と改めるべきであろう。Cf. Mvy. 9072. *pariṣandā-vārika*; BHSD, s.v. *pariṣandā*.

⁽⁸⁹⁾ *Vinayasūtra* の *prāsādaka-vārika* が Mvy では *prasādhi-v*^o になっている。この役職名は、所謂 *Mūlasarvāstivādin* の *Śayanāsanavastu* にも見え、そこでは *prāsāda-v*^o となっている (Gnoli 1978: 56.1, 12)。なお、*Vinayasūtra* が *Mahāvīyutpatti* の源泉史料の一つであることに関しては、中川正法「*Vinayasūtra* と

羯磨(*karman*)を行って僧伽に諮ったうえで比丘が任命されたようである⁽⁹⁰⁾。

*Abhisamācārikā*には、*pāṇīyavārika* (“水の管理者”. 32B5; 33A2⁽⁹¹⁾), *jentākavārika* (“浴室を管理する者”. 36B4, 37B4), *dīpavārikā* (“灯の係り”. 45A2, 45A3, 45A4) という語が見える。

また、所謂 *Mūlasarvāstivādin* の『出家事』(*Pravrajyāvastu*)には、ある客比丘が、*pānaka-vārika* (“飲み物の責任者”?) である沙弥に飲み物を求めたところ断られるという話がある(Näther 1996: 264, 12)⁽⁹²⁾。

この「～に責任をもつ、監督する」という意味の *vārika*⁽⁹³⁾ はおそらく \sqrt{vr} (“wards off, checks, restrains”⁽⁹⁴⁾) の派生語であろう。

6.2. *patra-cārikā*, *harita-c°*, *bhājana-c°*

さて、*Divyāvadāna* の *Pūrṇāvadāna* にある次の文は様々に議論されてきた。*Sūrpāraka* 城の王が栴檀の高殿を新築し、世尊とその弟子たちを食事に招待した。世尊は、まず *Pūrṇa*、それから神通力のある弟子たちを遣わした。城の大門で王と *Pūrṇa* が世尊の到着を待っていたときのこと——

Divy. 45.17-21. *yāvat patracārikā rddhyā haritacārikā bhājanacārikās cāgatāḥ. tān dṛṣṭvā rājā kathayati “bhadanta Pūrṇa kiṃ bhagavān āgatāḥ?” āyuṣmān Pūrṇaḥ kathayati “mahārāja patracārikā haritacārikā bhājanacārikās cāte na tāvad bhagavān”* (“そのとき、神通力で葉に乗る者たち、草に乗る者たち、器に乗る者たちがやって来た。彼らを見て王は「尊者 *Pūrṇa* よ。世尊が着かれたのか？」と言った。具寿 *Pūrṇa* は「大王よ。彼らは葉に乗る者たち、草に乗る者たち、器に乗る者たちです。世尊はまだです。」と答えた”)

なお、このテキストの脚注によれば、*patra-cārikā*, *harita-c°*, *bhājana-c°* とあるところ、写本では *patra-vārikā*, *harita-v°*, *bhājana-v°* となっている場合もあるという。

Mahāvīyūtpatti」(『原始仏教と大乘仏教: 渡邊文麿博士追悼記念論集』前田惠學編、京都、pp. 355-371) および Hu-von Hinüber 1997 を参照。

⁽⁹⁰⁾ *Sāyanāsana-vastu* には *prāsādaka-vārika* の羯磨が述べられ(Gnoli 1978: 25-56.7)、義浄訳『根本説一切有部百一羯磨』巻四には、「看檢房舎」(*sāyanāsana-vārika*) の羯磨が述べられている(大正24, 471a21f.)。

⁽⁹¹⁾ MS. *pāṇīya-dhārikām*.

⁽⁹²⁾ Näther 1975: 37.17 では *pāna-vārika* となっているが、改めたのであろう。なお、この語は“(a novice) in charge of drinks”と英訳されているが(Näther 1996: 291-292)、漢訳には「行蜜漿」(蜜漿をくばるもの)とあり、この *-vārika* を先にみた *vārayati* (“配る”) の派生語とみたようだ。なお、チベット訳は、*phor pa 'kbrud par byed pa* (“腕を洗う者”) としている(Eimer 1983: 296: 25)。

⁽⁹³⁾ Cf. BHSD, s.v.

さて、これら三つの単語を、Burnoufは、木の葉を使って来るもの、ライオンで運ばれたもの、壺に入れて運ばれたものと訳している(1844:261-262)。Edgertonは、木の葉や草木や壺に乗って空を飛んでくる者を意味すると考えている(BHSD, s.v. -cārika)。これに対し、Agrawalaは、吉祥なものを手にしたり、吉祥な動物や車に乗って、行列の先頭を歩く人々だと考えている(1963; 1966: 71-72)。

この話は、所謂Mūlasarvāstivādinの『藥事』(Bhaiṣajyavastu)にも見える。残念ながらその部分の梵本は見つかっていないが、対応するチベット訳と漢訳がある。まず、チベット訳では“*lo ma 'drim pa*”(“葉を配る者”), “*shang tse 'drim pa*”(“[ある種の]草を配る者”), “*snod spyad 'drim pa*”(“容器を配る者”)と訳されており⁽⁹⁵⁾、訳者が-cārikaを先に見たcārayati / vārayati (“配る”)の派生語と理解したことが分かる。

一方、義浄はこの三つの単語を「知其菜事」「知其食草」「知其器物」と訳している⁽⁹⁶⁾。漢訳が基づいた写本では、-cārikaではなく、-vārikaとあったようで、漢訳者はその*patra-vārika*, *harita-vārika*, *bhājana-vārika*を「(食用の)葉の責任者」「野菜の責任者」「食器の責任者」と理解しているわけである。

しかし、チベット訳や漢訳の「葉を配る者」ないし「葉の責任者」、「草を配る者」ないし「野菜の責任者」という役職名が存在したとは考えられないし、かりにあったとしても、招待された食事の場でその役割を果たせるとは考えられない。また、Divy.ではこれらが複数形になっていて、同じ役職の人が何人もいるのはおかしい。従って、筆者はEdgertonの解釈が妥当と考える。

いずれにせよ、この例は律典に精通していた義浄でさえも-cārika / -vārikaという二つの単語の混同を免れなかったことを示している。

⁽⁹⁴⁾ Cf. MW, s.v.

⁽⁹⁵⁾ *ji tsam na lo ma 'drim pa dang shang tse 'drim pa dang snod spyad 'drim pa dag rdzu 'pbrul gyis lhags pa. rgyal pos mtshong nas smras pa “ci btsun pa Gang po, bcom ldan 'das gshegs sam?” des smras pa “di dag ni lo ma 'drim pa dang shang tse 'drim pa dang snod spyad 'drim pa lags te, bcom ldan 'das ma lags so.”*(台北版『西藏大藏經』1, p. 89, 310A3-4).

⁽⁹⁶⁾ 「乃至佛令差五授事，以神通力先到其舍。何者為五？一者知其菜事，二者知其器物，三者知其食草，四者知其淨水，五者知其熟食。王見五人從空而至，問圓滿曰：“此是世尊以不？”圓滿報曰：“是五授事此人來此檢校。所謂知菜等乃至熟食。世尊未至。”(義浄訳『根本説一切有部毘奈耶藥事』卷三、大正24, 14a26-b3)。

おわりに

以上、パーリ文献や仏教梵語文献に見えるいくつかの難語について、関係する資料を紹介し、筆者なりの仮説を記した。筆者がこの論文で示そうとしたのは、パーリ文献と仏教梵語文献とは別々に研究すべきものではなく、批判的に比較し、総合的に研究する必要があるということである。そして、その際に、中期インド語の知識が不可欠なことはいうまでもない。

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A PRELIMINARY STUDY ON MEDITATION AND THE BEGINNINGS OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

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1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Before stepping into the labyrinth of Buddhist meditation and the beginnings of Mahāyāna, a few words about the origins of this paper will shed some light on its aims and, more important, on its limitations. The cause 'to blame' for this very preliminary study¹ goes back to the kind invitation received from Professor Paul Harrison to contribute to a panel on early Mahāyāna and Mahāyānasūtras at the 12th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Lausanne, 1999). The subject chosen is related to a long-standing (predominantly theoretical) interest in meditation as well as to the arch-question tormenting so many students of Indian Buddhism: the birth of Mahāyāna. This paper attempts to discuss the relationship between the two. The first part of the article is mainly dedicated to one technical aspect of meditation which seems to have played a crucial role in early Mahāyāna: the meanings of *samādhi* and its intricate connections with *dhyāna(pāramitā)*. The discussion is largely limited to the *Prajñāpāramitā* corpus and, more or less, related texts. The survey is, unfortunately, far from being exhaustive and not backed up by extensive philological work. The second part of the article, which deals with the rise of the Great Vehicle movement and the role of the spiritual cultivation in this process, admittedly indulges in building up a largely speculative hypothesis. I must confess from the beginning that the relation between the two parts of my article is not one of strict implication. What I say in the first part of the paper is not a direct and definitive proof of the scenario put forward in its second part. It is, nevertheless, one of the many pieces needed to reconstruct the *Sitz im Leben* of spiritual cultivation and its role in the rise of Mahāyāna. The hypothesis formulated in relation to the origins of the Great Vehicle is, admittedly, not dramatically new and is far from taking into account the multitude of facets involved in this process. Even if this modest attempt fails in putting forward a convincing narrative concerning the beginnings of Mahāyāna, there will always remain the consolation that it may succeed in adding a few more questions and doubts regarding this intricate historical problem.

I must thank Professor Harrison not only for giving me the chance to join his panel but also for having 'interrupted my dogmatic slumber'² with his challenging hypothesis on the central role of the ascetic monks in the birth of the Great Vehicle :

Far from being the products of an urban, lay, devotional movement, many Mahāyāna *sūtras* give evidence of a hard-core ascetic attempt to return to the original inspiration of Buddhism, the search for Buddhahood or awakened

cognition. (Harrison 1995, 65)

Previous to my encounter with this essay, my understanding had been under the spell of Akira Hirakawa's theories which stress the pivotal role played by laity in the formation of Mahāyāna Buddhism (cf., for instance, Hirakawa 1974, vol.1, pp.326-352; 1990, vol.2, pp.443-501).³ The ascetic-centrality hypothesis put forward by Harrison was not only new and stimulating but it also prompted me to start looking at this possibility from another angle. If ascetic communities were behind many of the early Mahāyāna sutras, then these sources should contain substantial material on spiritual cultivation (*bhāvanā*). What is then the meditation the early *bodhisattvas* practised or, at least, expounded in their scriptures? How different was it from the Śrāvakayāna tradition? Such an investigation could eventually shed light on the beginnings of the Great Vehicle. If not proper light, which is almost hopeless in the history of Indian Buddhism, then we should be content even with a dim glow. There is no doubt that this historical process must have been very complex, and an overall picture of the multiform religious phenomenon called Mahāyāna should take into account far more data and perspectives. Gregory Schopen's description of early Mahāyāna as 'a loose federation of a number of distinct though related cults' (Schopen 1975, 181) appears to be justifiably becoming a classical definition.⁴ Actually, even Hirakawa's theories, the trendiest target of the critics of the laity-centrality hypothesis, are far from being simple, and a number of his findings and insights retain, I believe, their persuasive power.

Before tackling these problems, we need to clarify our historical and textual background. Early Mahāyāna refers here to the period between the 1st century BCE and the 5th century CE. Following Shizutani (1974, 274) and Nakamura (1980, 152), I also use the term proto-Mahāyāna, roughly covering the age between 100 BCE and 100 CE, to describe the transitional and incipient stage of the movement. In choosing the 5th century as the *terminus ante quem* of early Mahāyāna, I am largely indebted to Gregory Schopen's findings. In an excellent lecture delivered at Otani University (Kyoto) in 1996⁵, Schopen convincingly argued that most of the earliest epigraphic evidence of Mahāyāna dates back to the 5th/6th centuries. Before this time⁶ and even during this period the Great Vehicle appears to have been a geographically and institutionally marginal presence in India (Schopen 1996, 13-14). The emergence of Mahāyāna as 'a clearly identifiable named group having its own monasteries' coincides with the decline and eventual disappearance of inscriptional references to the old Mainstream monastic orders (Schopen 1996, 15).⁷ The 5th century as the *terminus ante quem* of this period also tallies with the history of Buddhist thought. This is the age when Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (or the authors and redactors going under their names) roughly finalise the systematisation of the Yogācāra philosophy. Their work also sets the tone of the predominantly epistemological and logical trend, which aside from the Tantric developments, is to characterise the next seven or eight centuries of Buddhist doctrinal history in India.

Turning now to philological details, most of the texts discussed here come from the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature and related Mahāyāna sutras. This does not mean that I have

covered the whole of the discouragingly voluminous *Prajñāpāramitā* corpus which amounts to no less than 40 works (cf. Conze 1978), and, no doubt, runs for thousands and thousands of pages. The term 'related Mahāyāna sutras' is, admittedly, not well-defined but it refers here to texts like the *Samādhirāja-sūtra*, *Śūraṅgamasamādhi-sūtra*, etc. Except a few remarks, I shall not touch upon meditation in works like the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, Pure Land scriptures, visualisation sutras, etc., which, as explained below, are based on different approaches and understanding of what spiritual cultivation is.

Now, how far back in time do our texts actually take us? Our earliest solid evidence starts with the Chinese translations of Mahāyāna scriptures in the second half of the 2nd century CE. Any conjecture bearing on a period before this date cannot aspire to reach definitive certainty. Our attempts to put together a plausible jigsaw of apparently disparate events and data are undoubtedly fraught with many questionable inferences, but they, nevertheless, remain our sole way of saying something meaningful about the proto-Mahāyāna period. As long as it retains the caution and modesty required by hypothetical judgement, higher criticism continues to be, I believe, preferable to blind acceptance of tradition or complacent scepticism concerning historical reconstruction.

Though I often employ Sanskrit materials, I am aware that the Mss on which our modern editions are based are often very late.⁸ The extant Sanskrit version of the *Aṣṭa* appears to reflect the redactional development of the text between approximately 645 (Xuanzang's return to China) and 800 (the probable date of Haribhadra's compilation of his *Commentary*) (Kajiyama 1974, vol.2, p.345). Fortunately, it was one of the first Buddhist scriptures to be rendered into Chinese, and it represents the earliest attested stage of a *Prajñāpāramitā* text. Usually known under the title of *Dao xing (boruo) jing* 道行(般若)經, in 10 *juan* 卷, it is almost unanimously attributed by traditional sources and modern scholars⁹ to the Indo-Scythian Lokakṣema. A colophon gives us the exact date of the completion of its translation as 26 October 179 CE (cf. Harrison 1993, 141-144). Careful philological research has revealed that the *Aṣṭa* is the oldest *Prajñāpāramitā* sutra. It has also been surmised that the first two chapters (Conze 1968) or its first chapter (Kajiyoshi 1980) represent the original nucleus out of which the text evolved.¹⁰

The Sanskrit Ms of Recension A of the *Ratnagūṇa* is actually as late as 1174 (Yuyama 1976, X X III ff.; Conze 1960, 37). The *Fo shuo fo mu bao de zang boruoboluomi jing* 佛說佛母寶德藏般若波羅蜜經, in 3 *juan*, the Chinese version of the text is of little help in this case, since it was translated by Faxian 法賢 in 991.¹¹ In spite of our lack of Ms evidence, the *Ratnagūṇa* appears to belong to the earliest strata of *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. Conze (1994, X) considers that the first two chapters of this work represent the original *Prajñāpāramitā* dating back to 100 BCE.¹² According to him, 'the 41 verses of the first two chapters [of the *Ratnagūṇa*] constitute the original *Prajñāpāramitā* which may well go back to 100 B.C.' (Conze 1994, X).¹³ At our present level of knowledge it seems impossible to prove or disprove Conze's view in a definitive way, but it can be justifiably regarded as a plausible

conjecture.¹⁴ Though standing on the quicksand of the higher criticism, my working hypothesis here is that the first two chapters of the *Ratnaguṇa* and the *Aṣṭa* respectively represent the earliest strata of the *Prajñāpāramitā* corpus and, most probably, of the whole Mahāyāna literature. I have, therefore, paid special attention to these fragments in my examination of the spiritual cultivation and the rise of Mahāyāna.

The textual history of the *Pañca* and the *Śata* is far more complicated. According to Kajiyoshi (1980), the *Pañca* lineage developed not as a mere enlargement of the *Aṣṭa* but rather as a commentary (*upadeśa*) attempting to solve from its own peculiar perspective doctrinal points in the *Aṣṭa*.¹⁵ This process culminated in the compilation of the huge *Śata* (Kajiyoshi 1980, 112-114; 723-727).

This is not the place to discuss in detail the textual history of all the scriptures quoted in this paper. A final word on the *Da zhi du lun* 大智度論 (* *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*)¹⁶, which is much used in this paper, appears, however, to be necessary. The decision to refer to this treatise here may raise some complicated methodological problems.

First, the virtual silence of the Indian tradition in regard to the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* may cast doubt on its reliability for our discussion. Despite the traditional attribution and some modern views supporting it (see, for instance, Hikata (1958) and Yinshun (1993)), it is very unlikely that the author of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* is Nāgārjuna. Lamotte (1944-1976, vol. 3, pp.VIII-XLIV) shows, quite convincingly, I believe, that the author¹⁷ must have been a Buddhist scholar 'of Sarvāstivādin formation and Mahāyāna conviction' active in Northwest India at the beginning of the 4th century.¹⁸ The silence of the later Mādhyamika tradition might be explained by the relatively limited geographical transmission of the text in Northwest India and Central Asia which was followed by its early loss and fall into oblivion.

Second, is it historically justifiable to lump together a (relatively) late *sāstra* with the *sūtra* tradition? We have already seen that the *Pañca* and the *Śata* may have actually developed, partially, at least, as exegetically motivated texts. In a brilliant recent contribution, Stefano Zacchetti (1999)¹⁹ has shown that at least some passages in the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* seem to be linked to the same commentarial tradition which produced the *Pañca* and the *Śata*. This is a very important finding relevant not only to the present discussion but also to the entire history of the *Prajñāpāramitā* corpus.²⁰ The author's point, convincingly supported by a number of illustrations, can be summed up as follows:

During an analysis of the *Pañca*, where the first seven chapters of the Chinese translations (esp. DWK [i.e. Dharmarakṣa's, Wu Chaolu's, and Kumārajīva's translations respectively]) were compared with the corresponding Sanskrit versions (especially *Pañca-D* [i.e. Dutt's edition] and the *Śata*), I found that, in a number of cases, textual expanded readings, as transmitted in the Sanskrit against DWK(X) [X= Xuanzang's translation], were directly anticipated by the DZDL [i.e. *Da zhidu lun*]. (p.2)

My hypothesis is that they [i.e. these passages] probably were not composed by

the author of the DZDL (whoever he was): rather they very likely represent a certain generic exegetical tradition handed down (perhaps orally [...]) along with the *sūtra*, and, by chance, partially collected in the DZDL...(p.8)

(The explanations or additions in the square brackets belong to me.)

Obviously, not the entire *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* can be linked to this exegetical tradition^{2 1}, and many passages undoubtedly represent the creative work of its final author(s). At the present state of our knowledge it is very hard, if not impossible, to make distinctions between, on the one hand, tradition-handed views reflecting an early doctrinal stage, maybe close to the formation period of texts like the *Āṣṭa*, the *Pañca*, etc. and, on the other hand, late commentarial developments. Nevertheless, the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* remains a very useful tool when dealing with the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature and philosophy. It is my working hypothesis here that this commentary provides not only much needed clarifications but it may, at least occasionally, reflect earlier exegetical traditions. With this proviso in mind, I think that the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* can still be used in our discussion on meditation in the early *Prajñāpāramitā* texts.

2. *DHYĀNA* AND *SAMĀDHI* IN THE *PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ* LITERATURE

What kind of meditation did the early Mahāyāna *bodhisattvas* practise? It is very risky to generalise, especially after a preliminary exploration of the sources, but I shall, nevertheless, venture to say a few words about the spiritual cultivation in general in the early Great Vehicle. Although Śrāvākayāna and Mahāyāna share a basic common heritage of meditative practices and ideas, differences between the two traditions cannot be denied. The distinctively Mahāyāna innovations apparently evolved into two main directions.

On the one hand, we have basically traditional Śrāvākayāna meditative practices which are reinterpreted in the light of the *Prajñāpāramitā* relativism, with special emphasis on the idea of practising without a support and the complete negation of attachment to rapture.^{2 2} The ideal is a state of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), signlessness (*ānimitta*), and directionlessness (*apraṇihita*).^{2 3} This is mainly characteristic of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature and will form the object of my inquiry here. Despite the plethora of *samādhis*, some of them presumably actual concentration methods or states, some of them emblematic names for doctrinal goals, the main innovative effort of this trend was not directed towards the creation of new meditative techniques. Its chief contribution rather appears to lie in a new hermeneutic approach towards the spiritual cultivation. The most important point here is not what a *bodhisattva* practises, and usually he works with traditional methods and categories^{2 4}, but how he practises, to be more precise, how he practices without practising.^{2 5}

On the other hand, we have visualisation sutras mainly, but not exclusively, associated with the Pure Land Buddhism.^{2 6} I would venture to speculate that this trend originated in

technical elaborations upon the various psychological signs (*nimitta*) obtained in meditation coupled with a strongly devotional form of Buddha recollection (*buddhānusmṛti*). At the risk of being schematic in the extreme, we could say that the Prajñāpāramitā stream emphasised the *ānimitta* aspect as its main spiritual practice and goal while the visualisation sutras developed and idealised the *nimitta* aspect as the key to attaining the Buddhist *summum bonum*. Of course, this is a theoretical simplification and in reality we have a variety of positions. The relativist Prajñāpāramitā current is far from being devoid of visualisation and devotional passages. One of the main results and aims of the *bodhisattava*'s meditation is gaining direct access to countless Buddha lands (*buddha-kṣetra*) and worshipping each of their Buddhas. At the other extreme of the spectrum, a visualisation sutra like the *Amitāyurbuddhadhyāna-sūtra* teaches that the contemplation of the Pure Land leads to the attainment of the patient acceptance of the non-arising of phenomena (*anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti* 無生法忍, T12.341c22). A case in between, one is almost tempted to say a category in itself, is the *Pratyutpannasamādhi-sūtra*. After a description of a what appears to be a visualisation technique (T13.904b-905c; Harrison 1978, 21(section 2D)-36 (section 3L)), the Lord tells Bhadrāpāla that the Tathāgatas seen in *samādhi* are nothing but mental products because things appear as we imagine them ('*di ltar bdag ji lat ji ltar rnam par rtog pa de lta de ltar snang ngo*) (Harrison 1978, 36(section 3L)). The thought itself is declared to have no substantial existence (*dnegos po med pa=*abhāva*) (Harrison 1978, 36-7(section 3M)).²⁷

There is no doubt that the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras show a great degree familiarity with the traditional meditation techniques and the framework of the spiritual path (see, for instance, *Aṣṭadaśa*, vol. 2, pp. 19-21; *Pañca*, 203-210; etc.). As mentioned above, the basic novelty lies in their interpretation. Chapter 1, verses 9-10, of the *Ratnagaṇa* (pp. 10-11) can be said to represent the archetype of the Prajñāpāramitā treatment of meditation both in terms of chronology and philosophical approach. On the one hand, concentration is not denied and is held to play an important psychological role. The *bodhisattva* with his mind set on non-production experiences the most excellent of the tranquil concentrations (*an-upādu-dhīḥ spṛśati śānta-samādhi śreṣṭhām*. Verse 10). Dwelling pacified in himself, he receives his prediction of Buddhahood from the previous Tathāgatas (*evātma-śānta viharann iha bodhisattvo, so vyākṛto purimakehi tathāgatehi*. Verse 11). On the other hand, his knowledge of the highest truth of the emptiness of all phenomena makes him non-dependant upon concentration. The *bodhisattva* does not mind whether he is in or out of concentration because he knows perfectly the *dharma*-original nature (*na ca manyate ahu samāhītu vyutthito vā, kasmārtha dharma-prakṛtiṃ parijānāyivā*. Verse 11).

We find the same philosophical and psychological role assigned to meditation in the first chapter of Lokakṣema's Chinese translation of the *Aṣṭa*:

For the *bodhisattva mahāsattva*, all designations and phenomena are not grasped.²⁸ Therefore, [this] *samādhi* (* *sarvadharmānupādāno nāma samādhiḥ*)²⁹ is infinite and beyond measure.³⁰ It cannot be known by *arhats*

and *pratyekabuddhas*.^{3 1} Those *bodhisattvas mahāsattvas* who follow this *samādhi* will quickly obtain Buddhahood.^{3 2}

By Buddha's magnificent power, Subhūti thus spoke: 'All *bodhisattvas* who have attained the stage of non-regression (**avivartika*)^{3 3} and have obtained [the prediction of] reaching Buddhahood from the Buddhas of the past follow this *samādhi*, but they do not perceive [this] *samādhi*, do not conceive of [this] *samādhi*, do not practise [this] *samādhi*, do not think of [this] *samādhi*, do not wish to sit in [this] *samādhi*, and do not say "[this is] my *samādhi*." He who follows this *dharma* [i.e. way of practice] will have no doubts.'^{3 4}

菩薩摩訶薩一切字法不受。是故三昧無有邊無有正。諸阿羅漢辟支佛所不能及知。菩薩摩訶薩隨三昧者疾得作佛。持佛威神、須菩提說是語：“菩薩皆得阿惟越致字、前過去佛時得作佛、隨三昧亦不見三昧、亦有無三昧想、亦不作三昧、亦不念識三昧、亦不想識坐三昧、亦不言我三昧。已隨是法者無有疑。” (T8.426c18-25).

Apparently at an early date, Mahāyāna authors subsumed the traditional practice of trances (*dhyāna*), attainments (*samāpatti*), etc. under the perfection of meditation (*dhyānapāramitā*).^{3 5} It is possible that, as Hirakawa suggests, in the earliest stages of Mahāyāna the six perfections were regarded as equal^{3 6}, but even the oldest *Prajñāpāramitā* texts already regard the *dhyānapāramitā* as well as the other perfections as subordinated to and contained in the *prajñāpāramitā* (*Aṣṭa(M)*, 81; cf. also 310). To be sure, the role of the perfection of meditation is not denied, and the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (T25.180b) declares that the power of *dhyāna* can help the *bodhisattva* swallow the medicine of *prajñā*. A careless practice of meditation, however, can have disastrous effects for the *bodhisattva*'s career. The greatest concern is that spiritual practices, especially those of an ensatatic nature, like *dhyānas* and *samāpattis*, can seriously preclude the *bodhisattva* from achieving his noble cause of universal salvation. Not only that *dhyāna* is a solitary and self-centred practice but it also determines the sphere of the practitioner's future rebirth, which, for the proficient meditator, will automatically be outside the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*). The *bodhisattva* must, therefore, master the *dhyānas* and *samāpattis* without receiving their usual karmic fruit (*Aṣṭa(M)*, 332; 427; *Aṣṭadaśa*, vol1, pp.94-5; 100). He acquires the perfection of meditation entering the nine successive states of attainment but 'he does not cling to the level of *śrāvakas* or *pratyekabuddhas*, and he [practises meditation thinking], "Having stood in the perfection of concentration, I must now liberate all beings from the cycle of rebirths"' (*na ca śrāvakabhūmiṃ vā prtyekabuddhabhūmiṃ adhyālabate. anyatrāsyaiṃ bhavati. iha mayā samādhīpāramitāyāṃ sthitvā sarvasattvā samsārāt parimocayitavyā iti. Aṣṭadaśa*, vol1, pp.94-5).

The author of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, in a passage listing eighteen characteristics of the Mahāyāna *dhyānapāramitā* (T25.187c-190a), appears to be very eager to prove that

despite its ensatic aspects and periods of seclusion required by its practice, the *bodhisattva*'s meditation is an efficient method and integral part of the great being's messianic mission. To give only two examples here, the *bodhisattva* practises meditation in order to teach the inner bliss of *dhyāna* and *samāpatti* to those beings attached to exterior pleasures (T25.187c). He practises 'the **bodhisattva-dhyāna* which does not forsake the living beings' 不捨衆生菩薩禪 and 'in *dhyāna* he always generates thoughts of great compassion (*mahākaruṇā-citta*) 禪中皆發大悲心 (T25.188a6-7). In order to make friendliness and compassion possible in a practice dominated by ensatic states, the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* operates a technical innovation inconceivable from the viewpoint of the traditional Śrāvakayāna doctrine. 'The *bodhisattva* practising the *dhyānapāramitā* enters the successive *dhyāna* stages with thoughts of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) 菩薩行禪波羅蜜。於欲界心次第入禪。' (T25.188b3-4). This opens the way for extravagant displays of the psychological virtuosity of blending trance-states and active preaching. 'The *bodhisattva* always dwells in the *dhyāna*, concentrates his thoughts, remains unmoved, does not generate coarse observation (*vitarka*) and subtle examination (*vicāra*) and [yet] at the [same] time he preaches the Dharma with countless voices to all living beings in the ten directions and liberates them. 爾時菩薩常入禪定。攝心不動不生覺觀。亦能為十方一切衆生以無量音聲說法而脫之。' (T25.188c9-11)³⁷

The *Vimalkīrtinirdeśa* goes as far as to declare that the correct practice of solitary meditation (*pratisamhāna*) is not withdrawing from the attainment of cessation (**nirodhasamāpatti*)³⁸ and yet displaying ordinary behaviour.³⁹ (Chinese translation: 不起滅定而現諸威儀。是為宴坐。T14.539c21-22, T14.561b14-15⁴⁰; Tibetan translation: *ji ltar 'gog pa*⁴¹ *las kyang mi ldang zhing spyod lam kun tu yang snang bar 'gyur ba de ltar nang du yang dag gzhas par gyis shig* | P34.Bu190a4)

Let us now see what our texts have to tell about *samādhi*, one of the new leading 'stars' in Mahāyāna literature. In terms of spiritual cultivation, the attainment of the unsurpassed perfect Awakening (*anuttara-samyak-sambodhi*) is, presumably, neither a simple intellectual act of understanding nor a complete self-abandon to enstatic states. For the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature authors, it was a matter of paramount importance that wisdom should lead and control all the other perfections. Alongside innovations in defining the nature of *dhyāna*, they elaborated upon and reinterpreted another old spiritual alley. The four *dhyānas*, the core of the *dhyānapāramitā*, are considered to include all other aspects of spiritual cultivation: the five supernatural powers (*abhijñā*), the four states of mental sameness (*sammaccitta*), the eight deliverances (*vimokṣa*), the ten totalities (*kṛtsnāyatana*), the *bodhisattva*'s *samādhis* 諸菩薩三昧, amounting to 108 or 120 varieties, etc. (*Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, T25.185b; 187c). Amongst all these practices, it seems that early Mahāyāna chose to stress particularly *samādhi* as the ideal form of spiritual cultivation or cognitive perfection. To start with, the term was polysemic even in the early Canon⁴², and its wide semantic sphere must have served perfectly well the creative purposes and, probably, the psychological experimentation of the *Prajñāpāramitā* followers. Furthermore, it was an ideal term related both to *dhyāna* and

prajñā.

The popularity of *samādhi* in the Great Vehicle^{4 3} is witnessed by the impressive number of concentrations as well as sutras dedicated to them. The most popular and well-defined ones appear to be the three concentrations which will be dealt with below. The number of *samādhis* varies from 58 (*Aṣṭa(M)*, 490-2) to 108 (*Pañca*, 142-4 and 198-203)^{4 4}, 115 (*Śata*, 825-835), 118 (*Mahāvīyutpatti*, 40-49, under the heading *prajñāpāramitodbhāvita samādhi nāmāni*), 121 (*Śata*, 1412-1426), etc.^{4 5} The poetic frenzy of the sutras often made the number acquire hyperbolic digits. Other passages in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature mention hundreds of thousands (T8.1a26; T8.217a28) or millions of *samādhis* (T8.842b3). The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (p. 424)^{4 6} speaks of hundreds of thousands of *koṭis* of *samādhis* equal to the sands of the Ganges. The *Prajñāpāramitopedesa* explains 14 representative *samādhis* (T25.268b-c) and then declares their number infinite 無量 (T25.268c). Do we have here a process of gradual growth from a relatively limited number of concentrations to hyperbolic digits? As with many other processes of historical development, we can certainly assume that a gradual enlargement took place, but, on the other hand, the Śrāvakayāna tradition does not lack completely the rhetoric of astronomic numbers. The *Mahāvībhāṣā*, for instance, says that ‘if one classifies according to continuity (**samtāna*) and momentariness (**kṣaṇa*), then there is an infinite number of *samādhis*.’ 若以相續剎那分別、則有無量三摩地。(T27.538a26-7). It is, however, difficult to draw conclusions as to whether our Mahāyāna texts were influenced by an Abhidharmic tradition or we have to deal here with a completely independent growth.^{4 7}

Whatever the origin of the infinite number of concentrations may be, more important for our discussion here is to consider whether these *samādhis* actually refer to specific meditative techniques. The texts are not very clear and generous in details. It appears, however, that apart from some well-attested methods, many of these *samādhis* represent rather stylistic devices stressing the fact that the apprehension of the most profound aspects of reality must be connected with a state of concentration.^{4 8} The *Samādhirāja-sūtra* lists hundreds of qualifications and merits of ‘the *samādhi* that is manifested as the sameness of the essential nature of all *dharmas*’ (*sarva-dharma-svabhāva-samatā-vipañcita-samādhi*)^{4 9}, but there is no clearly identifiable meditative technique which can be singled out as this particular *samādhi*. The word appears to denote a ‘cognitive experience of emptiness’ covering a wide variety of senses, including the sutra itself (Gómez et al. 1989, 16). Similarly, in spite of the huge number of theoretical and rhetorical considerations on the *samādhi* which gives its title, the *Śūramgamasamādhi-sūtra* contains only one brief passage on how the ‘*samādhi* of the heroic march’ should be practised (T15.463b21-c5; P32.331b2-332a4): the *bodhisattva* should ‘contemplate all phenomena as empty 空, with no resistance (無所障礙 *apratigha*)^{5 0}, perishing with each [moment of] thought 念念滅盡, without aversion or passion 離於憎愛’. We have here rather a general statement of a basic refrain of the Mahāyāna *Weltanschauung* supposedly realised in a state of deep concentration. Furthermore, the text adds that the way of practising this *samādhi* is not singular and its actual method of cultivation depends upon the

functioning of the mind and mental concomitants (心行所行 **citta-caitta pravṛtti*) of each living being.^{5 1}

The central and perhaps the oldest form of *samādhi* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature appears to be the set^{5 2} known as ‘the three concentrations’ (*trayaḥ samādhyah* 三三昧)^{5 3}, i.e. the emptiness concentration (*sūnyatā-samādhi*), the signless concentration (*ānimitta-samādhi*), and the directionless concentration (*apraṇihita-samādhi*). They correspond more or less to the traditional three gates of liberation (*trīṇi-vimokṣa-mukhāni* 三解脱門).^{5 4} This triad might have played the role of a bridge between the two Vehicles by providing the proto-Mahāyāna ascetics with a preliminary epistemic model of emptiness (*sūnyatā*) and signlessness (*ānimitta*) which ultimately laid the foundations of the Great Vehicle paradigm shift.^{5 5} The *Pañca* (p.208)^{5 6} and the *Śata* (p.1440) use the same definition for the three concentrations as the *Ekottarāgama* (T2.630b) (Lamotte 1944-1976, 1213).^{5 7}

There are, nevertheless, differences in the way Mahāyāna authors conceive the three *samādhis*. The most important is the practise of these concentrations without hypostasization^{5 8}: ‘The *bodhisattva*, the great being, practising the perfection of wisdom, does not connect [his actual practice of] emptiness with the emptiness [conceived of as an entity]; [therefore, for him] there is no binding to emptiness.’ (*bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām caran na sūnyatām sūnyatayā yojayati na sūnyatāyogam. Pañca*, 48; cf. also p.52).^{5 9} And the same goes true for signlessness and directionlessness. The three *samādhis* are considered virtually identical with the practice of the perfection of wisdom and are declared the most exalted form of cultivation^{6 0} (*niruttaro hy eṣaḥ Śāriputra yogo yad uta prajñāpāramitāyogaḥ sūnyatāyogaḥ ānimittayogaḥ apraṇihitayogaḥ. Pañca*, 58-9; T8.224c23-4).^{6 1} This spiritual omnipotence^{6 2} makes them so effective that the *bodhisattva*’s career as a saviour for aeons is menaced. They can potentially trigger a speedy Awakening but if this is achieved before the completion of the *bodhisattva*’s vows, then it amounts to the falling to the level of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* (*Aṣṭa(M)*, 310). The *bodhisattva* must dwell in the concentrations of emptiness, signlessness, and directionlessness without actually realising them (*na sāksātkaroti*). Their complete attainment would mean the realisation of the reality-limit (*bhūta-koṭi*) (*Aṣṭa(M)*, 373-9; *Aṣṭa(W)*, 749-61).^{6 3} The *bodhisattva* should be like a bird in the air or like a skilful archer who shoots upwards one arrow and then keeps on shooting arrows in order to stop the fall of the first one (*Aṣṭa(M)*, 374; *Aṣṭa(W)*, 754-5).^{6 4} To achieve this the *bodhisattava*, basing himself upon friendliness directed towards all living beings, ties himself to them, transcends whatever belongs to defilements and Māra^{6 5} as well as the stages of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, and abides in the concentration of emptiness, etc.^{6 6} (*yasmin samaye Subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ sarvasattvānām antike maitricittam ārambaṇi-kṛtya tān paramayā maitryā paribadhṇāti atrāntare bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ kleṣapakṣam mārapakṣaṇ ca atikramya śrāvakabhūmiṃ prtyekabuddhabhūmiṃ ca atikramya tatra samādhāv avatiṣṭhate. Aṣṭa(M)*, 373-4; *Aṣṭa(W)*, 754).^{6 7}

The *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, which dedicates a long passage to the three *samādhis* 三三

昧 (T25.206a-8a), considers these concentrations to be a very particular and extremely powerful type of wisdom (*prajñā*). When the interlocutor asks our author why these forms of *prajñā* are called *samādhi*, the latter answers: 'If these three types of wisdom are not established in concentration, they become mad wisdom (**unmattaprajñā*).^{6 8} Many would [thus] fall into vicious doubts (**mithyāsāṅkā*), and they could not [practise] anymore. [But] if [these types of wisdom] are established in concentration, then they can destroy all defilements (*kleśa*) and obtain the true characteristic (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of phenomena. 是三種智慧若不住定中、則是狂慧。多墮邪疑、無所能作。若住定中、則能破諸煩惱、得諸法實相。' (T25.20618-21). The treatise uses a simile to explain the mental functions involved in the three *samādhis*: 'When a king 王 arrives, he necessarily has with him his chief minister 大臣 and his attendants 營從^{6 9}. The *samādhi* is like the king, the wisdom like the chief minister, and the other *dharmas* like the attendants' (T25.207a8-9). Although the three concentrations are declared to be a type of wisdom, their actual practice appears to be interwoven with the *dhyāna*. They are said to be found on nine or eleven *dhyāna* stages (地 *bhūmi*) according to whether we regard them as always pure (有漏 *anāsrava*) or as sometimes pure and sometimes impure (無漏 *sāsrava*) respectively (T25.207a23-b2).^{7 0}

This is the basic picture offered by our texts. It seems that two major doctrinal concerns stand out as paramount for their authors. The first one, hugely sensitive for the Great Vehicle followers, is how a *bodhisattva* can engage in meditation, especially in the cultivation of enstatic states as well as emptiness, signlessness, and directionlessness, without losing his salvific involvement. The second one, which Mahāyāna inherited from earlier Buddhism, is how and to what degree non-discursive cognitive modes can be combined with rational observational thinking in order to attain the supreme Awakening. The Mahāyāna texts and followers usually assure us that they can successfully solve these problems. The *bodhisattva* can balance and even fuse his meditation practice with his immense compassion and messianic career. We are told that his spiritual techniques, especially *samādhi*, can subtly blend *dhyāna* with *prajñā*.

The task of a self-effacing, purely descriptive historian (if such a person can be said to exist) should perhaps come to an end here. I cannot, however, resist the temptation to ask two more philosophical questions. How can one engaged in the three *samādhis*, which by definition exclude all types of entities, characteristics, and mental orientation, **simultaneously** feel compassion and friendliness towards all living beings?^{7 1} How is it possible to fuse *dhyāna* and *prajñā*? I am certainly aware of the immense difficulty of the question. Any attempt to answer such questions will transcend the realm of philologico-historical studies and land us in the field of the philosophy and psychology of religion. Even if an answer, let alone a certain one, may not be possible, the question will, nevertheless, satisfy a basic human need to discuss such propositions not only in terms of ascertaining their mere occurrence in historical sources but also in relation to truth-values. After all, these propositions admittedly try to say something about the essence of reality and human mind. Furthermore, the discussion

of their truth-value will, in turn, help a more critically engaged (and by necessity no longer 'purely descriptive') historian to judge the role and development of these ideas.

Let me sketch out a brief answer to the first question. Do we have here a dogmatic patchwork meant to accommodate two basically incompatible practices, i.e. ensatic states and active social involvement? Or do we have to deal with spiritual modes and states which cannot be known and assessed by means of our normal epistemic categories? The traditional Buddhist answer would obviously favour the latter solution. After all, deluded *prthagjanas*, to which I undoubtedly belong, have no right to pass judgements on such lofty states which they cannot experience. The only alternative is, we would be told, to become *bodhisattvas* ourselves. With no foreseeable plans to embark upon this noble enterprise myself and, what is even worse, starting from different philosophical presuppositions, I am not willing to accept this position without strong reservations. This is not the place to develop a full-fledged epistemic dialogue with Buddhism, but as far as our normal understanding of psychological states (including and accepting the altered states of consciousness) as well as the basic requirements of logical consistency goes, it is very hard to believe that one can experience **simultaneously** states of gradual decrease and eventual cessation of all discursive and emotional functions, on the one hand, and intense mental, verbal, and bodily activities for the salvation of the sentient beings, on the other. I rather tend to regard this as an instance of tension between what Schmithausen (1999)^{7 2} aptly calls the two poles of Buddhist spirituality, i.e. detachment (*vimucacati*, *nibbindati*, *virajjati*, *upekkhā/upekṣā*) and caring for others (*karuṇā*, *kāruṇīya*, *dayā*, *anukampā*), in Śrāvakayāna, and emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and compassion (*karuṇā*), in Mahāyāna. In his excellent lecture, Schmithausen argues that while there is no doubt that these poles represent the two fundamental pillars of Buddhism, the actual relation, psychological and doctrinal, between them is not as simple as it may appear.^{7 3} Though early Buddhism regards sympathy (*kāruṇīya*) as an important virtue, it does not consider it as 'an automatic effect of the awakening experience of the Buddha or even an inevitable outflow of *any* liberating experience' (p.6). We even see 'a certain tension between, on the one hand, the state of liberation characterized by *detachment* and, on the other, becoming *involved* in activity for the sake of others' (p.11). The Mahāyāna ideal of universal salvation brings new developments and nuances in the relation between the two poles, but the tension does not come to end. The *Prajñāpāramitā* literature in particular presents the *samādhis* of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and 'transphenomenality' (*ānimitta*) as extremely potent and able to lead directly to the attainment of Buddhahood, which, when too premature, would compromise the salvific career of the *bodhisattva*. Schmithausen refers here to Chapter 20 of the *Aṣṭa*, which we have also discussed above. Here the *bodhisattva* 'should only become familiar with them [the *samādhis*], but he must not prematurely realize (*sākṣāt-kṛ*) them, he must not "fall" (*pat*) into them' (p.17). Together with this careful practice, he must counterbalance these *samādhis* by cultivating benevolence or compassion with regard to all living beings (ibid.). The tension between the full awakening and salvific activity appears to be implicitly recognised by the texts themselves.

The solution suggested here is basically one of balanced but separate practice of the two poles. The passages from the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* and the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* discussed above seem to take a further step: meditative ensatic states, presumably quite potent and traditionally seen as part of the path towards liberation, are now said to include compassion, thoughts of the realm of desire, and normal behaviour. This *coincidentia oppositorum* represents a new step in the attempt to solve the underlying tension between the two poles. As an avowedly hopeless *prthagjana*, I find this development a doctrinally motivated move meant to portray the exalted ideal of the *bodhisattva*'s messianic mission rather than a psychological reality.

What about the *dhyāna* and *prajñā* fusion? This possibility is actually mentioned not only in relation with the three *samādhis* but also with the supremacy and comprehensive nature of the perfection of wisdom. The *Ratnaguṇa* declares that 'for those accomplished in the practice of the perfection of wisdom, all perfections are comprised in it (*prajñāya pāramita-sīkṣita-saṃskṛtānām*^{7 4}, *sarve ca pāramita bhont' iha saṃgrhītāḥ!* chapter XXV, verse 4, p.100). In a parallel passage, the *Aṣṭa* says: 'Subhūti, for the *bodhisattva*, the great being, thus practising the perfection of wisdom, all perfections are included in it' (*evam eva Subhūte prajñāpāramitāyām sīkṣamāṇasya bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya tasyām sarvāḥ pāramitā antargatā bhavanti. Aṣṭa(M)*, p. 431, *Aṣṭa(W)*, p. 825; Lokakṣema's translation: 須菩提、菩薩摩訶薩如是學深般若波羅蜜、總攝諸波羅蜜。T8.357c19-21). Could we see it as a psychological reality, i.e. not only as a doctrinal ideal but also as an actual spiritual experience? To start with, there is no way we can ascertain this by means of philologico-historical methods. Furthermore, the answer to this question largely depends on how *prajñā* is understood. Even if we limit ourselves to one scripture or one class of texts, the exact definition of *prajñā* would require a study in itself. To make things more complicated, the texts themselves warn us that a purely theoretical understanding of the concept is impossible and its elusiveness is part of its nature. Despite all difficulties, I would risk a very general definition and say that *prajñā* is a subtle cognitive process which presupposes both an intuitive grasp of the reality and a high degree of awareness with no emotional support, i.e. attachment. Whatever the subtle relation between the non-discursive realisation and awareness may be, I do not think that *prajñā* is a cessation of all mental functions as the *nirodhasamāpatti*.^{7 5} To the extant *prajñā* could be said to be an underlying attitude pervading the ascetic's life, I do not find it impossible to speak of its combination with *dhyāna* or any other practice. Problems of logical consistency (I only mean *prthagjana* logic) may, however, arise if we take *dhyāna* as a gradual decrease of emotional and cognitive activity culminating with *nirodhasamāpatti*. If this is the case, as in the passage from the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* which links the practice of the three concentrations to the nine or eleven *dhyāna* stages (地 *bhūmi*) (T25.207a23-b2), then the precise connection between *dhyāna* and *prajñā* becomes very difficult to explain. It may actually echo the relation between enstatic meditation (*śamatha*) and observational concentration (*vipāśyanā*) present since early Buddhism. Later scholastic tradition, Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna alike, have always portrayed *śamatha* and

vipaśyanā as being in a state of balance and harmony. This view has been shared by many modern Buddhist and scholars. Studies like, to give only two examples, those of Cousins (1984) and Kōchi (1973) actually stress this aspect.^{7 6} The relation between *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* has, however, not always been that of a perfect marriage. The early canon records clashes between monks who practice the *jhāna*-meditation (*jhāyī bhikkhū*) and monks who are attached to the doctrine (*dharmāyogā bhikkhū*) (ANIII355-6). The relation between the 'rationalist' trend and the 'mystic' current, epitomised by Musīla and Nārada, was the subject of a classical study published by La Vallée Poussin in 1937. The attempt to harmonise the tension between the two paths has often been done by what Schmithausen, using Hacker's term, aptly calls "inclusivism", i.e. a method of intellectual debate in which the competing doctrine, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate position' (Schmithausen 1981, 223). The process of relegating enstatic techniques to the role of ancillary or soteriologically irrelevant practices as found in the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* was brilliantly analysed by Griffiths (1983).^{7 7} Though the relation between *dhyāna* and *prajñā* is much more complicated^{7 8}, we could, nevertheless, discover some reflections of the older *śamatha* and/vs. *vipaśyanā* pair.^{7 9}

3. MEDITATION AND THE BEGINNINGS OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

Whatever the *bodhisattva*'s spiritual cultivation may actually have been, it seems to me very unlikely that those men coming up with such complex and subtle innovations were simple lay people with a mere populist desire to make the new Vehicle open for a general 'easy ride'. The background seems to be that of an ascetic and philosophical milieu perfectly familiar with the doctrinal developments of the traditional Buddhism. Although the promise to become a Buddha was theoretically open to everybody, the way to do it was by no means simple to understand and practise. The people writing these texts were not anti-traditionalist, anti-elite laymen simply interested in proclaiming their rhetoric of the democratic superiority of the Great Vehicle over the Lesser Vehicle. It is true that their hermeneutic or innovative efforts sometimes had iconoclast fervour and smashing effects, but all these did not stem from ignorance or mere despise of the scholastic tradition. Basically, they were motivated, I believe, by a different philosophical outlook which must have grown gradually from within the Buddhist *saṅgha* itself.

Looking for the roots, or, at least, part of the roots of Mahāyāna into ascetic communities is basically a variety of the old hypothesis which regards the rise of the Great Vehicle as a gradual development from the traditional schools (*nikāyas*), usually from the more liberal and progressive Mahāsāṅghika group. Baret's view on the origins of Mahāyāna (1955, 296-305) seems to me one of the most sensible formulations of the this theory.^{8 0} The French scholar outlines quite a number of similarities existing between the Mahāsāṅghikas

and the Great Vehicle (Bareau 301-304). He concludes, 'are there among the sects of the Lesser Vehicle ontological theses showing clearly Mahāyānist tendencies? To this question we can give an affirmative answer with all certitude.[...] The sects in question all belong to the Mahāsāṅghika group' (p.303). Backed up by a careful methodological treatment, the image of ascetic communities, doctrinally starting from a predominantly Mahāsāṅghika background, can better explain many, if not most, of the facets of the Mahāyāna rise.

At this point I must clarify a crucial methodological problem which underlies not only my presuppositions here but also many other studies dealing with Buddhist history. Although I surmise that some philosophical developments may have been the result of a doctrinal contrivance, as often pointed out above, there also instances in which I believe we could speak of a such a thing as real ascetic practice and that some passages in our texts seem to reflect it. I must confess that making the distinction between the two is an awfully complex problem but one thing is sure: taking the scriptures at their face value without properly questioning their rhetoric is not going to take us too far in the field of the history of religion. In his recent study on 'Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience', Robert H. Sharf (1995) makes an excellent contribution to the questioning not only of the tradition itself but also of some of our current research clichés. Sharf's paper is very convincing in deconstructing the concept of 'pure experience' as well as in proving that the modern stress on *zazen* or *vipassanā* is largely an invented tradition (see pp.246-259), which is often subjected to the 'politics of experience' (see pp. 259-265). Sharf also contends that we have too frequently presupposed that meditation must have been the central preoccupation of the traditional monastic life. I quite agree with this position, and I hope that in what follows I shall adduce some extra evidence concerning this. I am also inclined to believe, partly in line with Sharf's argumentation, that Buddhist literature, even its specialised treatises on the spiritual cultivation, do not necessarily reflect the meditative experiences of their own authors.

My working hypothesis is that religious texts, including meditation manuals and treatises, represent an 'intertextuality' of sources and influences ranging from actual inner experiences to external factors. Excluding or favouring one type of sources, without sufficient evidence, can turn out to be methodologically biased. It is actually here that with due respect I would dare to disagree with Sharf and contend that the methodology employed by Schmithausen (1973;1976) may prove, when cautiously handled, a viable avenue for historical research. Sharf criticises the latter study for its methodological attempt to derive the formation of Yogācāra idealism 'from a *generalisation* of a fact observed in the case of meditation-objects, i.e. in the context of *spiritual practice*' (Schmithausen 1976, 241; also quoted by Sharf 1995, 237). Sharf's viewpoint is that 'His [i.e. Schmithausen's] argument does not demonstrate that Yogācāra idealism emerged from reflection on an actual experience, so much as it shows that such a position can be derived from reflection upon the prescriptive meditative and soteriological ideals enunciated in Mahāyāna textual sources' (p.238). He goes on to say that idealism could actually be derived from reflections upon epistemic errors or the ontology

of dreams (*ibid.*). Now, I agree that it is indeed possible that the same generalisation could have been reached starting from different experiences and inferences. But on the other hand, I do not think that deriving a doctrine from inferences occasioned by actual meditative experiences is logically impossible (like, for instance, accepting that a 'married bachelor' is non-contradictory). A love novel may be the result of the author's desire to illustrate a theoretical philosophy as well as originate in a genuine emotional experience. I think that the passages analysed by Schmithausen point in the direction of inferences based on meditative experiences, but I confess that I cannot prove it in an absolutely conclusive way. The reason is that our verifiability principle here stands on a relatively fragile basis. We cannot possibly verify beyond doubt what the actual situation was centuries ago and, therefore, are left with the alternative of carefully reading and interpreting our passages. Especially when it comes to interpretation, many texts are so open that a variety of readings become possible. Even when one interpretation is preferable to others, it rarely happens that the evidence will be absolutely conclusive.

In our case, the bottom line is whether reflection upon spiritual experiences is possible or not. Since Sharf does not deny the psychological possibility of meditative experiences as such (see pp. 259-260), it is hard to understand why he does not accept that one can draw conclusions from one's own experiences and reports of other people's experiences. It would actually be quite surprising that the human being would not be tempted to do it. If the experience is psychologically possible, and it is a very special one, as meditation achievements presumably are, then it is to be expected that the meditator would try to find out a place for this experience in his philosophical understanding of life. Pointing out that Buddhist doctrines are not necessarily the result of meditation, let alone 'pure experience', is logical and salutary. Sharf is here right that much too often historians have been tempted to explain things only by appealing to spiritual experiences. Denying the possibility altogether is, however, unnecessary. Strictly speaking, it would require that Sharf should prove beyond doubt that meditative experiences cannot logically serve as a basis for philosophical inferences or that in each and every concrete historical case so far meditation and reflection upon it have never been the source of a doctrinal development.

A final word about meditation: my assumption that meditative experiences may have been a basis of philosophical inferences is not motivated by the desire to defend the 'pure experience' or the supremacy of the contemplative way of knowledge. I actually speak of inferences based upon meditation and not of 'pure experience' as a direct source of doctrinal development, something which I find quite unlikely. Obviously, this is not the place to embark upon a full discussion but I should like to make a very brief comment. I do not think that the 'otherness' of an experience, i.e. its being of a different psychological quality, ensures its absolute truth-value. The only way we can decide our epistemic criteria is not by appeal to private experiences as the ultimate source of truth. The truth of a philosophically relevant proposition can only be proved by those common experiences which have, to use a Peircian

term, 'ultimate warranted assertibility'.

Let us now return to the beginnings of the Great Vehicle. As Harrison (1995, 66) points out, if we suppose that 'a substantial proportion of early Mahāyānists were forest-dwellers meditating monks', we could explain why early inscriptions contain almost no references to the Great Vehicle. It is significant that, as outlined above, the earliest epigraphical references to the Great Vehicle make their appearance from the 5th/6th centuries on and in the beginning they are mostly found on the 'cultural fringe' of the Indian civilisation (Schopen 1996, 13-14). The ascetic-centrality hypothesis can also explain why so many early Mahāyāna sutras, like the *Rāṣṭrapālapariṣcchā*, the *Kāśyapapārivarta*, the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, the *Ugrapariṣcchā*, the *Ratnarāsi*, the *Samādhirāja*, etc., stress the need to live in the forest and practise the *dhutaṅgas* (cf. Schopen 1996, 16-18). The *Rāṣṭrapālapariṣcchā* and the *Samādhirāja* even use the old image of the solitary rhinoceros to recommend secluded spiritual cultivation. We can also understand why these early ascetic Mahāyānist communities, with little connection or, at least, with little control over the *stūpas*, were far less associated with their cult and exalted instead the worship, keeping, reading, copying, and spreading of their own scriptures. Many of the earliest Mahāyāna sutras, like, for instance, the *Pratyutpannasamādhi-sūtra* 般舟三昧經, the *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodanā-sūtra* 阿闍世王經, and the *Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūha-sūtra* 阿闍佛國經, are said to have talismanic powers which can protect from all types of disasters (Harrison 1993, 175-6).

The gradual rise of Mahāyāna from within the traditional *saṅgha* can explain the doctrinal continuities between the two movements. As we have seen in Section 2 of this paper, an impressive number of tenets and developments of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature can only be understood if we refer to traditional Śrāvakayāna doctrines with which our authors seem to be perfectly familiar. The hypothesis of a gradual formation of the new movement can also better explain why in spite of its general tone of self-glorification the literature of the new movement contains many passages which strike a note of conciliation with the Śrāvakayāna ideals. The deep-rooted misconception concerning an unfailing, ubiquitous fierce criticism on the Lesser Vehicle by the new movement is not supported by our texts. It is true that such attacks do exist and that the *bodhisattva* ideal is universally presented as superior to all other religious aspirations, but the new agenda is not carried out at the expense of completely denying the old tradition. It has often been noted that the term *hīnayāna* does not occur so frequently in the earliest scriptures of the Great Vehicle (Harrison 1987, 80, speaking of the Chinese translations in the 2nd century CE; Shizutani 1974, 40-41, Saigusa 1981, 124-5, on the rarity of the term in the *Aṣṭa*⁸¹; cf. Conze 1978, 7, n. 1, which points out that *hīnayāna* is seldom used but terms like *hīnajātika*, *hīnaprajñā*, *hīnavīrya*, etc. are freely used). To be sure, the levels of the *arhats* and *pratyekabuddhas* are declared inferior compared to the attainments of a *bodhisattva*, but we find early Mahāyāna scriptures like the *Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūha-sūtra* 阿闍佛國經 which depict the *śrāvakas* as happily sharing Akṣobhya's Pure Land with the *bodhisattvas* (Harrison 1987, 83-4). Such examples of peaceful co-existence are not

singular and can be equally found in the *Aṣṭa*, the *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodanā-sūtra* 阿闍世王經, and the *Cheng ju guang ming ding yi jing* 成具光明定意經 (ibid., p. 84). With the passage of time, the conciliatory tone of some of these early Mahāyāna texts gradually gives way to a more vehement, but not always complete, condemnation of the Lesser Vehicle.^{8 2} According to Conze (1994, X VI), the increase of sectarianism is a main criterion for detecting the later accretions in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature.

It is undoubtedly a conjectural scenario but I would imagine that a great part of the earliest Mahāyāna communities started as groups of ascetics motivated not only by a new understanding of the Path but also by a strong opposition to the well-established monastic institutions which often tended to neglect the spiritual quest altogether. We would have here a particular case in the long history of the duality between forest-dwelling ascetics (*ārañṇavāsī/vanavāsī*) and monks living in villages (*gāmavāsī*) or towns (*nagaravāsī*). We actually know fairly well the evolution of this dichotomy in Southeast Asia and this has been brilliantly summarised by Tambiah (1984, 53-76). It seems that most of the ascetic movements which have repeatedly occurred throughout the history of the *saṅgha* in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand paradigmatically started as a return to the pristine ideals of the early Buddhist Path: an intense practice of meditation accompanied by the strict observation of the Vinaya rules and, very often, of the *dhūtaṅgas*. Although the initial motivation of these groups did not presumably lie in gaining the patronage of the royal houses or masses, their rejection of the material wealth and their earnest spiritual quest, often associated, at least in popular imagination, with supernatural powers, have usually led to their immense popularity and frequent transformation into (paradoxically!) rich and well-established monastic communities. Another factor leading to their initially un hoped-for success was their neutral stance and distance from the political turmoil of their age, which made them suitable for the role of mediators and state-sponsored religious reformers. It is significant to note here the relations of these ascetic groups with their original communities as well as their gradual metamorphosis. Mendelson, also quoted by Tambiah (1984, 62), writes:

The forest monks, much like the hermits, did not necessarily cease to belong to a mother community which might be well of the village kind. Later in time, forest monks began to appear in forest communities, devoting themselves no longer to meditation alone but indulging also in cultural and educational activities, as did town and village monks; in short, they seem to have been treated in some places as separate sects.

To return now to our early Mahāyāna Buddhists, we could surmise that a similar situation could have taken place. The initial motivation of breaking away from the mother community, most likely a Mahāsāṅghika milieu, must have been both doctrinal and spiritual. Not only that the dissident ascetics must have felt themselves growingly different from the rest of the community in their philosophical outlook but they also were perhaps disillusioned with the materialism as well as the passion for social respectability and fame of the monastic

Establishment. There is a deep-seated tendency with a large number of modern students of Buddhism to associate monastic life, first and foremost, with the strict observance of disciplinary rules and intense meditation. Disappointing as it may be, the reality is often quite different from our ideals and hopes. Undoubtedly, there is a scarcity of materials concerning life in the Buddhist monasteries of ancient India. I do not mean here traditional ideals or modern projections filled with pro-Buddhist expectations. A patient and careful scholar can, however, dig them out of the discouragingly intricate *Vinaya* and epigraphical sources. The scholar in question is no other than Gregory Schopen to whom we owe one of the very few studies on the monastic life and daily activities on the basis of the data contained in the Tibetan translation of the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Kṣudrakavastu* (Schopen 1997a).

Although the text makes it clear that the basic occupations (*bya ba*, **karāṇiya*) of a monk are meditation (*bsam gtan*, **dhyāna*) and recitation (*gdon pa*, **paṭhanti*), these were far from being the only monastic duties, at least for large sections of the coenobites. For instance, sweeping the *vihāra*, both a cleaning activity and a ritual act, was as much part of the daily life as the more 'lofty' occupations, especially for the monks in charge of physical properties (*dge skos*, **upadhivārika*). Furthermore, many passages clearly show that the monks had to choose between specialising in meditation or recitation. In other words, 'a monk was expected to do one or the other but not both' (Schopen 1997a, 17). In the *Śayanāsanuvastu*, meditation in the forest is presented as potentially dangerous and in order to ensure a safe area for the tranquil practice of spiritual cultivation a place (*vastu*) in a public area (*prakāśe sthāne*) of the monastery had to be secured. This, in turn created the need for a series of new monastic occupations with coenobites specialised in and presumably dedicating all or almost all of their time to supporting this activity. The *Vinaya* texts actually authorise a series of many other menial jobs or qualified occupations necessary for the maintenance of the *vihāra* and ensuring smooth 'public relations' with the lay supporters.^{8 3}

Certainly, these texts basically reflect the situation of the Mūlasarvāstivādin community, and a complete study must include all relevant data in the entire Buddhist literature. Passages hinting at the practical hardships a meditating monk may have actually faced are not, however, limited to Mūlasarvāstivādin sources. I should like to discuss here another example which comes from the meditation classic of the Theravādins, the *Visuddhimagga*. The monk whose morality (*sīla*) has already been purified should first approach a spiritual friend (*kalyāṇamitta*) in order to receive his meditation subject (*kammaṭṭana*). 'After that he should avoid a monastery unfavourable to the development of concentration and go to live in one that is favourable' (*Visuddhimagga*, p.72; Ñāṇamoli tr. 1991, 90-91). A monastery unfavourable (*ananurūpa vihāra*) for the development of concentration (*samādhibhāvanāya*) is later on defined as a place which has any of 'the eighteen faults' (*aṭṭhārasa dosā*). 'These are: largeness, newness, dilapidatedness, a nearby road, a pond, [edible] leaves, flowers, fruits, famousness, a nearby city, nearby timber trees, nearby arable fields, presence of incompatible persons, a nearby port of entry, nearness to the border countries, nearness to the frontier of a

kingdom, unsuitability, lack of good friends' (*Visuddhimagga*, p.96; Ñāṇamoli tr. 1991, 118). Each of these faults is then described in detail (*Visuddhimagga*, p.96-99; Ñāṇamoli tr. 1991, 118-121). Let us quote here only the fragment depicting the situation in the first faulty monastery:

Firstly, people with varying aims collect in a *large monastery*. They conflict with each other and so neglect the duties. The Enlightenment-tree terrace, etc., remain unswept, the water for drinking and washing is not set out. [...] Drinking water must be maintained. By not doing it he [i.e. the monk who wants to practise meditation] would commit a wrongdoing in the breach of a duty. But if he does it, he loses time. He arrives too late at the village and gets nothing because the alms giving is finished. Also, when he goes into retreat, he is distracted by loud noises of novices and young bhikkhus, and by acts of the Community [being carried out]. (*Visuddhimagga*, p.96-97; Ñāṇamoli tr. 1991, 118-119)

This and all the other faults clearly suggest that a decent, quiet place to pursue one's spiritual cultivation, presumably *the* very *raison d'être* of the Buddhist Path, was not so easy to find within the Holy Community supposed to exist in order to facilitate and promote it. A large monastery (*mahāvihāra*) such as depicted by Buddhaghosa here was a far cry from the peaceful Shangri-La where the ascetic would find the quiet and spiritually-friendly environment necessary for his practice. Not only that we see that many of the young brethren were noisy and the Community was busy with prosaic administrative businesses (how close indeed to our modern academic institutions!) but we are also told that the monks in the monastery gathered with...varying aims or intentions (*nānāchandā*), and they, furthermore, quarrelled with each other (*aññamaññam paṭiviruddhatāya*). Our ascetic does not seem to be expected to maintain the water, which, if my interpretation is correct, means that the monks actively engaged in meditation were served by other groups of coenobites doing the more menial jobs. They were perhaps an elite which the *vihāra* was supposed to treat with special care but...reality must have often been disappointing. The monk in Buddhaghosa's scenario gets no special treatment and, moreover, being a conscientious brother does his duties and... ends up with little time left for meditation and an empty stomach.

A restless soul tired of the existential *duḥkha* joining the Holy Order with a genuine aspiration for Awakening must have found many of these monastic establishments spiritually disappointing. Neither the Mūlasarvāstivādin texts discussed above nor the *Visuddhimagga* are contemporary with the proto-Mahāyāna age^{8 4} but I assume that starting with the Aśokan period the growth of the institutional success of the Buddhist *saṅgha* may have paradoxically led to an increasing number of monastic establishments where meditation was hard to practise or confined to a minority. Actually, quite a few of the early Mahāyāna sutras direct their criticism not only against the inferior attainments and salvific abilities of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* but also against the decadence of the monastic institutions no longer

fulfilling their spiritual goals. A full-fledged attack on the Śrāvakayāna appears to have been felt either doctrinally unnecessary or socially inadvisable. Some of the proto-Mahāyāna groups appear to have genuinely considered that a large number of the traditional goals and practices could still be given a limited recognition in their new religious agendas. Other ascetic fraternities may have had to play down their critical tone. After all, in the incipient stage, they wanted to or had to keep minimum links with their mother communities and for a while were considered and probably considered themselves, at least in terms of Vinaya lineage, part of them. Some communities, few perhaps, had the zealot courage to break away in a more dramatic way but, by and large, the rise of the New Vehicle, as so many other historical events, must have been a gradual process.

While a vehement doctrinal criticism may have been considered unnecessary or inadvisable, a fierce attack on the monastic Establishment for neglect of the basic spiritual duties and aspirations must have been easier, even when it was directed at the mother community. This why we see so many early Mahāyāna scriptures lashing out at the excesses of the coenobites with no concern for spiritual values.^{8 5} Suffice it here to quote three stanzas from the *Rāṣṭrapāla* which is one of the most representative sutras in this respect:

Perpetually intent on gain they are, dishonestly feigning devotion to
[religious] practice.
‘No one in our world can ever vie with me in morality and virtues!’,
they will say.
Indeed they do hate each other, always fond they are to mutually pick
out their faults;
With farming and with trade they occupy themselves . Far from them do the
[true] ascetics stay!^{8 6}
In future times these monks with no restraint, a far cry from morality
and virtues,
With their feud, dispute, and envy will bring the ruin to my Law!
(*adhyavasānaparāḥ sada lābhe te kuhaśāṅhyaprayogaratās ca|*
kaścīd apīha samo mama nāsti vakṣyati śīlaguṇeṣu katham cit||
te ca parasparam eva ca dviṣṭā chidragaveṣaṇanīyaprayuktāḥ|
kṣīkarmavañijyaratās ca śramaṇā^{8 7} hi sudūrata teṣām||
evam asaṁyata paścimakāle bhikṣava śīlaguṇeṣu sudūre|
te’ ntara hāpayiṣyanti madharman^{8 8} bhaṇḍanavigrahaīrṣyavaśena||)

(*Rāṣṭrapāla*, p.17)

(常念利養不休息 諂曲詐現精進相 自謂持戒及苦行 一切無有如己者
惡口僞言喜鬪諍 常求人過不休息 彼恒遠離沙門行 營理田作及販賣
未來世中諸比丘 棄捨功德及戒行 以懷嫉妬鬪諍故 覆滅損壞我正法)

(Jñānagupta’s 闍那崛多 translation, T11.460c12-17)

The bitter dissatisfaction of the author who speaks on behalf or in praise of the ascetics

(*śramaṇā*), contrasted here with monks (*bhikṣava*), is very clear. The passage does not attack the coenobites because of their selfish preoccupation with their own liberation, the main Mahāyāna issue against the Lesser Vehicle, but simply because of their complete abandonment of any religious ideals. It is true that this disillusionment could have been voiced by laymen who caught a glimpse of the presumable Nirvāṇa-seekers predominantly concerned with trade benefits and factional disputes (How contemporary it sounds!). I find it, nevertheless, more likely that this considerable degree of familiarity with the dealings and atmosphere of a monastic institution is a reflection of inside knowledge more likely to have been obtained by fellow- or former fellow-coenobites. These were rather scandalous disclosures of the 'saṅgha behind closed doors' coming from insiders or, at least, laymen with a special status like Ugra in the *Ugraparipṛcchā*, which will be discussed below.^{8 9}

The hard-liners who could not find a place where they could quietly meditate and whose calls of return to a pure life of spiritual dedication fell on deaf ears had the alternative of setting up a forest-dwelling community in which these ideals could be fulfilled. Add here a progressive doctrinal background and a taste for non-orthodox interpretation, occasioned by philosophical reflection on the true meanings of the Teaching and on meditative experiences, and you have the formula of the first Mahāyāna communities. Their followers could be oxymoronically portrayed as groups with fundamentalist ideals and innovative interpretations. Let us not forget here that both elements are necessary to make a proto-Mahāyāna follower. Stressing only the ascetic ideal does not take us too far. Despite the scarcity of meditation-friendly environments, the Śrāvakayāna Buddhists continued their tradition of spiritual cultivation. After all, not all groups of ascetics had to turn into Mahāyāna communities of forest-dwellers. The *Vinaya* materials and the *Visuddhimagga* passages discussed above point at the difficulty not at the impossibility of practising meditation. There are many clues which indicate us that spiritual cultivation continued to be practised within the Śrāvakayāna doctrinal framework. The large number of meditation manuals and treatises, mostly preserved in Chinese translations, bear witness to the interest of the Śrāvakayāna authors in this area (Deleau 1992; 1993).^{9 0} There is nothing to prove beyond doubt that all these scriptures were written by the ascetics themselves but some passages seem to indicate first-hand knowledge of the actual practice. We also know that the *yogācāras* formed a respected group within the Sarvāstivādin community and their views are often recorded in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (Nishi 1939). Finally, monks practising meditation (*prāhanika*)^{9 1} appear recorded as donors in inscriptions of the Kūṣāṇa age (Schopen 1997b, 31, 36; Damsteegt 1978, 247). Though their Nikāya affiliation is not known, they appear to be Śrāvakayāna monks.

Many of the earliest Mahāyāna communities started perhaps as 'fundamentalist' groups rather than revolutionary and populist fraternities. I use inverted commas here because fundamentalism is never a return to a perfectly reconstructable pristine Teaching of a founder. It is usually a blend of more or less dim knowledge of the early doctrines with a great deal of interpretation and agendas meant to serve contemporary needs. The earliest Mahāyāna

Buddhists had the fundamentalist goal of returning to the very roots. Instead of being content with the *arhat* ideal, of which they actually heard so seldom, if ever, in the monastic Establishment, they decided to recreate the Founder's own spiritual experience, or, in other words, to become Buddhas themselves. The movement was not necessarily started as a democratic avenue for all laymen to achieve the supreme Awakening. Yet its logic implied more openness: it is no longer the formal membership to the Order that matters but the desire to practise sincerely. While most of the ascetics of the new movement remained renunciant monks associated with a mother community, their 'formal' status, especially when considered from the latter's official viewpoint, must have been somehow in a grey zone. The stress of the importance of the formal membership to a monastic institution would have been as inadvisable as the emphasis of a complete break with the Order. This is not to say that the openness to laymen and their needs was a mere a strategic move. Genuine feelings of sympathy and compassion towards these people and all living beings must have been at work here. After all, the 'Lesser Vehicle' is far from lacking a tradition in this respect. These genuine feelings were perhaps enhanced by the inside knowledge that the layman with his sincere belief in the merits of worshipping the *saṅgha* was actually cheated by corrupt *bhikṣus* who had betrayed the noble ideals. Last but not least, the sympathy and compassion must have been seen as an integral part of the ideal to become a Buddha. The picture of the founder himself, which many of the ascetics must have got through exalted biographies and *Jātakas*, was one of selfless dedication.

The universal salvation commitment is undeniably present in most of the earliest Mahāyāna scripture but I believe that it should not be unduly over-emphasised. The earliest strata of the *Ratnagūṇa* and the *Aṣṭa* contain passages proclaiming the salvific mission of the *bodhisattva*^{9 2} but this does not appear to be the most recurrent theme. What strikes one in these as well as other *Prajñāpāramitā* texts is the exalted exposition of the new cognitive mode which ensures the attainment of the supreme Awakening. It is called the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), or the wisdom of the Sugatas (*sugatāna prajñā*)^{9 3}, or the omniscience (*sarvajñātā*, etc.)^{9 4}. The first two chapters of the *Ratnagūṇa* often repeat, almost like a refrain, the following sentence: 'this is the practice of the wisdom, supreme amongst perfections' (*eṣā sa prajñā-vara-pāramitāya caryā*) (Ch. 1, verses 12, 14, 23, 24, 26, 28; Ch. 2, verses 1, 12) (cf. Conze 1994, X). Even in the case of a sutra like the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, for which the One Vehicle salvation theme is central, the early history of the text appears to be characterised by a more marked emphasis on the wisdom aspect. As Karashima points out in his brilliant philologico-historical study (1993, especially 171-174), in contrast to the Nikāya tradition which makes a sharp distinction between the awakening of a *śrāvaka* (*śrāvakabodhi*), a *pratyekabuddha* (*pratyekabodhi*), and the Buddha (*anuttarā samyaksambodhi*), the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* strongly urges everybody to attain the wisdom of a Buddha. The importance of the wisdom in the sutra is also apparent from the fact that in its earliest version the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* was an eulogy of the Great Wisdom (*mahājñāna*) rather than of the

Great Vehicle (*mahāyāna*). The following fragment sums up one of Karashima's most important conclusions in this study:

[...] in the idiom used by the old SP [=Saddharmapundarika], both *jñāna* and *yāna* had the same form *jāna* (*jāna*). It was the parable of 'the house in flames and the three carts' 火宅三車 in the *Aupamyā* Chapter which added to the sutra the amusing flavour of a narrative based upon a word play making use of this situation. But this word play resulted in confusion. In the idiom of the old SP, *jāna* (*jāna*) had both the meaning of 'vehicle' and 'wisdom' but it appears that only the *Aupamyā* used the term with its meaning of 'vehicle', while the other chapters probably used it in the sense of 'wisdom'.

[...] However, with the passage of time, the original idea was forgotten and under the influence of the *Aupamyā* Chapter, even places in which the word should have been construed as 'wisdom', it started to be interpreted as 'vehicle'. [...] This led to the wrong Sanskritisation of *jāna* (*jāna*), originally meaning 'wisdom', as *yāna* ('vehicle'). (Karashima 1993, 173)

This great emphasis on wisdom must have been in line with the fundamentalist agenda of the early Mahāyānists. Becoming a Buddha oneself means the transcendence of all attachments whatsoever, and the corollary of this new ideal is that the adept must forsake the attachment to this ideal itself.^{9 5} The early *arhat* ideal is not so different from this but what gives Mahāyāna its distinctive flavour is pushing the non-attachment, emotional and cognitive, to its utmost logical consequences. Nirvāṇa must be sought without being sought, practice must be done without being practised. A discursive mode of thinking can no longer serve the basic purpose of attainment without attainment. It is here that meditative states, super-normal powers, and Buddha's inspiration come to play a crucial role. I am not the first one to point out that there is an unmistakable vein of mysticism running through the *Prajñāpāramitā* and Mādhyamika literature (cf. Vetter 1984; Conze 1978, 6; May 1959, 20; de Jong 1949, X II). The combination of discursive reflection and mystical realisation represents the very core of the *Prajñāpāramitā* philosophy, and much of its development can certainly be interpreted as a process of inner evolution. There is, nonetheless, another aspect, linked to the historical realities of the age, which must have proved enormously beneficial for the exponents of the early Great Vehicle movement. The stress on mystical and supernatural attainments, usually connected with meditation and ascetic practices, was also a guarantee of freedom, at least doctrinal freedom, from the monastic Establishment which may have had claim of control of the scholastic and ordination orthodoxy but had no strong means of suppressing declarations of direct inspirational creativity.^{9 6} As Harrison (1995, 66) aptly remarks,

There followers of the Mahāyāna had to lay claim to be in a sense the true inheritors of Gautama, the inheritors of his mantle, and they had to establish that claim both with other Buddhists and with the population at large. There were, as far as I can see, two possible ways of doing this: by the possession of relics, and by the

(perceived) possession of ascetic techniques and magical powers.

Most of the *samādhis* in Mahāyāna Buddhism are declared to be inaccessible to *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*.⁹⁷ The adept who mastered them could claim that he shared a spiritual experience similar to that of the Buddha and this entitled him to say that he was speaking by the Buddha's might.⁹⁸ This is clearly illustrated in a large number of Mahāyāna sutras and emphasising this aspect appears to have been a major concern for the earliest authors. The introductory part of Chapter 1 of the *Aṣṭa*, for instance, wants to make it clear from the very beginning that whatever Subhūti will say it will be said by Buddha's might or authority (*buddhānubhāvena*, *Aṣṭa(M)*, p.4, *Aṣṭa(W)*, pp.28-30; Lokakṣema's translation:持佛威神, T8.425c).⁹⁹

Like the in the case of the forest-dwelling monks of Southeast Asia, the pure way of life of the proto-Mahāyāna communities as well as the emerging ideal of the spiritually accomplished and compassionate *bodhisattva* must have led to a definite interest and respect amongst lay people. Nothing of this survives in inscriptions or documents but one thing is sure: these early Mahāyāna groups could not have survived without a certain degree of lay support. It is impossible to give even a very rough estimation of the scale of the new movement. Again, only a general statement can be made. The assumption of a high number of proto-Mahāyāna groups and followers would automatically imply a greater social presence, and this is not supported by archaeological and epigraphical evidence. If, on the other hand, we surmise that their number was very low, we could not explain the impressive textual output which undoubtedly continued throughout this period of inscriptional silence. Even if the scale of the new movement was small or relatively small, its existence could hardly have escaped totally unnoticed to the mainstream monastic community. Yet, the scarcity of direct references and attacks against Mahāyāna in Śrāvakayāna sources is surprising. I would conjecture here that the next step in the history of Mahāyāna was its tacit acceptance (not in a doctrinal sense but social) by large segments of the Śrāvakayāna Order and the beginning of a new phase of peaceful co-existence. The more tolerant monasteries accepted co-existence with such groups, which, as I have suggested above, must have often kept some relations with a mother community. This situation lasted for centuries and this explains why the Chinese travellers speak so often of mixed monastic communities. Even when 're-included' into the mainstream monasticism, the Mahāyānikas appear to have remained or kept geographically and institutionally peripheral for the next few centuries.

What were the merits of this symbiosis? Maybe some Śrāvakayānika communities, despite the shortcomings of their institutions, were genuinely tolerant and found a place for these ascetics with which they often shared a common Vinaya lineage. Maybe the orthodox coenobites and scholastics wanted to keep the new potential trouble-makers under control, and it was better to have them under their eyes than far in the forest. For the Mahāyānikas, the benefits could have been multiple. Their economic survival was on a more certain basis. If cautious not to create a disruption of the monastic institution itself, they could recruit new

converts from amongst their fellow-monks or laymen. They could also diversify their activities and form new specialised subgroups, as the keepers of the *Bodhisattva-piṭaka* or the followers of the Bodhisattva Way (preachers?) in the passage below.

A glimpse into this new phase of co-existence as well as into the role of the 'layman' in the Great Vehicle is offered by the *Gṛhapatyugraparipṛcchā-sūtra*, one of the earliest scriptures to be translated into Chinese.¹⁰⁰ The sutra revolves round the question of the householder Ugra 甚理家¹⁰¹ concerning the way renunciant *bodhisattvas* 開士去家爲道者 and lay *bodhisattvas* 開士居家爲道者¹⁰² should practise the Path (T12.15c; T.12.23b; P23.Shi297b-298b).¹⁰³ After preaching the importance of the three refuges, morality, and converting 教化 the sentient beings, Bhagavat's 衆祐¹⁰⁴ answer takes an unexpected turn for one accustomed to the Vimalakīrti-type of Mahāyāna sutras. The Lord exposes the evils of the householder's life, compared with the sea never satiated to swallow rivers, an excellent food mixed with poison, etc. (T12.17c; T12.25b; P23.Shi305a). He utters a long eulogy on the virtues of becoming a monk (T12.19a; T.27.a; P23.Shi313b-317a), the ten ascetic practices (*dhūtaguṇa*) (T12.20a; T12.28a; P23.Shi321b), and dwelling in the forest (T12.20a-21c; T12.28a-29c; P23.Shi323a-328a).¹⁰⁵ The sutra contains here interesting details about what I assume to be the symbiotic phase of a Śrāvakayāna-Mahāyāna community. Ugra is told that he must strive to learn and practise under the following categories of monks (T12.19a28-b3; T12.27a21-25; P23.Shi317b5-8): the erudite 多聞 (**bahuśruta*)¹⁰⁶, the one versed in the sutras 明經者¹⁰⁷, the one observing *vinaya* 奉律者¹⁰⁸, the one keeping the [*Vinaya*] matrices 奉使者 (?)¹⁰⁹, the one keeping the *Bodhisattva-piṭaka* 開士奉藏者¹¹⁰, the one [dwelling in] mountains and marshes 山澤者 (**āraṇyaka*)¹¹¹, the one practising the acceptance of [any kind of?] offerings 行受供者 (**paiṇḍa-pātika*)¹¹², the one practising meditation 思惟者¹¹³, the one practising the Path (*yoga*?) 道行者¹¹⁴, the one of the Bodhisattva Way 開士道者 (**bodhisattvayāna*)¹¹⁵, the one helping [with the menial affairs of the monastery] 佐助者¹¹⁶, and the supervisor [of the monastery]¹¹⁷ 主事者 (T12.19a-b; T12.27a-b; P23.Shi317a-318b).¹¹⁸ These categories are not portrayed as antagonist groups of lay followers or ascetics, on the one hand, and traditional Mainstream monastics, on the other, but rather a symbiotic gathering of monks with apparently different doctrinal convictions and religious preoccupations.

Although Ugra is instructed in the first part of the sutra on specifically lay practices, near the end of the text the Lord exhorts him to lead a life according to the renunciant's precepts 受去家之戒¹¹⁹ (T12.22.a; T12.30b; P23.Shi330b-331a).¹²⁰ It is true that Ānanda is told by the Buddha that Ugra's virtue¹²¹ cannot be matched even by a thousand *pravrajita bodhisattvas* (T12.22b; T12.30c; P23.Shi322a), but our main character has already attained an extraordinarily high spiritual level. This is far from an assertion that lay people, as we commonly understand the term, can attain the supreme Awakening as such. In this case the lay status is purely formal and is maintained only for the sake of liberating sentient beings in more effective way. Lay *bodhisattvas* like Ugra must undergo a thorough training according a full-

fledged ascetic cultivation programme wrapped in a skilful Mahāyāna package. In such contexts, the term ‘lay bodhisattva’ becomes volatile.^{1 2 2} In terms of spiritual cultivation, we can hardly call Ugra a lay follower. He is an ascetic in disguise.^{1 2 3} It would seem that even if we accept a full or limited role of the lay followers in the rise of Mahāyāna, the overwhelming importance of their ascetic training cannot be denied. This background should, in turn, be explained and investigated as the real key to the origins of the Great Vehicle movement. And this is what this modest contribution has tried to do in a preliminary way.

ENDNOTES

¹ The word ‘preliminary’ qualifying anything which has to do with scientific research is more or less a pleonasm. Strictly speaking, any scientific study is by necessity preliminary as future discoveries and rethinking of the matter will potentially require its revision or discard. I use the word here in its weak sense to stress the very high degree of ‘preliminariness’ of my study. Not only that far more data are necessary to cover the complex problems concerning meditation and the beginnings of Mahāyāna but also a great deal of philological work is needed to solve many difficult issues which underlie all texts. I often had to sacrifice the latter in favour of a bird’s eye view of the topic.

² The phrase ‘den dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrach’ comes from the *Prologomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (Prologomena to any Future Metaphysics)* (Kant 1911, 260), originally published in 1783 as Kant’s response to the criticism received by his first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I must immediately add that in using Kant’s famous words, which acknowledge his indebtedness to David Hume, I have no pretension whatsoever that I deserve to be compared with the great German philosopher. Any expectation of a ‘Copernican Revolution’ is, therefore, inadvisable.

³ Needless to say that Hirakawa’s theory is not singular. Suffice it to mention here Lamotte’s classical article (1954), whose main thesis is repeated in Lamotte 1984.

⁴ Williams (1989, 22) also quotes this fragment. He then adds, ‘It seems unlikely to me that the Mahāyāna was the result of organized and influential activity by lay people.’

⁵ Schopen is not mainly concerned here with the periodisation of the Great Vehicle as such. He refers to the period from the beginning of the Common Era to the 5th/6th centuries as the Middle Period of Indian Buddhism (Schopen 1996, 1), and this largely coincides with my dates for early Mahāyāna. I take this opportunity to thank very much Professor Schopen for allowing to quote from and refer to the handouts of his lectures (Schopen 1996; 1997a). His findings have not been published in English yet but I understand that, fortunately, a Japanese translation of these lectures will soon be released.

⁶ There are extremely rare cases of references to Mahāyāna before the 5th/6th centuries in documents other than Mahāyāna scriptures themselves. A 3rd century document from Niya, in the Serindian cultural zone, uses the phrase *mahāyāna-saṃprastita* (Schopen 1996, p. 44, n. 39). Then we find it ‘in a primitive form in an inscription recording the donation of a trader or merchant in the Northwest (Mathura-2nd/3rd Cent.)’ (ibid., p. 45, n. 39).

⁷ In a personal communication Paul Harrison also suggested me the 6th century as the upper limit of the early Mahāyāna period.

⁸ A careful collation of all Sanskrit versions, Tibetan and, more important in this case, Chinese translations is a must. Unfortunately, lack of time has prevented me from doing it with all passages, and this, admittedly, is a serious drawback of the present study.

⁹ Very few modern scholars have doubted the attribution of the translation to Lokakṣema. One example is Hayashiya (1948, 519-569) who considers that the translator of the *Dao xing boruo jing* was Dharmarakṣa 竺法護.

¹⁰ For a critical survey of the main hypotheses concerning the textual history of the *Aṣṭa*, see Schmithausen (1977, especially 35-40). The intricate situation of the many Chinese translations and the light they shed on the development of the sutra is discussed in Lancaster (1975, 30-41). The classical survey in Japanese of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature remains Kajiyoshi's detailed study (1980). The *Aṣṭa* lineage is discussed mainly between pages 40 and 98. Needless to say that the main historical and philological data concerning the *Aṣṭa* can also be found in Conze 1978.

¹¹ For more details, see Yuyama 1976, X X XIXff. The Tibetan translation, especially the Dunhuang recension, appears to be very important for the textual history of the text (ibid. X VI—X VII; X X X ff.).

¹² Yuyama (1976, XIX) also cites Conze's hypothesis. He also notes that the language of the text is obviously old representing 'a fine example of Buddhist Sanskrit literature at its earliest stage' (Yuyama 1976, X X).

¹³ In Conze 1978, 9, the great scholar sounds much more cautious and states that 'it is very difficult to come to a decision on whether it is the *Ratnaguṇa* which is prior to the *Aṣṭa* or the other way round.

¹⁴ I am aware that the argument of simplicity alone does not necessarily yield the same conclusions in determining the earliest layers of a text. Speaking about the *Aṣṭa*, for instance, P. L. Vaidya conjectures in the Introduction to his edition of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts. No. 4. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1960, p. X VI)* that Dharmodgata's sermon in chapter 31 (especially paragraph 1 on page 259 of his edition) represents 'the oldest and simplest form' of the *Prajñāpāramitā* doctrine. Conze (1994, X VI), on the other hand, declares chapters 30 and 31 to be 'quite late' additions. Conze, and many other modern scholars who share a similar view, adduce, however, extra evidence from the history of the Chinese translations of the text to support the fact the above chapters represent a later accretion.

¹⁵ Kajiyoshi calls the *Aṣṭa* groups of versions and translations the '*Dao xing jing* 道行經 lineage' and the *Pañca* group the '*Fang guang jing* 放光經 lineage'. A detailed treatment of the latter is found in Kajiyoshi, 1980, 97-111. For a brief overview of Kajiyoshi's conclusions concerning the historical development of the whole *Prajñāpāramitā* corpus, see ibid., pp. 723-727. For a discussion of the textual history of the *Pañca*, see Lethcoe (1976). Though not mainly dedicated to an analysis of the *Pañca* recensions, Schopen (1977) contains not only pertinent remarks on Conze's translation of *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom* but also a very useful survey of all relevant texts.

¹⁶ This is the most probable reconstruction of title which the treatise adopts when referring to itself. The

original title may have also been **Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra-upadeśa*. On the title and its probable Sanskrit reconstructions, see Lamotte 1944-1976, vol.3, pp.V-VIII. The Japanese scholar Unrai Wogihara reconstructed it as the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa-sāstra* (quoted after Nakamura 1987, p.239, n.25).

¹⁷ Though Lamotte uses the word in singular, I think it is equally possible that we may have to deal here, as in the case of other encyclopaedic works, with a number of authors and redactors.

¹⁸ Any discussion concerning the author(s) of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* should also take into account Kumārajīva's role. This is acknowledged by contemporary Chinese sources which tell us that the original Sanskrit text was much longer and Kumārajīva actually condensed the treatise. For all relevant details, see Lamotte 1944-1976, vol.3, pp.XLIV-L. Not all modern scholars have, however, viewed Kumārajīva's role in the translation/editing process of the text as an attempt to abridge the supposedly huge original. Hikata (1958), for instance, thinks that the basic text of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* was written by Nāgārjuna himself but Kumārajīva played an active part in editing and enlarging many passages. Such a view remains, nevertheless, highly conjectural. On the other hand, though not exactly an enlarging the text, Kumārajīva and his jumbo-sized 'editorial board' of 500 scholars did add explanations of Indian terms to make the reading more palatable for the Chinese reader. This is clearly proven by Lamotte (1944-1976, vol.3, pp.XLIX-L) who also agrees that in this sense Hikata's distinction between passages authored by Kumārajīva and those attributable to 'Nāgārjuna' is quite justifiable (Lamotte refers here to Hikata's Introduction to his edition of the *Suvikrāntavikrāmin*). The great Belgian scholar sums up this process as: 'L'Upadeśa est l'œuvre d'un Indien, mais que ses traducteurs mirent à la sauce chinoise; et ce fut là la raison de son succès' (Lamotte 1944-1976, vol.3, pp.XLIX).

¹⁹ I should like to express my whole gratitude to Dr Zacchetti who kindly sent me a copy of his paper and allowed me to quote from it.

²⁰ It is very good news indeed that Dr Zacchetti intends to publish his excellent study soon. This will undoubtedly enable the readers to appreciate the soundness of his textual evidence and argumentation.

²¹ Zacchetti rightly sounds a cautious note, however, against any possible exaggeration of the importance of his findings: 'Besides these isolated instances of "anticipation pattern", no systematic influence of the DZDL on Sanskrit Larger *Prajñāpāramitās* can be found' (p.8).

²² In many instances, it is very hard, if not impossible, to decide what is directly related to spiritual cultivation. Technical passages on *dhyāna* or *samādhi* can certainly be identified but these are not the only methods of a *bodhisattva*'s training. Especially, the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, with its relativist position, tends to argue that it is not so important what you practise but rather how you practise. Seen from this perspective, a text like the *Vajracchedikā*, which probably belongs to the early strata of the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts (Nakamura 1987, 160-1), contains virtually nothing on meditation. The way of looking into the (non-)reality of phenomena which it exposes is, however, the most important part of the *bodhisattava*'s spiritual cultivation.

²³ The exact translation of *aprañihita(-samādhi)* raises difficult problems. The most frequent renderings are 'wishlessness' and 'desirelessness', the latter being also adopted in the first version of this paper. I am most grateful to Dr Lance S. Cousins who kindly pointed out to me that this is not the most appropriate

rendering and that the *Critical Pali Dictionary* equivalents of ‘aimless, not bent on anything...’ more aptly convey the original meaning of the term. I am also greatly indebted to Professor Schmithausen who kindly answered my question concerning the meaning of the term by referring me to his views expressed in the book review on the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* (Schmithausen 1987). Coupled with a careful (I hope) reading of some relevant passages, my rethinking of the matter has led me to believe that ‘directionless(ness)’ would better convey the lack of mental orientation which seems to characterise the state. I must, nevertheless, add that though the two eminent scholars mentioned above have been instrumental in reshaping my understanding of the concept, I am alone responsible for devising this translation. I am aware that ‘directionless(ness)’, whether appropriate or not, has the disadvantage of contributing to the proliferation of the abstruse Buddhist Hybrid English vocabulary.

Now, although I think that this translation is philologically more appropriate, ‘wishlessness’ and ‘desirelessness’ are not completely incorrect provided that they are properly construed. Not directing one’s mind towards objectives or objects of existence may be said to mean not to desire or wish for them. The Indian sources I have consulted actually seem to imply both nuances, i.e. not directing one’s mind towards any *dharma*s is at the same time not desiring them. It must, nevertheless, be stressed that in those texts which have survived only in Chinese translation the way *apraṇihita-samādhi* is explained may be influenced by the rendering adopted by the translator(s). ‘Wishlessness’ and ‘desirelessness’ are, however, full of other connotations both in their everyday usage as well as in modern Buddhist studies. I have opted for ‘directionless(ness)’ which though less frequent and perhaps clumsy, better reflects the lack of mental orientation.

Let us first see what the sources have to tell us:

The *Kośa* (p.450, l.1) uses in connection with *apraṇihita-samādhi* the phrase *tad atikramābhimukhatvāt* or ‘due to being directed towards the transcendence of these [i.e. *anitya*, *duḥkha*, *samudaya*, and *mārga*]’ (Xuanzang’s translation: 能緣彼定得無願名。皆爲超過現所對故。T29.149c24-5). This refers to orienting one’s mind towards the transcendence of the Noble Truths of suffering, origination, and path, which are only preliminary means preparing the adept for the actual attainment of Nirvāṇa.

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* says, ‘The reason for calling the mental direction *apraṇihita-samādhi* is that the practitioners set their mind [in such a way] that they do not desire the *dharma*s of the three realms of existence.’ 期心故者、謂無願三摩地、諸修行者期心不願三有法故。(T27.538b17-8). (La Vallé Poussin 1980, vol. 5, p. 184, n. 1, reconstructs 期心 as **āśaya* and translates it as ‘intention’). The text continues: ‘Although in regard to the Holy Path there is no complete desirelessness, the [practitioner’s] mental direction does not wish for the three realms of existence.’ 雖於聖道非全不願、而彼期心不願三有。(T27.538b19).

The *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* defines the term as ‘*apraṇihita* is knowing that there are no signs (*nimitta*) and thus there is nothing [towards] which an effort [should be made]. It is called the gate of effortlessness’ 無作者、既知無相、都無所作。是名無作門。(T25.206c16-17) (Lamotte 1944-1976, vol.3, p.1219, translates 作 as ‘réaction’ or ‘effort (*abhisamkāra*)’)

The Tibetan translation is usually *smon pa med pa* which literally means ‘absence of desires or wishes’. Chinese renderings basically vary between 無願 or ‘desirelessness’ (adopted, amongst others, by Xunazang) and 無作 or ‘effortlessness’ (used by Lokakṣema, Kumārajīva, etc.) (For a detailed list of Chinese translations of the three concentrations in *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, see Yamada 1959, 221).

Schmithausen (1987, 153-4) points out that the translation ‘unbegehrt, Unbegehrtsein’ or ‘not desired for, lack of desire’ adopted by the editors of the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* (see Bechert 1976, p.105, s.v. *apraṇihita* 2) is not the most appropriate. Instead, Schmithausen shows that *apraṇihita* must be understood as ‘[seine Aufmerksamkeit bzw. Begierde] nicht auf...gerichtet habend oder richtend’ (p. 154) or ‘not having directed or directing [one’s attention or desire] towards’. Amongst many other sources, Schmithausen quotes from the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* ad *Abhidharmadīpa* 583: *na praṇidhatte bhavam ity apraṇihitaḥ*, which he translates as ‘nicht [auf das Dasein etc.] gerichtet’ (p. 514) or ‘not directed towards [the existence, etc.]’.

Apart from the wide-spread use of ‘desirelessness’ or ‘wishlessness’, let us note here that Lamotte (1944-1976) translates 無作三昧 (Kumārajīva’s equivalent of *apraṇihita-samādhi*) as ‘concentration de la non-prise en consideration’, and Vetter (1984) renders the term *apraṇihita* as ‘free of goals’. In his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit* (s.v. *apraṇihita*), Edgerton gives the translation of ‘(state that is) free from desire, longing, or purpose’. Rather uncommon and not exactly appropriate, Horner (1938, vol.1, p.161) translates *appraṇihito samādhi* as ‘concentration where there is no hankering’.

²⁴ In a study on the spiritual practices of the *Prajñāpāramitā* ascetic, Mano (1977) concludes that the content of the practices as such did not differ from the Lesser Vehicle. The difference lies in the *bodhisattva*’s altruistic commitment and active role in society. I can agree with this view only partially. It is true that the two Vehicles shared a common heritage of many practices but we should not forget the innovations, technical and theoretical, brought about by the Mahāyāna ascetics.

²⁵ See, for instance, *evam carantu vidu-panḍitu bodhisattvo nārhatva śikṣati na pratyaya-buddha-bhūmau/sarva-jñatām anusikṣati buddha-dharme śikṣā-a-śikṣa-naya śikṣati eṣa śikṣā* (*Ratnagaṇa*, p.19, verse 7).

²⁶ For an excellent discussion of the visualisation techniques, see Yamabe’s recent contribution (1999). Sueki (1986, 208-211) also discusses the historical significance of the visualisation sutras but I am afraid that I cannot agree with many of his conclusions.

²⁷ The Chinese translations contain a section which has no direct parallel in the Tibetan version and has a more categorical wording of the basic stance of the sutra: ‘Thought creates the Buddha, thought itself sees him. Thought is the Buddha....Since thinking is empty, then whatever is thought is ultimately non-existent’ (Harrison 1990, 43). 心作佛。心自見。心是佛。....設使念為空耳。設有念者了無所有。(T13.906a1-2 and 6-7 respectively).

²⁸ The Taishō edition has: 一切字法不受字。I have emended it by deleting the last character 字。Not only that this 字 would make the meaning of the phrase difficult to understand but we also find a parallel sentence in the same chapter: 一切字法不受 (T8.426b1).

What the first 字 exactly stands for is not clear to me. Does it have its usual meaning of *kāra* or *aḥṣara*? Could it refer to *nimitta*? As explained above, Lokakṣema’s translation is not a word for word equivalent of

the extant Sanskrit text. The phrase here appears, however, to represent the rough equivalent of the *samādhi* name which we find in the Sanskrit edition: *sarvadharmānupādāno nāma samādhiḥ* (*Aṣṭa(W)*, p.60). The Chinese text does not indicate that this is a *samādhi* name but in the next sentence it says that the *samādhi* (apparently referring to this *samādhi*) is infinite, etc. Maybe Lokakṣema translated faithfully his own Sanskrit version which is different from the one we have today. Or maybe it is just a rather awkward rendering into Chinese which omitted *nāma samādhiḥ*.

²⁹ Haribhadra comments: ‘*sarva-dharmā nopādīyante yena samādhinā sa sarva-dharmānupādāno nāmo samādhiḥ*’ (Wogihara, p. 60).

³⁰ The Chinese has: 無有邊無有正. The Sanskrit has *sarvadharmānupādāno nāma samādhir bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya vipulaḥ puraskṛtaḥ apramāṇa-nītayaḥ...* (*Aṣṭa(W)*, p.60). I take 無有正 to stand for *apramāṇa*, though this is far from being the standard Chinese translation of the term. The same phrase is also found at T8.426b1-2.

³¹ The Sanskrit text, which is the continuation of the above sentence, has: [*samādhir...*] *asādhāraṇaḥ sarva-śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhaiḥ* (*Aṣṭa(W)*, p.60).

³² The Sanskrit text has: *kṣipram anuttarām samyaksambodhiṃ abhisambudhyate* (*Aṣṭa(W)*, p.60).

³³ The extant Sanskrit text contains no reference to the state of non-regression (see next note).

³⁴ The Sanskrit version for this second paragraph goes like this: *Buddhānubhāven’ āyuṣmān Subhūtiḥ sthāvira evam āha| vyākṛto ‘yam Bhagavan bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ pūrvakais tathāgatair arhadbhiḥ samyaksambuddhaiḥ anuttarāyām samyaksambodhau| yo’ nena samādhinā viharati|| sa tam api samādhim na samanupaśyati| na ca tena samādhinā manyate| ahaṃ samāhitaḥ| ahaṃ samādhim samāpatsye| ahaṃ samādhim samāpadaye| ahaṃ samādhi-samāpannaḥ ity evaṃ tasya sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ na samvidyate||* (*Aṣṭa(W)*, pp. 60-1). Roughly speaking the philosophical message of both the Chinese and Sanskrit texts is the same. Differences of detail are, however, present, and this shows again that we have to deal here with two distinct redactions.

³⁵ For a detailed discussion of this *pāramitā* based on many Mahāyāna sources, most of which are not dealt with here, cf. Dayal 1970, 221-36.

³⁶ Hirakawa (1974, vol.1, p.354) makes this conjecture in connection with one of the earliest Mahāyāna scriptures, the **Ṣaṭ-pāramitā-sūtra* 六波羅蜜經 which is no longer extant.

³⁷ The equivalents *vitarka* and *vicāra* for 覺 and 觀 respectively are assured by the fact that the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* uses the same characters for these terms in the standard definition of the first *dhyāna* (cf. T25.186a5).

³⁸ The Chinese 滅定 undoubtedly refers to the attainment of cessation. Lamotte’s translation (1994, 44), based on the Tibetan version and Xuanzang’s 玄奘 Chinese translation, understands the term as referring to *nirodhasamāpatti*. The Tibetan ‘*gog pa*’ is not unproblematic. It usually stands for the Sanskrit *nirodha* but this does not necessarily mean that it refers to *nirodhasamāpatti*, whose full Tibetan translation is ‘*gog pa’i snyoms par ‘jug pa*. Thurman (1991, 24) translates here ‘without forsaking cessation’ and explains ‘cessation’ as ‘Skt. *nirodha*. The third Holy Truth, equivalent to *nirvāṇa*’ (p.115, n. 4). Bhikṣu Prāsādika reconstructs ‘*gog pa las kyang mi ldang* (*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, 404; see note 41 below) into Sanskrit as

nirodhān nōtiṣṭhātī (*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, p.86). Lal Mani Josh translates *nirodha* into Hindi as *nirodh kī avasthā* or ‘state of cessation’ (ibid., p. 216).

All the three Chinese translations make it clear, however, that we have to deal here with a meditative state. Kumārajīva and Xuanzang use 滅定 which is the standard translation of *nirodhasamāpatti*. Zhiqian 支謙 is not so clear but his wording also implies a trance state without mental activities, which most probably is the attainment of cessation (see note 39 below). Furthermore, the whole fragment deals with the correct way of practising meditation which makes *nirodhasamāpatti* sound very appropriate. The overall sense of the paragraph also appears to support reading *nirodhasamāpatti* here. All Buddhist laymen, after all, are supposed to perform ordinary deeds and not forsake Nirvāṇa, even though they are not usually able to attain it in this lifetime. So it would come as no surprise that Vimalakīrti is able of such a thing. On the other hand, being immersed in *nirodhasamāpatti* and yet displaying normal behaviour is indeed a great feat becoming the famous *bodhisattva* and fully agreeing with the other great deeds listed in this passage.

³⁹ Cf. Lamotte’s rendering (1994, 44): ‘Not withdrawing (*vyutthātum*) from the recollection of extinction (*nirodhasamāpatti*), but displaying ordinary attitudes (*īryāpathasamdarśana*), this is how to meditate’. Lamotte basically follows the Tibetan version and supplies in small format (like ‘recollection’ above) the variations and additions found in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation. The Chinese 威儀 as well as the Tibetan *spyod lam* very likely render here the Sanskrit *īryāpatha*.

⁴⁰ Kumārajīva’s (T14.539c21-22) and Xuanzang’s (T14.561b14-15) translations here are identical. The wording of Zhiqian’s 支謙 version, which is our earliest textual witness translated sometime between 223-253, is somehow different: 立於禪以滅意現諸身。是為宴坐。(T14.521c6-7) ‘Being in trance (**dhyāna*) and ceasing all thoughts [, and yet] displaying bodily [behaviour], this is the [correct] practice of meditation (**pratisamīlīna*)’. The basic meaning is, however, the same.

⁴¹ Bhikṣu Prāsādika’s edition of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* has ‘*jog pa*. I believe it is simply a typographical error for ‘*gog pa*, i.e. the usual Tibetan translation of *nirodha*.

⁴² Cf. Gunaratana 1985, 8-11.

⁴³ The *Aṣṭadaśasāhasrikā* uses the compound *samādhipāramitā* at least two times (vol.1, pp.94-5; vol.2, 19-21) in places where one would expect to see *dhyānapāramitā*. This may be another proof of the importance given to the word *samādhi* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts. Without other contexts, however, it is dangerous to draw conclusions as to whether we have to deal here with a mere synonym of the *dhyānapāramitā* or a deliberate lexical choice implying the superiority of *samādhi* over *dhyāna*.

⁴⁴ Haribhadra says nothing about their number and actual practice (cf. Wogihara 1933, p.97, ll.26-7).

⁴⁵ The Tibetan translation of the *Śata* apparently gives the number of 162 (Conze 1975, p.20, n.109). I have not been able to check the reference myself. The Sanskrit version edited by Ghoṣa gives first 115 *samādhis* (pp. 825-835, which list all *samādhis* with a short description) and then 121 *samādhis* (pp.1412-1414, which enumerate the *samādhis*, and pp. 1415-1426, which explain briefly each of them). We may have here a process of accretion within the same sutra. Anyway, a comparison with the 58 *samādhis* of the *Aṣṭa* suggests that the authors and redactors of the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts kept on increasing the number of *samādhis*.

⁴⁶ The sutra first lists 17 *samādhis* and then adds *peyālam yāvad Gaṅgānaḍivālikopema-samādhikoḥīnayutaśatahasrapratilabdho*.

⁴⁷ A final conclusion is further precluded by the difficulty of accurately dating the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.

⁴⁸ Conze (1975, 21) aptly remarks, 'In the beginnings of the Mahayana it became usual to give names to a manifold variety of concentrated attentions on insights into aspects of truth, and even to the concomitants of being in a state of concentration.'

⁴⁹ I have adopted the translation given by Gómez et al. (Gómez and Silk 1989, 15-16). For a discussion on the philological problems raised by this term, see Gómez and Silk 1989, pp.79-80, n. 7.

⁵⁰ McRae (1998, 77) translates the term as 'unobstructed'. I consider Lamotte's (1965, 257) rendering of the phrase as 'sans résistance' more appropriate. The term *apratigha* appears frequently in *Prajñāpāramitā* texts with the meaning of 'non-resisting' (for references, see Conze 1967, 54).

⁵¹ The text also makes an interesting remark that this *samādhi* contains all *dhyānas*, *samāpattis*, *vimokṣas*, *samādhis*, *abhijñās*, and *ṛddhis* (T15. 631c27-632a1; P32.289a3-a5). But this is again a generality which says nothing about this *samādhi* as a particular meditative technique. A similar remark is found in the *Pañca* (p.144, ll.8-9): *tatra katamaḥ sūraṅgamo nāma samādhiḥ. yena samādhinena sarva-samādhinām gocaram anubhavaty ayam ucyate sūraṅgamo nāma samādhiḥ*. 'What is the *samādhi* called 'the heroic march'? That *samādhi* by which the domain of all *samādhis* is encompassed is said to be the *samādhi* called "the heroic march"'.

⁵² *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (T25.207c-208a) declares the three concentrations to be actually identical and to have a unique object. This *samādhi* can assume different varieties according to the aspect examined and the type of person practising it.

⁵³ A brief but, as usual, extremely well documented note on the three *samādhis* is found in Lamotte (1944-1976, vol.3, pp.1213-5). In an excellent paper on mysticism in the early *Prajñāpāramitā* literature and Nāgārjuna, Vetter (1984, esp. 497-508) also discusses the three concentrations. For a study on the three *samādhis* in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, see Kawamura 1966. In his study mainly dedicated to *animitta*, Harvey (1986) also frequently refers to the *suññatā* and *appañihita* in Pali Buddhism.

⁵⁴ For canonical sources, cf. Vin III 92-3, DN III 219, SN IV 360, AN I 299, Mil 337. Vin III 92-3 uses three terms apparently referring to the same set of practices: *vimokkho 'ti suññato vimokkho animitto vimokkho appaṇihito vimokkho. samādhīti suññato samādhi animitto samādhi appaṇihito samādhi. samāpattīti suññatā samāpatti animittā samāpatti appaṇihitā samāpatti*. The three gates to liberation in these canonical sources and its later Abhidharmic developments are construed according to the basic doctrinal framework of the Śrāvakayāna. Suffice it here to give only one example. The commentary to the *Vinaya* text cited above says that empty means empty of passion, hatred, and confusion (cf. Horner 1938, vol.1, p.161, n.3). Cf. also Vetter 1984, 500-1. The *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (T25.207b-c) contains a fairly detailed discussion on the particularities of the three concentrations in the Mahāyāna contrasted to the Śrāvakayāna understanding. The main characteristic is discussed in relation to the emptiness concentration and represents the well-known difference between the Śrāvakayānika *sattvasūnyatā* and the Mahāyānika *dharmasūnyatā*.

⁵⁵ Lamotte (1965, 22) also notes the close relation between the two Vehicles in respect with the three

concentrations: ‘trois Samādhi appelés Portes de la délivrance (*vimokṣmukha*) où le Petit Véhicule confine au Grand’.

⁵⁶ For other definitions, cf. *Pañca* p.222; *Aṣṭadaśa*, p. 47; *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (T25.206a-c).

⁵⁷ Akanuma (1929, 133) gives the *Sutta* no. 163 in the *Tikanipāta* (AN I 299) as the Pali equivalent of this Chinese translation. It is true that the Pali text also deals with the three concentrations, but unlike the Chinese text, and the corresponding Sanskrit *Prajñāpāramitā* fragments, which define the three *samādhis*, *Sutta* no.163 speaks about the three concentrations as the three methods (*tayo dhammā*) which can eradicate *rāga, dosa, moha*, etc. Unless we take similarity of topic as a very general criterion of correspondence, this Pali *Sutta* cannot be considered an equivalent of the Chinese and Sanskrit passage in question.

⁵⁸ Abhidharma Buddhism seems to have been aware of this danger. The *Kośa* (pp.449-51) speaks of three other *samādhis*, i.e. *sūnyatāsūnyatā-samādhi*, *aprañihitāprañihitā-samādhi*, and *ānimit्तānimitta-samādhi*, whose objects (*ālambana*) are *sūnyatā-samādhi*, *aprañihitā-samādhi*, and *ānimitta-samādhi* respectively (ibid., 450). Cf. also La Vallée Poussin 1980, vol.5, pp.184-192.

⁵⁹ Conze (1975, 62) translates slightly different: ‘a Bodhisattva, a great being who courses in perfect wisdom, does not join emptiness with emptiness, nor is emptiness a matter for joining’.

The Chinese version reads: ‘The *bodhisattva mahāsattva*, practising the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), does not connect emptiness with emptiness. [...] Why? Emptiness, signlessness, and directionlessness are not something which can be connected or not connected.’ 菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜時、空不與空合。[...] 何以故？空、無相、無作、無有合與不合。(T8.223b6-9).

The additions in the square brackets in the main text belong to me. My understanding largely coincides with the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (T25.328c16-24) which comments upon the passage as follows: ‘There are two types of emptiness. One is the emptiness concentration, and the other is the emptiness of phenomena (**dharmaśūnyatā*). The emptiness concentration is not something that can be connected with the emptiness of phenomena. Why? If one made efforts to become united with the emptiness of phenomena by means of the emptiness concentration [alternative rendering: ‘if one forcefully attempted to connect the emptiness concentration with the emptiness of phenomena’], then the own-nature (**svabhāva*) of phenomena would no longer be empty. Furthermore, what is empty has a nature which is empty by itself. It is not produced by causal conditions (**hetu-pratyaya*). If it were produced by causal conditions, it would not be called “empty of nature”. 空有二種。一者空三昧、二者法空。空三昧不與法空合。何以故？若以空三昧力合法空者、是法非自性空。又空者性自空。不從因緣生。若從因緣生、則不名性空。(T25.32817-21). I am indebted to Dr Stefano Zacchetti who kindly drew my attention to this commentary in the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*.

On the meanings of *yojayati* and *yujayati*, see Conze (1967). On the phrase *na yujyate* in the later Madhyamika philosophy, see May (1959, p.56, n.19c).

⁶⁰ Lamotte (1944-1976, vol.3, p.1214) considers that unlike the Theravāda Abhidhamma, the Sarvāstivāda scholastic tradition grants these three concentrations a significant place in the framework of the spiritual path. Dr Cousins personally informed me that the three concentrations have a very significant role in the Theravādin *Abhidharma*. I am not prepared to discuss the matter in detail here but I agree that we need to

rethink this view expressed by Lamotte.

⁶¹ I understand *yoga* here as ‘practice’. The Chinese translates here as 相應 or ‘correspondence’, ‘relation’, etc. Conze (1975, 65) renders it as ‘endeavour’ which is rather vague in this context. My understanding is that *yoga* replaces here the usual terms of *samādhi* or *vimokṣa*. The compound *prajñāpāramitā-yoga* occurs in the *Aṣṭa* (*Aṣṭa(M)*, p.344; *Aṣṭa(W)*, p.701).

⁶² The three concentrations are also called gates to liberation because their practice leads to *vimokṣa* and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* (*Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, T25.207a).

⁶³ On the same theme of practising the concentrations without abandoning the living beings and without actually attaining the Buddhahood, cf. *Aṣṭa*, p. 310; 356-7; 371; 375-79;

⁶⁴ The simile of the archer is also found in the *Ratnagūṇa* (Ch.20, stanzas 9-10, Yuyama ed. 1976, pp. 77-8). Cf. Vetter 1984, p.506, n.21.

⁶⁵ Conze (1994, 224) translates ‘factiousness of the defilements and of Mara’. I think that Kajiyama’s and Tanji’s (1975, vol.2, 173) rendering of *kleśapakṣaṃ mārapakṣaṃ* as 煩惱に属するもの、魔に属するもの is more appropriate. Haribhadra does not explain the term as such but says: *Māra-pakṣaṃ cātikramyeti anen’ āntarāyika-dharma-samatikramaṇopāyaḥ sūcitaḥ syāt* (Wogihara ed., p.754).

⁶⁶ Both Conze (1994, 224) and Kajiyama and Tanji (1975, vol.2, p.173) understand *samādhāv avatiṣṭhate* as referring to dwelling in the friendliness concentration. This is a distinct possibility but I think it makes more sense to understand the phrase as denoting the emptiness concentration (as well as the signlessness and directionlessness concentrations) which should be practised upon a friendliness basis. Haribhadra does not make any comments concerning this point.

⁶⁷ For a discussion of this passage, cf. also Vetter 1984, 506 and Schmithausen 1999, 16-18.

⁶⁸ I use for this passage Lamotte’s reconstruction (1994-76, 1220). Lamotte translates 狂慧 as ‘sagessees frénétiques’.

⁶⁹ Lamotte (1944-76, vol.3, p.1222) translates 營從 as ‘soldats (*sainika*)’. In note 1 on the same page he remarks that a similar comparison appears on page 135 (vol.1). The Chinese text in question (T25.72c2) has instead of 營從 the compound 侍從, translated by Lamotte as ‘suite (*parivāra*)’. I could not find the lexeme 營從 in any dictionary of Classical Chinese but both characters suggest the meaning of ‘attendants’ or ‘servants’, which is actually supported by the apparently equivalent usage of 侍從 in the above simile.

⁷⁰ This distribution is essentially the same with the *Mahāvibhāṣa* (T29.539b1-2) and the *Kośa* (Pradhan ed., 451) (cf. Lamotte 1944-1976, p.1224, n.3). This suggests again the familiarity of the author with the Sarvāstivāda tradition.

⁷¹ Cf. verse 24, Chapter 1 of the *Ratnagūṇa* (p.14-15) which gives us the classical definition of compassion in the Great Vehicle: the *bodhisattva* ‘produces [his] great compassion [but] has no notion of living beings’ (*mahatīm janeti karuṇām na ca sattva-samjñā*; Chinese translation: 發大慈悲為衆生、為已不起衆生相。T8.677b14-15).

⁷² I am grateful to Professor Schmithausen who kindly allowed me to quote from and refer to the handout of his excellent lecture.

⁷³ The problem is obviously related to the four *apramāṇas* and this has recently been the subject of an

excellent contribution by Maithrimurthi (1999). Maithrimurthi's detailed study follows their doctrinal history from the beginnings of Buddhism to the early Yogācāra.

⁷⁴ Faxian 法賢 appears to have read: *śikṣita-gsamskṛtānām*. He translates: 若學般若住無爲、能攝一切波羅蜜。(T8.682c7).

⁷⁵ The *prajñā* mode appears, however, to be a cessation of verbal activities. The culmination of the *bodhisattva*'s career is described as *sarva-vāda-caryoccheda* or 'the stopping of all speech and practice' (Lamotte 1984, 93). This is, I believe, an intuitive state rather than a complete coming to a halt of all mental functions.

⁷⁶ Cousins (1984) deals with *samatha* and *vipassanā* in the Pali Canon. Kōchi (1973) uses a variety of sources from Chinese translations of Abhidharma texts and the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Zhihui 智顓 and the Chan tradition.

⁷⁷ I am much indebted to Schmithausen and Griffiths (1983) for the methodology of dealing with spiritual cultivation from a philologico-historical perspective. To the latter I also owe the terminological dichotomy of enstatic (a word actually coined by Mircea Eliade) and observational techniques.

⁷⁸ An aspect which could not be treated here is the triad *śīla*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā* which is a pan-Buddhist doctrine. A complete discussion of the relation between meditation and wisdom should, therefore, take into consideration this relationship, too.

⁷⁹ Though not referring to the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature in particular, La Vallée Poussin (1937, 190-191) seems to contrast *prajñā* with *śamatha*, *samādhi*, *dhyāna*, and *samāpatti*. We have seen, however, that the relation between all these practices is not so simple.

⁸⁰ Bareau believes that the original home of Mahāyāna should be sought in a region between Godaverī and the Ganges, i.e. Konakan, Mahākośalla, and Orissa (p. 300). This represents Bareau's version of the hypothesis which places the beginnings of the Great Vehicle in Southern India, a theory with a long history both in traditional and modern accounts. Related to this geographical placement, Bareau also gives some clarifications concerning his view on the main sectarian influences upon the early Mahāyāna communities. 'The Buddhist communities of this region must have received two currents of influences, one coming from the North, from Magadha, the sacred land of Buddhism, where all sects mixed together in their pilgrimages, and the other from the South, from the land of Andhra, where a group of sects lately issued from the Mahāsāṅghikas had settled and developed since before the Common Era' (p.301). I am not in a position to give any conclusive pros or cons against Bareau's geographical placement, but it is commonsensical say that this should be carefully checked against archaeological and epigraphical discoveries which have continued to pile up since 1955. It is worth mentioning that the earliest occurrences of the term 'Mahāyāna' in inscriptions mostly include peripheral places of the Indian civilisation: the mixed Serindian site at Niya, Mathura, Salt Range, Bengal, and Orissa (Schopen 1996, note 39, p. 45). Though not directly connected with the proto-Mahāyāna stage, these findings should, nevertheless, make us rethink (not necessarily reject) the theory of the Central Southern origin of the Great Vehicle. Bareau is actually aware of the fact that the earliest Chinese translations made by Parthian, Khotanese, and Sogdian monks in the 2nd century CE could represent a major shortcoming of a hypothesis which places the original homeland of Mahāyāna in

Dekghan. His conjecture is far from being unrealistic. Maybe, he says, the number of the missionaries of the new movement was too small, and their passage through the predominantly Sarvāstivādin Northwest was too fast to be remembered and recorded. Or maybe they still called themselves monks of the Sarvāstivāda, or Mahāsāṅghika, or Vibhajyavāda schools, and the Mahāyāna sutras which they were carrying were still considered to form a part of the *Saṃyuktapiṭaka* or *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* of these schools (Bareau 1955, 300). Again, I can only say at this stage that the whole matter needs to be reconsidered in light of the newest discoveries in all fields related to Buddhist studies.

⁸¹ Shizutani actually says, ‘The Chinese translations of the *Aṣṭa* (*Shōbon hannya* 小品般若) despise the two Vehicles but do not call them *hīnayāna* yet. The term *hīnayāna* is later and seems to appear first in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*’ (1974, 40-41). Saigusa (1981, 124-125), referring to Vaidya’s and Kajiyama’s studies, points out that one occurrence of *hīnayāna* is, nevertheless, found in the Sanskrit Ms of the *Aṣṭa*, though he adds that he will not discuss the textual history of this passage. (Incidentally, it appears in Chapter 11 (*Aṣṭa(M)*, p. 238, *Aṣṭa(W)*, p. 50) which, as we remember, is not amongst the earliest.) He further gives data concerning the number of occurrences in the Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*: *mahāyāna* 60 times, *hīnayāna* 8 times, etc.

⁸² Generally speaking, the Mahāyāna attitude towards the Hīnayāna seems to have evolved into two main directions: (1) The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, and later on the Tathāgatagarbha current, declare the Lesser Vehicle to be ineffective and proclaim the absolute supremacy of the One Vehicle (*ekayāna*), i.e. Mahāyāna. (2) Other trends, especially the Yogācāra, do not deny altogether the possibility of attaining Awakening by Śrāvakayāna spiritual cultivation but consider it an inferior form which the *bodhisattva* should not choose (Schmithausen 1999, 14).

⁸³ In the answers following his lecture at Otani University in 1997, Gregory Schopen referred to passages in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* which go as far as to portray the meditation practice in a negative way. It seems that meditation in this text usually refers to the contemplation of the impure (*aśubhabhavanā*), which potentially could raise problems of respectability in a Brahmanic society so intensely preoccupied with polluting factors. Meditating monks are advised by the Buddha to build a meditation hall in order to avoid being accused of handling cadavers. Practising alone in the wilderness is presented as dangerous, and the monks are warned by the Lord that the forest is often haunted by *yakṣas* and *yakṣiṇīs*.

⁸⁴ Buddhaghosa is actually concluding the passage discussed above with a quotation from the commentaries (*vuttam pi c’etaṃ Aṭṭhakathāsu*) (*Visuddhimagga*, p.99) which warn about these eighteen faults in verse form. Clearly, we have to deal here with a tradition which predates Buddhaghosa himself.

⁸⁵ Schopen (1997a, p. 16, n. 52) gives a long list of such critical passages in the *Rāṣṭrapāla*, the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, and the *Ratnarāśi*.

⁸⁶ Jñānagupta’s 闍那崛多 translation suggests another understanding of this sentence: ‘Far is he from the ascetic’s practice!’.

⁸⁷ Finot has *śravaṇā* in the text but notes that the two Chinese versions give the equivalent of *śramaṇā* (p.17, n. 2). I have emended and translated it accordingly.

⁸⁸ Finot remarks that on the basis of the Chinese version this must be read *maddharmam*. I have adopted

this reading here but I want to point out that we also have another possibility. T11.460c17 has 我正法 or 'my true Law' which could be a translation of *saddharman*. In many varieties of the Northern Indic scripts *ma* and *sa* are very similar *akṣaras* which could be and actually were easily mistaken by the scribes. The Chinese 我 ('my') could be construed as an explanatory addition of the translator and/or *causa metri*, i.e. to keep the uniformity of the seven-character verse. T12.4b12 has 如來法 which does not appear to be a literal translation of a Sanskrit term here but a rough equivalent.

⁸⁹ Ugra is told that he should not talk to the people of the village about what happens in the *vihāra*, and vice versa (T12.19b5-8; T12.27a26-28; P23.Shi318a). The purport of this interdiction is not an attempt to conceal monastic corruption. This is actually the fragment which exhorts Ugra to study under various categories of monks depicted as exemplary models of behaviour (see below). The interdiction concerning the disclosure of the monastic life to village people was probably motivated by the desire to keep secret those spiritual activities which were considered beyond lay understanding. The urge to refrain from talking about the village in the monastery must have originated from the need to keep the life of the monks 'far from the madding crowd' with its worldly concerns. For Ugra's special status as a layman, see below.

⁹⁰ The group of texts known in Chinese sources as 'meditation scriptures' 禪經 include a number of texts of various affiliations ranging from purely Śrāvakayāna positions to hybrid creations and clear Mahāyāna doctrines and practices. The ascetics associated with these 'meditation scriptures' and their relationship to the rise of the Great Vehicle has been discussed by Odani (1996).

⁹¹ Edgerton translates *prāhāṇika* as 'engaging in (ascetic) exertion' and *prahāṇa* as 'exertion, strenuousness', the latter being discussed in a detailed entry. Lüders rendered the term as 'practiser of meditation' (see Schopen 1997b, 31, 36). Cf. also Damsteegt 1978, 247.

⁹² For the *bodhisattva*'s salvific dedication in the earliest layers of these works, see, for instance, the *Ratnagūṇa*, Ch. 1, verses 24, 25, pp. 14-15 and the *Aṣṭa(M)*, pp.20-21, 23-25.

⁹³ Cf. *Ratnagūṇa*, Ch. 1, verse 12, p. 11.

⁹⁴ Conze (1994, p.X X, n. 9) says that *sarva-ākāra-jñātā-caryā* or "knowledge of all modes" is a late scholastic term for the omniscience of the Buddha as distinct from that of other saints. The *Aṣṭa* always uses the simpler term "all-knowledge", except at X X X 507.' Lokakṣema's translation of the *Aṣṭa* use a phonetic transcription: 薩芸若. For a discussion of the development of the concept of omniscience in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, see also Kajiyoshi 1980, 635-351.

⁹⁵ Cf. Conze (1975, 5): 'All the main thousand lines of this Sutra [i.e. The Large Sutra on perfect Wisdom] can be summed up in two sentences: 1. One should become a Bodhisattva (a Buddha-to-be), i.e. someone content with nothing less than all-knowledge attained through the perfection of wisdom for the sake of all living beings. 2. There is no such a thing as a Bodhisattva, or all-knowledge, or a "being", or the perfection of wisdom, or an attainment.'

⁹⁶ We should not forget, however, the fourth offence involving defeat (*pārajika*) of the groundless claim of having attained the state of a the spiritually accomplished man (*uttarimanussadhammapālāpa*, *uttaramaṇuṣyadharmapralāpa*, 妄說得上人法). For the Pali *Vinaya*, see VinIII 87-109. For a detailed discussion of this defeat in the *Vinaya* literature, see Hirakawa 1993, 298-334. The case with our early

Mahāyāna authors must have been delicate. These people were not considering themselves authors in the modern sense of the word but only transmitters of the authentic Teaching. It is hard to say whether this could be regarded as a *pārajika* case.

⁹⁷ The appeal to abstruse *samādhis* as a way of proving the superiority of a teaching or Buddhist saint is not restricted to Mahāyāna texts alone. Migot (1956, 508-9) quotes a passage from the Chinese translation of the *Ekottarāgama* in order to show how appeal is made to such a *samādhi* in order to prove Śāriputra's superiority over Maudgalyāyana. I shall quote here only the most relevant part of the paragraph: 'But as to the *samādhi* entered upon by Śāriputra, Bhikṣu Maudgalyāyana does not know its name' 然舍利弗所入三昧、目連比丘不知名字。(T2.709b27-28). In another part of his classical study on Śāriputra, Migot (1956, 477) refers to a similar idea found in the *Asokāvadāna*. The fragment in question presents a hierarchy of levels of understanding: a *pratyekabuddha* has not even heard of the name of the *samādhi* comprehended by the Buddha's wisdom; similarly, the name of a *pratyekabuddha*'s *samādhi* is unheard of to Śāriputra, and so on, gradually decreasing, to Maudgalyāyana, Mahākāśyapa, Upagupta's *upādhyāya*, and Upagupta himself (T50.162b).

⁹⁸ Cf. Harrison 1993, 170-171.

⁹⁹ Such a view must have been greatly facilitated by the Buddhology shared by the Mahāyāna exponents as well as most of the Mahāsāṅghikas.

¹⁰⁰ The sutra was first translated into Chinese under the title of 'The Scripture on the Dharma-Mirror' 法鏡經 in 181 CE by the Parthian An Xuan 安玄 and the Chinese Yan Fotiao 嚴佛調. It was later translated by Dharmarakṣa 竺法護 as the *Yuqieluoyue wen pusa xingjing* 郁伽羅越問菩薩行經 at the end of the 3rd century or beginning of the 4th. It also forms Chapter 19 of the *Mahāratnakūṭa-sūtra* 大寶積經 (T11.472b-480b) translated by Saṅghavarman 康僧鎧 (3rd century?). The Tibetan translation '*Phags pa khyim bdag drug shul can gyis zhus pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*' also represents Chapter 19 of the *Mahāratnakūṭa-sūtra* (P23.Shi296b-333b). The text has been translated into Japanese by Sakurabe (1974). For modern studies, cf. Sakurabe (1974, 346-350) and Hirakawa (1990, vol.2, 108-187). My references to the various passages first give the pages of An Xuan's and Yan Fotiao's translation, then Dharmarakṣa's translation, and finally the Peking edition of the Tibetan version. Lack of time has unfortunately prevented me from collating all these passages with Saṅghavarman's translation.

¹⁰¹ I give only An Xuan's and Yan Fotiao's Chinese equivalents in the main text and write the variants in my notes. Dharmarakṣa has a phonetic transcription for Ugra: 郁伽長者. The Tibetan rendering of Ugra's name is *Khyim bdag drag shul can*.

¹⁰² 爲道者, literally 'a person practising the Way', can be traced back to the *Lao zi* 老子 and the *Zhong yong* or *The Doctrine of the Mean* 中庸. In Chapter 48 of the *Lao zi* (Zhu ed., p. 192) we find the following passage: 爲學日益、爲道日損。'In the pursuit of Learning (*xue*) one grows day by day. In the pursuit of the Way (*dao*) one decreases day by day.' The modern editions usually have the above wording but a number of old editions and commentators insert 者 after 爲學 and 爲道, which would mean that we would have to read as 'the person who pursues...' (cf. *Lao zi*, Zhu ed., p. 192, notes). The Ma Wang Dui Ms, the earliest version of the text, has: 爲學者日益、聞道者日云(損)。'He who pursues Learning grows day by day. He

who hears the Way decreases day by day.’ (Lau ed., p. 204).

In Chapter 13 of *The Doctrine of the Mean* we read: 子曰、道不遠人。人之爲道而遠人、不可以爲道。’Confucius said, “The Way is not something remote from man. If a man pursues the Way and yet departs from man [i.e. humanity], then this cannot be regarded as the [true] Way.”) (*Zhong yong*, p. 226).

Yan Fotiao, who is also known to have studied and co-operated with An Shigao, probably had his basic training in Chinese classics and must have been familiar with such texts. As many of his fellow Chinese literati interested in Buddhism, he probably also felt attracted to Taoist works.

¹⁰³ Dharmarakṣa’s translates 出家菩薩 and 居家菩薩 respectively.

¹⁰⁴ Dharmarakṣa uses the same 衆祐 for *bhagavat* which was widely used throughout the so-called archaic translation 古譯 period covering all Buddhist texts rendered into Chinese before Kumārajīva.

¹⁰⁵ The praise of forest-dwelling is by no means restricted to our sutra. We find it in quite a few early Mahāyāna texts. The *Śikṣā samuccaya* dedicated a whole chapter to it (Bendall 1897, 193-201), which incidentally begins with a reference to the *Ugraparipṛcchā*. Dayal (1970, 222-3), quoting a large number of Sanskrit sources, refutes Anesaki’s view that the Mahāyāna writers ‘find the life of nobles or householders in no way incompatible with the practice of the *pāramitās* and the attainment of *bodhi*.’

¹⁰⁶ Tibetan translation: *dge slong mang du thos pa*.

¹⁰⁷ Tibetan translation: *dge slong chos rjod pa* or ‘Dharma-reciting monk’.

¹⁰⁸ Tibetan translation: *dge slong ‘dul ba ‘dzin pa* or ‘the discipline-keeping monk (**vinaya-dhara-bhikṣu*)’. The division between monks specialised in sutras (*sutamitika*) and those experts in *vinaya* (*vinayadhara*) is very old being already found at the sites of Bhārhut and Sāñcī (cf. Schopen 1997, 26).

¹⁰⁹ The exact category meant here is not very clear. What the exact sense of the Chinese 奉使者 is remains a mystery for me. I have translated it following the Tibetan version *dge slong ma mo ‘dzin pa*, which unfortunately is not very clear either. I take *ma mo* to stand here for *māṭṭkā* but it is again difficult to decide precisely what this means. It could refer to Abhidharma or proto-Abhidharma texts but it is more likely that it refers to Vinaya commentaries (cf., for instance, **Vinayamāṭṭkā* 毘尼母經 T24.801ff.). Sakurabe (1974, p. 278) translates it as ‘the *bhikṣu* who keeps the Vinaya summaries’ 戒律の綱要を保持する比丘. Actually in the following passage explaining what Ugra has to learn from each of these categories of monks, this *bhikṣu* is presented as a model from which the householder must study ‘how to restrain his mental, verbal, and bodily acts’ (P23.318a). Dharmarakṣa translates it as 住法者 or ‘the one dwelling in Dharma’, which again is not clear and does not seem to be the equivalent of the Tibetan term. Neither his text nor An Xuan’s and Yan Fotiao’s version includes 住法者 or 奉使者 in the passages explaining what Ugra has to learn from these categories of monks (T12.27b; T12.19b). If 奉使者 was really the original term used by An Xuan and Yan Fotiao in their translation, it is hard to decide what it actually meant. I think it is more likely that the text is corrupt and 使 should be emended to 律, but then we must either surmise an instance of dittography or venture to operate a more daring addition to the text, e.g. 奉律母者 (?).

¹¹⁰ Tibetan translation: *dge slong byang chub sems dpa’i sde snod ‘dzin pa*.

¹¹¹ Tibetan translation: *dge slong dgon pa pa*.

¹¹² Tibetan translation: *bsod snyoms pa*. The Tibetan version lists here four other categories not present in An Xuan's and Yan Fotiao's translation: *phyag dar khrod pa* or 'the one wearing only rags', '*dod pa chung pa* or 'the one with few desires', *chog shes pa* or 'the one easily content', and *rab tu dben pa* or 'the one living in complete solitude'.

¹¹³ Tibetan translation: *dge slong rnal 'byor spyod pa* (**yogācāra*; **yogin*).

¹¹⁴ Tibetan translation: *dge slong bsam gtan pa* (**dhyāyin-bhikṣu* or **dhyātr*). The Chinese terms used here lend themselves to several reconstructions and it is hard to decide precisely what Indian words they translate. The Chinese text, however, appears to list first **dhyātr* and then **yogin*. Dharmarakṣa has only 坐禪者 which could stand for both **dhyātr* and **yogin*.

¹¹⁵ Tibetan translation: *dge slong byang chub sems dpa'i theg pa*. Interesting to note that the lay follower is expected to learn under the monk of the Bodhisattvayāna the four means of conversion (*catvāri saṃgraha-vastūni*) (P23.Shi318b). This was appears to be a *bodhisattva*'s minimum requirement of altruistic involvement, and it was inherited from the Śrāvakayāna tradition. The *catvāri saṃgha-vatthūni* are well known in the Pali Canon (DIII152; AN II 32; etc.). Together with the first two of the *brahma-vihāras*, they could be the ethical 'missing link' between the two Vehicles. It takes only few steps to amplify them into full-fledged altruism and universal salvation.

¹¹⁶ Tibetan translation: *dge slong lag gi bla*, which is translated by Das as 'one who does the menial service to the congregation of lamas in a monastery' (s.v. *lag gi bla*).

¹¹⁷ Tibetan translation: *zhal ta byed pa*. Das translates this word as 'to serve, to inspect, review, superintend', etc. (s.v. *zhal ta byed pa*).

¹¹⁸ Dharmarakṣa lists more categories than An Xuan's and Yan Fotiao's version: 多智者、解法者、持律者、住法者、持菩薩品者、閑居行者、分衛者、服五衲衣者、獨行者、坐禪者、大乘者、精進者、典寺者、觀一切比丘僧行。

¹¹⁹ T12.22a27 有 誡. I follow here the Ming edition which gives 戒.

¹²⁰ Dharmarakṣa's translation shows clearly that, at least in his version, we have here the equivalent of the full-ordination disciplinary rules (學具足出家戒法, T12.30b6). All translations actually list five principles supposed to be the equivalent of a monk's disciplinary rules. These principles are all very strict. For instance, they are very emphatic about celibacy, which should be perfectly observed even on the mental level (心不念習姪欲, T12.30b9-10).

¹²¹ Dharmarakṣa translates 'the wisdom of their virtue' 其德之智 (T12.30c6).

¹²² The term 'lay' in the Buddhist context has different co-notations from the Christian institutions. As Harrison has pointed out, 'the terms *upāsaka* and *upāsikā* do not mean "layman" and "laywoman" in the usual English sense, but refer rather to persons hovering just below ordained status, those who are, as it were, semi-ordained.' (1995, 59). For the misconceptions governing the way the terms clergy and laity are usually construed, see also Durt 1991.

The social status of lay characters like Ugra, Vimalakīrti, etc. is not without relevance. They are very wealthy and well-educated. To speak in Western terms, they are members of the gentry. The term has often been used to speak of the Chinese literati class but I think we can also use it, *mutatis mutandis*, for most of

the wealthy Indian householders. The *New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* defines ‘gentry’ as ‘people of gentle birth or good breeding; *the* class composed of such people, *spec.* that below nobility’. It would be interesting to collect all available data and come up with an accurate statistical picture of the social groups to which the householders in Buddhist texts belong, but even when they are *vaiśyas*, therefore below the *brāhmaṇa* and *ksatriya* castes, they still form part of the ‘twice born’ (*dvi-ja*) community. Their wealth must have further contributed to their ‘good breeding’. Most of the characters in our texts appears to enjoy the privilege of enough time and leisure to devote themselves to spiritual quest. So even if we were to speak of a ‘lay Buddhist movement’, we should adopt the more appropriate term of ‘gentry Buddhist current’.

^{1 2 3} Such ascetics in lay disguise appear in the Pali Canon as well. We find, for instance, the householder (*gahapati*) Citta giving doctrinal clarifications and speaking of meditative practices and theories to monks (SNIV281-304). I owe this reference to Dr Cousins’s kind suggestion.

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Quotations from the Chinese *Tripitaka* are made from the Taishō edition (T) and they follow the usual conventions.

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A Sanskrit Fragment of the *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-vyākhyā* of Haribhadra: A Romanized Text

Zhongxin JIANG

1. Introduction

ABBREVIATIONS

Recension A = Akira Yuyama(ed.), *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā* (Sanskrit Recension A), Cambridge 1976, Cambridge University Press.

Recension B = Obermiller E.(ed.), *Prajñā-Pāramitā-Ratna-Guṇa-Saṃcaya-Gāthā: Sanscrit and Tibetan Text*, Moscow-Leningrad 1937, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, XXIX)

Rgs. = *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā*.

Rgs.-*Vyākhyā* = Haribhadra's *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-vyākhyā*

1.1.

We know from the article of Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana: "Sanskrit Palm-leaf MSS. in Tibet"(*Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, XXI, 1, Patna, March 1935, pp.21-43) that he went to Tibet in search of Sanskrit manuscripts for the second time from the 4th April to the 10th November 1934. During the expedition, he found an incomplete manuscript of Haribhadra's *Ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-vyākhyā* at *Ṣa-lu* Monastery near *Śi-ge-rtse*. In the list attached to the article, the manuscript is described as follows:

III. *Ṣa-lu* monastery(near *Śi-ge-rtse*)

| Vol. No. | Name | Author | Script | Size(in inches) | Leaves | Lines | |
|----------|--|------------|--------|-----------------|--------|-------|------------|
| XI 4.42. | Ratnaguṇa= saṅcayagāthā= vyākhyā | Haribhadra | .. | 20 3/4 × 2 1/2 | .. | .. | Incomplete |

He did not give any information on the number of leaves. Also, we do not know exactly what he meant by the word "incomplete". Therefore, we cannot infer how many leaves of the manuscript were actually preserved.

1.2.

In his book of the *Rgs.*, Prof. Akira YUYAMA, the distinguished philologist of

Buddhist Sanskrit, paid attention to the information concerning the manuscript discovered by Sāṅkṛityāyana, but he mistakenly cited the place and the time of the discovery as “Spos-khañ Monastery near Gyangtse” and “during his first expedition(1929-1930)”, respectively.

In May 1982 during his stay in Beijing, Prof. Yuyama visited the then Library of the Beijing Cultural Palace of Nationalities, on its invitation to inspect Sanskrit manuscripts preserved there at that time. The present author had the good fortune to accompany him on his visit. The Library, however, showed him only one manuscript — that of the *Saddharmapundarikasūtra* which the present author was then studying. At the close of his visit, he expressed great interest in my own study of the manuscript of the Lotus Sutra and thus encouraged me a great deal. At the same time, he wrote down a line of letters on some paper and showed it to me. It said: *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-vyākhyā* by Haribhadra. He hoped that the present author could find out whether the manuscript of the text was preserved in the library or not. Thus he brought my attention to this manuscript, and it was not long before I was able to find it there. Therefore, I wish to express my profound gratitude for the warm encouragement and advice received from Prof. Akira Yuyama.

1.3.

The present work is an edition of a fragmentary leaf of a Sanskrit handwritten manuscript of the *Ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-vyākhyā* by Haribhadra. The leaf was found among the Sanskrit manuscripts which were formerly kept in the then Library of the Beijing Cultural Palace of Nationalities (北京民族文化宫图书馆), today known as the China Ethnic Library (中国民族图书馆). In an unpublished list, namely the “List of Sanskrit Palm-Leaf Manuscripts Preserved in the Ethnic Library” (民族图书馆藏梵文贝叶经目录), which the late Prof. Sen Wang (王森) compiled for the sake of the Library, the leaf is numbered as 0018.

The fragmentary manuscript is written on a 47.2 × 4.4 cm palm-leaf which contains 11 lines on the obverse side and 10 on the reverse. Each line contains about two hundred letters (*akṣara*) which are quite small and close together. At either end of the leaf, some lines of letters are broken off and also there are a few illegible letters on the leaf itself. Apart from that, the letters in the manuscript are clear enough to read.

The leaf is probably the last one of the manuscript. The content consists of Haribhadra’s commentaries on the 8th to the 18th verse of the 31st chapter and the 1st to the 6th verse of the 32nd chapter, these two chapter colophons, and the final colophon. On the lower margin of the reverse side of the leaf, one finds pen-written *Devanāgarī* letters. It

reads as follows:

XI. 4. ratnaguṇasaṃcaṃyagāthā (patra 1)

From the above-cited description in Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana's list, we may conclude that these letters were written by him. The number "XI. 4." agrees with that in the list. In comparison with the title of the text found there, the word "*vyākhyā*" is wanting in the title written on the margin of the leaf. As a glance on the leaf will show, the title given in the list is quite correct. Concerning the size of the leaf, there is a discrepancy, but we can measure the original leaf accurately to get the correct size. The words, "*patra 1*", on the margin of the leaf, which mean "one leaf", are very significant as they complement the meaning of the word "Incomplete" found in Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana's list, in describing the manuscript. They tell us explicitly that this "Incomplete" manuscript, discovered by him, was in fact only a single leaf and is therefore nothing other than the present one under discussion. Thus, we may safely say that the single palm-leaf fragment, which I present in this article, is the whole of the "Incomplete" manuscript of the *Rgs.-vyākhyā* of Haribhadra recorded in Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana's list.

1.4.

Also, according to reliable information, one more manuscript of the *Rgs.* is preserved in the Potala Palace in Lhasa. Reportedly the Sanskrit manuscript consists of six fragmentary leaves. As the characteristic features, such as the size of the leaves, the number of lines on each side of the leaf, the number of letters (*akṣara*) of each line, coincide with those of the leaf which I am dealing with here, I suspect that these leaves belong to one and the same manuscript, and it is not a manuscript of the *Rgs.* but that of Haribhadra's *Rgs.-vyākhyā*. I am sure that the actual state of the manuscript will become public knowledge before long.

1.5.

The *Rgs.*, written in the Buddhist Sanskrit, is very important for the study of the philology, vocabulary, morphology, style, syntax and so on of the language. The Sanskrit manuscript of Haribhadra's *Rgs.-vyākhyā* is unquestionably a great help towards a further study of the *Rgs.* In order to illustrate this, I will give an example here, but only for reference. The third foot of the eleventh verse in the 31st chapter of the *Rgs.* both in the Recensions A and B reads as follows:

mātsarya preta bhavate upapadyayātī

Both editors of the Recensions A and B do not comment on this reading. Seemingly they do not see any problem with it. However, it is strange that there isn't any noun or

pronoun as this sentence's subject, while two almost synonymous verbs, namely *bhavate* and *upapadyayātī*, stand next to each other. Such a sentence does not make sense. Therefore, this reading is hardly acceptable, and should be emended. However, how should one emend it? If one cannot solve this problem on its own, then one needs only one glance at Haribhadra's comment on the verse to find the answer. It is found in the third line of the obverse side of the leaf published here, which runs as follows:

te māsaryātī, preta-bhavanēṣūpapadyante

Based on this comment, we may then confidently emend the above-cited sentence as follows:

māsarya preta-bhava te upapadyayātī

This reading, having a subject *te* and only one verb *upapadyayātī*, is syntactically normal and its meaning is also clear, and therefore gives us no difficulty in translating it.

In short, Haribhadra's commentary on the *Rgs.*, written in Classical Sanskrit, shows us, how an Indian scholar of his time, understood the Buddhist Sanskrit in the *Rgs.*, and which is quite comprehensive and often accurate. This indeed is a great help to scholars of Buddhist Sanskrit nowadays. I am sure that a careful study of the manuscript of the *Rgs.-vyākhyā* will promote better understanding not only of the Buddhist Sanskrit in the *Rgs.* but also the language itself, used in other texts.

1.6.

Signs Used in the Romanized Text

- | | |
|-----|---|
| () | restored <i>akṣara</i> (s) |
| [] | damaged <i>akṣara</i> (s) |
| { } | <i>akṣara</i> (s) which was blacked out by the scribe or which should be deleted |
| < > | <i>akṣara</i> (s) which was written additionally under a relevant line or a lower margin of the leaf |
| + | lost <i>akṣara</i> |
| .. | illegible <i>akṣara</i> |
| * | <i>virāma</i> |
| ↓ | designates an external Sandhi, where the first syllable of a word and the last consonant of the preceding one constitute an <i>akṣara</i> or a letter. |
| - | designates the word before and after this sign as parts of a compound. |
| ○ | punch hole |
| ' | <i>avagraha</i> , written in the manuscript. There are only two occurrences, in which the <i>avagraha</i> is omitted. They are indicated with the sign "(?)". |

1. Romanized Text

Recto

- 1 /// + + + + + ○ r_i ity_i āha / yasyo nētyādi / yasya māyōpama-dharmatā-balān_i nāsty_i ātma-saṃjñā na ca para-satva-saṃjñā tasya sva-para-vibhāgābhāvenānūnaya-pratigha-virahān_i nimittōdgrahaṇa-vaimukhye sati niṣiddha-vastv-ācaraṇābhāvān_i nāivāsamvaro 'sti evaṅ_i ca yasya na samvare śīla-vrata-parāmarśa-doṣatvān_i nāpy_i asamvare 'kuśalōdayāvagraho 'sti / + + + + +
- 2 + + + + + + + + [nāya]k(e)na // ś[ī]lānv[i]tasyāivaṅ_i dāne pravṛttir_i ity_i āha // yo evētyādi / ya evānantarōkta-śīlena samvṛtyā samanvāgataḥ paramārthena ca niṣprapa○ñco 'ta evāvagrahābhāvāt_i so 'napekṣako bhavati / sarvasminn_i eva priyāpriya-vastuni / evaṅ_i cōttamāṅgādīni tyajan_i diyamāne vastuni layābhāvād_i alīna-citto vidyamānārtha-tyāgāt_i sarva-sva-tyāgī satataṅ_i ca dāna-phaleṣu nairapekṣyād_i alino bhavet* bāhya-vastu-parityāgābhāvāt_i katham sarva-tyāgīti ced_i āha // jñātvētyādi / yatra hi nāma-prekṣā-pūrva-kāritayā dharmāṅām_i pra(k)ṛ
- 3 + + + + + [eva](ñ)_i ca d(o)ṣatvād_i vaśikāṃ paramārthena svabhāva-virahān_i nirātmikāṅ_i ca jñātvā yadātmano mānsādikaṃ tyajan_i alīna-cittaḥ kim_i punar_i bāhyaṃ vastu tadā na tyajed_i evaṅ_i cā○sambhavo 'tra bāhye vastuny_i asau mātsaryaṅ_i kuryād_i iti / nairātmīya-yogena kim_i arthan_i dāne pravṛttir_i ity_i āha / ahētyādi / {a}yady_i aham_i ity_i ātmani saṃjñā vastuni cātmiye mamatā bhaved_i anurāgo 'parityāga-lakṣaṇaṣ_i tadā nāiva tyāga-buddhir_i bhaviṣyati / upalambha-tamas-āvṛtatvena mūḍhānām / evaṅ_i cet_i te mātsaryāt_i preta-bhavanaṣūpapadyante / atha vā kathaṅ_i cin_i manuṣyeṣūpapa
- 4 (dyante ta)[dā] bhavanti dāridrya-prāptāḥ / tataś_i ca yathōkta-nītyāiva dāne pravṛttir_i iti sthitam* kim_i arthan_i evaṅ_i dāne 'dhimuktir_i iti ced_i āha // tadētyādi / yadēmān_i paśyati daridrān_i sa○tvām{nsa}ś_i tadā bodhisatvo dayā-sampatyā yathōkte dāne 'dhimuktaḥ san* āgamādi-pramāṇōpetatvena phalena saha sarva-sva-tyajanāt* sadā mukta-tyāgī bhaved_i ataś_i caturo dvīpām sapta-ratna-samalaṅkṛtām_i tatra sarvathāvagraha-virahāt_i kheṭa-tulyām / tri-maṇḍa-parīśuddhi-yogena datvā tathā saumanasya-prāpto bhaven_i na yathā dvīpān_i yathōktān_i labdhvā prāpyēti yāvat* / yathōktaṅ_i ca dāna
- 5 + + + m_i an[u]ttara-bodhau pariṇāmayitavyam_i ity_i āha // dānam_i ityādi // anantarōkta-krameṇa dānan_i datvā vidvān_i paṇḍito bodhisatvo yāvantaḥ satvāṣ_i tri-bhaveṣu vidyante ○ tān_i samanvāhṛtya sarvebhyaṣ_i tebhyo bhavaty_i idan_i dānan_i dattam_i iti

- evam, āsayena tad, dānam, agra-bodhau pariṇāmayati jagad-artham, eva bo{dha}(dhi)satvānāñ, cākṣayatvāt, tad, dānam, a<kṣa>yam syād, iti bhā○vaḥ / tatra dā{na}(nā)bhiniveše phalam, āvedayann, āha / na cētyādi / deya-dāyaka-pratigrāhakānupalambhād, yo nāiva vastv-avagrahañ, karoti / datvā ca dānam, parānugraha-buddhyā tat-phalā
- 6 bhilāṣāñ, nāiva kadā-cid, vipākam, praktikāmṣati // evam sa phalena saha sarvasva-tyajanāt, tyaktvā bhaved, vidvāñ, sarvasva-tyāgi / svalpañ, ca tyaktôpāyakausīla-balāl, labhate / samkhyā-pramā○ṇābhyāñ paricchettum, aśaktatvād, bahum, aprameyañ, ca vipākam, iti śeṣaḥ / mātṣarya-nigrahāya ca dāna-pāramitāvād, anumodanā-pūrvakaḥ pariṇāmo (')bhyasanīya ity, āha // yāvantietyādi / ○ yāvantaḥ satvāḥ kāma-rūpārūpya-lakṣaṇe tri-bhave sarvākāśa-dhādv-antargatatvāñ, nikhile sambhavanti / te ca sarve dānañ, dadaty, ananta-kalpāñ* buddhebhyo lokavidbhyo 'rhadbhyāḥ pratyeka
- 7 buddhebhyaḥ, ca tathā cēcchanti śrāvaka-guṇāñ, asyôpalakṣaṇatvād, buddhādi-guṇāñś, ca vastûpalambha-yogena pravṛttatvāt, parikalpa-sthāne sthitā iti bhāvaḥ yaḥ, cābhyāḥ samyag-upāya-kuśa○lo vidvāñ* bodhisatvaḥ, teṣāñ, taḥ, puṇya-kriyā vastv, anumodya satvārtham, pratyagra-bodhau pariṇāmayed, evañ, cāsau mātṣaryanigrahād, abhibhaved, sarvañ, jagat, pūrvôktaṃ yathôkta-pariṇāmana○yā pariṇāmayan* kim, ivēty, āha // kācasyētyādi / yathā kācasya maṇi-ratnasya rāsayāḥ syur, mahāntaḥ, tāñ, sarvāñ, vaidūrya-ratnañ, ekañ mūlya-prabhāvābhyāñ, mahatvād, abhibhaved* (ta)
- 8 thā sarvasmiñ, jagati pūrvôkte yāvāñ, pṛthu-dāna-skandhaḥ / tañ sarvam, abhibhaved, anumodanā-pūrvakam, anantarôkta-krameṇa pariṇāma[ko bo]dhisatvaḥ / vistareṇa pāramitā-dvaye nirdiśyāivam, pariśiṣṭa-pāramitāsv, avavādam kathayann, āha / yadītyādi / yadā bodhisatvo 'vaśiṣṭa-pāramitā-paripālanena dehôpamāno jagataḥ sambandhitvena dānañ, tāsāñ, eva pariśodhanañ, kartur, upalambhāñ, mamatvañ, na tatra karoti / kriyā-karmānavabodhāc, ca na vastu-prehañ, tadā varddhate kuśalair, mahānubhāvaś, candra ivānabhraḥ prabhāmaṇḍalaiḥ śukla-pakṣa ity, evāvaśiṣṭa-pāramitāvavādenākḥilārthā
- 9 vavādo dharmôdgata-bodhisatva{tva}(tve)<na> <mana-pariśuddhi-śāta>ñ, kalyāṇa-mitreṇa [v]idheya iti // ratna-guṇa-saṅcaya-gāthā-vyākhyāyāñ, dharmôdgata-parivartta eka-trimśattamaḥ // // evam labdhāvavādānāñ, cittôtpādādi-krameṇa pramuditādi-bhūmy-adhigamād, dānādi-pāramitānāñ, mukhyato vyāpāram, āvedayann, āha // dānenētyādi tatra tāvañ, mukhyataḥ pramuditāyāñ, bodhisatva-bhūmau sthito {mātṣarya}mātṣarya-prahāñ, dānena sarvathā preta-gatiñ, ātmanaḥ sarvasatvānāñ, ca cchinatti bodhisatvaḥ, tathā dāridryañ, tathā tat-pratibaddhāñś, cāmāya-duḥkhādiñ, sarva-kleśāñ, devādi-gatāv, apanayati

- 10 bhogāṁś, ca prakāra-bhedād, anantān, audāryād, vipulān, labhate bodhisatva-
cārikāñ, carann, ato dānena satvān, bodhi-cittādu pratis[thāpa]nāt, paripācayeṭ,
kṛtsra-prāptāṁś, tathā vimalāyāṁ sthitaḥ sarva-dauḥśīlya-vigamād, yathōktena śīlena
tiryag-gatim, aneka-rūpāṁ, aṣṭau cākṣaṇān, atiprasiddhān, varjayati /
manuṣyatvādi-{..}(la)kṣaṇān, viśiṣṭārtha-kāriṇo {ca} labhate ca nityam* prabhā-
karyāṁ, sarva-vyāpāda-vigamāt, kṣāntyā rūpaṁ labhate / lakṣaṇādy-alaṅkṛtatvāt*
paramam, ativaipulyād, udāraṁ, tapta-hāṭaka-saḍṣatvāt, suvarṇṇa-cchavir, mano-
nukūlatvāt, priyo 'secanaka-kāyatvāj, ja(gata u)
- 11 dikṣaṇīyo bhavet* arcīmatyāṁ sarva-kauśīdya-vigamād, vīryeṇa śukla-guṇebhyo
na parihāṇim, abhyupaiti jñānañ, ca viśama-(ha)tyād, anantam, buddhatva-parama-
dhana-sañcayātmakatvāj, jina-kośa-gaṇjam* prāpnoti // sudurjayāyāṁ sarva-vikṣepa-
prahāṇād, dhyānena kāma-guṇān, vikṣepa-hetu-bhūtān, doṣākaratvān, nindaniyān*
sarvathā parityāgād, utsrjāti / viśiṣṭa-satyābhisambodhi-paṅcābhijñā-svabhāvadvād,
yathā-kramam, vidyāṁ, abhijñāḥ śūraṅgamādi-samādhiś, cōtpādanād, abhinirharati
/ ābhimukhyañ, ca sarva-dausprajñā-vigamāt, pra{..}jñayā dharmāṇāṁ, prak(r)[ū]++

Verso

- 1 parijñāya trai-dhātukebhyo 'pāyebho viparyāsa-bandhanebhyaḥ samyag,
atīkrāmet* .. . ṇa meghena ca dharmā-cakra-ratna(m) pravartya bhava
ya○thā-krameṇa deśayat(i) dharman, traya viparyāsu duḥkha
.. .. . balāt, paripūryēmān, iva.. .. . dharmāt, pāramitā-svabhāvāt*
sa bodhisatvo praṇidhāna-sāmarthyāt, suvarṇṇād(i)-maya-bhūtān,
aniṣpādanād, ādhāra-buddha-kṣetra-pariśuddhim* jighatsādy-abhāvād, ādheya
buddha-kṣetra-satva-śuddh(i)[m, ā]dhara
- 2 pramatyā durla<bha>-sāmarthyena satva-dhātor, buddhatve pratiṣṭhāpanād, buddha-
vaṁśam, api parigrhṇāti / tathā dharmā-meghāyān, daśamyāṁ, bhūmau jñāna-
balena dharmā-deśanā-prabaddhād, dharmā-vaṁśa○n, tathā 'vicchinna-bodhisatva-
paramparā-niṣpādanāt, saṅgha-vaṁśāñ, ca parigrhṇāti / evañ, kramād, ekādaśyāṁ
samanta-prabhāyāñ, ca buddha-bhūmau savāsana-sarvāvaraṇa-prahāṇād, aviparīta-
dharmāvabodhena parigrhṇāti sarva-dharmān* vistareṇa mātarañ, nirdiśya vañ,
cira-sthitaye pratyapayann, āha // vaidyottamo jagatūyādi / yathātiśayena lakṣya-
lakṣaṇa-parijayād, vaidyotta[mo ja](gatya, a)
- 3 ndharādi-roḡāpanaya-kārī kathito 'nvartha-saṁjñā {..} ca cittōtpādādi-guṇa-
ratnānām sañcaya-rūpatvād, ratna-guṇa-sañcayāḥ padya-{..}(ba)ndhena nirdiṣṭatvād,
yathā svabhāvañ, taṁ sarva-satvā ○ yathēmam, bhāvanōpadeśa-krameṇa satya-
dvaya-kathanān, mārgam, anuprāpnumuṣ, tathā bhavadbhiḥ kāryam, ity, āryānanda-

prabhṛtibhyaḥ pratyayitavān, iti boddhavyam, evaṃ śata-sāhasrikāyāṃ, bhagavatyāṃ yasante 'bhidhānāt, tatrāyam, bhāvanōpadeśa-kramo 'bhisampratyaya-kārī yad, utādu tāvaç, chrute deşe kṛtāvasthiti-deśakam, bhagavantam sāksādhira{..}jam simhāsana-sthan, dharma-cakra-mudrayā yuktaṃ yathāvat, pū..

- 4 pūrvakam, buddha-bodhisatvādibhiḥ parivṛtam, vibhāvya praṇamet* tato vajraparyāṅkam, āpūrya ṛjuṅ, kāyam praṇidhāya samādhi-yogena sthitvā jihvān, tāluga-tān, kṛtvā nāsikāgre dṛṣṭim, avasthāpya daśasu dikṣu buddha-bodhisatvālamḃana-pūrvakan, tebhyaḥ samupadeśam, ādāya prajñā-pāramitānayaṃ sarva-dharma-nairātmya-dyotakam, mūla-cittena nāmataḥ samālambya tasyāiva pada-prabhedam, parivarttādi-bhedād, anucara-cittena niśamayet, tato (')ṣṭābhisamayāvasthā-bhedena saṃkhyā-prahañād, gaṇanayā pratyabhisamayam sva-rūpa-niścayāt, tulanayā 'py, ādhāryāpavādābhā[vā](t*)
- 5 mīmānsayā {..} pratyakṣānumāna-pramāṇōpapannatvāt, pratyavekṣaṇatayēty, evaṃ, prajñā-pāramitākam caturbhir, ākārair, vyañjanāni tu vyasta-sa(ma){pra}stāni yathākramam nirartha-sadarthatayēty, evaṃ, ākārābhyām, vicāraṇāç, cittena vicārayet* tadā tu yathā vicāritan, nimittam, idam, eva satyam, moho 'nya ity, avadhāraṇā-cittēnāvadhṛtya yathā vicāritam, evārthan, nāmāmbake mūla-citte sankalana-cittena prakṣipyānuttara-samyak-sambuddhatva-cchanda-sahagatenāśāsta-cittena prajñā-cakṣuṣā māyōpamatvena sarva-dharmāṇāṃ samyag-jñānālokenādarśanād, avikalpa ...
- 6 hetu-phala-bhāva-virahāç, chūnyān, ataḥ sva-sāmānya-nimitta-vaikalyād, animittān, ataḥ prārthayitavya-vastv, anupalambhād, apraṇihitān, evaṅ, ca pra[kṛ]ti-prabhāsvara-vimokṣa-mukha-samādhinā cittōtpādādi-krameṇa dharma-cakrāparijñānāt* viparyāsa-ba{..}ndhanena saṃsāra-cārake baddhān, satva-dhātūn* abhyuddhartum, mahā-karuṇā-cittena bhāvanān, kuryāt* // tatra na samādhou kausīdyaḃ, ālambana-sampramoṣo layāuddhatye ta{..}thā sa bhogaḥ punar, ābhoga itī ṣaḍ-doṣāṇāṃ yathāvasaram, utpāde tat-pratipakṣeṇa vāṣṭau prahāṇa-saṃskārān* yathā yoga +
- 7 + + + .. tayā hi samādhi-guṇeṣv, abhisampratyaya-lakṣaṇayā śraddhayā yoginaṣ, chandaḥ samutpadyate / tataṣ, chanda-balād, vīryam, ārabhate / tato vīrya-balena kāya-citta-prasrabdhiḃ, āsādayati // tataḥ prasrabdha-kāya-cetasah kausīdyaṃ, vyāvarttate / tasmāç, chraddhādayaṣ, catvāraḥ kausīdya-prahāṇāya bhavanti / smṛtir, ālambana-sampramoṣasya pratipakṣaṣ, tayā samyag-āḃlambanāvasthānāt* samprajānyam layāuddhatyayoḥ pratipakṣaṣ, tena prāmodya-vastu-buddhādi-guṇa-manasikārāt* layasya samvega-vastv-anityatādi-manasikārād, auddhatya
- 8 + + + nam, bhavati / layāuddhatya-praśamana-kāle cānābhoga-doṣaṣ, tat-pratipakṣeṇa cetanābhyaṇiyā layāuddhatya-praśame sa(t)i yadā cittam, ālambane niṣprakampam,

anatisaṃskāra-vāhi-pravṛttam, bhavati / tadā punar, ābhogo doṣaḥ, tena citta-
vikṣepād, ataḥ, tat-pratipakṣeṇōpekṣā bhāvanīyēty, evaṅ, krameṇa vibhāvya-
vyutthāna-pūrvakam saṅgīti-kāraḥ śrī-vajra-dhara-rūpādhimokṣeṇa bodhisatvādīn,
āhūya prajñā-pāramitā-deśanayā dharma-dānaḥ, datvā taḥ, sarvam, anabhiniveśa-
yogena sarvasatvārtham, anuttara-samyak-sambodhau pariṇāmayed, e[vañ ca]

- 9 + + + śidheyam, iti // // ratna-guṇa-saṅcaya-gāthā-vyākhyāyām, parīdanā-
parivartto dvā-triṃśattamaḥ // // mātēyaṅ, gamitā na yoga-vidhibhiḥ kaiś, ciḥ,
purā prāṇibhir, vijñāyāsva-samasta-moha-tamasā nāthena yā bhāṣitā // tām,
vyākhyāya suyukti-saṅgata-padaīḥ puṇyasya yā vāpi ya[.].ḥ, tenēmān, guṇa-ratna-
saṅcayavatīm, prāpnotu śiḡhram janaḥ // 8 // yo 'laṅkāro '[bhi]samaye tat-piṇḍārtha-
prakāśikā prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā samāptāivam śubhōdayā // anaṣṭa-
cchandasāikatra ślokānām, pariṣaṃkhyayā śatādhikam, idaṃ jñeyam sahasra-dvaya-
10 + + + + + + // // // kṛtir, iyam, ācārya-haribhadra-pādānām, iti // 8 // //
// // m[ā]tur, vyākhyām likhitvā yaḥ, chīla-guṇena bhikṣuṇā / samavāptam
śubhan, tena jagad, buddhatvam, āpnuyāt* // //

Postscript

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A Comparison of Zhiyi's 智顓 and Jizang's 吉藏 Views of the *Lotus Sūtra*: Did Zhiyi, after all, Advocate a "Lotus Absolutism"?

Hiroshi Kan'no

Introduction

Among the systems of doctrinal classification (*jiaopan* 教判) that circulated during China's North-South Dynasties Period, there is a scheme known as the "five-period classification" (*wushi jiaopan* 五時教判).¹ Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠(523-592), Zhiyi (538-598), and Jizang (549-623), the so-called three great masters of the Sui 隋 all criticized the five-period scheme severely, from which we can infer that the five-period scheme enjoyed considerable influence in its time. Regrettably, sources that allow us a first-hand knowledge of North-South Dynasties doctrinal classifications are extremely lacking,² and so we are compelled to approach this topic indirectly, by way of later works such as following:

Jingying Huiyuan's *Dasheng yizhang* 大乘義章,
Zhiyi and Guanding's 灌頂(561-632) *Fahua xuanyi* 法華玄義,
The works of Jizang,
Ji's 基 *Dasheng fayuan yilin zhang* 大乘法苑義林章, and
Fazang's 法藏(643-712) *Huayanjing tanxuanji* 華嚴經探玄記 and *Huayan wujiao zhang* 華嚴五教章.

¹ This scheme is not to be confused with Zhiyi's system of "five periods and eight teachings" (*wushi bajiao* 五時八教).

² Fragments of this are to be found in the *Daban niepan jing jijie* 大般涅槃經集解, which was compiled in the Liang 梁 Dynasty; but the system of five periods is never addressed directly. See Hiroshi Kan'no, "Daihatsu nehanyō jūge ni okeru Sōryō no kyōhan shisō", *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* vol.35-1 (December 1986), pp. 78-81; and "Daihatsu nehanyō jūge ni okeru Sōshū no kyōhan shisō", *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* vol.37-1 (December 1988), pp. 87-91. Fragments bearing on the five-period scheme are also to be found in Fayun's *Fahua yiji* 法華義記. On this subject, see Kan'no, *Chūgoku Hokke shisō no kenkyū* (Tokyo: shunjūsha, 1994, pp. 154-164).

We know about two representative types of the five-period classification³, through the introduction of Jingying Huiyuan and Jizang. Jingying Huiyuan introduced the classification system of Liu Qiu 劉虬(438-495).⁴ Jizang described the classification system of Huiguan 慧觀(d.u).⁵ The two schemes differ somewhat in content, but they share a common concern for establishing hierarchical gradations of value between the various Mahāyāna sūtra. That is to say, one of their foremost hermeneutic concerns is to determine whether a given Mahāyāna sūtra possesses value that is relatively higher than that of other Mahāyāna sūtra, or whether there is one Mahāyāna sūtra in particular that possesses supreme value with regard to all the sūtra. Thus, for example, we find that the *Lotus Sūtra* is accorded a higher value than the *Prajñā* sūtras, but that is inferior in status to the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*.

However, this paper is not concerned specifically with the differences between these two schemes of five-period classification. Rather, after providing a brief introduction to the five-period scheme of Huiguan as described by Jizang, I will proceed to clarify Jizang's basic idea that "the Mahāyāna sūtras are without difference in their revealing of ultimate reality"—a view of the Mahāyāna sūtras that Jizang established in direct criticism of Huiguan's position.⁶ I will further show that Jizang's way of thinking also displays some

³ There are other types of the five-period doctrinal classification introduced in the *Dapin youyi* 大品遊意, a text that is attributed to Jizang which some hold to be the work of someone else. See T 33.66b-c.

⁴ Liu Qiu was a scholar who lived in reclusion (*yinshi* 隱士) during the Southern Qi 齊Dynasty and an ardent devotee of Buddhism. His *Wuliangyi jing xu* 無量義經序(Preface to the *Sūtra of Illimitable Meaning*) still survives. While his *Zhu Fahua jing* 注法華經(Commentary to the *Lotus Sūtra*) is no longer extant, it is quoted numerous times in Jizang's Commentaries to the *Lotus Sūtra*. See Kan'no, *Chūgoku Hokke shisō no kenkyū*, pp. 117-140.

⁵ A disciple of Kumārajīva, Huiguan's *Fahua zongyao xu* 法華宗要序(Preface on the Essential Theme of the *Lotus Sūtra*) is still extant. For his view of the *Lotus Sūtra*, see Kan'no, *Chūgoku Hokke shisō no kenkyū*, pp. 20-24.

⁶ Liang Wu Di 梁武帝already provided a partial criticism of Huiguan's five-period classification in his *Zhu jie dapin xu* 注解大品序(*Chu sanzang ji ji* 出三藏記集, T 55.53c-54c). That is to say, he criticized the status accorded to the *Prajñā* sūtras in the five-period classification on four basic grounds: the idea that (1) the *Prajñā* sūtras are inferior to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, (2) that the *Prajñā*

commonalities with Huiyuan. On the basis of these preparatory forays into Jizang's and Jingying Huiyuan's equanimous view of the Mahāyāna sūtras, I will continue to discuss the doctrinal classification of Tiantai Zhiyi 天臺智顛, the chief concern of this article. The main question here is whether Zhiyi, after all, really took the posture of asserting a "Lotus Sūtra absolutism"—the idea that the *Lotus Sūtra* stood supreme among all the sūtras or discourses on the Dharma that the Buddha delivered over the course of his career.⁷ To state my conclusion up front: it is my contention that Zhiyi was decidedly not an absolutist when it comes to the *Lotus Sūtra*. Rather, it is more fitting to call him a "perfect teaching" (*yuanjiao* 圓教) absolutist, ascribing to a view that all the Mahāyāna sūtras are equal, a view that is fundamentally identical with those of his contemporaries, Huiyuan and Jizang. Finally, as a matter of general methodological perspective on this issue, I would like to suggest that it is essential to distinguish two fundamentally different hermeneutical orientations when it comes to investigating questions of Zhiyi's doctrinal classification: ① organize the order by which the Buddha preached the Dharma over the course of his own career; ② design concrete forms of religious practice suited to the conditions at hand, the concern for which was peculiar to the new Buddhism of Zhiyi's own day.

Part One: Huiguan's 慧觀 Five-period Classification Scheme

A fairly detailed introduction to Huiguan's system of five-period classification is

sūtras are inferior to the *Lotus Sūtra*, (3) that the *Prajñā* sūtras are referred to as the common teaching of the three vehicles and, as such, is a teaching for the śrāvaka, and (4) that the *Prajñā* sūtras are to be relegated to the second period of the gradual teaching.

⁷ Andō Toshio states in his *Tendai gaku - konpon shisō to sono tenkai* (Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1968), "The final completion of a system of doctrinal classification that promoted a full *Lotus* absolutism must be ascribed to the efforts of Zhiyi." (p.58); also, "Disassociating himself from the Dilun 地論 theories of north China, which regarded the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* as the superior sūtra, and the theories of *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* exegetes in the south, who regarded the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* as superior, Zhiyi newly laid the scholastic foundation for promoting the *Lotus Sūtra* as the supreme sūtra. The spirit of *Lotus Sūtra* absolutism that was nascent in the teaching of Huisi 慧思, who was active to the north of the Yangzi River, came into full bloom with the completion of the Tendai 天臺 system of doctrinal classification in the regions south of the Yangzi. (p.60)

provided in Jizang's *Sanlun xuanyi* 三論玄義,⁸ part of which states:

As for this idea of five periods, when the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* first found its way into the region south of the Yangzi 揚子 River, the Song-period 宋 monk Huiguan from Daochang 道場 Monastery composed a preface for it, and he divided the whole of the Buddhist sūtras into two basic categories. The first category was the sudden teaching, with which he identified the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. The *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* reveals the truth in full only for the bodhisattvas. The second category begins with the Deer Park [the site of Mṛgadāva, where the Buddha first turned the wheel of Dharma] and ends with the Sāla grove [the site where the Buddha entered parinirvāṇa]. It proceeds from the shallow to the profound, for which it is known as the gradual teaching. The gradual teaching unfolds by way of five periods (*wushi* 五時). In the first period the three vehicles are taught individually or separately. The second period corresponds to the preaching of the *Prajñā* sūtras. Because the latter instructs the three capacities (*ji* 機) of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva conjointly, it is also called the “pervasive teaching for the practitioners of the three vehicles.” The third period is that of the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* and *Brahmapariṣcchā Sūtra*. The bodhisattva is praised and the śrāvaka is censured and on this basis it is called the “teaching that censures and praises.” The fourth period corresponds to the preaching

⁸ Huiguan's five-period system is also introduced in fascicle 10A of the *Fahua xuanyi* 法華玄義 (T 33.801a-b), but the names for the doctrines of the five periods are different from those given in the *Sanlun xuanyi*. For example, the doctrine of the separate exposition of the three vehicles in the *Sanlun xuanyi* is called the teaching that posits distinguishing characteristics in the *Fahua xuanyi*; the doctrine of the common exposition of the three vehicles in the *Sanlun xuanyi* is known as “the formless or featureless teaching” in the *Fahua xuanyi*. In the *Sanlun xuanyi* we observe a naming that is based on the “equality” and the “divergence” of the practice and the effect of the three different practitioners - śrāvaka, pratyeka-buddha and bodhisattva. In the *Fahua xuanyi* we observe a naming that is based on an ontological view concerning all phenomena. The doctrine of the teaching that censures and praises in the *Sanlun xuanyi* is expanded in the *Fahua xuanyi* to become the “teaching that extols and disregards, censures and praises, obviously the meaning is the same. For the issues that are the particular concern of this article, the differences in terminology of these two systems need not be seen as a problem.

of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Here the three vehicles are brought together and returned in common to the singular and ultimate end, whence it is known as the “teaching that reverts to commonality or sameness.” The fifth period is the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, which is known as “the teaching of the eternal abiding.” (T 45.5b)⁹

For convenience of explanation, the scheme may be illustrated as follows:

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Sudden Teaching | <i>Avataṃsaka / Huayan Sūtra</i> |
| Gradual Teaching (Five Periods) | ① Three vehicles taught individually or separately (<i>Āgama</i> sūtras) ② Three vehicles taught in common (<i>Prajñā</i> sūtras) ③ Teaching that censures and praises (<i>Vimalakīrti</i> , <i>Brahmapariṣcchā</i> , etc.) ④ Teaching that reverts to commonality (<i>Lotus Sūtra</i>) ⑤ Teaching of Eternal Abiding (<i>Nirvāṇa Sūtra</i>) |

According to Jizang, this classificatory system of the five periods was used variously by the three great Dharma-masters of the Liang 梁 period: Zhizang 智藏(485-522) of Kaishan 開善 Monastery, Sengmin 僧旻(467-527) of Zhuangyan 莊嚴 Monastery, and Fayun 法雲(476-529) of Guangzhai 光宅 Monastery.¹⁰ In addition to its eliciting the basic thought

⁹ Certain scholars have dismissed citations of Huiguan’s *Niepan xu* 涅槃序 (Preface to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*) in Jizang as unreliable, since the *Niepan xu* itself no longer survives. On the basis of the evidence that remains they have suggested that Huiguan’s sudden, gradual, and five-period classification scheme was actually a product of someone from a later period. But Huiguan himself knew not only of the existence of the *Prajñā*, *Vimalakīrti*, *Brahmapariṣcchā*, and *Lotus* sūtras, but of the existence of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, and *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* as well. For example, he himself took part in the effort to recodify the forty fascicle northern text of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* translated by Dharmakṣema 曇無讖 and produce the thirty-six fascicle text of the southern version of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. As for the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, it was translated into Chinese at Daochang 道場寺 Monastery in Jiankang 建康 by Buddhahadra 佛馱跋陀羅(359-429) in 418, and Huiguan himself resided at none other than Daochang Monastery. As such, there are also scholars who support the possibility that the person who formulated this system of doctrinal classification was Huiguan himself. But we will not entertain this problem of authorship of the five-period classificatory system here.

¹⁰ According to fascicle 10A of the *Fahua xuanyi* (T 33.801a-b), Sengmin subscribed to a four period system of doctrinal classification. In addition to Zhizang and Fayun, the names of Sengrou 僧柔 of Dinglin 定林 Monastery (431-494) and Huiji 慧基(434-490) are also mentioned as persons

from the most important Mahāyāna sūtras, the particular strength of this classificatory scheme lies in its using the basic principle that “the Buddha’s teaching evolved from shallow to profound” as a means to locate schematically the relative place of the more important Mahāyāna sūtras in the Buddha’s career. On the basis of such a scheme, it became possible for people to develop a systematic understanding of the incredible miscellany of teachings that were traditionally attributed to the Buddha. To this end, the system of five periods is considered to have carried great influence in the North-South Dynasties Period, a period when the necessity of doctrinal classification was itself intensely promoted.

Part Two: Jizang’s Criticism of the Five-period Classification and his Advocacy of the Equality of the Mahāyāna sūtras

Criticisms of the five-period classificatory scheme appear scattered throughout Jizang’s writings. For example, in the third fascicle of his *Fahua xuanlun* 法華玄論, Jizang quotes extensively citations from sūtras and treatises, he notes that there are only two wheels of the Dharma, those of the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna (or the bodhisattva canon and the śrāvaka canon), and that distinctions such as the three doctorines –sudden, gradual, and indeterminate–have no basis in the scriptures.¹¹ He states:

“These various sūtras and treatises only elucidate the two vehicles of the Mahāyāna and

who used the five-period system.

¹¹ Jizang introduces the sudden and gradual doctrines (together with the latter’s distinction into five periods) of Huiguan’s *Niepan xu* in his *Fahua xuanlun* 3, after which he states, “A later person [after Huiguan] altered his teaching by adding one more element, producing an additional ‘methodless doctrine or teaching’ (*wufang jiao* 無方教). (T 34.382b). Such scriptures as the *Śrīmālā Sūtra* and the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra* were not something preached at the very outset of the Buddha’s career, as was the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. Nor can they be considered to have been preached near the time of the Buddha’s death at the end of his more than forty-year career. Being sūtras that expound the idea of the One Vehicle and the eternity of the Buddha’s body, they also cannot be accommodated into the existing system of the sudden, gradual, and five-period classificatory scheme. Hence they are accommodated by invention of a new category known as the “methodless doctrine.”

Hīnayāna. Therefore, there are only two forms of Dharma-wheel, and one should not posit the further existence of three [sudden, gradual, and indeterminate] teachings.” (T 34.382c). Again, on the subject of scrutinizing the spiritual capacities of sentient beings, he says: “We thereby know that there should only be two teachings, and that we should not posit the existence of three teachings.” (T 34.382c). Thus he comes to the same conclusion.

As we stated earlier, the five-period classificatory scheme introduced elemental distinctions of value among the Mahāyāna sūtras, on the basis of their relative doctrinal profundity. However, Jizang advances a way of thinking that would see the different Mahāyāna sūtras as equal in value, from which vantage he criticizes the five-period classification. What is more, even in instances where he does not mention the five-period scheme explicitly, Jizang manages to effect a thorough-going criticism of this system by making copious comparisons between the *Lotus Sūtra* and the various other Mahāyāna sūtras. In other words, taking the *Lotus Sūtra* as his focus, he compares the *Lotus Sūtra* with other Mahāyāna sūtras (specifically speaking, the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, the *Prajñā* sūtras, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, and the *Śrīmālā Sūtra*), during the course of which he mounts a substantial criticism of the five-period classificatory system.

For example, in the five-period system the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* which is identified with the sudden teaching is accorded an exalted status that is utterly distinct from that of the sūtras of the five periods of the gradual teaching. However, when Jizang compares the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, he comes to the conclusion that the two sūtras fundamentally possess the same value; and this conclusion is identical with a concrete criticism of the views of the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* that are posited in the five-period system.

In the same way, we find criticism directed toward the five-period scheme on the basis of its notion that the *Prajñā* sūtras are inferior to the *Lotus Sūtra*, or criticism directed to the five-period scheme’s assertion—on the grounds that the *Lotus Sūtra* does not expound the doctrine of the Buddha-nature or the eternal abiding of the Buddha—that the *Lotus*

Sūtra is inferior to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. But since it is not possible in the space of this article to introduce in detail Jizang's comparative studies on the various Mahāyāna sūtras,¹² we will confine ourselves to examining Jizang's basic view of the sūtras as expressed in his idea that "there is no difference among the Mahāyāna sūtras with respect to their revealing of ultimate reality."

Jizang states in *Fahua xuanlun* vol.2, "With respect to their revealing of ultimate reality, there should or will be no difference between the various Mahāyāna sūtras." (T 34.378c). In *Fahua yishu* 法華義疏 vol.5 he says, "The Mahāyāna sūtras are not different in their revealing of ultimate reality." (T 34.518c). From this idea that there are no differences between the numerous Mahāyāna sūtras with respect to their capacity to reveal ultimate reality, it follows that Jizang advocated a basic equality in their status or value. And indeed, this notion is the foundation of Jizang's view of the Buddhist scriptures is a fact that is already quite well known.¹³

But why did Jizang think that "there is no difference between the Mahāyāna sūtras with respect to their revealing of ultimate reality"? I would like to try to clarify this idea by looking for its reason in his four perspectives on the manifest (*xian* 顯) and secret (*mi* 密) and four perspectives on the primary (*zheng* 正) and subsidiary (*pang* 傍). The *Fahua xuanlun*¹⁴ and *Sanlun xuanyi*¹⁵ indicate that Jizang's decisive distinction between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna doctrine is, formally speaking, something that is based on the sūtras and commentarial treatises. However, its conceptual or intellectual foundations must be sought elsewhere. A possible solution to this question might be found in the four perspectives of the manifest and the secret and the four perspectives of the primary and

¹² On this subject, see Kan'no, *Chūgoku Hokke shisō no kenkyū*, pp. 399-482.

¹³ Hirai Shun'ei, *Chūgoku hannya shisō shi no kenkyū - Kichizō to Sanron gakuha* (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1976), pp. 482-484; Itō Takatoshi, *Kichizō no kyōten kan to taiki no mondai, Nippon bukkyō gakkai nempō* vol.49 (March 1983).

¹⁴ T 34.382b-c.

¹⁵ T 45.5b-c.

subsidiary as expounded in Jizang's *Fahua youyi* 法華遊意.¹⁶ The four perspectives of the manifest and the secret are listed as follows:¹⁷

| | |
|---|---------------------------|
| (1) Manifestly instructs the bodhisattvas, but does not secretly teach the śrāvakas | <i>Avataṃsaka Sūtra</i> |
| (2) Manifestly instructs the śrāvakas, but does not secretly teach the bodhisattvas | <i>tripiṭaka</i> teaching |
| (3) Manifestly instructs the bodhisattvas, while secretly teaches the śrāvakas | <i>Prajñā</i> sūtras |
| (4) Manifestly instructs the bodhisattvas, and manifestly teaches the śrāvakas | <i>Lotus Sūtra</i> |

Then again, the four gates of subsidiary (*pang*) and primary (*zheng*) may be represented as follows:¹⁸

| | |
|--|---------------------------|
| (A) Primarily reveals ultimate reality, but subsidiarily reveals the expedient means (as expedient means) | <i>Avataṃsaka Sūtra</i> |
| (B) Primarily teaches expedient means without revealing (it as expedient means); primarily conceals ultimate reality | <i>tripiṭaka</i> teaching |
| (C) Primarily reveals ultimate reality; subsidiarily teaches expedient means without revealing (it as expedient means) | <i>Prajñā</i> sūtras |
| (D) Primarily reveals the expedient means (as expedient means); primarily reveals ultimate reality | <i>Lotus Sūtra</i> |

When we consider conceptual differences between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna on the basis of this scheme, they look something as follows: The Mahāyāna sūtras of items (1), (3), and (4) in the first set and items (A), (C), and (D) of the second set share the common feature of “manifestly instructing the bodhisattvas” (*xianjiao pusa* 顯教菩薩) and “primarily revealing ultimate reality” (*zheng xian zhenshi* 正顯真實).¹⁹ (The position

¹⁶ These two schemes are expounded in *Jingming xuanlun* 淨名玄論 vol.7 (T 38.900b) and *Weimojing yishu* 維摩經義疏 vol.1 (T 38.909b-c). Muranaka Yūshō, Kajō daishi *nizō gi* no seiritsu kō, *Nanto bukkyō* vol.22 (January 1969), *idem.* in *Tendai karmon no kichō* (Tokyo: Sankibō busshorin, 1986).

¹⁷ T 34.645a.

¹⁸ T 34.645b-c.

¹⁹ In the *Fahua youyi*, “ultimate reality” (*zhenshi* 真實) is variously fixed or identified with “the

toward the śrāvakas is characterized by the different strategies expressed in the three points of “not secretly teaching,” “secretly teaching,” and “manifestly teaching.” Even in terms of the use of expedients, the śrāvaka occupies a position of “subsidiarily revealing the expedient means,” “subsidiarily teaching the expedient means unrevealed,” and “primarily revealing the expedient means.”) In contrast to this position, it can be ascertained that the Hīnayāna does not teach the bodhisattvas and it conceals the ultimate truth. Consequently, it is only for the bodhisattvas that ultimate reality is manifestly revealed, while for the śrāvakas it remains concealed or secret. Nevertheless, when it comes to the *Lotus Sūtra*, the case could be made that ultimate reality is revealed even for the śrāvakas, since the *Lotus Sūtra* is a discourse that is directed to śrāvakas whose spiritual capacities have been tamed and who have thereby entered into the first stage (*chuxin* 初心) of the ten faiths of the bodhisattva, that is to say, they have turned from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna.²⁰

To summarize: in perspectives (1), (3), (A), and (C), ultimate reality is not revealed to the śrāvakas, but ultimate reality is revealed for the bodhisattvas. In cases (4) and (D), which correspond to the *Lotus Sūtra*, ultimate reality is manifestly revealed for the śrāvakas and the bodhisattvas, alike. By contrast, in the case of the Hīnayāna of perspectives (2) and (B), the teachings of the three vehicles are given out on behalf of the śrāvakas, but the fact that they are mere expedients is not manifestly explained, and the ultimate reality of the One Vehicle is kept concealed. Since they are not concerned with instructing the bodhisattvas per se, naturally they do not reveal ultimate reality. Consequently, even though the various Mahāyāna sūtras differ in their handling of the teaching of the śrāvakas, they are in common agreement on the point that ultimate reality is manifestly revealed for the bodhisattvas. Hence, on the basis of this point, the notion is

ultimate cause and effect,” “the absolute or final culmination of the Great Vehicle,” and “the One Vehicle.”

²⁰ Fascicle seven of the *Fahua yishu* (T 34.543b) states, “The disciple asks: ‘If the śrāvaka is able to enter the stages of the ten faiths when he converts from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna, does he merely enter the first mind-set stage of the ten faiths or does he complete the stages of the ten

advocated that “there is no difference among the Mahāyāna sūtras with respect to their revealing of ultimate reality.”

If we take the *Lotus Sūtra* as the focus, then we can say: From the vantage point of instructing the bodhisattva, all of the Mahāyāna sūtras are to be regarded as having equal value—for Jizang, this affirmation is consistent in Jizang’s works. But when it comes to instruction and teaching of the śrāvakas, the charge might be made that the *Lotus Sūtra* still holds a kind of hegemonic supremacy over other Mahāyāna scriptures. One of the points that Jizang advances as a distinctive conceptual contribution of the *Lotus Sūtra* is the idea—based on the notion of the One Vehicle—that the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha are able to achieve Buddhahood.²¹ For, in effect, all the sūtras that come after the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* (the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* itself being excluded from this scheme) are understood to describe a process through which the śrāvakas are tamed to the point where they are prepared to receive the final instruction of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Where this point is expressed most clearly is in Jizang’s general concept of the “four tamings.”²²

Having examined this particular aspect of the equality of the Mahāyāna sūtras, let us now take a look at the basis on which differences and distinctions are established between the various Mahāyāna sūtras. In *Fahua xuanlun* vol.3, Jizang responds to this issue from the two perspectives of “primary and subsidiary theses (*pangzheng er yi* 傍正二義)

faiths in full? Reply: ‘He merely enters the first mind-set stage of the ten faiths.’”

²¹ The second fascicle of the *Fahua huanshu* 法華論疏 (T 40.817c) says, “Moreover, the idea that the two vehicles will reach Buddhahood is the main theme of the *Lotus Sūtra*.” Fascicle seven of the *Fahua yishu* (34.544c) says, “Moreover, the idea that the two vehicles are given prophecy of future Buddhahood is itself the main theme of the *Lotus Sūtra*, and, therefore, we single it out for particular attention here. Fascicle eight of the *Fahua yishu* (T 34.565b) says, “The giving of prophecy of future Buddhahood to the two vehicles is the central point of the *Lotus Sūtra*, as well as the great theme of all the multitude of sūtras.”

²² The idea of the “four tamings” (*si tiaorou* 四調柔) means to tame or make receptive the spiritual capacities of the adherents of the two vehicles. This is accomplished by means of the four teachings of (1) the vehicle of gods and humans, (2) the two vehicles (of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha), (3) the vehicle (of the *Prajñā* sūtras) that is taught by themselves (śrāvakas), and (4) the vehicle (of the *Vimalakīrti sūtra*) that is taught by the others (bodhisattvas).

and “differences in teaching arising from the differences of the salvific capacities of the sentient beings” (*douyuan butong* 逗緣不同).

Firstly, the distinction between “subsidiary and primary theses” takes the central teaching of a given sūtra as its “primary thesis” (*zhengzong* 正宗). “Subsidiary thesis” refers to any supportive teachings that are not given clear or direct exposition. For example, in the *Prajñā* sūtras, the notion of “having nothing to apprehend” is the primary thesis; in the *Lotus Sūtra*, it is the One Vehicle; in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, it is the concept of the Buddha-nature. For each of these respective sūtras, the other two doctrinal theses would, accordingly, be considered subsidiary theses. (In the *Prajñā* sūtras, for example, the One Vehicle and the Buddha-nature are treated as subsidiary theses.) The conceptual significance of this scheme might be construed as follows: At the same time that Jizang accounts for the very real fact of scriptural difference and discrepancy in terms of differences in primary thesis, he avoids the absolutization of discrepancies and distinctions among these texts by affirming the existence of subsidiary theses. While preserving discrepancy and difference within the sūtras, he concurrently elicits their points of commonality and provides a singular foundation for them in the idea of “there being no difference in their revealing of ultimate reality.”

In this respect, discrepancies and points of difference between various sūtras are grounded in differences of primary thesis. What explains the reason that in the sūtras the primary thesis is different is the idea of “differences in teaching arising from the differences of the salvific capacities of the sentient beings” (*douyuan butong* 逗緣不同). In the third fascicle of the *Fahua xuanlun* Jizang says: The myriad sūtras are not the same in their handling of the different salvific capacities of sentient beings. But in their mutual effort to deliver the teachings, they seek to avoid unnecessary duplication or redundancy. Because the inapprehensibility of ultimate reality is expounded at length in the *Prajñā* sūtras, in the *Lotus Sūtra* it is not treated in depth. And because the cause and effect of the One Vehicle is not expounded at length in the *Prajñā* sūtras, in the *Lotus Sūtra* it is expounded in detail. (T 34.388b)

As such, the way in which sūtras expound teachings that are adjusted specifically to the salvific capacities of sentient beings will vary from sūtra to sūtra; and as a consequence, unnecessary repetition of the central theme of a given sūtras is avoided. For example, in the passage that we quoted above, the idea of the inapprehensibility of ultimate reality is considered to be the teaching that is suited to the intended audience of the *Prajñā* sūtras; while for the intended audience of the *Lotus Sūtra*, the cause and effect of the One Vehicle is considered to be the appropriate doctrine. In this way, different forms of teaching are variously given out.

Part Three: Points of Commonality between Huiyuan and Jizang

Jizang's idea that "there is no difference between the Mahāyāna sūtras in their revealing of ultimate reality" is different in character from the tradition of doctrinal classification that would impose a hierarchy on the sūtras according to value. However, this is decidedly not a point that is unique to Jizang alone, for we can find antecedents to it in Jingying Huiyuan as well.²³

In the section of his *Dasheng yizhang* that treats "the doctrinal legacy of the sūtras," Huiyuan criticizes Liu Qiu's system of the five-period classification scheme, vigorously rejecting the latter's effort to establish absolute distinctions of value between the Mahāyāna sūtras on the premise of their degree of doctrinal profundity.²⁴ When we seek the real thrust of Huiyuan's thought on the subject, we find that it comprises the two elements of (1) "religious practice or development" (*xingde* 行德) and (2) "the Dharma or universal reality that is to be demonstrated" (*suo biao zhi fa* 所表之法). Examples of "religious practice"

²³ For Huiyuan's system of doctrinal classification, see Yoshizu Yoshihide, "Jōyō E'on no kyōhan ron," *Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō* vol.35 (March 1977).

²⁴ References to works of Jizang appear in the *zhongjing jiaoji yi* 衆經教述義 (Doctrinal Legacies of the Sūtras) section of Huiyuan's *Dasheng yi zhang* 大乘義章, on which ground scholars argue that the text was amended by later followers of Huiyuan. See Suemitsu Chikamasa, "Daijō gishō 'shukyō kyōshaku gi' ni okeru Jō yō ji E'on sen no mondai – Kichizō no chosho to no taihi," *Sō tōshū kenkyū in kenkyū sei kenkyū kiyō* vol.13 (July 1981).

are like the arousing of the thought of enlightenment, practice of charity, moral restraint, samādhi, wisdom, liberation, acquisition of the Dharma-body, dhāranī, the One Vehicle, and the wonderful attainment of the perfect quiescence of Buddhahood. The Dharma to be demonstrated refers to the essential truth or teaching that one finds at the root of each and every scripture. For Huiyuan, it is a mistake to attribute major differences to the Mahāyāna sūtras by fixing one's attention solely on their manifold representations of religious practice. It is essential that one also recognize the element of equality by foregrounding the universal Dharma that individual sūtras expound in common. Because there are disparities in "religious practice", there will be disparities in the thematic thrust of the sūtras. As such, discrepancies and distinctions will inevitably take shape between different texts.²⁵ The same idea is also expounded in the essay on the "two truths" in the *Dasheng yizhang*, but here Huiguang's 慧光(468-537) classificatory system of the four doctrines is the target of criticism. Huiyuan states: "One must not engage lightly in making absolute determinations regarding the relative profundity of the different Mahāyāna sūtras." (T 44.483b). When we compare the thought of Huiyuan as described here with that of Jizang, the universal "Dharma" spoken of by Huiyuan is in many ways identical with the "ultimate reality" (*dao* 道) spoken of by Jizang. Similarly, the differences in thematic thrust that Huiyuan attributes to disparities in program of "religious practice" are akin to the differences in "primary thesis" that Jizang ascribes to each sūtra.

To sum up, it could be said that in Huiyuan, as well, we find a way of thinking that is analogous to Jizang's notion of "there being no difference among the Mahāyāna sūtras in their revealing of ultimate reality." However, when it comes to the rationale for difference

²⁵ The *Dasheng yizhang* (T 44.466c-467a) says: As to the idea of fixed themes or meanings, discrete scriptures exist among the sūtras, and there are also differences in their doctrinal or thematic thrust. . . . The points that are illumined in these different sūtras will also be different in various ways. And yet, whatever contents they preach, they are the sublime practice conditionally born of the Great Vehicle and are the ultimate doctrine. We must not engage in trivial debates over differences in their relative status.

and distinction in the sūtras, Huiyuan treats it solely as a matter of difference in thematic thrust²⁶ and, as such, does not speak at all to the issue of “difference arising from the differences of the salvific capacities of sentient beings.” Like Jizang, Huiyuan subscribed to the idea of a twofold canon (i.e., Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna) and only accepted Huiguang’s distinction between four elemental systems of doctrine with a certain amount of criticism. But by turning his attention to this idea of “salvific capacity” (*yuan* 緣)—that is to say, the circumstances of sentient beings’ religious endowments and abilities—Jizang situated scriptural difference and discrepancy in relation to sentient beings proper, with the idea that sentient beings’ capacities are tamed and matured over time. In so doing, emphasis came to be placed on the formation of stratagems of doctrinal classification that sought to establish an organic or holistic unity among the sūtras and their teachings.²⁷

Part Four: Zhiyi’s View of the *Lotus Sūtra*

We have shown that Jizang affirmed a basic equality between the Mahāyāna sūtras, and that Huiyuan, as well, held similar views on this point. But was Zhiyi’s view of the sūtras, after all, one of a “*Lotus Sūtra* absolutism”? Or did it share features in common with that of Jizang and Huiyuan? We will look into this question now.

In the course of his individual explanations of the five aspects of profound meaning (*wuchong xuanyi* 五重玄義), Zhiyi in the *Fahua xuanyi* introduces and criticizes various

²⁶ This is similar in kind to Jizang’s twofold distinction between “primary and subsidiary theses.”

²⁷ In *Fahua xuanyun* vol.1, where Jizang explains the ten great benevolences of the Thatāgata (T 34.367c-368a), and in the seventh fascicle on “the meaning of the parable of the Chapter on Faith and Understanding,” Jizang discusses the five-period classificatory system, for which he finds a singular basis in the parable of the Faith and Understanding Chapter [of the *Lotus Sūtra*]: This same point is made in the latter half of fascicle nine of the *Fahua xuanyi*: “The sūtras differ from one another in their illumination of doctrinal themes by dint of the fact that they are addressed to different spiritual capacities.” (T 33.795b). This would indicate that Jizang, ultimately, ascribes to the same basic intellectual problem as that expressed by Zhiyi and Guanding in their own handling of the five-period classification. On the relationship between the five-period classification and the parable of the Chapter on Faith and Understanding, see Kan’no, *Chūgoku Hokke shisō no kenkyū*, pp. 615-826.

traditional explanations of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Among them, it is the explanation of Fayun 法雲 that he regards as most important and that he criticizes most vehemently.²⁸ Let us review for a moment its salient features.

According to the *Fahua xuanyi*, when Fayun compared the systems of salvific cause and effect taught in earlier sūtras with that elucidated in the *Lotus Sūtra*, he made a hard and fast distinction in status between these scriptures. The sūtras prior to the *Lotus Sūtra* he judged to be “crude” (*cu 麤*), on the grounds that they are narrow in doctrinal substance (*ti xia 體狹*), lowly in relative rank or stage (*wei xia 位下*), and short-term in their function (*yong duan 用短*). The *Lotus Sūtra* he regarded as “subtle and marvelous” (*miao 妙*), for the fact that it is broad in doctrinal substance (*ti guang 體廣*), lofty or elevated in rank or stage (*wei gao 位高*), and long-term in its function (*yong chang 用長*).²⁹ Zhiyi criticizes Fayun’s explanation from six perspectives, to each of which he applies four points of refutation: (1) the four criticisms with considering causal (*yin 因*) substance to be wide or narrow, (2) the four criticisms that attend construing causal rank or stage to be elevated or lowly, (3) the four criticisms with analyzing causal function in terms of long-term or short-term, (4) the four criticisms with considering resultant (*guo 果*) substance to be wide or narrow, (5) the four criticisms that attend resultant rank being seen as elevated or low, and (6) the four criticisms that attend resultant function being viewed as long-term or short-term.

In each of these cases, Zhiyi relies on Fayun’s idea that the *Lotus Sūtra* preaches a theory or doctrine of the so-called “four unities” (*siyi 四一*), namely, the idea that the doctrine is unitary (*jiaoyi 教一*), the practice is unitary (*xingyi 行一*), the person is unitary

²⁸ *Fahua xuanyi* vol. 1B, T 33.691b-692c.

²⁹ This representation of Fayun differs somewhat from the explanation that appears in the current version of Fayun’s own *Fahua yiji* 法華義記, but here we will introduce it on the basis of the *Fahua xuanyi*. Concerning the explanation that appears in Fayun’s *Fahua yiji* proper, see Kan’no, *Chūgoku Hokke shisō no kenkyū*, pp. 169-182.

(*renyi* 人—), and the truth is unitary (*liyi* 理—).³⁰ Turning them back on Fayun, Zhiyi uses these points to mount his fourfold refutation of Fayun’s view of the *Lotus Sūtra* and its relationship to other Mahāyāna sūtras. If one asserts, as Fayun himself does, that the *Lotus Sūtra* was preached during the fourth of the five periods and, as such, does not expound the idea of the Buddha-nature or the eternal abiding of the Buddha, then it becomes untenable to claim that the “four unities” are conclusively expounded in the *Lotus Sūtra*. As Zhiyi himself points out in his criticism, if the four unities are expounded in such texts as the *Prajñā* sūtras and the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, must not the *Lotus Sūtra* thereby be “crude” and the *Prajñā* sūtras and the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* be profound? Let us introduce the four criticisms by looking at the example of the first item of “causal substance being wide or narrow.”

When he compares the *Lotus Sūtra* with scriptures that allegedly preceded it, Fayun makes a rigid distinction between the two, taking the earlier scriptures to be “crude” and the *Lotus Sūtra* to be “marvelous” or “sublime.” According to Zhiyi, if the designation of “prior” sūtras is understood to refer to the tripiṭaka or Hīnayāna teaching, then Fayun’s proposition is correct. But if one equates the idea of “prior” scriptures with any and all sūtras preached before the *Lotus Sūtra*, then they are unilaterally dismissed as “crude”, which must be regarded as a mistake.

Citing passages from the *Prajñā*, the *Brahmapariṣcchā*, the *Avataṃsaka*, and the *Vimalakīrti* sūtras, Zhiyi shows that, even in these so-called “prior” sūtras, the Buddha expounds a “causal substance that is wide or broad.” Thus, elaborating on Zhiyi’s basic point, we can say that in the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* the two doctrines of the perfect teaching (*yuanjiao* 圓教) and the separate teaching (*biejiao* 別教) are preached; in such

³⁰ Of the four items of doctrine, practice, person, and truth, “doctrine or teaching” (*jiao* 教) refers to the doctrine as expounded in the sūtras; “practice” (*xing* 行) refers to self-cultivation or practice as carried out in accordance with the doctrine; “person” (*ren* 人) refers to the individual who takes up the practice; and “truth” (*li* 理) refers to the ultimate reality or truth that is realized through the practice.

vaipulya-period scriptures as the *Brahmapariṣcchā Sūtra* and the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, the tripiṭaka (*sanzang* 三藏), pervasive (*tongjiao* 通教), separate, and perfect doctrines are all expounded; and in the *Prajñā* sūtras the three doctrines of the pervasive teaching, the separate teaching, and the perfect teaching are expounded. As such, it turns out that the perfect teaching is taught in virtually all of these scriptures and their periods, for which reason it comes to be called the “previously expounded perfect teaching” (i.e., the perfect teaching expounded prior to the *Lotus Sūtra*). Hence, along with the idea of a “previous perfect teaching” having been preached, Zhiyi argues that it is a mistake to rigidly categorize the Mahāyāna sūtras prior to the *Lotus Sūtra* (in which this perfect teaching is included) as crude.

Fayun was one of those persons who implicitly accepted the five-period doctrinal classification and who, therefore, took the *Lotus Sūtra* to be a sūtra that was inferior in status to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. Thus, while Fayun classifies the *Lotus Sūtra* as “marvelous” or “sublime”, he nonetheless considers the *Lotus Sūtra* incomplete (and inferior to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*) on the grounds that it does not preach the doctrine of the Buddha-nature and the eternal abiding of the Buddha. But if this is actually the case, wouldn’t Fayun’s explanation become self-contradictory and the *Lotus Sūtra* be regarded as “crude”? In essence, Zhiyi’s method for criticizing Fayun is to point out this contradiction to wit the incompatibility of claiming that the four unities are expounded in the *Lotus Sūtra* and that cause and effect in the *Lotus Sūtra* are both “marvelous,” while maintaining that the *Lotus Sūtra* does not expound the idea of the Buddha-nature and the eternal abiding of the Buddha.

On the remaining five points of criticism we can be quite brief: By and large Zhiyi’s argument against Fayun is mounted, on one hand, as an attack on the one-sided and totalistic categorization of “prior sūtras” as crude and the *Lotus Sūtra* (the “current” scripture) as marvelous, and on the other, as a criticism of the contradiction inherent in Fayun’s rigid claim that the *Lotus Sūtra* is “marvelous”, even though it does not expound the eternity of the Buddha and the idea of the Buddha-nature. As a base of this criticism

we find Zhiyi's own view of the *Lotus Sūtra* and perfect teaching taking shape, which becomes apparent as he directs the attention to the existence of the perfect teaching in Mahāyāna sūtras prior to the *Lotus Sūtra* and to the claim that the *Lotus Sūtra*, in principle, expounds the doctrine of the Buddha-nature and the eternal abiding of the Buddha.

Zhiyi advocated that the Mahāyāna sūtras are basically equal in status, on the grounds that they all preach the perfect teaching. However, if one takes into account Zhiyi's classificatory system of the five periods³¹, the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* combines an element of the separate teaching with a central exposition of the perfect teaching; the Hīnayāna *tripiṭaka* (i.e., the *Āgama* sūtras) expounds only the *tripiṭaka* doctrine; the Mahāyāna *vaipulya* sūtras (the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, etc.) incorporate expositions of all four *tripiṭaka*, pervasive, separate, and perfect doctrines, using the three Mahāyāna doctrines to refute the Hīnayāna; the *Prajñā* sūtras interpose the pervasive teaching between the perfect and separate doctrines. Finally, the *Lotus Sūtra* is judged to be a scripture that preaches only the perfect teaching, without intermixing the expedient doctrines of the *tripiṭaka*, pervasive, and separate teachings in the way that other Mahāyāna sūtras do.³²

³¹ Basically, Zhiyi divides or classifies the sequence of the Buddha's preaching of the dharma into the five periods of (1) the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, (2) the *Āgama* sūtras, (3) the *Vaipulya* sūtras, (4) the *Prajñā* sūtras, and (5) the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. This was a sequence of preaching that was especially devised by the Buddha in order to mature the spiritual capacities of the śrāvakas, for which reason it is referred to as the "distinctive or separate sequence of the five periods" (*bie wushi* 別五時). In contrast, the idea that the Buddha preached the sūtras of the five periods freely whenever and wherever the need arose is referred to as the "common five periods" (*tong wushi* 通五時).

³² According to *Fahua xuanyi* vol.1A (T 33.682b), it should be known that the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* preaches a perfect teaching that is admixed (*jian* 兼) with the separate teaching; the Hīnayāna preaches the *tripiṭaka* doctrine alone (*dan* 但); the *Vaipulya* sūtras preach the unharmonized (*dui* 對) entire array of *tripiṭaka*, pervasive, separate, and perfect teachings; the *Prajñā* sūtras preach a pervasive doctrine that is interposed between and carries over (*dai* 帶) to the perfect and separate doctrines; and this *Lotus Sūtra* purely and directly preaches the highest enlightenment (*dao* 道) without further resorting to any of the previous admixed (*jian*), singular (*dan*), unharmonized (*dui*), or interspersed or linked (*dai*) forms of explanation. Hence it is called the "marvelous Dharma."

If one confines oneself to the question of the progress of the Buddha's own career, then, generally speaking, his preaching of the Dharma can be said to have unfolded through the "distinctive sequence of the five periods," with the *Lotus Sūtra* serving as the final completion of the Buddha's message all largely out of concern for maturing the spiritual capacities of the śrāvakas. The *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* is judged to be of the same single flavor of ghee as the *Lotus Sūtra*, but is also understood to have been preached on behalf of sentient beings who were too late to hear the preaching of the *Lotus Sūtra* and for sentient beings of future ages. In other words, when it comes to consideration of the Buddha's career, the sūtras of the five periods were all preached in organic relation to one another; and especially for the śrāvaka these scriptures of the five periods are all but indispensable.³³ Therefore considering the *Lotus Sūtra* as something absolute and supreme is not consistent with Zhiyi's way of explaining things. For all of the sūtras of the five periods are, in one way or another, necessary and indispensable. They all have various roles to play; and they all contribute to the completion of the Buddha's preaching. For example, if it is to be only the *Lotus Sūtra* that is to be singled out, then the salvation of the śrāvakas would be impossible. For the spiritual capacities of the śrāvakas are progressively matured by means of the preaching of the various sūtras that were delivered during in the middle periods of the Buddha's career. In this way, preparations were first put into place for the śrāvakas to hear the *Lotus Sūtra* after which they were finally brought to salvation by the *Lotus Sūtra* itself.

I suspect that, in Tiantai 天台 circles, it was Zhanran 湛然(711-782) who was responsible for touting a scriptural sectarianism that centered on the supremacy of the single text of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Moreover, this likely came in response to the Huayan 華嚴 school which claims the supremacy of a single sūtra such as the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. As my

³³ As far as the śrāvakas are concerned, all but the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* are necessarily required. However for one group of the bodhisattvas, there was no reason for whole of the sūtras of the five periods to be necessary.

last topic, I would like to take up the argument for this point.³⁴

Part Five: Conclusion.

Generally speaking, Chinese Buddhist doctrinal classification aimed to organize the discourses of the Buddha according to the manner in which they were delivered during the course of his own lifetime. As such, the temporal and geographical frame of reference for these classificatory investigations remains limited to the perspective of India during the period when the Buddha was active in the world. However, Zhiyi was active during an era when the dominant concern was to sort out the different teachings of the Buddha in order to ascertain which was the most genuine or applicable teaching for the time and place at hand. In this respect, his intellectual problem was different from that which sought to design classifications of doctrine that reflected the situation when the Buddha himself was alive. In his studies of the Buddhist sūtras, Zhiyi evidently placed great emphasis on affirming the existence of the perfect teaching as a principle of ultimate reality that is expounded in common throughout the Mahāyāna sūtras. And if this is the case, it is more fitting to call Zhiyi a “perfect teaching absolutist” than it is to refer to him as a “*Lotus Sūtra* absolutist.”³⁵

The important thing for Zhiyi is the idea that one must realize for oneself the perfect

³⁴ Ikeda Rosan, Tannen ni seiritsu suru goji hakkyō ron, *Indogaku bukkyō gaku kenkyū* vol.24-1 (December 1975); *idem.* Sekiguchi Shindai, *Tendai kyōgaku no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1988).

³⁵ The “ten marvels of the manifest trace” (*jimen shimiao* 迹門十妙) that are set forth in the *Fahua xuanyi* explain, on the basis of ten points, how the “manifest trace” section of the *Lotus Sūtra* is superior to all sūtras preached prior to the *Lotus Sūtra*. But in point of fact, it actually preaches that the perfect doctrine (*yuanjiao* 圓教) is superior to the tripiṭaka (*sanzang* 三藏), pervasive (*tongjiao* 通教), and separate (*biejiao* 別教) doctrines. The “ten marvels of the original substance” (*benmen shimiao* 本門十妙) explain how, because of the idea of the eternal enlightenment of the Buddha, the original substance [section of the *Lotus*] is superior to the manifest trace section of the *Lotus Sūtra*. The entire system places particular emphasis on the original substance section of the *Lotus Sūtra*, with the idea that this section openly reveals the original ground of the Buddha. But when we ask ourselves just what is the supreme teaching that is embodied and expounded by this eternally/distantly enlightened Buddha, it is something that finds its foundation in the perfect teaching that is itself the ultimate teaching of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

teaching (*yuanjiao* 圓教) that is the epitome of the Buddha's teaching. Just as it was with the śrāvakas when the Buddha was alive, so in Zhiyi's day beings were thought to possess varying spiritual capacities. Taking into consideration this diversity, Zhiyi sought to design forms of religious practice that would bring about realization of the perfect teaching. In this respect, there is no reason to think that the diversity of spiritual capacities during Zhiyi's own day need be the same as that for the period when the Buddha was alive. As such, even though he designed the "perfect and sudden calming and contemplation" (*yuandun zhiguan* 圓頓止觀) or *Great Calming and Contemplation* (*Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀) as a method of practice intended specifically for realization of the perfect teaching, out of consideration for the diversity of beings' spiritual capacities he also created the systems of gradual calming and contemplation and the indeterminate calming and contemplation. Then again, within the system of "perfect and sudden calming and contemplation" he also incorporated the diverse array of samādhi that we find organized under the rubric of the four forms of samādhi, all in the interest of accommodating different spiritual capacities. Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising to find that Zhiyi taught various forms of samādhi that lay outside the *Lotus Sūtra*, including those based on such Mahāyāna sūtras as the *Pratyutpanna-samādhi Sūtra* 般舟三昧經, the *Vaipulyadhāraṇī Sūtra* 方等陀羅尼經, and the *Mañjuśrīpariṣcchā Sūtra* 文殊問般若經. Why was this the case? Reliance on sūtras other than the *Lotus Sūtra* does pose a contradiction if we insist on regarding Zhiyi as a "*Lotus Sūtra* absolutist." But they decidedly do not pose a contradiction if we regard Zhiyi as a "perfect teaching absolutist."³⁶

³⁶ Sekiguchi Shindai advocated that the classificatory system of "five periods and eight doctrines" that has been taught since the time of Zhanran 湛然是 something that takes its stance in a kind of *Lotus Sūtra* absolutism. However, according to Sekiguchi, such an interpretation misconstrues Zhiyi's view of the sūtras, in so far as it does not take into account the four samādhis of the *Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀 (*Great Calming and Contemplation*), the practices of which are based on such diverse sūtras as the *Pratyutpanna-samādhi Sūtra*, the *Vaipulyadhāraṇī Sūtra* 方等陀羅尼經, and the *Mañjuśrīpariṣcchā Sūtra* 文殊問般若經. See Sekiguchi Shindai, *Tendai kyōgaku no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1988). As I have suggested in this essay, it is necessary to

In this way, whenever we reflect on Zhiyi's view of the Buddhist sūtras, I think it appropriate that we do so by making a distinction between the two projects of sorting out the Buddha's preaching of the Dharma with reference to the era when the Buddha himself was alive, and the concern for the concrete religious practice or application of the Buddha's teachings that typified the new Buddhism of the era when Zhiyi himself was active.

recognize a clear distinction between forms of doctrinal classification that have as their hermeneutic focus the period when the Buddha was alive, and an approach to the sūtras that arises from a concern for religious practice that addresses the circumstances of Zhiyi himself and persons living in Zhiyi's own time. For example, even though we might say that Zhiyi preached a classificatory system of "five periods and eight teachings" that opens the way to a kind of *Lotus* absolutism, this is an idea that took as its object the period when the Buddha himself was alive. We must conclude that the standpoint of Zhiyi himself was one of an absolutism of the perfect teaching.

Note: I would like to offer my appreciation to Prof. Daniel Bruce Stevenson for the translation of my Japanese paper to English. And, research for this article was pursued, in part, through the support of a grant from the Section for Scientific Research of the Japanese Ministry of Education.

**The *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* and the *Karmavibhaṅgasūtra* (2)¹:
Transliterations of the Original Manuscripts
Preserved in the National Archives of Nepal**

Noriyuki KUDO

Symbols Used:

| | |
|-------|---|
| + | lost <i>akṣara</i> |
| () | restored <i>akṣara</i> |
| [] | damaged <i>akṣara</i> |
| <> | omitted <i>akṣara</i> |
| { } | superfluous <i>akṣara</i> |
| {{ }} | erased <i>akṣara</i> |
| <<>> | interlinear insertion |
| .. | illegible <i>akṣara</i> |
| . | single element missing |
| * | <i>virāma</i> |
| ○ | punch hole |
| in | unclear mark, appears as combination of <i>anusvāra</i> and <i>virāma</i> |
| ' | <i>avagraha</i> |
| ; | <i>visarga</i> -like sign, appears as the mark to fill a blank |

Abbreviations:

Abbreviations follow the system established by H. Bechert, *Abkürzungsverzeichnis zur buddhistischen Literatur in Indien und Südostasien*, Göttingen, 1989 (Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beiheft 3)

In addition, commas, periods, and straight quotation marks have been added to the text for convenience of reading.

In the footnotes, all the references, whatever related closely or not, concerning to the prakritic forms or orthographical/sound-oriented mistranscriptions are given.

We must express our thanks to the former Director of the National Archives of Nepal, Professor B.D. Dangol, for his kind support in providing us with the microfilms of the MSS and other forms of assistance.

¹ First part is published in the previous issue of this Annual Report: 「Mahākarmavibhaṅga と Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa (1): ネパール国立古文書館所蔵の写本」 (辛嶋静志・工藤順之・吹田隆道) 『創価大学国際仏教学高等研究所年報』第2号、93-128頁。 ("Mahākarmavibhaṅga and Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa (1): Two Original Manuscripts preserved in National Archives of Nepal," by Seishi KARASHIMA, Takamichi FUKITA and Noriyuki KUDO, in *Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University for the Academic Year 1998*. 1999, pp. 98-128). The present writer would like to express sincere thanks to my senior collaborators, Mr. FUKITA and Prof. Dr. KARASHIMA, for their cooperation in reading these two manuscripts.

MS[A]: No. 4-20

atha Suko¹ māṇavaṣ² Ṭaudeyaputro yena Bhaga○vās³ ṭenopasaṁkrāntaḥ |
 upasaṁkramya Bhagavatā sārddha⁴ saṁmukhaṁ saṁmodanī⁵ saramjanī⁶ (7r.3) vividhā⁷
 kathā⁸ vyatisāyokrānte⁹ nikharṇṇaḥ¹⁰. e○te¹¹ nikharṇṇam¹² Suko¹³ māṇavaṁ{s}¹⁴
 Ṭaudeyaputra¹⁵ Bhagavān ida<<m a>>¹⁶vocat* |
 "ka[ñic]it¹⁷ māṇa<<va>> (ta)t tathaivaṁ¹⁸"
 "(7r.4) jath<<ā>>¹⁹ Bhagavatā Gautameṇa²⁰ saṁkhaḥ kuku<ro>²¹ vyā○kṛtaḥ |
 anya<<d a>>pi tāvad vayaṁ Bhagavantaṁ Gautamaṁ pṛcchema kañcid eva
 prade(7r.6)śaṁ²², saced avakāśaṁ kuryāt* praśnavyākaraṇāya" |
 "pṛccha māṇava yadyad evā<<ka>><m>kṣasi²³ |"

¹ For Śuko. Cf. BHSG §2.56, 63: *s* for *ś*. Elsewhere in this MS.

² For *-st-*. Cf. BHSG §2.61: *ṣt* for *st*. Elsewhere in this MS.

³ For *Bhagavā(m)ṣ*.

⁴ For *sārddha(m)*. Cf. BHSG §2.72: drop of *anusvāra*; 8.31-32: *-a* for *-am* [*a*-stem sg.Ac.].

⁵ Read *saṁmodanī(m)*. Cf. BHSG §10.55: drop of *anusvāra* [*i*-stem sg.Ac.].

⁶ Cf. BHSD, s.vv. *saṁrañjanīya*, *saṁrajanīya* (Pāli: *sārāṇīya*). See also MS[A]3v.5-4r.1. About this formulaic passage, namely "*upasaṁkramya Bhagavatā sārddhaṁ saṁmukhaṁ saṁmodanīṁ saṁrajanīṁ vividhāṁ kathāṁ vyatisāryaikānte niṣaṇṇaḥ*," see BHSD s.v. *saṁmodana*, f. °nī (p. 582).

⁷ For *vividhā(m)*. Cf. BHSG §9.20-22: drop of *anusvāra* [*ā*-stem sg.Ac.].

⁸ For *kathā(m)*. Cf. BHSG §9.20-22: drop of *anusvāra* [*ā*-stem sg.Ac.].

⁹ Read *vyatisā(r)yaikānte*.

¹⁰ For *niṣa(r)ṇṇaḥ*. This writing (superfluous addition of *r* mainly before double consonants) is found nearly throughout this MS.

¹¹ Read *e(kān)te*.

¹² For *niṣa(r)ṇṇam*.

¹³ For *Sukaṁ*. Cf. BHSG §8.36: *-oas a*-stem, m.sg.Ac. ending.

¹⁴ Analogy of sandhi *-nt-* > *-ms t-* or mere mistranscription ?

¹⁵ For *Taudeyaputra(m)*. Cf. BHSG §2.72: drop of *anusvāra*; 8.31-32: *-a* for *-am* [*a*-stem sg.Ac.].

¹⁶ This insertion is given just under the appropriate space on the line below, which results in interruption of the line 4.

¹⁷ Sandhi does not appear.

¹⁸ For *eva*. See BHSD s.v. 2 *eva*. MS[A] omits a passage which constitutes the last half of *Gautama's* question and the beginning of *Śuka's* answer, namely, *yathā mayā śaṅkhaḥ kukkuro vyākṛtaḥ. bho Gautama tat tathiva*. This omission is probably due to the copyist's eyes skipping to the next in the text. See MS[B].

¹⁹ For *yathā*. Cf. BHSG §2.34: *j* for *y*. Long vowel sign is added by a later hand.

²⁰ For *Gautamena*. Cf. BHSG §2.39: *ṇ* for *n*.

²¹ Read *kukku(ro)*.

²² About this phrase, see BHSD s.v. *pradeśa*. This portion is quoted as the sole example (p. 380).

²³ See BHSD, s.v. *ākāṅkṣati*. Here, Edgerton quotes *Lañk(āvatārasūtra)* 14.19: *yad-yad evākāṅkṣasi ahaṁ te tasya-tathaiva praśnasya vyākaraṇena* (p. 86).

MS[B]: No. 1-1697

(4v.2)atha Suko¹ mā{{va}}²navas Taudeyaputro Bhagavāms tenopasaṃkrānta, upasa(m)kr. ..³ + + + .[ā]rdha⁴ sammukhaṃ (4v.3) + + ..nī⁵ saṃrajani⁶ vividhāṃ kathāṃ vyatisāryokānte⁷ niṣarṇṇaḥ⁸. ekānta○⁹;niṣarṇṇam¹⁰ Sukaṃ māṇavam Taudeyaputraṃ Bhagavān¹¹ idam avocat*.

"kaccit* māṇava tat tathaiva yathā mayā śāṅkhakukkuro¹² vyā(4v.4)+ +"

".. bho Gautama tat tathaiva yathā bhavatā Gautamena śāṅkhakukkuro vyā○kṛtaḥ | anyad api tāvad vyaṃ<<ga¹³>>vantam Gautamaṃ pṛcchema kañcid eva pradeśam, saced avakāśam kuryāt prasnasya¹⁴ vyā[ka]..(4v.5)+ +"

"+ + + + ..¹⁵ [ya]dyad eva kāmṣasi |"

¹ For *Suko*. Cf. BHSG §2.56, 63: *s* for *ś*. Elsewhere in this MS.

² Here MS has *-va-* but this *akṣara* is erased by the scribe.

³ Read *upasa(m)kr(amyā)*.

⁴ Read (*Bhagavatā s)ārdha(m)*.

⁵ Read (*saṃmoda)nī(m)*.

⁶ For *saṃrajani(m)*. See the footnote on this word in MS[A].

⁷ Read *vyatisāryaikānte*.

⁸ For *niṣa(r)ṇṇaḥ*. This writing (superfluous addition of *r* mainly before double consonants) is found nearly throughout this MS.

⁹ This *visarga* is probably a mere sign for filling the blank after the punch hole.

¹⁰ For *niṣa(r)ṇṇam*.

¹¹ Read *Bhagavān*. Final nasal is mistakenly doubled even after the long vowel.

¹² The word *śāṅkhakukkuro* is a compound or separate words? If the latter is presumed, the form *śāṅkha* is used for *śāṅkhaḥ* (cf. BHSG §8.22-23). See MS[A].

¹³ Inserted from the lower margin. This insertion is made by a later hand because the letter inserted has a number 3 which indicates its line from below and this number is written in Devanāgarī, not in Nevārī.

¹⁴ For *prasnasya*. Cf. BHSG §2.56, 63: *s* for *ś*.

¹⁵ Read (*nāya | pṛccha māṇava*).

MS[A]: No. 4-20

"ko bho Gautame¹ hetu², kaḥ³ (7v.1) pratyayo yenai<<he>>ke⁴ satvā alpāyūṣo 'pi, dirghāyūṣo (?)pi, bahvābādhā api⁵, anyābādhā api | durvvarṇṇā api, suvarṇṇā a<<pi>>, alpeśākhyā⁶ api, maheśā(7v.2)khyā api | nīcakulīnā apy, acce⁷kulīnā ○ api, anādeyavākyā apy, ādiya⁸vākyā api | alpabhojñā⁹ api, mahābhojñā¹⁰ api | (7v.3) dvaḥ¹¹prajñā api, mahāprajñā api | kasya nu ○ bho Gautama karmaṇo vipākenedaṃ satvānāṃ nānātvaṃ prajñāyāt^{*12} |"

¹³ tena hi māṇava śr(7v.4)ṇu sādhu ca suṣṭhu ca maṇasikuru bhāṣiṣye | ○
¹⁴vicitrakarmā suvicitrakleśā vicitracitrā suvicitradesaṇā |"

yathoktaṃ (7v.5) Bhagavatā Śukasya māṇavasya Taudeya¹⁵putrasyāsvalāpa¹⁶nasya māṇavasya |¹⁷

"(8r.1) karmasvakān ahaṃ māṇava satvān vadāmi, karmadāyādān{a}¹⁸ karmayoni¹⁹n* karmapratiśaraṇān*, karma māṇava satvān vibhajanti²⁰ | yad idaṃ hīnot{a}²¹kr̥stu²²[madh]ya(8r.1){motta}matāyāṃ | |

¹ For *Gautama*. BHSG §8.28: ending -e as m.sg.V of a-stem.

² For *hetuḥ*. Cf. BHSG §2.92: drop of *visarga* [u-stem sg.N.].

³ After this, approximately 13 letters' open space, drawn by a slightly curved line to fill that blank.

⁴ Read *yenebaike*.

⁵ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

⁶ Original writing is *alpo-* and a long vowel sign attached to the right side of the consonant sign is erased.

⁷ Read *ucca-*.

⁸ Read *ādeya-*. Cf. BHSG §3.48.

⁹ For *°bhogā*. Similarity in pronunciation between *ñ-* and *g(y)-*.

¹⁰ For *°bhogā*. Similarity in pronunciation between *ñ-* and *g(y)-*.

¹¹ For *duḥ-*.

¹² Read *prajñāyate* (Pass., 3.sg.). Is this an orthographical confusion? (Copyist might read vowel sign -e joined to the left side of t- as the vowel sign of preceding y-, and thus -yate might be written as *yāt**.)

¹³ Two sentences, "*tatra Bhagavāṃ Śukam māṇavakam Taudeyaputram idam avocat. karmavibhāṅgan te māṇavaka dharmaparyāyam deśayisyāmi*," are omitted, see MS[B].

¹⁴ From here upto the end of this folio, MS[A] does not correspond to MS[B].

¹⁵ Original -*deva-*. Rewritten.

¹⁶ For *asvalāyanasya* [= *asvalāyanasya*].

¹⁷ After this, approximately 21 letters' open space with a curved line to fill the blank. Probably there might be confusion in manuscript's transmission. MS[B] puts more sentences to connect the conversation: "*evaṃ Bhagavann*" *iti Śuko māṇavas Taudeyaputro Bhagavataḥ pratyaustrāṣit. Bhagavān idam avocat.*

¹⁸ Read *karmadāyādān*.

¹⁹ Original -*nī-*. Rewritten.

²⁰ Read *vibhajati*.

²¹ Is it an "epenthetic vowel -a" (BHSG §3.99-101) ?

²² For *°utkr̥sta* (= *utkr̥ṣṭa*). Cf. BHSG §3.57: u for a; §2.62: -st- for -ṣṭ-.

MS[B]: No. 1-1697

"ko bho Gautama <<ko¹>> hetuḥ, ka² pratyayo ○ yenehaike satvā alpāyūṣo (')pi, dirghāyūṣo (')pi, bahvābādḥā api³, alpābādḥā api, durvarṇṇā api, suvarṇṇā a(4v.6)++++
 + + ..⁴ heśākhyā api, nīcakulinā api⁵, uccakulinā-m⁶ api⁷, anādeyavākya api⁸, ādeyavākya
 api⁹, alpabhogā api, mahābhogā api, duṣprajñā api, mahāprajñā api, ka(5r.1)++++
 + +¹⁰ v[i]pākenedaṃ satvānāṃ nānātvaṃ prajñāyate ||"

tatra Bhagavān¹¹ Śukaṃ māṇavakaṃ Taudeyaputram idam avocat* ||

"karmavibhaṅgan te māṇavaka dharmaparyāyaṃ deśaiṣyāmi || tat* śṛṇu sādhu ca
 suṣṭhu ca (5r.2)++++¹²"

"eva]m] Bhagavann" iti Śuko māna¹³<va>ko <Tau>deyaputro Bhagavataḥ
 pra○tyaśauṣīt*¹⁴ ||

Bhagavān idam avocat* ||

"karmasvakān ahaṃ māṇava satvān vadāmi || karmadāyādā¹⁵ karmayonayaḥ¹⁶
 karmma(5r.3)++++¹⁷ṇava satvān vibhajati || yad idam hīnotkṛṣṭamadhyamatā○yāṃ
 ||

¹ Inserted from the lower margin. This insertion is made by a later hand because the letter inserted has a number 2 which indicates its line from below and this number is written in Devanāgarī, not in Nevārī.

² For *kaḥ*.

³ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

⁴ Read (*pi alpēśākhyā api ma*).

⁵ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

⁶ This is *m* as sandhi-consonant. Cf. BHSG §4.59.

⁷ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

⁸ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

⁹ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

¹⁰ Read (*śya nu bho Gautama karmaṇo*).

¹¹ For *Bhagavān*. Cf. BHSG §2.68.

¹² Read (*manasikuru. bhāṣiṣye* |).

¹³ For *-ṇa-*.

¹⁴ For *-śrauṣīt*. Cf. BHSG §2.16: sibilant + *r* > initial single sibilant (As is noted by Edgerton, *śr-* is initial of its root form).

¹⁵ For *karmadāyādā(n)* [pl.Ac.]. BHSG §8.92.

¹⁶ For *karmayonīn* [f.pl.Ac.]. BHSG §10.152-3.

¹⁷ Read (*pratiśaraṇān. karma mā*).

MS[A]: No. 4-20

- 1¹. aṣṭi² karma³ alpāyuhṣamvat⁴ta⁵niyam̐ |
2. aṣṭi karmma dīrghāyuhṣamvra⁵ttanīyam̐ |
3. aṣṭi karma bahvābādhāsamvarttanī(8r.3)yaṃ |
4. aṣṭi karmma⁶ alpābādhāsamvarttanīyam̐ |
5. a⁶ṣṭi karmma dau<<rva>>lpa⁷saṃvarttanīyam̐ |
6. aṣṭi karma prāsādikasam^{*}varttanīyam̐ |
7. aṣṭi karma (8r.4) alpeśākhyā⁸saṃvarttanīyam̐ |
8. aṣṭi karma maheśā⁹okhyasaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
9. aṣṭi karma ṇaca⁹kula¹⁰saṃvarttanīyam̐ |
10. aṣṭi karmma¹¹ uccakulīn^{*}12sam̐(8r.5)varttanīyam̐ |
11. aṣṭi karmma¹³ alpabhogasaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
12. aṣṭi karmma mahābhogasaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
13. aṣṭi karmma duḥprajñasa¹⁴varttanīyam̐ |
14. aṣṭi karmma mahāprajña(8v.1)saṃvarttanīyam̐ |
15. aṣṭi karma ṇarakau¹⁵papattisaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
16. aṣṭi karmma tiryagyonyupapati¹⁶saṃvarttanīyam̐ |
17. aṣṭi karmma yamalokopapa<<ti>>saṃvarttanīyam̐ |
18. aṣṭi (8v.2) karmma¹⁷ asuralokopapatisaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
19. a⁶ṣṭi karmma manukho¹⁸papatisaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
20. aṣṭi karmma <<kāmāvacara¹⁹>>devopapatisaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
21. (8v.3) aṣṭi karmma rūpāvacaradevopapatisaṃvarttanīyam̐ |
22. aṣṭi karmma²⁰ ārūpāvacara²¹devopapatisaṃvarttanīyam̐ |

¹ This number corresponds to that given by Lévi[1932] in Roman numerals.

² In this MS[A], *asti* is normally written as *aṣṭi*. Cf. BHSG §2.61.

³ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

⁴ For *-samvra(r)ttanīyam̐*. BHSG §2.17: loss of *r* in triconsonantal cluster.

⁵ Read *-v(r)ja-*.

⁶ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

⁷ Read *durvarma-*.

⁸ For *alpeśākhyā-*. Cf. BHSG §3.5: *ā* for *a*.

⁹ Read *ṇica-* [= *nīca-*].

¹⁰ Original *-lā-*. Long vowel sign is erased.

¹¹ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

¹² Read *uccakula-*.

¹³ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

¹⁴ For *°sa(m)-*.

¹⁵ For *ṇarako-*. Cf. BHSG §3.78: *au* for *o*.

¹⁶ For *-upapati-*. Cf. BHSG §2.84. This writing is found elsewhere.

¹⁷ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

¹⁸ For *manuṣyo-*. (*ṣyo-* > **ṣo-* > *-kḥo* ?)

¹⁹ Lévi[1932, p.30, fn.9] writes: A om. *kāmāvacara*. But this word is inserted from the upper margin.

²⁰ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

²¹ For *ārūpyāvacara*°. See BHSD, s.vv. *ārūpa* and *ārūpya* (p. 104).

MS[B]: No. 1–1697

- tadyathā |
1. asti karmmālpāyū<h>saṃvattanīyaṃ¹ |
 2. asti karma dirghāyussamvatta{{ya}}nīyaṃ² |
 3. asti karma bahvābādha³ samvartta;(5r.4)+ +⁴ |
 4. asti karma⁵ alpābādha⁶ samvarttanīyaṃ | |
 5. asti karma durvarṇaṃ asamvartta○nīyaṃ |
 6. asti karma prāsādikasamvarttanīyaṃ | |
 7. asti karma alpeśākhyasamvarttanīyaṃ | |
 8. asti karma mahēśākhyā;(5r.5)+ +⁷ rttanīyaṃ | |
 9. asti karmma nīcakulopapattisamvarttanīyaṃ |
 10. asti karma ○uccakulopapattisamvarttanīyaṃ | |
 11. asti karma alpabhogasamvarttanīyaṃ | |
 12. asti karmma mahābhogasamvarttanīyaṃ <|>
 13. (5r.6)+ +⁸ [ka]rṃma du[s]prajñā⁹ samvarttanīyaṃ | |
 14. asti karma mahāprajñā¹⁰ samvarttanīyaṃ | |
 15. asti karma narakopapa{r}tti¹¹ samvarttanīyaṃ | |
 16. asti karmma tiryā{ka}gyonyupapattisamvarttanī ..m¹² [|
 17. as].i¹³ karmma preta¹⁴loko(5v.1)+ + ..¹⁵ samvarttanīyaṃ |
 18. asti karmma¹⁶ asuralokopapa{r}ttisamvartta{{yaṃ}}nīyaṃ | |
 19. asti karmma manuṣyopapattisamvarttanīyaṃ | |
 20. asti karmma kāmāvaca<<ra>>devopapattis.[m]v. .. + +¹⁷ [| |
 21. as]t[i] karma rūpāva(5v.2)+ + +¹⁸ vopapattisamvarttanīyaṃ |
 22. asti karmma¹⁹ ārūpyāvacaradevopapatti○samvartta²⁰ nīyaṃ | |

¹ For °samva(r)ttanīyaṃ. BHS §2.17: loss of r in triconsonantal cluster.

² For °samva(r)ttanīyaṃ. BHS §2.17: loss of r in triconsonantal cluster.

³ For bahvābādha°. Cf. BHS §3.5: ā for a.

⁴ Read (nīyaṃ).

⁵ Hiatus. BHS §4.55.

⁶ For alpābādha°. Cf. BHS §3.5: ā for a.

⁷ Read (samva).

⁸ Read (asti).

⁹ For duṣprajñā°. Cf. BHS §3.5: ā for a.

¹⁰ For mahāprajñā°. Cf. BHS §3.5: ā for a.

¹¹ Rewritten rtti > tti.

¹² Read -(ya)m.

¹³ Read as(t)i.

¹⁴ MS[A]8v.1 gives yama-.

¹⁵ Read (papatti).

¹⁶ Hiatus. BHS §4.55.

¹⁷ Read °s(a)mv(arttanīyaṃ).

¹⁸ Read rūpāva(carade)-.

¹⁹ Hiatus. BHS §4.55.

²⁰ Rewritten rtti > rttā.

MS[A]: No. 4–20

23. aṣṭi karma (8v.4) kṛtaṃ nopacitaṃ |
 24. aṣṭi karmnopacitaṃ na kṛtaṃ |
 25. aṣṭi karmma kṛtaṃ upacitaṃ |
 26. aṣṭi karmma naiva kṛtaṃ nopacitaṃ |
 27. aṣṭi karmma ye(8v.5)na sa<<ma>>tvāgataḥ¹ put*galo² narakeṣūpapannaḥ
 paripūrṇa³nairaiyikaṃ⁴āyuh kṣa<<pa>>yitvā cya<<va>>ti |
 28. aṣṭi karmma yena samaṃnvāgataḥ⁵ pudgalo narake(9r.1)ṣūpapannaḥ
 sārddhanairayikaṃ āyuh kṣa<pa>yitvā cyavati |
 29. aṣṭi kamma⁶yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalo narakeṣūpapannamātra evaṃ⁷cya<<va>>ti |
 30. aṣṭi karmma nīyato⁸(9r.2)papatisaṃvarttanīyaṃ |
 31. aṣṭi karmma⁹anīya¹⁰to¹⁰papatisavarttanīyaṃ |
 32. aṣṭi karmma desāṃtaravipakṣaṃ¹¹ |
 33. aṣṭi karma ye<na> samanvāgata<<ḥ>> (9r.3) pudgalaḥ pūrvva¹² sukhīto bhūtvā
 paścāt¹³duḥkhi¹³to bhavati |
 34. aṣṭi karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ pūrvva duḥkhi¹³to bhūtvā paścād api (9r.4)
 sukhīto bhavati |
 35. aṣṭi karmma yena sa<ma>nvāgata¹³ḥ pudgalaḥ pūrvvaṃ sukhīto bhūtvā paścād api
 sukhīto bhavati |
 36. aṣṭi karmma yena sama(9r.5)nvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ pūrvva duḥkhi¹³to bhūtvā paścād api
 duḥkhi¹³to bhavati |¹⁴

¹ Read *samanvāgataḥ*.

² Read *pudgalo*.

³ Is it a compound or a form of sg.Ac. with the loss of *anusvāra*?

⁴ Read *nairayikam*.

⁵ For *samanvāgataḥ*. Cf. BHSG §2.64.

⁶ For *ka(r)mma*. BHSG §2.17: loss of *r* in triconsonantal cluster; 2.89: *kamma* for *karma*.

⁷ For *eva*. See BHSD, s.v. 2 *eva* (p. 157).

⁸ For *nīyato-*. BHSG §3.17: *ī* for *i*.

⁹ Hiatus. BHSG §4.55.

¹⁰ For *anīyato-*. BHSG §3.17: *ī* for *i*.

¹¹ BHSD, s.v. *vipakṣam*: “the form is clearly a hyper-Sktism for MĪndic (Pali) *vipakka* = Skt. *vipakva*, confused with MĪndic *vipakkha* = *vipakṣa*.” (p. 490)

¹² For *pūrvvaṃ*. Cf. BHSG §2.72: drop of *anusvāra*; 8.31–32: *-a* for *-am* [*a*-stem sg.Ac.]. Also 34 and 36.

¹³ Sandhi does not appear.

¹⁴ This *daṇḍa* is *visarga* used for *daṇḍa*.

MS[B]: No. 1-1697

24. asti karmma¹ upacitaṃ na kṛtaṃ ||
 23. asti karma kṛta² nopacitaṃ ||
 25. asti karma kṛtaṃ upacitañ ca ||
 26. asti (5v.3)+ +³ [nai]va kṛtaṃ naivopacitaṃ⁴ ||
 27. asti karmma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ nara○keṣv⁵ āyuh kṣapayitvā narakeṣv
 evopapadyate⁶ ||
 28⁷.
 29. asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalo narakeṣū⁸ papannamātra e(5v.4)+ + + +⁹
 30. + + .. rma¹⁰ tiryagatopapatti¹¹ samvarttanīyaṃ ||
 30. asti karma niya○topapatti¹² samvarttanīyaṃ ||
 32. asti karmma deśāntaravipakṣaṃ¹³ ||
 33. asti karma yena sa{{mva}}manvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ pūrvaṃ su(5v.5)+ + + + +¹⁴
 ḥkhito bhavati ||
 34. asti karmma yena samanvāgataḥ pu○dga{{ta}}laḥ pūrvaṃ duḥkhito bhūtvā paścāt
 sukhito bhavati ||
 35. asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ pūrvaṃ sukhito (5v.6)+ + + + + + +¹⁵ to
 bhavati ||
 36. asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ pūrvaṃ duḥkhi<<to>> bhūtvā paścād api
 duḥkhito bhavati ||

¹ Sandhi does not appear.

² For *kṛta(m)*.

³ Read (*karma*).

⁴ In this set of phrases, its order in MS[B] differs from MS[A].

⁵ MS[A] has *upapannaḥ paripūrṇanairaiyikam*.

⁶ MS[A] reads *cyavati*.

⁷ MS[B] omits the sentence about “half a life-time.”

⁸ Here probably the scribe’s eyes skipped the line.

⁹ By analogy from previous sentence in this MS, a possible reading is *e(vopapadyate l)*.

¹⁰ Read (*asti karma*).

¹¹ Is this meant for *niyatopapatti*- ?

¹² Is this meant for *anīyatopapatti*- ?

¹³ BHSD, s.v. *vipakṣam*. See the footnote on MS[A].

¹⁴ Read *su(khito bhūtvā paścād du)*.

¹⁵ Read (*bhūtvā paścād api sukhi*).

MS[A]: No. 4–20

37. aṣṭi karmma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ¹ ādho² bhavati matsarī |
 38. aṣṭi ka(9v.1)rmma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalo³ daridro bhavati tyāgavān* |
 39. aṣṭi karmma yena sa<ma>nvāgataḥ pudgala ādhā⁴ bhavati tyāgavān* <<|>>
 [39A]⁵
 41. aṣṭi [p]udgalo yasya karmma (9v.2) kṣīṇam bhavati nāyuh <|>
 40. aṣṭi pudgalo yasyā○yuh kṣīṇan na karmma |
 42. aṣṭi pudgalo yasyāyuh⁶ karmmaṇi ca kṣīṇāṇi | |
 43. aṣṭi pu(9v.3)d[ga]lo yasyāyuh kṣīṇam punāni⁷ ca |⁸
 43a⁹. aṣṭi ○ pudgalo yasya naivāyuh kṣīno¹⁰ bhavati na karmma | api kleśā | kṣīṇāḥ |
 44. aṣṭi pu(9v.4)dgalah kāyena sukhī na cintena¹¹ |
 45. aṣṭi pu○dgalah<<ci>>ḥ¹² {1} tena sukhī na kāyena |
 46¹³.
 47. aṣṭi pudgalo naiva cintena¹⁴ sukhī na kāyena |

¹ Hiatus. BHS §4.55.

² For ādh(y)o.

³ For pudgalo. Cf. BHS §3.78: au for u.

⁴ For ādh(y)o.

⁵ This number with capital letter A is given by me. Here, MS[A] does not have any sentence but Lévi[1932] implies the existence of one more subject: “a(sti) k(arma) y(ena) s(samanvāgataḥ) p(pudgalaḥ) [sic].”

⁶ Read yasyāyuh.

⁷ Read puṇyāni. (Transcriptional error such as puṇyāni > *puṇyāni > punāni ?)

⁸ This danḍa is visarga used for danḍa.

⁹ = XLIII bis. (Lévi[1932], p. 75).

¹⁰ For kṣīṇam (=kṣīṇam). Cf. BHS §8.36: -o for n.sg.N.-Ac.

¹¹ For cittena.

¹² The sign indicating this insertion is misplaced. Read pudgalaḥ {1} <ci>>(t)tena.

¹³ MS[A] omits this subject.

¹⁴ For cittena.

MS[B]: No. 1-1697

38. asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ¹ draridho² bhavati tyāgavān* ||
 37. (6r.1) + + + + + + + .. gataḥ³ pudgalaḥ⁴ ādhyo bhavati matsarī ||
 [39A]⁵
 asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ⁶ daridro bhavati matsarī ||
 39. asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ⁷ ādhyo bhavati tyāgavān* ||
 41. (6r.2) + + + + + + +⁸ karma kṣīṇaṃ nāyuh |
 40. asti pudgalo yasyāyu⁹ kṣīṇaṃ na kaṀrma |
 42¹⁰.
 43. asti pudgalo yasyāyuh kṣīṇaṃ¹¹
 43a. na karmāni ca ||¹² api tu kleśā kṣīṇā bhavanti ||
 44. asti pudgalaḥ kāyena sukhi;(6r.3) + + .[t]e[na]¹³ ||
 45. a[s]t[i] pudgalo yaś cittaena sukhi na kāyena¹⁴ ||
 46. asti pudgalaḥ ○ kāyena ca sukhi cittaena ca ||
 47. asti pudgalau¹⁵ naiva kāyena sukhi na cittaena ||

¹ Sandhi does not appear.

² Read *daridro*. Cf. BHSG §2.44 (though a change *dr-* to *ḍb-* is not treated).

³ Read (*asti karma yena samanvā*)gataḥ.

⁴ Sandhi does not appear.

⁵ This classification does not appear in MS[A] but Lévi notes it [1932, p.31, fn. 1].

⁶ Sandhi does not appear.

⁷ Sandhi does not appear.

⁸ Read (*asti pudgalo yasya*).

⁹ For *yasyāyuh*.

¹⁰ MS[B] omits the sentence about the destruction of both acts and life.

¹¹ Probably this and next sentences are confused.

¹² Comparing to MS[A], “*na karmāni*” does not correspond to any phrase. It is a possible solution to render this “*na karmāni*” to refer “*na karma*” in 43a.

¹³ Read *sukhi (to cit)tena*.

¹⁴ This *akṣara ye* is rewritten but its original letter is not readable.

¹⁵ Read *pudgalo*.

MS[A]: No. 4–20

48. aṣṭi (9v.5) karmma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalo 'pāyeṣūpapannaḥ {1} aṣṭirūpo¹ bhavati snigdhakāya² snigdhačchavi³ nayanābhiraṃo darśanīyaḥ |
49. aṣṭi karmma yena sa(10r.1)manvāgataḥ pudgalaḥ {1} apāyeṣūpapanno duvarṇṇo⁴ bhavati rūkṣakāyo ghoradarśanaḥ pratikula⁵ darśanaḥ |
50. aṣṭi karmma yena sa<ma>nvāgataḥ pudgalo 'pā(10r.2)yeṣūpapanno durganvā⁶ bhavati jihmendriyo bha○vaty avyaktendriyaḥ ||
51. daśākusalānām karmmapathānām vipakena⁷ dasānām bā(10r.3)[hyāta]⁸ bhāvānām abhivṛddhir bhavati |
- 51A⁹.
62. dasānu○saṃsā¹⁰ tathāgatacaityāṃjalikarmaṇaḥ |
- 63¹¹.
64. dasānusaṃsā¹² chattrapradāṇasya |
65. da(10r.4)sānusaṃsā ghaṃṇṭhā¹³ pradāṇasya |
66. dasā{{va}}nusaṃ○sā vastrapradāṇasya |
67. dasānusaṃsā {{1}} āsanapradāṇasya |
68. dasānusaṃ¹⁴sā bhā(10r.5)janapradāṇasya |
69. dasānusaṃsā bhojaṇapradāṇasya <<|>>

¹ Read *abhirūpo*.

² For °*kāya*(h). Cf. BHSG §8.22: drop of *visarga* [-a for -ah, a-stem, sg.N.]

³ For °*chavi*(r). Cf. BHSG §10.15: -i for -ir [i-stem, sg.N.]

⁴ For *du*(r)*varṇṇo*.

⁵ For *pratikūla*-. Cf. BHSG §3.45-46: u for ū.

⁶ For °*gandhā*. Due to orthographical similarity between *mv* and *ndb*.

⁷ For *vipakena*. Cf. BHSG §3.28: a for ā.

⁸ Read *bāhyān*(ām). There are only two *akṣaras* at the beginning of this line. Unfortunately, this leaf is eaten by worm just in the middle of these *akṣaras*. However, second *akṣara* has apparently short vowel *a*.

⁹ MS[A] omits another pendant of phrases: *dasānām kuśalānām karmapathānām vipakena dasānām bāhyānām bhāvānām vipattiḥ bhavati* [or *prajñāyate*]. This number with capital letter A is given by me.

¹⁰ For *dasānusaṃsā*(s). BHSG §2.63: s for ś: 8.78: -ā for -āḥ [a-stem, pl..N.]

¹¹ MS[A] omits “*dasānusaṃsās tathāgatacaityavandanāyāḥ*.”

¹² For *dasānusaṃsā*(s). BHSG §2.63: s for ś: 8.78: -ā for -āḥ [a-stem, pl..N.]

¹³ Read *ghaṃṇṭā*-.

¹⁴ Long vowel sign of °*sām*° is erased, so read °*saṃ*°.

MS[B]: No. 1–1697

48. asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgala¹ (6r.4) +² pāyeṣūpapannaḥ³ abhirūpo bhavati snigdhakāyaḥ snigdhaçchaviḥ⁴ na○yanābhirāmo darśanīyaḥ <|>
49. asti karmma yena samanvāgataḥ pudgalo <'>pāyeṣūpapannaḥ durvarṇṇo bhavati rūḥṣakāyo (6r.5) + ra⁵darśanaḥ pratikūladarśanaḥ |
50. asti karma yena samanvāgataḥ pudga○laḥ {1} apāyeṣūpapannaḥ durgandho bhavati {1} jihvendriyo⁶ bhavaty avyaktendriyaḥ <|>
51. daśānām akuśālānām karmapathānām (6r.6) + + kena⁷ daśānām bāhyānām bhāvānām abhivṛddhiḥ prajñāyate |
- 51A. daśānām kuśālānām karmapathānām vipākena {1} daśānām bāhyānām bhāvānām vipattiḥ prajñāyate |
62. daśān.s.ṃśā⁸ [ait].āñ[j].lika(6v.1)+ +⁹ ||
63. d.śānuśaṃsā¹⁰ tathāgataçaityaçandanāyāḥ¹¹ ||
64. daśānusaṃśāc¹² chatrapradāne¹³ |
65. daśānusaṃśā ghaṇṭha¹⁴pradāne |
- 66.¹⁵
67. daśānusaṃśā āsanapradāne ||
68. daśānusaṃśā bhājanaprad[ā] ..¹⁶ [| |]
69. .. + + + ..¹⁷ [bho]jaṇapradā(6v.2)+ +¹⁸

¹ For *pudgala* (b). Cf. BHSG §8.22: drop of *visarga* [-a for -aḥ, a-stem, sg.N.]

² Read (a).

³ Sandhi does not appear.

⁴ Sandhi does not appear.

⁵ Read (gbo)ra-.

⁶ Read *jihvendriyo*.

⁷ Read (vipā)kena.

⁸ Read *daśān(u)s(a)ṃśā(s)*.

⁹ Read (tathāgataç)ait(y)āñ!(a)lika(rmanah).

¹⁰ Read *d(a)śānusaṃsās*.

¹¹ Here °*vandanāyāḥ* takes sg. Genitive case. However, it takes Locative case (sg.) in the opening passage of its commentary portion [30r.6] and Genitive case in the concluding passage [30v.2].

¹² For *daśānusaṃsās*.

¹³ Rewritten *ai > e*. In this enumeration (64–76), MS[B] reads °*pradāne* instead of °*pradānasya*. However, it reads °*pradānasya* in the commentary portion.

¹⁴ Read *ghaṇṭā*-.

¹⁵ MS[B] omits: *daśānusaṃsās vastrapradānane*.

¹⁶ Read °*pradā(ne)*.

¹⁷ Read (*daśānusaṃsā*).

¹⁸ Read °*pradā(ne ||)*

MS[A]: No. 4-20

70. dasānusamsā yāna¹pradānasya² |
 71. dasānusam*sā puti³śrayap<r>adāna[sya] |
 72. dasānusamsā pā(10v.1)laka⁴prahva⁵pradānasya |
 [72A]⁶
 73. dasānusamsā mālāpradānasya |
 74. dasānusamsā muktapuṣpa⁷pradānasya |
 75. dasānusamsā pradīpapradānasya |
 76. .. sānusamsā⁸ gandha(10v.2)pradānasya |
 77. dasānusamsā pra<<vra>>jyāyaḥ⁹ |
 78. daśā○śamsā āraṇya¹⁰vāse |
 79. dasānusamsāḥ piṇḍapārtika[tve]¹¹ |
 80. dasa vaiśāradyāni <|>

(10v.3) [ayam] uddeśaḥ karmavibhaṅgasya || © ||

¹ Lévi[1932, p.31, fn. 13] gives a note: A *dasānusamsāpānatpradānasya*. This reading is not acceptable because a consonant sign *y-* has a sharp line in its lower part and, on the other hand, a consonant sign *p-* has a curved line; *akṣara pra-* does not have consonant sign *t-* before it.

² Lévi's text reads: °*pradāne* (p. 31).

³ Read *prati-*.

⁴ Read *pānaka-*.

⁵ Lévi[1932, p. 31, fn. 14] comments: (évidemment *pānakaphala*°. Cf. le suivant).

⁶ Lévi's text reads: *dasānusamsāḥ phalaprādāne* (p. 31), basing on MS[B].

⁷ This *akṣara -ṣpa-* is rewritten on the original. The latter is not readable.

⁸ Read (*da*)*sānusamsā*.

⁹ Read *pravrajyāyaḥ*. (Is it a possible form *-*āyaḥ* [ā-stem, sg.G.] as is in case of sg.L. ending -*āyam* [BHSG §9.80]?)

¹⁰ For *araṇya*°. Cf. BHSG §3.5: *ā* for *a*.

¹¹ For *piṇḍapārtikatve*. Cf. BHSG §3.49-50: *i/i* for *ai*. Lévi[1932, p. 32, fn.2]: A *piṇḍapātrikaraṇe*.

MS[B]: No. 1-1697

70. +¹ [śā]nuśamśā yānapradāne ||
 71. daśānuśamśā pratiśrayapradāne |
 72. daśānu○śamśāḥ pānakapradāne ||
 [72A] daśānuśamśā hala²pradāne |
 73. daśānuśamśā mālāpradāne ||
 74. daśānuśamśā muktapuṣpapradā(6v.3)+ +³
 75. [da]śānuśamśā dvīpa⁴pradāne ||
 76. daśānuśamśā ganvapradaṇe ||
 [76A] daśānuśamśā ○ dhūpa⁵pradāne ||
 77. daśānuśamśā⁶ pravrajyāyāḥ ||
 78. daśānuśamśā aranyavāse ||
 79. daśānuśamśā⁷ pañḍapātikatve <||>
 80. daśa vaiśāradya(6v.4)+⁸

+ + [m] .d.eśāḥ⁹ karmavibhaṅgasya dharmaparyāyasya¹⁰ || ||

(To be continued)

¹ Read (*da*).

² For *phala*-. Cf. BHSG §2.35: *h* for aspirate stop.

³ Read °*pradā(ṇe)* ||)

⁴ For *dīpa*-. As for the discussion about *dīpa* and *dvīpa*, see, for examples, John Brough ed., *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, Oxford, 1962, pp. 209-211 and Genjun H. Sasaki, *A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy*, Tokyo, 1958, pp. 594-603. (佐々木規順『阿毘達磨思想研究』、清水弘文堂、東京。第七章「ブラクリットの正当な古典梵語化—dīpa と dvīpa—」).

⁵ *dhūpa*: incense, perfume. This subject is not treated later. Lévi[1932, p. 32, fn.1]: B add. *daśānuśamśā dhūpapradāne*.

⁶ For *daśānuśamśā(h)* .

⁷ For *daśānuśamśā(h)* .

⁸ Read (*mi* ||)

⁹ Read (*ayaṃ (u)d(d)eśāḥ*).

¹⁰ MS[A] omits this word.

An *Uṣṇīṣa-Vijayā Dhāraṇī* Text from Nepal

Akira YUYAMA

शुभमस्त्वार्यव्यूहाय ॥

Prefatory

There has been very little chance for us to see any of the original Indic texts of the *Uṣṇīṣa-Vijayā Dhāraṇī* (abbr. *UvDh* hereinafter) in the *Dhāraṇī-Samgrahas* that are known to exist in collections around the world.¹ The reason for this is very simple. It is difficult and expensive to obtain a large quantity of manuscripts in order to examine only a very small portion of such *dhāraṇīs*. It is hoped that this humble article will be the first step for me to further investigate various other Indic *dhāraṇī* collections.

It is very excellent timing indeed that Professor Lokesh Chandra has brought out a facsimile edition of a collection of *mantra-dhāraṇīs*.² Needless to say, it is not at all good enough to see only one among many other extant manuscripts. It is probable that this manuscript text does in no way represent an authentic Indic version. There may be not just a single version but many others. It is therefore worth looking into it, at least for me, after having seen some versions in a variety of scripts beyond the Indian Subcontinent. As a matter of fact, there are a number of versions transmitted particularly in East Asia.³

¹ Cf. e.g. A. Yuyama, *Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscript Collections: A Bibliographical Guide for the Use of Students in Buddhist Philology* (= *Bibliographia Indica et Buddhica: Pamphlet Series*, II) (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies Library, 1992), ix, 28 p.

² *Kāraṇḍavyūha and Other Texts. Sanskrit Manuscripts from Nepal*. Reproduced by Lokesh Chandra from the Collection of Prof. Raghuvira (= *Śata-Piṭaka Series: Indo-Asian Literatures*, CCLXVIII) (New Delhi: Sharada Rani / International Academy of Indian Culture, 1981), manuscript folio Nos. 11a-13a = facsimile folios 332-336 numbered newly by the editor of this book.

³ For various versions see e.g. A. Yuyama (湯山明), “演福寺銅鐘の梵語銘文覚書 — この小論を末松保和教授に捧ぐ — [Remarks on the Sanskrit Inscriptions on the Bell Kept at the Temple Yeon-bog-sa — Dedicated to Professor Yasukazu Suematsu —]”, 東洋學報 [Tōyō Gakuhō], LXVI, 1-4 (= 財団法人東洋文庫創立60周年記念特輯號 [Collected Papers in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Toyo Bunko] (1985), p. 325-362 (English summary on p. *13*-14*).

Cf. also A.Yuyama, “Die Sanskrit-Texte in Lañ-tsha und tibetischer (Dbu-can) Schrift auf der im

This is eloquently attested by a well-known story: that Buddhapāli 佛陀波利, a monk from Kashmir, arrived in Wu-t'ai-shan 五臺山 in the first year of the I-fêng 儀鳳 era (i.e. 676 CE) and then decided to translate / transliterate the *UvDb* into Chinese. In order to get an original text, he travelled back to his native country and returned in the second year of the Yung-ch'un 永淳 (i.e. 682 CE) to the capital, Ch'ang-an 長安, to start the translation / transliteration.⁴ It was at this time that this particular *Dhāraṇī* had become popular and had also been translated / transliterated by his contemporaries.⁵ Buddhapāli's work was, therefore, not exactly completed.⁶

This account is no doubt true, as we know that. Buddhist translators in China always had to face difficulties in obtaining good or better original texts. This story tells us that there was no reliable *UvDb* text available to Buddhapāli, who was thus forced to return west. It is possible that there existed some *UvDb* texts which may have been corruptly transmitted. In the light of this it is important to consider whether corrupted texts had already been transplanted in China at his time.

There is no doubt that such *dhāraṇī* texts become corrupt in the course of transmission. One can expect no merit by reciting *dhāraṇīs* with a wrong pronunciation. It was Emperor Ch'ien-lung 乾隆 (1711-1799, r. 1736-1796) who undertook the formidable task of collecting complete sets of *dhāraṇīs* in Manchurian, Chinese, Mongolian and Tibetan. This project began in the year 1749 CE and was concluded in 1759. The texts in 80 fascicles were printed in 1773. It is

Jahre 1346 gegossenen Glocke des Tempels Yeon-Bog-jeol in Korea", *Ausgewählte Vorträge - XXIII. Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 16. bis 20. September 1985 in Würzburg*, herausgegeben von Esnar von Schuler (= *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Supplementband X) (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989), p. 429-434. - 【Yeon-bog-jeol = 演福寺 (Yeon-bog-sa)】

A compact but detailed information of the textual tradition and iconographical classification with regard to Uṣṇīṣa-Vijayā is given by Lokesh Chandra, "Comparative Iconography of the Goddess Uṣṇīṣavijayā", *Acta Orientalia Hungarica*, XXXIV, 1-3 (Budapest 1980), p. 125-137.

⁴ Cf. e.g. *Hōbōgirin*, Fascicule annexe (new rev. ed. 1978), p. 238a: *Butsudabari*, s.v.

⁵ 佛頂尊勝陀羅尼經: e.g. Taisho No. 968, translated by Tu-hsing-i (679 CE): Vol. XIX p. 353a1-355a5 / Taisho No. 969, translated by Divākara (613-638 CE): Vol. XIX p. 355b17-357a29.

⁶ Cf. Taisho No. 967: Vol. XIX, p. 349b1-c13 「明太宗序」, written in the ninth year of the Yung-lo 永樂 era (i.e. 1411 CE). I would not go into detail about the story, but refer for further details to Ryūjō KANBAYASHI in Genmyō ONO: 小野玄妙編・佛書解説大辭典, IX (Tokyo 1933, rev. ed. 1964), p. 323b-d: 佛頂尊勝陀羅尼經 (神林隆淨稿), s.v.;

See further a prefatory introduction ascribed to Chih-ching 志靜 (cf. T. XIX p. 349 fn. 2), i.e. T. No. 967, XIX p. 349b1-c19, translated by Étienne Lamotte, "Mañjuśrī", *T'oung pao*, XLVIII (1960-1961), p. 86-88 (out of p. 1-96) [= T. XIX, p. 349b2-c3]. — Buddhapāli's Text is to be found in: Taisho No. 967: Vol. XIX, p. 349c24-353c22.

also fortunate that this important collection has been made available by the wisely-directed effort of Lokesh Chandra.⁷

A Version at Chü-yung-kuan and Yeon-bog-sa

It is a well-known fact that most probably after the fifth year of the Chih-chêng 至正 era, i.e. 1345 CE, the most authentic version of this *Dhāraṇī* was carved into the eastern wall of the cave at Chü-yung-kuan 居庸關 in six scripts.⁸ These scripts are in Lañ-stha (Rañja /Rañjana), Tibetan, 'Phags-pa, Uighur, His-hsia (Tangut) and Chinese, the then dominant writing systems in the East Asian area. This must have been undertaken under the imperial authority of the Yüan dynasty (1271-1368 CE).⁹

Further, this very same text was inscribed in Lañ-stha and Tibetan scripts almost at the very same time, i.e. 1346 CE, by the Yüan Masters of Arts on a bell hung at the Temple Yeon-bog-sa 演福寺 in Gae-seong 開城, the then capital of the Koryō 高麗 dynasty (918-1392 CE) by order of Emperor Ch'ung-mok-wang 忠穆王 (r. 1344-1348). This bell can still be found hanging at the Southern Great Gate of this ancient city.

The fact that the inscription found on the bell at the Yeon-bog Temple was cast in the year 1346 CE is significant in the history of Buddhism in East Asia. It is interesting to note that both inscriptions read almost exactly the same. As I have already suggested in my papers before, it is most probably the version of imperial authority both in the Yüan and Koryō dynasties. In my footnotes I cite this version as "Yüan-Koryō", when necessary.

It is therefore to be much regretted that this version does not seem to have been transmitted to Korea or Japan. There is an old collection of *mantra-dhāraṇīs* 眞言

⁷ See *Sanskrit Texts from the Imperial Palace at Peking in the Manchurian, Chinese, Mongolian and Tibetan Scripts*, edited by Prof. Dr. Lokesh Chandra from the Collection of Prof. Dr. Raghu Vira, Part 6 (= *Śatapīṭaka Series*, LXX, 6) (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1968), p. 1493-1498 [= 第2套第5卷52-57葉]. For further details see A. Yuyama, *Tōyō Gakubō*, LXVI, p. 355a-356a, n. 6.

⁸ Reproductions of the rubbings are to be found in: Prince Roland Bonaparte, *Documents de l'époque mongole des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles* (Gravé et imprimé pour l'auteur, Paris, 1895), Planche II (rubbings by Edouard Chavannes); 村田治郎編著・居庸關, 2卷 (京都大學工學部, 1957), Vol. II, Plate XCI: - with a detailed introduction by Gadjin Nagao 長尾雅人 & Akira Fujieda 藤枝晃; - also 常盤大定・關野貞: 中國文化史蹟, XII (Second edition - Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1976), Part I, Plate LXIV (with a commentary, II p. 64-71).

⁹ See e.g. A. Yuyama, *Tōyō Gakubō*, LXVI, p. 332; - -, *ZDMG*, Supplementband X, p. 431.

集 transcribed originally in the order of Hangul 韓／諺文, Chinese 漢文 and Siddham 悉曇 characters. The oldest text was printed in 1569 CE, i.e. two centuries after the 1346 Temple Yeon-bog two-script version. The three-character version must have been popular and was thereafter reprinted in the years 1658, 1688 and 1777 CE. The latest edition was printed in a revised form in 1800 CE – with additional *mantra-dhāraṇīs*, this time in Siddham, Chinese and Hangul scripts.¹⁰ This edition had not been known to Genmyō Ono in 1933 when he edited the *Bussbo Kaisetsu Daijiten* (see Vol. VI, p. 192a, *q.v.*). Fortunately, it has recently been reprinted photomechanically twice in Seoul.¹¹ Unfortunately, however, the text of our *UvDb* is rather corrupt, in particular the portion that is written in the Siddham script. The text is very different from the Yeon-bog Temple version.

Tz'u-hsien's Version

Another *UvDb* that I have treated with great interest is the version transliterated by Tz'u-hsien 慈賢 from Magadha, or *Maitrabhadra, National Preceptor of the Ch'i-t'an 契丹 kingdom. This is yet another version among many others.¹² His version is to be found only on a stone slate kept in the famed Yün-ch'u-ssü 雲居寺 of Fang-shan 房山. This text has fortunately been reproduced in facsimile form from rubbings, first in the form of a rubbing: *Fang-shan Shib-ching* 房山石經(遼金刻經), XXI (Peking 1991), p. 499.¹³ Then later it appeared in an edition on a positive print: *Chun-hua Ta-ts'ang-ching* 中華大藏經, LXVIII (Peking 1993), p. 460.

The most important matter regarding this Tz'u-hsien's version is that it exists only on the so-called Fang-shan Stone-plate *Ta-ts'ang-ching*. This means that it has not been recognized as a text with imperial authorization. As a matter of fact, as far as the Fang-shan version tells us, it is rather corrupt. It is indeed strange, however, that Tz'ü-hsien, a high-ranking Indian monk, would not have done the work carefully enough. Carving a sacred text in stone is done in order to preserve it for

¹⁰ For further details see a bibliographical dictionary of Korean Buddhist literature published in Japanese: 東国大学校 仏教文化研究所編・韓国仏書解題辞典 (東京・国書刊行会, 1982), p. 372f.

¹¹ The first reprint was published in 1978 (寶蓮閣), and next in 1988 (雲林筆房老舖) with a brief but comprehensive introductory preface by Dr. Li (法雲居士・李鐘益).

¹² For further details see A. Yuyama, "The *Uṣṇīṣa-vijayā Dhāraṇī* Transliterated by Tz'ü-hsien", *Bauddhavidyāsudhāraṇī: Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert On the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, edited by Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann (= *Indica et Tibetica*, XXX) (Swistal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1997), p. 729-742 (incl. 2 plates)

¹³ For the Fang-shan Stone Scriptures see among others an enlightening work edited recently by Yasunori KEGASAWA: 氣賀澤保規編・中國佛教石經の研究 (房山雲居寺石經を中心に) (京都大学 學術出版会 1996), e.g. p. 476.

future generations. It is perplexing that he would not undertake the project with the utmost care. No wonder, then, it was not admitted into any extant *Ta-ts'ang-ching* in China.¹⁴

A Version from Nepal

To the best of my knowledge, no version preserved in the Indic original has ever been properly treated. In this paper, therefore, I wish to pay attention to an Indic text. Although it is only the study of one text, I wish to use it as a step towards future research into the textual tradition as a whole. I feel compelled to do this even though at present I have no other good sample version to use for comparison.

Let us first make a faithful transliteration with some corrections of apparent scribal errors and damage, mostly additions by way of sharp-edged brackets < >. And then I will try to reconstruct the version. The *UvDb* begins afresh and independent from a new folio as does the next. The very text thus ends on folio 13b (or 336) with a space left blank before the next text / folio. On the first folio, i.e. folio 11b (or 332 numbered by the editor) is found an illustrative figure (probably painted in colour), which must doubtlessly be the icon of the deity Uṣṇīṣa-Vijayā. In reconstructing this version, there is not enough space to quote all the variant readings but only a few important ones along with full textual remarks. Regarding the *daṇḍas*, I shall not debate whether they read *eka-daṇḍas*, *dvi-daṇḍas* or no *daṇḍas*.

The scribal hand of this text from Nepal looks the same throughout the entire manuscript. The *Dhāraṇī* Collection must, therefore, have been copied by a single scribe. As usual, a letter like the Arabic numeral 8 is used for a *visarga*, as well as a sign at the end of a sentence before *dvi-daṇḍas*, e.g. *buddhāyaḥ* (for *buddhāya*, 11b1/332.1), *svābhāḥ* (for *svābhā*, 12a3/333.1). I have indicated unnecessary letters with round brackets (). Some other signs are also used in the following romanized and reconstructed texts: < > for missing letter(s) in the manuscript, the square brackets [] for damaged or illegible portions. Dubious readings are noted with { }. Note that in this manuscript the sign ‘ (and a single example of ‘ at 12b1/334.1) is used for a punctuation and the numeral 2 for a repetition of a word or phrase (i.e. to save the scribal labour!). Such signs are frequently seen in Indic manuscripts.

Some graphical remarks:

Most of the following examples are not at all unusual in a number of manuscripts

¹⁴ See A. Yuyama, “The *Uṣṇīṣa-vijayā Dhāraṇī* Transliterated by Tz’ü-hsien”, esp. p. 737 (§3.1-2).

from Nepal, and are often seen elsewhere, too. A sibilant *ś* is often written as a dental *ṣ* in consonant clusters, e.g. *rasmi-* (for *raśmi-*, 12a2, 13a4), *samāsvāsayantu* (for *samāśv°*, 13a2-3). Note also a simple mistake like *parisuddha-* (12a2). It is quite common to see a duplicated *t*, *m*, *v* or *y* after *r*, e.g. *°varttanāya* (12a4, [12b1]), *karmma-* (12a4), *°air m-mahā-*! (11b5), *dharmmā* (13b1), *sarvva-* (passim), *āryya-* (13a5). A retroflex *ṇ* may well be a usual confusion seen frequently in Indic manuscripts from Nepal, e.g. *gagaṇa-* (for *gagana-*, passim).

The same syllable, or a word containing the same sound at the beginning, is often omitted, probably by simple mistake or carelessness, e.g. *sugata-<vara->vacana-* (11b5), *a-<sama->samanta-* (11b4), *mahā-<mudrā->mantra-* (1ab5), *hr̥dayâ<dhiṣṭhānâ>dhiṣṭhite* (12a3), *samayâ<dhiṣṭhānâ>dhiṣṭhite* (12b1-2), but *vaj<r>a-stambha <bha>va<n>tu* (13a1) may simply be for *vajram=bhavantu!* It may also be noted here that a word or phrase is repeated carelessly at the turn of lines (and folios), e.g. *vaj<r>odbhave* (12b5-13a1), *śodhaya 2* (13a3-4).

The most irritating one is *vaja-*; *vajini* (for *vajra-*, passim; *vajriṇi*, 13a1). But *vajra-* at 12a4 seems to be correct, though not apparent enough! The scribe must have seen no difference between *ja* and *jra!* The *anusvāras* could simply be damaged, worn or rubbed off, e.g. *sa<m>hata<na>*- (12a4). There are annoying *anusvāras* added meaninglessly, e.g. *adhiṣṭhānâ(m)dhiṣṭhita-* (12a5 et al.), *buddhâ(nām)dhiṣṭhānâ(m)dhiṣṭh<i>te* (12b4).

Faithful transliteration

(Folio 11b1/332.1) om̐ namo buddhāyaḥ // om̐ namo bhagavatye sarvva-trailokya-
prati(.2)viśiṣṭāya buddhāya te namaḥ / tad-yathā // om̐ bhr̥m̐ bhr̥m̐ bhr̥m̐
śodhaya (.3) viśodhaya 2 a-samantāvabhāsa-spharaṇa-gati-gagaṇa-sva(.4)bhāva-
viś[u]ddhe uṣṇīṣa-vijaya-parisuddhe abhiṣim<caṃ/can>tu mām sa(.5)rvva-tathāgataḥ
sugata-<vara->vacanāmṛtābhiṣekair m-mahā-<mudrā->mantra-(12a1/333.1)padaiḥ
// om̐ āhara 2 āyu<ḥ>-saṃdhāraṇī śodhaya 2 viśodhaya 2 gagaṇa-svabhāva-
viśuddhe uṣṇīṣa-(.2)vijaya-parisuddhe // sahasra-rasmi-saṃcodite sarvva-
tathāgatāvalokini ṣaṭ-pāramitā-paripū(.3)raṇi // sarvva-tathāgata-mātra daśa-
bhūmi-pratiṣṭhite // sarvva-tathāgata-hr̥dayâ<dhiṣṭhānâ>dhiṣṭhite svāhāḥ // (.4)
om̐ mudre 2 mahā-mudre vajra-kāya-sa<m>hata<na>-parisuddhe ‘, sarvva-
karmmāvaraṇa-viśuddhe pratinivarttanā(.5)ya viśuddhe sarvva-tathāgata-
samayādhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭhite svāhā // om̐ mudre 2 mahā-mudre vaj<r>a-kāya-
sa<m>(12b1/334.1)[hatana-parisuddhe] ‘ sarvva-karmmāvara[ṇa-pa]riśuddhe
pratiniva[rta]nāya viśuddhe sa<r>vva-tathāgata-samayâ(.2)<dhiṣṭhānâ>dhiṣṭhite

svāhā // oṃ muni 2 mahā-muni vimuni <2> mahā-vimuni ‘, mati 2 mahā-mati ‘, ma-mati su-(.3)mati ‘, tathāgata-bhūta-koti-pariśuddhe visphurita-<buddhe> viśuddhe ‘, oṃ he he jaya jaya vijayā // sma(.4)ra smara // sma smara sma // sma sphāraya 2 sarvva-buddhā(nāṃ)dhiṣṭhānā(m)dhiṣṭh<i>te svāhā // oṃ śuddhe 2 bu(.5)ddhe 2 ma{va?!}j<r>e 2 mahā-vaj<r>e su-vaj<r>e // vaj<r>a-garbhe jaya-garbhe vijaya-garbhe ‘, vaj<r>a-jvāsā{jvālā?!}-garbhe ‘, vaj<r>odbhave (13a1/335.1) // vaj<r>odbhave sarvva-<va>j<r>a-sambhave // vaj<r>iṇi vaj<r>a-stambha <bha>va<n>tu mama śarīraṃ sarvva-satvānāṃ ca kāya-pariśu<ddhir> bha(.2)vantu , mama <sadā> sarvva-gati-pariśuddhiś ca sarvva-tathāgata-hṛdayā<dhiṣṭhānā>dhiṣṭhite // sarvva-tathāgatās ca samā(.3)svāsayantu // oṃ buddhe 2 siddhya 2 bodhaya 2 vibodhaya <2> // mocaya 2 vimocaya 2 śodhaya 2 śo(.4)dhaya 2 {so repeated} viśodhaya 2 samantān mocaya 2 samanta-rasmi-parasmita-pariśuddhiṃ sarvva-tathāgata-(.5)hṛdayādhiṣṭhānā(m)dhiṣṭhite // oṃ mudre 2 <mahā-mudre> mahā-mudrā-mantra-padaiḥ svāhā // // āryya-u(13b1/336.1)[ṣṇī]ṣa-vijayā nāma dhāraṇī parisamāptaṃ // ye [dha]rmmā vā ‘, hetu-prabhāvā ‘, hetu<m> tekhām {?} (.2) tathāgataḥ h<y> avadat teṣāṃś ca ‘, yo nirodha ‘, evaṃ-vādi mahā-śravan<aḥ> // // śubhaṃ // //

Reconstructed Text

(11b1/332.1) oṃ namo buddhāya¹⁵ // oṃ namo bhagavate //¹⁶ sarvva-trailokya-prati(.2)viśiṣṭāya buddhāya te namaḥ //

tad-yathā // oṃ bhrūṃ bhrūṃ bhrūṃ // śodhaya śodhaya¹⁷ // (.3) viśodhaya viśodhaya // a-sama¹⁸-samantāvabhāsa-spharaṇa-gati-gagana¹⁹-sva(.4)bhāva-viśuddhe // uṣṇīṣa-vijaya-pariśuddhe // abhiṣiṅcantu²⁰ mām sa(.5)rva-tathāgatāḥ sugata-vara²¹-vacanāmṛtābhiṣekair mahā²²-mudrā²³-mantra-(12a1/333.1) padaiḥ //

¹⁵ Ms *buddhāyaḥ!* This phrase of homage is missing in both Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien!

¹⁶ Ms *bhagavatye* (no daṇḍa). This may have meant *bhagavatyai*, dat., with the deity in mind.

¹⁷ The scribe has most probably dropped a repetition sign “2” at the end of the line!

¹⁸ Ms omits *-sama-*, most probably through the scribe’s carelessness, as it is followed by the same letters.

¹⁹ The scribe writes *gagaṇa-* (for *gagana-*) in all cases! No further note will therefore be given hereinafter.

²⁰ Ms *abhiṣiṅ<can>tu!* The scribe has certainly dropped *ca* (with *anusvāra*), i.e. *cam!*

²¹ Ms omits *vara-*, a usual careless mistake as the following word begins with the same sound *va-*!

²² Ms *mmahā-* after *-r* of *°air!* This phenomenon is very common within words, e.g. *dharmma-*, *karmma-*.

²³ Ms missing *mudrā-*, since the sound *m-* is repeated thrice! Another careless mistake!

oṃ āhara āhara // āyuh²⁴-saṃdhāraṇi²⁵ // śodhaya śodhaya // viśodhaya
viśodhaya // gagana-svabhāva-viśuddhe // uṣṇīṣa-(.2)vijaya-pariśuddhe²⁶ //
sahasra-raśmi-²⁷saṃcodite // sarva-tathāgatāvalokini // ṣaṭ-pāramitā-paripū(.3)raṇi
// sarva-tathāgata-mātra²⁸ // daśa-bhūmi-pratiṣṭhite // sarva-tathāgata-
hr̥dayādhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭhite²⁹ svāhā³⁰ //

(.4) oṃ mudre mudre mahā-mudre // vajra-kāya-saṃhatana-³¹pariśuddhe //
sarva-karmāvaraṇa-viśuddhe // pratinivartanā(.5)ya // mamāyur-viśuddhe³² //
sarvva-tathāgata-samayādhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭhite svāhā //³³

oṃ muni muni mahā-muni // vimuni vimuni³⁴ mahā-vimuni // mati mati mahā-
mati // ma-mati su-(.3)mati // tathāgata-bhūta-³⁵koṭi-pariśuddhe // visphurita-
buddhe // viśuddhe //³⁶

oṃ he he jaya jaya vijaya³⁷ // sma(.4)ra smara // sphara sphara³⁸ // ³⁹sphāraya

²⁴ Ms *āyu-* (for *āyuh-*), which must simply be a careless mistake, not by Middle Indicism! Cf. Yüan-Koryō *mamāyuh-*^o, but Tz'ü-hsien *āyuh-* (or possibly *āyu-*)!

²⁵ Ms °*ṇi* for °*ṇi*, voc. (= Yüan-Koryō). Cf. °*lokini*, voc. (12a2/333.2), °*pariūrāṇi*, voc. (12a2-3/333.2-3)!

²⁶ Ms °*suddhe* (for °*suddhe*), a simple mistake as noted above.

²⁷ Ms *rasmī-* (for *raśmi-*) in all cases, as noted above. No further note will therefore be given hereinafter.

²⁸ So reads Ms (for normal Skt. *mātar*, voc., of *mātr-*)! It may well be a confusion of the vocative forms of fem. *ā-*stems, i.e. *māt(r)ā-* (cf. *ambā-* : *amba*, voc., “Mother!”; RV +); cf. Edgerton, *BHSGr*, 9.15, 13.7! Cf. Yüan-Koryō & Tz'ü-hsien °*māte*, voc. (of *mātā-* < *mātr-*)!

²⁹ Ms °*ā<dhiṣṭhānā>dhiṣṭhite*, a usual careless mistake by the scribe as mentioned above. No further note will therefore be given hereinafter.

³⁰ Ms *svābhāḥ* (for *svābhā*) as mentioned above.

³¹ Ms *vaj<r>a-kāya-sa<m>hata<na>*; Yüan-Koryō & Tz'ü-hsien *vajra-kāya-saṃhatana-*. See next note!

³² Ms simply *viśuddhe*, which may be out of place. Cf. Yüan-Koryō & Tz'ü-hsien: *mamāyur-viśuddhe*!

³³ This whole paragraph is repeated in the Ms!: *oṃ mudre 2 mahā-mudre vaj<r>a-kāya-sa<m>(12b1 / 334.1)[hatana-pariśuddhe] ' sarvva-karmāvara[ṇa-pa]riśuddhe pratiniva[r]tānāya viśuddhe sa<r>vva-tathāgata-samayā(.2)<dhiṣṭhānā>dhiṣṭhite svāhā //*

³⁴ The repetition sign “2” is mistakenly missed by the scribe.

³⁵ Ms *tathāgata-bh[ū]ta-*^o, i.e. *tathāgata-bhūta-*^o, must be wrong. Cf. Yüan-Koryō: *tathatā-bhūta-*^o. But Tz'ü-hsien *tathā-bhūta-kuṭi-*^o may also be corrupt!

³⁶ Ms *visphurita-<buddhe>*! I wonder if Yüan-Koryō *visphuṭa-buddhe* / *śuddhe* / and Tz'ü-hsien *visphuṭa-viśuddhe* make better sense! I leave the question of *visphuṭa-* / *visphurita-* for the time being!

³⁷ Ms *jaya jaya vijayā* (not *vijaya*)! Cf. Yüan-Koryō *jaya jaya* / *vijaya vijaya*. Tz'ü-hsien *jaya jaya mahā-jaya*!

³⁸ So reads Yüan-Koryō, while Ms *sma smara sma* (a mere corruption?); cf. Tz'ü-hsien *sphura sphura*! The latter may suggest something in relation to *visphuṭa-* / *visphurita-*!?

³⁹ Before this reads Ms strangely annoying *sma* again!

sphāraya // sarva-buddhādhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭhite⁴⁰ svāhā //

om śuddhe śuddhe // bu(.5)ddhe buddhe⁴¹ // vajre vajre mahā-vajre⁴² // su-vajre // vajra-garbhe // jaya-garbhe // vijaya-garbhe // vajra-jvala-garbhe⁴³ // (13a1/335.1) vajrodbhave⁴⁴ // vajra-sambhave⁴⁵ // vajriṇi // vajraṃ bhavantu⁴⁶ // mama śāriraṃ sarva-satvānāṃ ca kāya-pariśuddhir⁴⁷ bha(.2)vantu // mama sadā⁴⁸ sarva-gati-pariśuddhiś ca // sarva-tathāgata-hṛdayā<dhiṣṭhā>dhiṣṭhite // ⁴⁹ sarva-tathāgatāś ca māṃ⁵⁰ samā(.3)śvāsāyantu //

om buddhe buddhe⁵¹ // siddhya siddhya // bodhaya bodhaya // vibodhaya vibodhaya⁵² // mocaya mocaya // vimocaya vimocaya // śodhaya śodhaya // {.4}⁵³ viśodhaya viśodhaya // samantān mocaya mocaya // samanta-raśmi-pariśuddhe⁵⁴ // sarva-tathāgata-(.5)hṛdayādhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭhite⁵⁵ //

om mudre mudre mahā-mudre // ⁵⁶ mahā-mudrā-mantra-pade⁵⁷ // svāhā // //

⁴⁰ Ms *sarva-buddhā[nām]dhiṣṭhānā[m]dhiṣṭh<i>te!*

⁴¹ The repetition sign “2” is missing again – at the turn of lines!

⁴² Ms *ma{va!}j<r>e 2 mahā-vaj<r>e!*

⁴³ So read Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien; Ms *vaj<r>a-joāsā{vālā?}-garbhe!*

⁴⁴ So read Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien; Ms repeats *vajodbhave* (12b5-13a1) *vajodbhave*, again at the turn of lines / folios!

⁴⁵ Ms *sarva-<va>j<r>a-sambhave*, which may simply be a corruption for *vajra-°!* Cf. Yüan-Koryō *vajra-sambhave*; Tz’ü-hsien *vajra-sambhavi* (preceded by *vajrodbhavi*)!

⁴⁶ Ms *vaj<r>a-stambha <bha>va<n>tu!* This must originally have intended *vajraṃ bhavantu* (so Yüan-Koryō); but Tz’ü-hsien *vajraṃ bhavatu!*

⁴⁷ So reads Yüan-Koryō; Ms °-*pariśu<ddhir>!* Cf. Tz’ü-hsien °-*pariśuddhiś ca bhavatu!*

⁴⁸ Ms *mama <sadā>!* Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien *me sadā.*

⁴⁹ This may well be out of place or superfluous, as the phrase is found at the end of the next paragraph. It is not found in Yüan-Koryō. But Tz’ü-hsien instead reads *sarva-tathāgatāḥ samāśvāsa-niṣṭhite!*

⁵⁰ The scribe must have carelessly dropped *māṃ!* Both Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien read it and make sense!

⁵¹ This may be emended to *buddhya buddhya* (so read Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien).

⁵² The repetition sign “2” is missing!

⁵³ The scribe repeats the phrase by mistake again at the turn of lines: *śo(.4)dhaya 2!*

⁵⁴ So read Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien; but Ms strangely *samanta-rasmi-parasmita-pariśuddhim!*

⁵⁵ So read Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien; but Ms *hrdayādhiṣṭhānā(m)dhiṣṭhite!*

⁵⁶ Ms missing *mahā-mudre*, which read Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien.

⁵⁷ So reads Yüan-Koryō, but but Tz’ü-hsien *<mahā-mudrā>mantra-pada-niṣṭhite!* Ms °-*padaiḥ*; cf. Ms at 12a1 °-*padaiḥ*, preceded by *sugata-vara-vacanāmṛtābhisekair* (11b5-12a1)!

ārya-u(13b1/336.1)ṣṇīṣa-vijayā⁵⁸ nāma dhāraṇī parisamāptā⁵⁹ //

⁶⁰ye dharmā⁶¹ hetu-prabhavā⁶² hetuṃ teṣāṃ⁶³ (.2) tathāgato⁶⁴ hy avadat /
teṣāṃ⁶⁵ ca yo nirodha evaṃ-vādi⁶⁶ mahā-śramaṇaḥ⁶⁷ //

// śubhaṃ //

Concluding Remarks in Brief

This version from Nepal is very corrupt in various ways, as can be seen above. I may have pointed out those careless mistakes rather bitterly. One may doubt if it is worth examining such a corrupt text as this. I would nevertheless think it necessary at this stage to study even this kind of sample text for future investigations.

It is therefore to be much regretted that, owing to limited time and space, I have been unable to compare it with the versions at Chü-yung-kuan in the Yüan dynasty (inscribed ca. 1345 CE) and at Yeon-bog-sa in the Koryō dynasty (cast in 1346 CE) in more detail (see footnote 3 above). These seem to me the most elaborate and best collated *UvDh* version among the extant texts outside the Indic region.

⁵⁸ Ms °-vijayā! It must simply be a mistake, not the confusion with *bīja*- and the like!

⁵⁹ Ms °ptam, a simple habitual mistake, not the confusion of gender!

⁶⁰ There is no end of quoting various examples of the so-called “Pratītyasamutpāda-gāthā”, although it still remains with a number of philological problems on this verse, in particular metrical. This *gāthā* is missing in Yüan-Koryō & Tz’ü-hsien. For the time being see e.g. the articles by A. Yuyama and Y. Kurumiya in Japanese: 湯山明, “《十二因縁呪》覚え書き”, 印度學佛教學研究, XX, 1 (1971), p. 448(48)-444(52); 久留宮圓秀, “もう一つの法身偈”, 浅井圓道先生古稀記念論文集・日蓮教学の諸問題 (京都・平楽寺書店, 1997), p. 915-933, and the most recent work in this connection Marek Mejer, “The *Ārya-dharma-dhātu-garbhā-vivaraṇa* Ascribed to Nāgārjuna”, *Sūryacandrāya: Essays in Honour of Akira Yuyama On the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, edited by Paul Harrison and Gregory Schopen (= *Indica et Tibetica*, XXXV) (Swisttal-Odendorf 1998), p. 125-133.

⁶¹ Ms here reads *vā* ; superfluously. This may have meant an emphatic *vā* (cf. Edgerton, *BHSD*, p. 475b, *vā*, s.v. 2)!?

⁶² Ms °-prabhāvā, but °-prabhāvā(h) must certainly be original (cf. Yuyama, *op.cit.*, *passim*)!

⁶³ Ms *hetu<ṃ> tekhām* {?!}

⁶⁴ Ms *tathāgataḥ* must simply be a mistake.

⁶⁵ Ms *teṣāṃś*, a hyper-Sktic mistake!

⁶⁶ Ms °-vādi must simply be a mistake (cf. Yuyama, *op.cit.*, p. 447(49)f.; §5)!

⁶⁷ Ms °-śravaṇa<aḥ> (not with retroflex *ṇ*) is simply a mistake for *śramaṇaḥ*; it may not be a graphical confusion with *śravaṇa*- (cf. Edgerton, *BHSD*, p. 534b, *q.v.*)!

With regard to source materials, there still remain a large number of texts, including the tomb inscriptions which have recently been unearthed in the Yünnan Province. There may be undiscovered inscriptional evidence on the Indian subcontinent in addition to manuscripts.

The accumulation of such tiny research work will be beneficial not just in the field of Buddhist history but to Asian studies as a whole.

**A Mahāyānist Criticism of *Arthaśāstra*:
The Chapter on Royal Ethics in the
*Bodhisattva-gocaropāya-viṣaya-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa-sūtra****

Michael ZIMMERMANN

The **Bodhisattva-gocaropāya-viṣaya-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa-sūtra*¹ (*BGUVVNS*) is available in a Tibetan and two Chinese translations.² Its title could be translated as “Sūtra which Expounds Supernatural Manifestations [that are Part of] the Realm of Stratagems in the Bodhisattva’s Field of Action”. The second Chinese translation, however, carries the name of the main expounder of the sūtra, Sazhe’niganzi 薩遮尼乾子, as the title: *Da sazhe’niganzi suo shuo jing* 大薩遮尼乾子所說經: “Great Sūtra Expounded by Satyaka Nirgranthaputra”.³ What attracted my interest in this sūtra is the sixth chapter in the Tibetan translation, corresponding to the first part of the fifth chapter in the Bodhiruci translation (*Ch*₂), entitled

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¹ The titles in the Tibetan read as follows: *’Phags pa byang chub sems dpa’i spyod yul gyi thabs kyi yul la rnam par ’phrul ba bstan pa shes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo*; the transliterated Skt.: *Ārya-bodhisattva-gocaropāya-viṣaya-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa-nāma-mahā-yāna-sūtra*. The title probably derives from part (3) of the sūtra (see my summary for parts (1) through (10) below). For the Chinese titles see below. With the chapters on *ekayāna* and the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine in the *BGUVVNS* deals J. Takasaki 高崎直道, *Nyoraizō shisō no keisei (Formation of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory)* 如来藏思想の形成, Tokyo: Shunjū-Sha, 1974, pp. 254-273.

² Cp. the list of abbreviations at the end of this article for detailed references.

³ In the Tibetan the expounder’s name is given as *gCer bu pa’i bu bden smra(s)*, an interpreting rendering of the same Skt. Satyaka Nirgranthaputra (also *Ch*₁: Sazhe’niganzi 薩遮尼乾子 for Satyaka Nirgranthaputra). The term *nirgrantha* usually designates non-Buddhist ascetics, in particular Jaina monks; the second member *-putra* serves to show that the expounder is a member of that group (cp. Ludwig Alsdorf, *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Albrecht Wezler, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1974, pp. 375 n. 9 and 587ff.). The preacher (Pāli: Saccaka Niganthaputta) appears in several Pāli sūtras and Mahāyāna texts. Most notably, we find him as the Buddha’s interlocutor in two sūtras at *MN* I.227-237 (*Cūlasaccakasutta*) and *MN* I.237-251 (*Mahāsaccakasutta*). For references cp. Chizen Akanuma 赤沼智善, *Indo bukk’yō koyū meishi jiten (*Dictionary of Indian Buddhist Proper Names)* 印度佛教固有名词辞典, Tokyo: Hōzōkan, ⁵1994, pp. 553f. For sake of brevity, in what follows I shall refer to Satyaka Nirgranthaputra simply as “Satyaka”.

rGyal po'i tshul (**Rājanīti*) and *Wanglun* 王論 respectively.⁴ It deals with the rights and obligations of a righteous king (*dharmarāja(n)*) concerning mainly his relation to his subjects and material wealth, the tax system, measures of punishment, the classification of crimes, warfare, his rules of conduct, and the question of the scriptural grounding of his ruling. All these issues can be subsumed under what has traditionally been called *rājadharma*, the moral, ritual and political codes of a king.⁵ Other more or less synonymously used terms for this concept are *rājasāstra*, *rājanīti*, *daṇḍanīti* or *arthaśāstra*.⁶ Of particular interest is the denomination *daṇḍanīti*. The term *daṇḍa* originally means “stick, staff”, and derived from it, also “punishment”.⁷ It is thus clear that punishment was understood as a dominating factor among the duties of a king. We will come back to this later on.

The chapter on *rājanīti* in the *BGUVVNS* is missing in the oldest translation from the fifth century by Guṇabhadra suggesting that it was only later added to the sūtra.⁸ There are two

⁴ The following descriptions are, if there are no additional remarks, based on the Tibetan. The relation between the three translations seems complicated but this is not the place to discuss their relations and the textual history of the sūtra in detail. Generally speaking, Guṇabhadra's translation (*Ch₁*) from the fifth century is shorter than the other Chinese translation. This is due not only that some passages can be found only in Bodhiruci's translation but also because Guṇabhadra has a more concise style. For the most part, the Tibetan runs parallel to the first Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra. *Ch₂*, on the other hand, seems to have incorporated commentarial (and in some instances apparently less authentic) elements, and even shows, in certain passages, different interpretations which were probably not part of the Indian text (cp. n. 30). In many cases, however, the meaning of the sometimes unclear Tibetan translation becomes thereby elucidated, its basic structure more easy to grasp. This relation between *Tib* and *Ch₂* also holds true for our chapter on *rājanīti*.

⁵ Cp. Kane III.1ff.

⁶ Cp. Kane I.149ff.; III.4ff.

⁷ Cp. Manfred Mayrhofer, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindiarischen*, I. Band, Lieferung 9, Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1991.

⁸ By no means, however, can we be sure that passages missing in (an) older translation(s) should more or less automatically be treated as interpolations. The absence of a text part in a translation may have different reasons. The text part could be deliberately omitted by the translator for some motive (cp. Yuyama arguing that Kumārajīva knew about the existence of the last part of the fifth chapter in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* but omitted it because of grammatical, prosodical and stylistic reasons: Akira Yuyama, “Why Kumārajīva Omitted the Latter Half of Chapter V in Translating the Lotus Sutra, in *Festschrift Dieter Schlingloff*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm, Reinbek: Dr. Inge Wezler, Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 1996, 325-330); the text on which the older translation is based could be a different recension lacking the text part in question, but must not necessarily be the older recension (the analysis of the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* yields such a result in regard to its two recensions, which both existed already in the fifth century; cp. the author's forthcoming Ph.D. thesis); even if we come to the conclusion that a part of the text was interpolated into the scripture at a later stage, it can well be possible that the this is of old origin and had been circulating separately

observations, which could further strengthen the assumption that the chapter in question was only inserted later and does not fit homogeneously into the text. The first regards its content: The chapter is mainly dealing with **pragmatic** questions regarding the political ethics of a king which by their nature are different from the more theoretical topics expounded before and after it, viz., the ten paths of wholesome actions (*kuśala-karma-patha*), the merit resulting from food offerings to ascetics, and the immoral behaviour of kings and brahmins. The second point, a formal one, is the absence of verse portions within this chapter. In most of the other sections, the text is divided into small prose fragments followed by verses which repeat their content. Nevertheless, as an overall impression, the chapter shares the dialogue form of the whole sūtra, and seems to fit well into its narrative frame. We thus have to consider at least two alternatives: The chapter on *rājanīti* could be a later interpolation into the text, which would not necessarily mean that its content was composed after Guṇabhadra's translation of the sūtra. The portion could well contain a very old nucleus that was just slightly adapted in order to fit into the framework of the sūtra. Considering the fact that towards the end of the *BGUVVNS* it is predicted by the Buddha that one hundred years after his *parinirvāṇa*, under the rule of King Aśoka, the sūtra would re-appear after having been enclosed in the caskets containing the Buddha's relics, an eventual redactor could have felt encouraged to add these rules of political ethics in order to suggest, though not expressing it directly, that the glory of King Aśoka had also been due to following the royal ethics as taught in the *BGUVVNS*.

For the second alternative, i.e., the deliberate omission of the chapter by the team in charge of the translation led by Guṇabhadra, we are in need of a sound reason, which could provide us with a motive for such an omission. A possible motive could be seen in Guṇabhadra's conviction that a monk should not occupy himself with military affairs.⁹ As we shall see, the

before. In order to decide the question if a textual element was later interpolated or not we have no other choice than to look for possible reasons which could have led a redactor or translator to decide for its inclusion or exclusion. Internal textual discrepancies with regard to the part concerned should, of course, be another important criterion.

⁹ This statement is attributed to Guṇabhadra in the *Gaoseng zhuan* 高僧傳, a Chinese historical-biographical work compiled about sixty years after the death of Guṇabhadra: "Un religieux ne devrait pas s'occuper des affaires militaires." (Translation in Robert Shih, *Biographies des Moines Éminents (Kao Seng Tchouan) de Houei-Kiao*, Première partie: *Biographies des premiers traducteurs*, Bibliothèque du Muséon 54, Louvain – Leuven: Institut Orientaliste, 1968, p. 153). According to the *Gaoseng zhuan* he made this remark in a conversation with emperor Wang Xuanmo 王玄謨 after his army had defeated the prince whose favour Guṇabhadra had enjoyed for ten years. That Guṇabhadra himself obviously followed this rule is, again according to the *Gaoseng zhuan*

question of warfare is also part of the sixth chapter. It is thus possible to imagine that Guṇabhadra considered this question as well as some other issues involved in the chapter as not appropriate to be discussed in a Buddhist text or judged it as too delicate for himself and the Buddhist clergy in general and therefore omitted the whole chapter. At this stage, a definite decision for one of the two alternatives is not possible. For the sūtra itself, however, the inclusion of the sixth chapter means a considerable increase of passages with Satyaka as the main character.¹⁰

I shall now give a brief sketch of the contents of the *BGUVVNS* in order to clarify what is the doctrinal and narrative background of the chapter on political ethics:

- (1) *Nidāna*: The Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī requests the Buddha, who is staying in Ujjayanī in the park of king Caṇḍapadyota, to teach the *BGUVVNS*. The Buddha agrees and starts to expound twelve kinds of moral behaviour, which benefit living beings and let them attain *anuttarasamyak-sambodhi*.
- (2) **The six perfections (*pāramitā*)**: He expounds the perfections of *dāna*, *sīla*, *kṣānti*, *vīrya*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā* in twelve aspects respectively.
- (3) **The perfection of *upāya***: The Tathāgata further explains twelve ways how a bodhisattva should apply *upāyas* thus realising the perfection of *upāya*; he also expounds twelve *upāyas*¹¹ of the tathāgatas. The application of these *upāyas* is the source for the qualities which finally lead to the complete purification of buddha-fields.¹²
- (4) ***Ekayāna* doctrine**: The Buddha states that there is only one vehicle, the *Mahāyāna*, but depending from the practitioner's situation he teaches three different vehicles, though the *dharmadhātu* is undifferentiated. Also the non-Buddhist teachers are said to be the *upāya* of the Buddha; no other could reach a comparable status to a buddha within a buddha realm. Final emancipation is only possible through the Great Vehicle.
- (5) **Meeting the king**: Satyaka, followed by thousands of other *nirgranthakas*, meets king Caṇḍapadyota¹³. Satyaka admonishes him to keep the ten paths of wholesome actions (*kuśala-karma-patha*) and illustrates the negative results in the next rebirths if they were not respected.

(ibid. p. 153), documented by the fact that among the letters which Guṇabhadra had sent to the prince nothing relating to military affairs could be found. His letters had been examined after the defeat. This further increased Wang Xuanmo's respect for the monk.

¹⁰ The sixth chapter covers about one fifth of the whole text. All passages with Satyaka as the main character (including the sixth chapter) amount to more than three fifth of the sūtra.

¹¹ The *upāyas* contain the five *kaṣāyas* and other negative or differentiating elements. The sixth *upāya* is the manifestation of different vehicles (*theg pa tha dad pa* (S 19a4); *Ch₂*: 示現三乘差別濁 (T 325a29f.): “manifesting the degradation (*kaṣāya*) of the differentiation in three vehicles”). The tenth is the manifestation of quarrels with/among non-Buddhists (*gzhan mu stegs can gyi 'khrug pa yod par ston pa* (S 19a4f.); *Ch₁*: 現說法異 (T 304c20)).

¹² The exact relation between the *upāyas* and the qualities remain unclear in *Tib* and *Ch₂*. My understanding follows *Ch₁*: 如來方便出生十二功德成就精練佛土 ... (T 304c17f.).

¹³ King Caṇḍapadyota (*Ch₂*: 猛光王; in *Ch₁* just “Caṇḍa”: 嚴熾) of Ujjayanī is a well-known figure in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. Though it is said about him that he rules according to the *dharma*, the bald king, who suffers from insomnia, punishes terribly: he has all persons beheaded who mention in his presence the word “fat”, which he dislikes. He is revengeful; full of wrath he even kills one of his wives. On one occasion he has 80.000 brahmins and all demons of his country

(6) **Chapter on *rājanīti***: see below (A.-L).

(7)-(10):¹⁴ After partaking of the meal prepared for him and his followers, Satyaka expounds to the king the 15 qualities resulting from offering food etc. to ascetics and mentions the vices and shortcomings of several brahmins and kings.¹⁵ Upon the king's question if there were anybody faultless among living beings, Satyaka answers that there is Gautama of the Śākya clan, who is faultless due to his derivation from the Śākya lineage.¹⁶ In order to underline the faultlessness of the Buddha, Satyaka goes on to recount the Buddha's enormous amount of virtues, his 32 marks of a great man (*mahā-puruṣa-lakṣaṇa*), his 80 secondary characteristics (*anuvyañjana*), his 32 kinds of great compassion (*mahā-karuṇā*), etc.

The king then wants Satyaka to visit together with him the Buddha who resides in the same park.¹⁷ In front of the Buddha, Satyaka teaches Śāriputra the relativity and ultimate insignificance of all phenomenal differentiation, referring to the non-duality of the *dharmadhātu*. After the Buddha has explained to Mahāmaudgalyāyana that Satyaka makes use of many different manifestations¹⁸ to convert living beings and lead them to *samyaksambodhi*, Satyaka himself describes awakening as something beyond any characterisation, when asked by Mahākāśyapa why he had not yet attained it. The Buddha then predicts that Satyaka after many aeons would become a tathāgata and that the listeners present in that moment would be reborn in his realm.

Finally, the Buddha, speaking again to Mañjuśrī, points out the enormous amount of merit resulting from the propagation of the *BGUVVNS* and predicts that the sūtra will appear again after 100 years under the rule of a king called Aśoka. At that time people will not be able to gain faith into it and only after another 50 years, when they are finally following the Mahāyāna, the *BGUVVNS* will receive proper reverence.

At the very end the Buddha entrusts Ānanda with the transmission of the sūtra and provides him with several titles for it.

Let us now turn to the chapter on *rājanīti*. Before focusing on some crucial issues contained I will line out its main points of discussion. The chapter shows a strict dialogical structure: Throughout the chapter Caṇḍapadyota is listening to the explanations of Satyaka given in reply to the king's questions.

executed. (cp. Jampa Losang Panglung, *Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya Analysiert auf Grund der Tibetischen Übersetzung*, *Studia Philologica Buddhica* 3, Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1981, pp. 181-190).

¹⁴ I summarize chapter (7) through (10) under a single paragraph as their topics contribute only little to elucidate the position of the chapter on *rājanīti*. Chapter (7) to (10) account for more than half of the sūtra.

¹⁵ Among them are killing, adultery, drinking, gluttony, sluggardliness, a too compassionate attitude, slowness of acting, etc. The king listens patiently but can't control his temperament when Satyaka finally accuses him of being too passionate (*shin tu gtum; aticaṇḍa*), angry, and cruel. It is only after Satyaka apologises by stating that he should have chosen a better time to tell this truth to the king that Caṇḍapadyota spares his life.

¹⁶ Nirgrantha asserts that the faultlessness of Gautama was already mentioned in "our" Veda.

¹⁷ King Caṇḍapadyota orders under the threat of capital punishment all important representatives of his country with their attendants to join the meeting, which is described in terms of a huge public festival.

¹⁸ Among them we find the practitioner of non-Buddhist teachings, of the *śrāvakayāna* and the *pratyekabuddhayāna*, and also *bhikṣus*, titans, and gods.

- A. Definition of the meaning of *prajā*, *sattvaloka* and *bhājanaloka*. (S 29a7-30a1; Q 58a2-58b1; T 329b10-329c12)
- B. Satyaka states that living beings are protected by the merit resulting from their own good deeds¹⁹ or by the ruler. The denomination “ruler” (*dbang po*; **indra*) is only applied if the king by his moral and *dharma* loyalty pleases living beings. There are four kinds of rulers: a *cakravartin*, a *mahārāja*, a “fortress ruler” (*kham s kyī rgyal po*; *koṭṭarāja*) and a “province ruler” (*rgyal phran*; *maṅḍalin*).²⁰

There follows a description of the realm of a *cakravartin*: Adopting the *dharma*, he is endowed with the seven jewels; in his realm there is equality, no harm (*gnod*), no weapons,²¹ no enemy, no punishment; he himself lives according to the ten paths of wholesome actions and, what characterises him as a righteous king, he also encourages his subjects to do so. In regard to the question how to subjugate²² and control foreign realms, the text states that the rulers of other countries contentedly follow the *cakravartin*. He grants them sovereignty (*rnam par rgyal ba*; *vijaya*) but admonishes them also to follow him, be loyal to the *dharma*, and to adopt the principle of equality in their rule.²³ (S 30a1-32a6; Q 58b1-60a6; T 329c12-332c12)

¹⁹ Satyaka seems to refer to a state as described in the *Aggañña Suttanta* (DN III.27) and other texts, when a king is not required because living beings do not yet feel desire and as a result there is also no crime. Satyaka attributes this to the merit of their wholesome deeds. The second kind of protection, granted by the king, obviously must relate to a less ideal state.

²⁰ The Sanskrit equivalents are based on their occurrences in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra* (cp. *Tibetan-Sanskrit Word Index to the Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra*, eds. Yasunori Ejima and others, Tokyo: The Reiyukai, 1998). The *Mahāvīyutpatti* (ed. Ryōzaburō Sakaki, 2 vols., Kyoto 1916. Reprint Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1981), however, knows both Tibetan translations (3677: *kham s kyī rgyal po 'am rgyal phran*) for *koṭṭarāja* and has *māṅḍalikarāja* as another equivalent for *rgyal phran* (3674). *Ch*₂ in this passage simply reads: 一者轉輪王，二者少分王，三者次少分王，四者邊地王。(T 330a23f). T. Sako, in his article about the relation between *cakravartin* and minor rulers, cites the classification system of the *BGUVVNS* in n. 1 on page 1. Unfortunately he does not provide us with a reason why he considers *koṭṭarājan* as the equivalent for *rgyal phran* and not for *kham s kyī rgyal po* (cp. Toshio Sako 佐古年穂, “‘Tenrinnō – Shōō’ ni Kanren shite” (*Concerning the Relation ‘Cakravartin – Minor Ruler’) 「転輪王—小王」に関連して, in *Suguro Shinjō Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū* (**Felicitation Volume for Dr. Shinjō Suguro on his 70th Birthday*) 勝呂信静博士古希記念論文集, ed. *Suguro Shinjō Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū Kankō Kai*, Tokyo: Sankibō, 1996, 1-15 (866-852)).

²¹ Right after the description of the function of the seven jewels, however, a sword-jewel among the seven secondary jewels (軟寶) of the *cakravartin* is mentioned (T 331c21-332a1). This section is only found in *Ch*₂. The sword is said to fly through the air to a minor ruler in case he does not follow the orders of the *cakravartin*. When the minor ruler sees the sword he toes the line and thus the sword does not let occur the killing or the harming of any living being (... 而彼劍寶不起殺心害一衆生). The text adds that no king would use his weapons and everybody would follow voluntarily the *cakravartin* (?) (一切國土不加刀仗自然隨順).

²² *Legs par phab ste* probably for *abhinirjitya* (cp. Johannes Nobel, *Udrāyana, Die Tibetische Übersetzung des Sanskrittextes, Zweiter Teil: Wörterbuch*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1955, s.v. 'bebs-pa); the Chinese has 安慰降伏: “to surrender peacefully”.

²³ The Chinese translation goes on and has the *cakravartin* threaten the rulers in the following way: 若不除滅，我當與汝極大重罪。: “If [you] do not abolish [depraved doctrines], I will bring on you a heavy punishment!” The part concerning subjugation and control of the minor rulers has been translated in T. Sako’s article (op. cit. in n. 20) on p. 11 (S 32a1-5; Q 60a2-5; the Derge edition, on which his rendering is based, seems to have different readings though). In his note 26 he states that the part is missing in Bodhiruci’s translation. This is not correct. The passage is found in T 332b27-332c7. The first half of the passage of the *BGUVVNS* in the Tibetan appears nearly word by word in

- C. Only a *cakravartin* does not have to rely on *sāstras* (*Ch₂*: 王論法) when ruling his empire, due to his knowledge resulting from the *dharma* and the immaculate moral behaviour of his subjects. All other kings are in need of *sāstras*, which were revealed by the great *ṛṣis* in order to protect living beings. Immediately in the following passage the *arthaśāstra*(s) is/are criticised as harmful counterfeits of the right *dharma*, in which to have confidence is set on the same level as to take delight in the ten paths of unwholesome actions. A righteous king, however, should base himself on *sāstras* which are not characterised by greed (*rāga*), anger (*dveṣa*) and misguidedness (*moha*), but which have conscientiousness (*apramāda*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) as their essence. (*S* 32a6-33a4; *Q* 60a6-61a2; *T* 332c12-333a22)
- D. The righteous king should protect living beings by following the two above mentioned essentials: Conscientiousness is defined as keeping in mind the transitoriness of his wealth and his own life. Compassion comprises the favouring of the poor and those suffering from crimes, wars or famines as well as the adequate punishment of the “dishonourables” (*mi srūn pa; anājāneya*). Punishment, however, should be based on the five principles of (1) rightfulness (*samyāñc*), (2) efficacy of punitive power, (3) criminal intention of the accused, (4) renunciation of capital punishment, if it is evident that the case can be settled by merely “declaring the crime” (*skyon brjod*), and (5) if the case cannot be settled by merely “declaring the crime”, the infliction of hard punishments with a gentle (*mṛdu*) and compassionate mind free of anger (*dveṣa*), except capital punishment and mutilation. (*S* 33a5-34a7; *Q* 61a2-61b8; *T* 333a22-333b27)
- E. Simile about the compatibility of harsh punishment and compassion: Just like a loving father treats his son harshly to dispel his offences and to prevent him from further transgressions, in the same way should a righteous king deal with the punishment of his subjects. (*S* 34a7-35a1; *Q* 61b8-62a8; *T* 333b27-333c16)
- F. Five categories of “dishonourableness” and how they are to be punished: The underlying principle is to make the transgressors return to the right path. Capital punishment, etc. must in no case be inflicted. Rebellious leaders of subjugated countries should not be driven out from there. They should be urged to loyalty through “gratefulness (towards the righteous king) and fear”. By this way the king’s name would become renown. In cases of “dishonourableness” of the king he should correct himself as he would be afraid of rebirth in bad existences and the loss of his glory. If he did not know what is morally right and bad, he should ask ascetics and brahmins who would council him and who would name “with mild words” his transgressions. (*S* 35a1-37a1; *Q* 62a8-64a2; *T* 333c16-335b5)
- G. In order to protect the non-sentient world (*bhājanaloka*) a righteous king should never ravage what serves as very basis of human existence (food-supplies, houses, ponds, etc.).²⁴ By making offerings to the gods of his realm, he should protect them. Further, the categorisation in terms of dishonourableness of men who treat their parents, wife and employees badly, or who do not respect monks and brahmins, is discussed. Disrespect towards the latter group could annoy the gods and let them harm living beings through famines. (*S* 37a1-38a6; *Q* 64a2-65a3; *T* 335b5-336b24)
- H. A king should not inflict capital punishment or mutilation. The ordering of capital punishment would cause the revenge of the executed person.²⁵ In order to protect living beings rightly he

the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*AK*) (*Abhidharma-Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, ed. P. Pradhan. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967, 185.24-186.2). The same passage in *Ch₂*, on the other hand, is much longer with many details. Sako (p. 10) assumes that the *AK* passage is a quotation from a *sūtra*. Whatever the exact relation between the passage in the *AK* and the one found in the Tibetan version of the *BGUVVNS* may be, it demonstrates that *Ch₂* is probably far less a literal rendering of the Indian text, if not based on a different Indian recension at all.

²⁴ As a further argument against this kind of destruction, it is said that the king could thereby destroy the abodes of gods and animals. The text states that they all, i.e., humans, gods and animals are innocent.

²⁵ Cp. below and especially n. 64 for details and different interpretations.

should rather choose punishments without irreparable effect as medicine to cure the transgressor instead of frightening his subjects. (*S* 38a6-38b5; *Q* 65a3-65b1; *T* 336b24-336c7)

- I. The properties in the king's realm should neither be called the possession of the king nor that of others.²⁶ The righteous king must collect taxes but should refrain from collecting them in those cases of poverty which are the result of conditions beyond the subject's control like natural disasters or robbery. His attitude would be that of an ascetic or brahmin invited by somebody to eat but finally remaining without food, because the prepared food got lost due to circumstances for which the host is not responsible. (*S* 38b5-39b7; *Q* 65b1-66b1; *T* 336c7-337a21)
- J. Description of ten aspects that characterise a king who is based on conscientiousness and compassion and has realised the ideal of a righteous king. These ten aspects include personal qualities of the king such as fearlessness towards suffering or promptness of thought and action as well as factors concerning his reign such as loyalty and respect of his subjects or the absence of enemies. (*S* 39b7-40b4; *Q* 66b1-67a3; *T* 337a25-337c1)
- K. A righteous king should confront a hostile army with three stratagems. He should first try to avoid fighting by means of benevolence and favour or by showing his army's superiority to the enemy. Secondly, if this remains without success, he should reflect on the protection that he has to provide as a righteous king and on his prospective victory over the opponent. He should intend to get hold of the hostile soldiers alive. Only then his army should be addressed. Finally, as the third stratagem, he should structure his army in an efficacious way and enter into the battle. Even though he killed and wounded, the negative consequences for his merit would not effect him, if he accomplished his deeds with compassion and without resignation. On the contrary, because of his readiness to protect his subjects with his life and wealth his merit would become measureless. (*S* 40b4-41b5; *Q* 67a3-68a1; *T* 337c1-338a17)
- L. Finally, Satyaka enumerates eight views (*samjñā*) which a righteous king should hold. They centre on an attitude of compassion and love towards his subjects, a rehabilitating treatment of wrong-doers, and generosity with regard to his possessions. Keeping to these eight views would guarantee prosperity and inner peace for the country and the king's next birth among gods. The chapter ends with six verses repeating in part elements of the moral code of a righteous king. (*S* 41b5-43a5; *Q* 68a1-69a5; *T* 338a17-338c25)

This summary of the *BGUVVNS* has already made it clear that the sūtra deals with several distinct topics. After a more or less general introduction, the sūtra turns quickly to the application of stratagems (*upāya*) by the tathāgatas through which they purify their buddha-fields. As a form of stratagem, the tathāgatas also create heterodox religious movements and the other two vehicles in order to adapt their teaching to the circumstances of the practitioners. Final emancipation, as a matter of fact, is only possible through the teachings of the Mahāyāna, with a buddha residing at the head of each world system. This doctrine of *ekayāna*²⁷ certainly constitutes an element of "tolerance"²⁸ towards non-Mahāyānist

²⁶ Because they are created by the king's subjects but are protected by the king.

²⁷ The *ekayāna* doctrine is one of the central issues in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*. Also the *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanādasūtra*, as one of the main proponents of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, expounds the *ekayāna*.

²⁸ As far as I can see the system of *ekayāna* proposed here is a typical case of "Inklusivismus", in the sense the term was used by Paul Hacker. On the doctrinal level it would therefore be hard to speak of tolerance if we assume with Hacker that tolerance can only be found, "wo man sich der Fremdheit von gewissen Erscheinungen klar bewußt ist und sie dennoch im praktischen Umgang

teachings. It recognises these teachings as a necessary step in dealing with beings of different inclinations, though placing them clearly on a lower, preparatory level. Nevertheless, their existence does not provoke any hostility. This philosophical background could easily be employed in dealing with and “tolerating” a multireligious society.²⁹ The name of the main proponent of the sūtra, Satyaka Nirgranthaputra, is also characteristic. Usually the term *nirgrantha* designates non-Buddhist monks, in particular Jaina monks. Towards the end of the sūtra, however, Satyaka is – in accordance with the *ekayāna* doctrine – declared to be no more than a temporary manifestation on his way to become a fully awakened tathāgata.

After the explanations on the political ethics of a righteous king in the sixth chapter, the sūtra then deals with the virtues and the superiority of the Buddha. This part functions as a logical continuation of the *ekayāna* doctrine expounded in the first part. The sūtra here retreats into a less phenomenal, loftier sphere, free of any *upāya*-caused nuisances veiling the incontrovertible position of the Tathāgata.

Now, the position of the sixth chapter between these two main blocks (*upāya/ekayāna* and praise of the Buddha) is revealing. The affirmative attitude towards religious pluralism is part of the chapter itself: besides Buddhist monks, brahmins too serve as the moral counsellors of the king; nowhere is it stated that the *dharma* to be followed is particularly Buddhist, and there is no mentioning of buddhas or bodhisattvas throughout the whole section.³⁰ Religious heterogeneity is definitely the background against which these

duldet oder geistig gelten läßt.” (P. Hacker, “Religiöse Toleranz und Intoleranz im Hinduismus”, *Saeculum* 8.2/3, 1957, 167-179, p. 171; cp. also P. Hacker, *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Lambert Schmithausen, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978, index s.v. *Inklusivismus*). For discussions of Hacker’s “Inklusivismus” further see *Inklusivismus, Eine indische Denkform*, ed. Gerhard Oberhammer, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, Occasional Papers 2, Wien: Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien, 1983; with other Indian forms of approval of religious diversity deals A. Wezler, “Zur Proklamation religiös-weltanschaulicher Toleranz bei dem indischen Philosophen Jayantabhaṭṭa”, *Saeculum* 27.4, 329-347.

²⁹ In any case, Indian juridical literature binds the king to treat all religious groups according to their own customs. The king should even take care that their own customs are upheld. Cp. P. Hacker 1957: 168, op. cit. in the preceding note.

³⁰ In the Chinese, however, a tendency to stress the exclusive superiority of the Buddhist doctrine becomes manifest in some passages, e.g., in the section dealing with the question whom the king should consult in order to learn what is morally right and bad (F.). Whereas in the Tibetan the king is advised to ask both brahmins and ascetics, the Chinese reads:

於彼瞿曇法中住者是眞沙門，能行正道，利益衆生，是福田者，能知正法，是如法語者。

大王，當知。除彼沙門瞿曇法外，餘諸一切婆羅門等是名邪道，非實沙門，非法語者。

不應取語。(T 335a1-5; Ji 872b5-10)

guidelines for royal ethics have been established. The king is not a *cakravartin* whose realm is free of evil, but he deals with all different kinds of executive duties which, emerging from a different religio-political tradition, are partly in drastic opposition to the Buddhist *dharma*. The sphere he has to deal with is the world described in the sections on *upāya* and *ekayāna*. On the other hand, Satyaka's principles, though not openly propagated, are clearly inspired by an idealising Buddhist background, which joins hand with the lofty descriptions of the Buddha in the following sections. Is it possible for the king to keep loyalty to the Buddhist *dharma*? How deeply should he plunge into the realm of the *upāyas* of the tathāgatas? What should be his attitude towards the values of other religious doctrines? In other words, the sixth chapter thus finds itself torn between the Mahāyānist pretension of a soteriological monopoly as its doctrinal basis, and, on the other hand, the need to interact with a de facto pluralistic society being far from accepting this Mahāyānist standpoint as superior. The position of the chapter on *rājanīti* between the two main blocks, when seen from that perspective, also formally mirrors this conflict.

In the following I will focus on two issues included in Satyaka's exposition of political ethics which are in several respects different from the pertinent literature of *arthaśāstra*.³¹ Let us start with an outspoken criticism by Satyaka:³²

“Those who dwell in the *dharma* of that Gautama are the real *śramaṇas*, [they alone] are able to go along the right path and benefit living beings. It is they who are the [true] fields of merit (*puṇyakṣetra*); they know the right *dharma*, and they are the ones who preach in accordance with the *dharma*. Great King, [this you] should know: Apart from the *dharma* of that *śramaṇa* Gautama all other brahmins are called ‘[those on] the wrong path’, ‘not real *śramaṇas*’ and ‘those who do not preach the [right] *dharma*’. [Their] words should not be accepted!”

Later, in section H., the Chinese, again in contrast to the Tibetan, states that the **Buddha** does not allow the king to inflict capital punishment and mutilation (*T* 336c3; 336c6; *Ji* 874c21; 875a2).

³¹ By *arthaśāstra* literature I mean the *Arthaśāstra* by Kauṭalya as well as the relevant passages in the brahminic *dharmaśāstras* and the epics. The scope of these texts is wide, and the systems of values vary. The rules formulated there are evidently not of homogeneous nature. In this study, besides the *AŚ*, I have restricted myself to some of the most influential writings, viz., among the *dharmaśāstras*, the ones attributed to Manu and Yājñavalkya, and the *Śāntiparvan* chapter of the *Mahābhārata*. Since a detailed comparison with these sources is not the object of our discussion here, my references to them are only sporadic. The influence of the *AŚ*, possibly the main target of criticism of the *BGUVVNS*, on the actual politics in India has been characterised as restricted (cp. Kane I.197; Basham 1964: 125).

³² All following quotations are based on *S*. The variants provided for *Q* do not comprise differences in punctuation and the usual confusion between *nga/da* and *pa/ba*.

The Chinese runs as follows (obviously faulty variants are not provided):

王言。大師，云何名為邪法羅網之所纏心。答言。大王，於諸外道非義論¹中起義論想，於無益論生利益想，於非法中生是法想，於末世時非是智者所作論中以爲正論生於信心，熏修邪見以爲福德是名邪法羅網纏心。王言。大師，以何等法名為王論令諸小王依彼論法，治國，理民，是名如法能護

smras pa / log pa 'i chos kyis¹ 'khor ces bya ba gang yin /
smras pa / don gyi bstan bcos su ming btags pa / gnod par 'gyur ba dang ldan pa / dam pa 'i
chos ltar bcos pa / rtsod pa 'i dus na skyes bu dam pa ma lags pas bgyis pa la mos pas yongs su
bgos² pa 'i lta bas yon tan du lta ba lags so //
smras pa / bram ze bstan bcos gang la chos dang ldan pa 'i rgyal pos brten³ cing skye dgu
skyong bar byed pa 'i bstan bcos gang yin /
smras pa / rgyal po chen po de ni bstan bcos gang las mi rigs pa 'i chags pa dang / mi rigs pa 'i
zhe sdang dang / mi rigs pa 'i gti mug gi gnyen po rang bzhin nam / rab tu dbye ba 'am / phan
yon gyi sgo nas bstan pa te / de la gnyen po 'i rang bzhin ni 'di lags te / 'di lta ste / de 'i gnyen
por 'gyur ba ma chags pa dge ba 'i rtsa ba dang / zhe sdang ma mchis pa⁴ dge ba 'i rtsa ba dang /
gti mug ma mchis pa⁴ dge ba 'i rtsa ba lags so // de la gnyen po kun nas slong ba ni 'di lags te /
'di lta ste / bag mchis pa dang / snying rje lags so // (S 32b7-33a4; Q 60b5-61a2)
¹ S: *kyi* (cp. S 32b4); ² Q: *bsgos*; ³ Q: *rten*; ⁴ S: *pa 'i* for *pa*.

[The king] asked: “What does ‘to be confused by a wrong law (*mithyādharmā*)’ mean?”

Answer: “It is to [wrongly] conceive of the so-called *arthaśāstra*(s) as virtuous (*guṇa*) [caused] by [a wrong] view (*dṛṣṭi*) habituated through belief [into these writings. But those *arthaśāstra*(s)] are connected with what leads to harm, [they are] counterfeits of the good law (**saddharma-pratirūpaka*) and made by bad people in [this last and] vicious [of the four] age[s] (*kaliyuga*).”

[The king] asked: “Brahmin, which are the *śāstras* on that a king loyal to the *dharma* bases himself and protects [his] subjects (*prajā*)?”

Answer: “Great King, they are [those] *śāstras* in which the antidotes (*pratipakṣa*) against the evil (*viṣama*) greed (*rāga*), the evil anger (*dveṣa*), and the evil misguidedness (*moha*) have been expounded according to [their] nature, [their] subdivisions (*prabheda*), and [their] benefits (*anuśamsā*). Thereby the nature of the antidotes is [the following]: the wholesome root (*kuśalamūla*) of the [evil’s] antidote “without greed”, the wholesome root of the [evil’s] antidote “without anger”, and the wholesome root of the [evil’s] antidote “without misguidedness”. What thereby gives rise (*samutthāna*) to the antidotes is conscientiousness (*apramāda*) and compassion (*karuṇā*).”

This paragraph openly blames the *arthaśāstra*(s) as leading to violence. As mentioned in the beginning, the term *arthaśāstra* is nothing but another designation for the traditional codices of a king. The best known representative of the *arthaśāstra* literature is the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya (*Aś*), a work which probably came into existence as early as the late 4th century BCE.³³ However, it is highly probably that it never reached the same range of popularity as did the *Manusmṛti*, the *Mahābhārata* or the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which, beside others,

衆生。答言。大王，離諸顛倒貪欲之心，離諸顛倒瞋恚之心，離諸顛倒愚癡之心，依對治，依實體，依差別，依利益。依對治，依實體者對所治法所謂名爲不貪善根，不瞋善根，不癡善根。云何能起所治法，能治法。所治法者謂放逸心及無慈心。能治法者謂行法行王不放逸心，大慈悲心。
 (T 333a10-23; Ji 869b17-869c11)

¹ Var. given in T: 相 for 論.

³³ Cp. Hartmut Scharfe, *Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kauṭalya*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1968, pp. 1ff.

all contain portions dealing with the duties of a king.³⁴ It is widely acknowledged that parts of these expositions, including the *AŚ* par excellence, are Machiavellian in their nature, following the principle of the end justifying the means. They are characterised by subtle or unscrupulous cunning, deception, expediency and dishonesty. The punishments suggested are horrible; mutilation as well as death penalty occur frequently.³⁵ The main goal is to provide the king with the most efficacious means to continuously acquire more wealth for him and his country and to let him expand his territory, which amounts to granting protection to his subjects from enemies inside and outside the country.

Even Kane, who generally speaks of the *arthaśāstras* in high terms, remarks that “the Mahābhārata and the Kauṭīliya both support in several places the adoption of means entirely divorced from all rules of fair dealing and morality” and provides plenty of examples in support of his view.³⁶ Especially Kauṭilya’s *AŚ* can serve as an example par excellence for the above described tendency and did not remain without criticism among brahminic authors.³⁷

We do not know which works dealing with *arthaśāstra* the authors or compilers of the *BGUVVNS* had in mind when putting forth their criticism. But it is clear that the general tendency underlying these works, i.e., that the end justifies the means, does come into collision with key concepts of the Buddhist ethics. The *BGUVVNS* consequently rejects these traditional works as “not virtuous”, because they were (1) leading to violence, (2) only pretending to be the good law, and (3) composed by bad people in the *kaliyuga*. Regarding the two latter accusations, the *BGUVVNS* seems to follow the *Purāṇic* conception of time. The *Purāṇas* assume a cycle of four ages (*yuga*) through which the world goes. The last of these four ages, the *kaliyuga*, is said to start with the war of the *Mahābhārata* and is the most

³⁴ There are, as a matter of fact, many more old Indian texts dealing with *rājanīti*. For a comprehensive listing cp. Kane I.13.

³⁵ Basham (1959: 119) mentions impalement as the usual form of execution. For the two forms of impalement, viz., “impalement proper” and “impalement after decapitation” cp. A. Wezler’s “An Internal Contradiction in the Mṛcchakaṭīka? Some Remarks on Impalement in Ancient and Mediaeval India” in *Festschrift Dieter Schlingloff*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm, Reinbek: Dr. Inge Wezler, Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 1996, 287-306.

³⁶ Cp. Kane III.10ff.

³⁷ Such criticism is put forward in the *Kādambarī* of Bāṇa, a work of the 7th century, which blames the *AŚ* to be “without compassion” (*nirghṛṇa*) and to contain for the main part teachings that are “exceedingly cruel” (*atiṅśamsa*): *kiṃ vā teṣām sāmpratam yeṣām atinśamsaprāyopadeśanirghṛṇam kauṭilyaśāstram pramāṇam* / (source cited in Kane I.174, n. 161).

degenerate of the ages. The right *dharma* is forgotten and evil prevails. Associating the composition of the *arthaśāstras* with this late period does not necessarily disqualify them as guidelines with some authority. It is common to both epic and Buddhist mythology to assume that long time before, at a stage when living beings were still free of desire and misguidedness, there was no need for any kind of punitive regulations and even no need for a king in charge of maintaining justice and protection from external enemies.³⁸ Nevertheless, by arguing that the *arthaśāstras* are only a product of the last age, the *BGUVVNS* probably tries to stress their relativity and thereby denies their claim for authority. For the *BGUVVNS* it is nothing but a wrong view that habituates living beings to follow the *arthaśāstras*. When the authors of the sūtra claim that the *arthaśāstras* are “counterfeits of the good law”³⁹, they probably intend to stress that the underlying principle is not in accordance with basics of the Buddhist doctrine and that they only pretend to be for the benefit of all living beings. In the perception of the authors of the *BGUVVNS* the guidelines of the *arthaśāstras* are rather impregnated with the “poisons” of the degenerated age and should thus not be accepted as “good”.

The main argument (1) against the *arthaśāstras* refers to their harming nature. This is followed by explanations of a set of elements which define the right guidelines for a king. According to them all political measures of a king should be based on the antidotes against the three fundamental defilements greed, anger and misguidedness.⁴⁰ They are mentioned frequently in Buddhist literature as the three poisons (*doṣa*) or the three unwholesome roots (*akuśalamūla*).⁴¹ The sūtra then rather unorthodoxly states that conscientiousness (*apramāda*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) are the factors that give rise to the antidotes, whose natures consist in the absence of the three poisons. This pair, i.e., conscientiousness and

³⁸ For the Buddhist tradition cp. the *Aggañña Suttanta* (DN III.80ff.); for the *Mahābhārata* see Kane III.4. Exceptional for the Buddhist tradition is the 12th chapter of the *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*. In this chapter the god Brahman argues that the king is created by the gods (*Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*, *Das Goldglanz-Sūtra*, *Ein Sanskrittext des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus*, ed. Johannes Nobel, Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1937, p. 134.7-135.3).

³⁹ The term *saddharma* usually designates the Buddhist *dharma*.

⁴⁰ The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* mentions the following antidotes against the three poisons: *aśubhā bhāvanā rūgasya pratipakṣaḥ* / (115.31f.; quoting the *Ratnamegha[sūtra]*); *dveṣasya maitrī pratipakṣaḥ apriyasattvādarśanaḥ ca* / (117.8f.); *mohānuśayasya pratīyasamutpādadarśanaḥ pratipakṣaḥ* // (120.17) (*Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva*, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 11, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961).

⁴¹ Cp. Jikido Takasaki, *An Introduction to Buddhism*, Tokyo: The Tōhō Gakkai, 1987, 144ff.

compassion, appears several times throughout the chapter and can undoubtedly be said to function in the *BGUVVNS* as the essential factors underlying a Buddhist inspired rule. To find *karuṇā* in such a central position is not surprising as it can be said one of the dominant, if not **the** dominant, Mahāyānist response to the saṃsāric world. It is thus just natural that *karuṇā* lies at the bottom of the antidotes against the three main defilements. It corresponds to friendliness (*maitrī*), which functions as the antidote of anger in the more classical Mahāyānist schemes (see above).

Apramāda, however, maintains a less eminent position in Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is well attested in the Pāli scriptures (*appamāda*) where it is said to underlie all spiritual progress in terms of thoughtfulness (synonym to *sati-avippavāsa*) and zeal.⁴² The *Abhidharmakośa* defines *apramāda* as the cause for the cultivation of wholesome *dharma*s and adds that, according to others, it serves as the guard of the mind.⁴³ Besides this, the term *apramāda* is also employed less scholastically to express carefulness and caution in mundane affairs. This is the general usage of the term in the *arthaśāstra* literature when in the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* the king is said to protect his subjects “with effort and conscientiousness”,⁴⁴ to “continuously keep up the rod (of punishment) and handle (his affairs) conscientiously”,⁴⁵ or when the king is admonished not to be without conscientiousness, for this would cause him to stumble and bereave him of his life.⁴⁶ In the *AŚ* the term does not appear at all; its negative counterpart *pramāda*, however, is found frequently and, when used in relation to another person, it can mean a stratagem against that person.⁴⁷

The *BGUVVNS* itself defines *apramāda* immediately after the above-cited portion in the following words:⁴⁸

⁴² For *pramāda* as the supreme (*agga*) among the wholesome *dharma*s described in six similes cp. *AN* III.364f; cp. also *SN* I.86ff. The last words of the Buddha before his death are an invitation to strive with conscientiousness/zeal (... *appamādena sampādethāti*; *DN* II.156).

⁴³ *Apramādaḥ kuśalānām dharmānām bhāvanā / kā punas tebhyo 'nyā bhāvanā / yā teṣv avahitātā / cetasa āraḥṣeti nikāyāntariyāḥ* sūtre paṭhanti / [*read °iyāḥ for °itāḥ] (Abhidharma-Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967, 55.7f.).*

⁴⁴ *ŚP* 76.3: *sarvās caiva prajā nityam rājā dharmeṇa pālayet / utthānenāpramādena pūjayet caiva dhārmikān //*; similar *Manu* 7.142cd: *yuktaś caivāpramattaś ca parirakṣed imāḥ prajāḥ //*.

⁴⁵ *ŚP* 12.9cd: *nityam udyatadaṇḍaḥ syād ācarec cāpramādataḥ //*.

⁴⁶ *ŚP* 83.28ab: *pramādād dhi skhaled rājā skhalite nāsti jīvitam /*.

⁴⁷ Cp. *AŚM* 197.

⁴⁸ *Ch*₂: 知身無常，資生無常，善自觀身，見諸過失，能如實知，如見遠離受用資生。行法行王雖得自在，不行非法，如是名為不放逸心。(T 333a23-25; Ji 869c11-14)

rgyal po chen po de la chos dang ldan pa'i rgyal po'i longs spyod rnams dang / bdag nyid kyang mi rtag par rtogs shing / dran pa nye bar bzhag ste / nyes dmigs su lta zhing nges par 'byung ba 'tshal bas / longs spyod rnams la spyod' cing / rgyal po'i dbang phyug gi dbang bgyid pa 'di ni / de'i bag mchis pa lags so // (S 33a5f.; Q 61a2f.)

¹ Q: om. *rnams la spyod*.

“Great King, a king loyal to the [right] *dharma* understands and brings to [his] awareness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) that material wealth and he himself too are not lasting; [he thus] perceives the misery [of these things] (*ādinava*) and desires deliverance (*niryāna*). [If he] handles material wealth and practices [his] sovereign power with [the aforementioned attitudes], then this is his conscientiousness (*apramāda*).”

The definition surprises as it deals less with conscientiousness in the sense it is used in the *arthaśāstra* literature, i.e., as attention and carefulness in the king’s duties and caution towards his enemies. The definition rather understands *apramāda* as an inner attitude which leads to the reflection on and the awareness of the transitoriness of all worldly matters and to the desire for deliverance. In this way the term *apramāda* gains a new dimension: it reminds the king of the need for his spiritual emancipation and admonishes him not to cling to his life and wealth. In contrast to the second factor of the pair, i.e., compassion for living beings, which presupposes a more or less ethically engaged attitude, the definition above arranges *apramāda* rather on the opposite side, where renunciative aspects are prevailing. The central pair *karuṇā* – *apramāda* thus turns into a somewhat antithetic relation which could be compared to the (much more) fundamentally opposed relation between compassion and *śūnyatā*.⁴⁹

The term *apramāda* offers the advantage that it is not mainly associated with the Buddhist teaching, as we have seen above. Though defined in a spiritual way, the usage of this word in the *BGUVVNS* also retains its vulgar sense of “carefulness, caution”. This could be a reason for choosing it as one of the key terms, given that the whole setting of the *BGUVVNS* is placed in a multireligious environment. In the following I shall shortly focus on two issues in the chapter on *rājanīti* of the *BGUVVNS* and examine if their treatment reveals considerable differences from the traditional literature of *arthaśāstra*. The issues in question are the *sūtra*’s position towards punishment and war.

There can be no doubt that punishment (*daṇḍa*) maintains a prominent position among the duties of a king. Punishment is one of the means by which the king protects his subjects. As

⁴⁹ For the relation between these “two poles of Buddhist spirituality” and its underlying tension cp. Lambert Schmithausen, “Mitleid und Leerheit: Zu Spiritualität und Heilsziel des Mahāyāna”, in *Der Buddhismus als Anfrage an christliche Theologie und Philosophie*, ed. A. Bsteh, Studien zur Religionstheologie 5, Mödling, forthcoming 2000.

mentioned above, according to the mythology, it is in particular this main task of protection which made the appointment of a king necessary. In case of punishment we deal with the protection of the subjects from transgressors within the country. According to the *Manusmṛti*, the *daṇḍa*, made of the highest energy, was emitted by Īśvara as the *dharma* to protect all living beings.⁵⁰ And, as it is further stated, “If the king did not tirelessly inflict punishment on those who should be punished, the stronger would roast the weaker like fish on a spit ... and (everything) would be upside down.”⁵¹ This conviction, viz., that without punitive measures the world would end up in chaos, appears frequently in the pertinent literature. Without fear of punishment the so-called *mātsyanyāya*, the principle that the stronger devours the weak, is thought to become prevailing.⁵² Protecting the subjects by frightening and deterring potential criminals thus seems to have been considered as one of the essential functions of punishment. Another, equally important issue is the expiatory function of punishment. It is believed that in the same way as in the religious-spiritual realm expiatory acts (*prāyaścitta*) lead to the purification of wrong-doers from their bad deeds, so does punishment (*daṇḍa*), its counterpart in the mundane sphere, purify the criminal from his offence.⁵³ The king, by inflicting punishment on the culprit, enables the positive *karman* which the transgressor had collected in former lives to become effective and thereby operates for the benefit and in the interest of the culprit. The act of punishing is thought to destroy the factor which, caused through the offence, hindered this positive *karman* to become effective.⁵⁴ Besides this, Kane, based on his study of the *dharmaśāstra* literature, adds some more reasons. According to him, the individual and social urge for retaliation and the preventive exclusion of a criminal from society (capital punishment as the most drastic form) were also arguments in use to justify punishment.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ *Manu* 7.14: *tasyārthe sarvabhūtānām goptāraṁ dharmam ātmajam / brahmatejomayam daṇḍam asṛjat pūrvam īśvaraḥ //*.

⁵¹ *Manu* 7.20f.: *yadi na praṇayed rājā daṇḍam daṇḍyeṣv atandritaḥ / sūle matsyān ivāpakṣyan durbalān balavattarāḥ // ... pravarttetādharottaram //*; the translation is according to Wendy Doninger and Brian K. Smith, *The Laws of Manu*, Penguin Books, 1991.

⁵² For references cp. Kane III.21f.

⁵³ Cp. Wezler 1995: 108ff.; 117; 122ff.; 126ff.; 132ff.

⁵⁴ Cp. Wezler 1995: 124f.

⁵⁵ Cp. Kane III.388ff.; Tähtinen comes to the conclusion that retaliation is of only subordinated nature and “has been replaced by the rite of expiation” (pp. 26; 39). For a bibliography on the theories of penal law in India cp. Wezler 1995: 133f. (n. 183; 184; 186).

The *BGUVVNS* definitely joins the tenor of traditional brahminic literature in stressing the need for punishment and dedicates about one third of the chapter on royal ethics to its discussion. Even in the definition of *karuṇā*, the second of the two key terms, the sūtra states that the king's compassion consists in the support of the poor and in the adequate punishment of the dishonourables.⁵⁶ Here I will not be able to deal with the discussion of all of the five factors that regulate punishability (D.), the questions how the different categories of criminals are to be punished (F.), and how a king should deal with his own transgressions (F.). I shall limit myself to analysing the passages with regard to the questions how punishment should be applied and why extreme forms such as the death penalty and mutilation should be avoided under any circumstances.

Let us start with the two last issues regarding punishability in D.:⁵⁷

[4] 'jam par lags kyi / brlang bar ma lags so / [5] byams pas lags kyi / zhe sdang gis ma lags so // ... [ad 4] smras pa / ji ltar na 'jam par yin gyi / brlang bar ma yin zhes bya / smras pa / gal te skyon brjod pa tsam gyis 'grub par rtogs pa zhib na yang bcing ba dang / bsad¹ pa la sogs pas gnod par mi bgyi bar yang dag par skyon brjod pa lags kyi / skyon ma brjod par ma lags so // [ad 5] smras pa / ji ltar na byams pas yin gyi / zhe sdang gis ma yin zhes bya / smras pa / gal te skyon brjod pa tsam gyis mi 'grub par rtogs pa zhib na dgum² pa dang / dbang po nyams par bgyi ba³ dang / yan lag gtub pa ma gtogs par byams pa'i sems dang / snying rje'i sems nye bar bzhag ste / bcing ba dang / go rar stsal ba dang / brdeg⁴ pa dang / bsdigs pa dang / gnod par bgyi ba dang / spyo ba dang / brgyad bkag pa dang / gnas⁵ bkar ba dang / longs spyod dbrog⁶ pa la sogs pa brlang⁷ ba'i rnam pa rnams kiyis brlang bar bgyi ba ste / de las 'das par brlang bar bgyi ba ma lags so // (S 33b5-34a6; Q 61b1-8)

¹ Q: gsad; ² Q: 'gum; ³ Q: bgyid pa; ⁴ Q: brdag; ⁵ Q: gnas nas bkar; ⁶ Q: 'phrogs; ⁷ Q: blang.

“[4] [A king loyal to the *dharma* punishes] mildly, not harshly. [5] [He punishes] with friendliness (*maitrī*), not with anger (*dveṣa*).” ... [ad 4] [The king] asked: “What [do you mean with ‘He punishes] mildly, not harshly?’” [Satyaka] answered: “[‘He punishes mildly, not

⁵⁶ ... dbul po rnams la nor sbyin pa dang / mi srin pa rnams la yang dag par chad pas gcad¹ pa 'di ni / de'i snying rje zhes bgyi ste / (S 33b1-2; Q 61a5-6)

¹ Q: ba cad [i.e. bcad] for gcad.

The *Suvarṇabhāṣasūtra*, in its 12th chapter on *rājasāstra*, describes at long the disastrous consequences for his realm if a king overlooks transgression and does not punish the wicked. No mentioning of compassion is made there throughout the chapter. Deterrence and justice appear as the prevailing tenets.

⁵⁷ Ch₂: 四者依柔軟語，非麤獷語。五者依慈心，非瞋心...

[ad 4] 王言。大師，云何柔軟，非麤獷語。答言。大王，知此衆生所犯王法，但應呵責，不合餘治，應如其過正說，不隱，善說，苦²言。如是呵責，非不呵責是名軟語，非麤獷語。

[ad 5] 王言。大師，云何慈心，非瞋心。答言。大王，智者知此，非但呵責斷此罪過，除却斷命，不得割截手、腳、眼、耳、鼻、舌，依於大慈大悲之心，聽繫閉、牢獄、枷鎖、打縛、種種呵責，奪取資生，驅擯他方，爲令改悔，非常惡心捨此衆生是名慈心，非瞋心。

(T 333b9-27; Ji 870a5-b3)

¹ Var. given in T: 知 for 如; ² Var. given in T: 若 for 苦.

harshly' applies,] if – [given that] it is evident that [a settlement can] be reached through merely declaring the crime – [the king] refrains from harming [the culprit] through binding [him], killing [him], and so on and [just] declares the crime. [It does not apply if the king does] not [make use of] the declaration of the crime.” [ad 5] [The king] asked: “What [do you mean with ‘He punishes] with friendliness, not with anger?’” [Satyaka] answered: “[‘He punishes with friendliness, not with anger’ applies,] if – [given that] it is evident that [a settlement can] not be reached through merely declaring the crime – [the king] brings forth a mental state of friendliness and compassion and behaves harshly by [inflicting] harsh forms [of punishments, such as] binding, imprisoning, beating, threatening, harming(!), scolding, reproaching, exiling [the culprit from] the region, confiscating [the culprit’s] property and so on, [but] not killing [him], injuring [his] senses, or cutting parts [of his body]. Beyond that [he does] not inflict harsh [forms of punishments].”

I am not quite sure if my admittedly interpretative translation of [4] hits the mark. Punishments by merely verbally criticising the culprit (*vāgdaṇḍa*, *dhigdaṇḍa*) are well-attested in brahminic literature and the epics.⁵⁸ As the Chinese (呵責: “to scold, to charge”) indicates, the act may consist in more than a simple declaration of the crime and could, e.g., by proclaiming the transgressor’s act publicly, come close to a reproach and open stigmatisation. To “reach a settlement” alone through that “declaration” might indicate that the actual crime was of a trivial nature and thus the king is not urged to apply any harsh measures. Or it could be understood that the evident and sincere repentance of the culprit made all further forms of punishments unnecessary. However, if this situation does not apply, the king – actualising friendliness and compassion – is supposed to inflict more violent methods with the exception of the death penalty and irreparable damaging of the body. The other kinds of punishments mentioned above are well-attested in the *arthaśāstra* literature.

Punishment and simultaneous cultivation of love and compassion deserve further explanation, and when asked about this seemingly contradictory point, Satyaka answers the king with the following simile (E.):⁵⁹

'di lta ste dper bgyi na / phas bu mi srin pa zhig bcos par 'tshal na / byams pa'i sems dang / snying rje'i sems nye bar bzhag ste / dgum pa dang / dbang po nyams par bgyi ba dang yan lag

⁵⁸ Cp. Kane III.391; for the epic cp. e.g. *ŚP* 228.34, 259.19, 283.7.

⁵⁹ *Ch₂*: 譬如父母於惡行子，為念子故，欲令改悔，方便苦治，除却斷命，不壞諸根，餘打罵等隨心苦治，不名捨心，不名惡心，不名惱心，以念子重，為令改悔，更不作故，而彼父母不名非法，名為念子，不失慈心。大王，當知行法行王治諸一切惡行衆生亦復如是，慈心重故，為令改悔，除却斷命，不壞諸根，生大慈心，起大悲心，繫閉，打縛，惡口，呵罵，奪其資生，驅擯他方，為令改悔，捨惡，從善，亦令其餘念惡衆生不作非法，非常惡心捨此衆生，亦不故心為惱衆生，而行苦切。如是名為行法行王以慈悲心行惡口等治罪衆生，不名非法，不失慈心。是故二行名雖有返²，而不相違。(T 333c2-c15; Jī 870b8-c1)

¹ All versions (also *T*) read 不 instead of 却; ² Var. given in *T*:反.

gtub pa ma gtogs par gnod pa'i rnam pa gzhan gyis brlang bar bgyid de / 'on kyang de la sdang¹ ba'i sems sam / gnod par bgyi ba'i sems mi 'byung ste / gzhan du na nyes pa² bzlog pa nyid kyi ched du bgyis te / nyes pa ma byung ba rnams mi 'byung bar bya'o snyam ste / brlang bar bgyid do //

de bzhin du rgyal po chos dang ldan pa yang skye dgu rnams la bu'i 'du shes nye bar bzhag ste / sems can mi srun pa rnams bcos³ na / srog bcad⁴ pa dang / dbang po nyams par bgyi ba dang / yan lag gtub pa ma gtogs par byams pa'i sems dang / snying rje'i sems su bgyis te / bcing ba dang / ...⁵ brlang ba'i rnam pa rnams kyis brlang bar bgyid kyang / de sems can de dag la sdang⁶ ba'i sems sam / gnod par bgyi ba'i sems mi 'byung ste / gzhan du na nyes pa bzlog pa nyid kyi ched du bgyis te / de ma lags pa gzhan rjes su bslab⁷ pa dang / nyes pa ma byung ba⁸ rnams mi 'byung bar bya'o snyam ste brlang bar bgyid do // (S 34b2-35a1; Q 62a2-a8)

¹ Q: *gtad* for *sdang*; ² S: *nga* for *pa*; ³ Q: '*chos* for *bcos*; ⁴ Q: *gcad*; ⁵ Same enumeration as above with *gnod par bgyi ba dang* / missing; ⁶ Q: *btang*; ⁷ Q: *brlab*; S: *brlang*; ⁸ Q: *ba'i*.

“It is as if a father, [who.] when [he] wants to cure a dishonourable son, after [he] has brought about a mental state of friendliness and compassion, treats [his son] harshly with [all] other kinds of harming [punishments] except killing [him], injuring [his] senses, or cutting parts [of his body]. But thereby no mental state of malignity or causing harm arises [in the father. He] rather acts in order to dispel the fault, and treats [him] harshly while thinking: ‘May faults [which yet] have not come forth not arise!’”

In the same way, also a king loyal to the *dharmā* brings about the conception that [all of his] subjects [are his] sons, and, when [he] cures dishonourable living beings, acting in a mental state of friendliness and compassion, [he] treats [them] harshly with harsh forms [of punishments, such as] binding ... except killing [them], injuring [their] senses, or cutting parts [of their body]. And yet no mental state of malignity or causing harm arises [in] him towards those sentient beings. [He] rather acts in order to dispel the[ir] faults, and treats [them] harshly while thinking: ‘Other [living beings] than those [punished here] may imitate (*anusīkṣati*) [the transgressors]; may faults [which yet] have not come forth not arise!’”

The term *zlog pa* (**vinivartana*; future form: *bzlog*) appears to be most naturally translated by “to dispel” (the faults). However, also a causative translation seems possible, such as “to cause [him] to dismiss” (the fault) or even “to turn [him] away” (from the fault), though in the latter case a particle *las* (*nyes pa las*) would be preferable. The passage provides two arguments why punishment should be applied: The first is the removal of the fault, be it through the direct act of punishment itself or through causing the culprit to turn away from the fault. The second is the hope that the infliction of punishment may keep off the wrongdoer and other subjects from such offences, i.e., the deterring aspect of punishment. Both arguments, as seen above, are common in brahminic literature. What distinguishes the argumentation is the distinct rejection of forms of punitive measures that in their consequences are irreversible for the culprit. We will soon come back to this topic.

The idea of the king as the father of his subjects was wide spread in ancient India and in this point the simile should come as no surprise.⁶⁰ The explicit mentioning of the

⁶⁰ Whereas Lingat (p. 26f.) does not question the fact that also the brahminic *śāstras* and even the *Arthaśāstra* by Kauṭilya stress the idea of the king as the father of all his subjects, he remarks that

actualisation of feelings of love and compassion before inflicting punishment, on the other hand, is noteworthy. Though the *arthaśāstra* literature mentions the need for a king to restrain his rage,⁶¹ the main stress regarding punishment falls on justice. It will soon become clear what one of the possible reasons for the admonition to be compassionate could be.

Besides the imagery of the king-father who treats his subjects in the same way as he would treat his own son, later the sūtra develops another analogy, which is already pointed at in the passage above: the verb *bcos pa* (“to cure”) usually designates medical treatment. In L., among the eight views to be cultivated by a king, the first view has the king not to drop his compassion when restraining the dishonourables. He should, it is said, cure them in the same way a father cures his son. Then, immediately in the following passage, the king, this time compared to a physician, is advised to remain without anger towards the transgressors and to apply himself to the annihilation of their faults.⁶² By this last analogy it becomes evident why forms of punishments with irreparable consequences should not be inflicted: No physician would go so far as to cause damage to some part of the body and even less the death of a patient provided that there are other kinds of effective “medications”. Obviously the *BGUVVNS* considered other measures of punishment as sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of law and order. It does not prescribe to an ethic of retaliation, as it is found in certain passages of the *arthaśāstra* literature, nor does it promote a theory of discouragement through extreme punitive measures. The main emphasis is put on the aspect of curing the transgressor from his illness and thereby keeping the door for him open to return to a more or less unstigmatized life as he may have led it before his transgression.⁶³

this concept might have been particularly emphasized by Aśoka. In his eyes, Aśoka associated with it primarily the active guidance of his subjects towards virtuous behavior. For the brahminic sources, however, he claims the use of this concept mainly for oppressive motives. I find this interpretation not totally unobjectionable.

For the king as father cp., e.g., *Manu* 7.80; *Yājñ* 1.334.

⁶¹ Cp. e.g. *AŚ* I, chapter 6; also *Manu* 7.46: anger as the worst vice.

⁶² *S* 42a1-2; *Q* 68a4-5; *T* 338a25-b2.

⁶³ In an interesting passage in the *ŚP* we find some arguments against the death penalty (259.1ff.). The interlocutor Satyavat argues that, though in certain cases *dharma* can be *adharmā* and vice versa, killing can never be *dharma* and that the death penalty also “kills” the family members (in terms of economic support?) of the executed who are not at all to blame. He then states that also a bad person would once adopt right behavior and that in the saṃsāric cycle of transmigration the birth of morally impure beings is not restricted to unvirtuous families (and hence, given that vice versa pure beings can be born in unvirtuous families, there is no legitimization to undermine the economic basis of such beings by executing their bread winner). Though the opponent of the discussion Dyumatsena admits

There might be several reasons behind the rejection of capital punishment and mutilation. Let us have a look at passage H., which I will shortly summarise. Caṇḍapradhyota directly confronts Satyaka by asking why a king, characterised by a defiled mind (*nyon mongs pa can gyi sems; kliṣṭacitta*), should not inflict death penalty and forms of mutilation. The question itself leaves room for speculation. It is unclear if for the questioner killing and mutilation are necessarily combined with a defiled mind, an assumption which would render it difficult to explain why other harmful forms of punishment, such as beating, should not be associated with mental defilements. If, on the other hand, the emphasis of the question lies on the defiled mind, one would be ready to argue that capital punishment etc. were acceptable if the king only ordered it with an undefiled mind, namely after having actualised compassion, as seen above. However, in his answer Satyaka states that **even** (*yang*) a king with a defiled mind would not think of killing etc., for he would be well aware of the consequences: The order to kill the culprit would leave the king in a state of aversion (*pratigha*) in the moment of death and lead to rebirths in bad existences (*apāya*); he would further be pursued for a long time by hostilities (from part of the punished one and his relatives in this world and the next existences?).⁶⁴ Mutilation and injuring of the senses,

that even by capital punishment one cannot tame the people, he defends, nevertheless, the perpetuation of the status quo.

⁶⁴ The Tibetan in this passage allows also for another interpretation:

'di ltar des rang gi las kyi dbang gis 'chi na yang khong khro ba 'i sems bskyed de / dus bgyis na ngan song rnam su skye bar 'gyur ba dang / yun ring por rjes su 'brang ba 'i¹ sha khon du 'gyur ba mthong bas / de 'i slad du sems can dgum par ma² rjod³ de / (S 38b1-2; Q 65a5-6)

¹ Q: *ba* for *ba 'i*; ² S: *om. ma*; ³ Q: *brjod*.

Though another grammatical subject than the king is not found before the sentence in question, one could also understand it as the punished transgressors who die in a state of aversion, are reborn in bad existences and cannot get rid of their hostile feelings there. Such a reading seems to be suggested by the Chinese (see below). Philologically, I think, both possibilities must be taken into account. This second alternative would in fact better explain why the moment of death is associated with feelings of aversion. It is only natural that the person to be punished with death would feel aversion towards the one ordering his execution. On the other hand, the question arises why a king without compassion should be bothered by the idea that an executed transgressor is reborn in a bad existence. The only answer is that he could be afraid that the transgressor would try to harm him in his coming existences. It thus seems that both alternatives mainly aim at the same argument, namely that the king should not order execution because he would have to fear the revenge of the executed person, apparently extending into existences after this life.

The Chinese runs as follows:

彼法行王見彼衆生至於死時依自業過生¹瞋恨心，死已命斷，生惡道中，惡心隨逐長夜不斷。

(T 336b27-29; Ji 874c15-18)

¹ Ji: 去 for 生.

Whereas Tibetan *sha khon* (**vaira*), “animosity, hostility, revenge”, can probably only be understood as directed towards the king who ordered the execution, Chinese 惡心 (“evil mind”) is of

however, would not be reparable and were therefore inadequate to be ordered. The culprit should be punished with other measures such as imprisonment or binding which allowed him to be cured. To apply the death penalty and mutilation would result in an imperfect protection of the subjects and undermine their reliance (missing in *S*) on and sympathy (missing in *Q*) for the king.

The passage lists three arguments against death penalty and mutilation: (1) A bad future existence for the king (if we follow the first interpretation) and revengeful feelings against him from the side of the executed person (and his or her relatives?), (2) the irreparable nature of mutilation (and of course also of execution) preventing the curing of the transgressor, and (3) the loss of reliance/sympathy of the king's subjects. The first argument is self-evident. To abstain from intentional killing of sentient beings is counted as the first of the five precepts to be followed by all Buddhists.⁶⁵ In principle, this must also apply to the king. The sūtra does not offer any tool to relativise this norm but instead describes the king's bad future.⁶⁶ In case of mutilation the argument is different. This shows that in principal, if considered necessary, even in the *BGUVVNS* the king was considered to be entitled to harm living beings, obviously without any major consequences for his own future. Some passages before, a tool has been provided for the limitation of any bad karmic consequences for the king by admonishing him to practise friendliness and compassion when inflicting punishment on others.

The second part of the first argument, viz., the fact that the king has to expect the revenge of the executed person, links capital punishment with the aspect of fear. Whereas the king can protect himself against all kinds of dangers coming from the human world, it would be

less specific nature and could also be interpreted as concerning the general state of mind of the reborn culprit. The main argument would then be that execution can in no way help the culprit (and society). In his coming existences he would, due to his unchanged state of mind, continue to cause disturbances in social life. The implicit call for granting the wrong-doer the chance for reformation in this life in order to stop the crimes' perpetuation can hardly be missed. At the same time this argument would constitute a criticism towards the idea that execution can function as some kind of moral purification, an idea mentioned in note 79.

⁶⁵ Schmithausen 1999: 45; Demiéville 347f.

⁶⁶ In the brahminic conception of kingship the ruler's duty to accomplish the *rājadharma* is stressed as the most essential. This duty includes the infliction of punitive measures in open contrast to the idea of *ahimsā*. It seems that there was no doubt that a king applying himself to his *dharma* would attain merit despite the adoption of violent measures. The *BGUVVNS*, however, does not take up this argumentation which grants priority of the specific *dharma* over *ahimsā* (cp. also Wezler 1995: 125; 129, n. 165).

much more difficult, if not impossible, to prepare against revengeful attacks from the non-human world, in which the killed transgressor will be reborn (according to the second interpretation). Even if we follow the alternative understanding and assume that it is the king who is reborn in bad existences, he will there be exposed to the revenge of the executed, an idea, which equally must have had some deterring power in order to be mentioned as part of the argument.

The main aspect of the second argument is the irreversibility of the potential harm attributed. The reformation ideal of punishment, as expressed in the medical simile above, entails the application of a medication whose side effects should not overshadow the actual goal of its use. In other words, if there are alternative forms of punishment that do not involve heavy side effects such as the irrevocable loss of corporal functions, these should be applied. Binding and imprisonment are mentioned as such. Apparently the authors of the *BGUVVNS* did not favour the often-attributed discouraging function of extreme forms of punishment. On the contrary, in the last argument they charge these measures with undermining the relation between subjects and king by claiming that they damage their reliance on or sympathy for him. In the whole argumentation no mention is made of the principle of *ahimsā*. Probably, the authors of the *BGUVVNS* considered the argument of *ahimsā* in this context as not efficacious. The argumentative application of this principle could have forced them to explain why other forms of harsh punitive measures would not in the same way contradict the principle of *ahimsā* – a possible objection near at hand, which they most likely did not dare to evoke.⁶⁷

Another issue in the chapter on royal affairs that deserves to be treated in more detail is that of warfare. In section K. the *BGUVVNS* deals with the king's strategies in case of war. Whereas the Tibetan text does not state clearly that the situation is limited to a pure defensive war, Bodhiruci introduces the section with the statement that a hostile army would attack the king (*T* 337c2ff.). I have argued above that the Chinese translation by Bodhiruci has most probably incorporated commentatorial elements and is thus to be depicted as the less authentic transmission in terms of the Indian background. This explicit limitation of the king's strategies to a war of pure defence by the Chinese translation should thus be taken

⁶⁷ Also in the passage of the *ŚP* Satyavat does not argue with the principle of *ahimsā* when opposing capital punishment (see n. 63)!

with caution. Of course, there are no passages at all suggesting that the Tibetan version recommends the invasion of a foreign territory. But, on the other hand, there is equally no explicit rejection of such a possibility,⁶⁸ which, after all, appears to have been regular in India during most of its history. In the *arthaśāstra* literature, one of the main duties of a king is the protection of the subjects from outside aggression. Further, in many passages the king is directly urged to take possession of other countries (by means of warfare).⁶⁹

The *BGUVVNS*, now, deals with the question how to confront a hostile army and suggests three successive steps. In the first step the king should try to avoid a battle with the help of three stratagems (*upāya*), i.e., by encountering the enemy with kindness (*mdza' ba*), by granting favours (*phan gdags; *anugraha*), and by surrounding and frightening the enemy with the assumed superiority of his own army. This set of stratagems is, at least in part and under different terminology, an element of the *arthaśāstra* and appears at length at, e.g., *AŚ IX.6*. There the stratagems are not only employed against aggressors but also in different situations against the king's antagonists as well as in the life of ordinary people. The set comprises four (and sometimes even more) *upāyas*, viz., friendliness (*sāntva*), gifts (*dāna*),

⁶⁸ The question if the Tibetan can be understood to be restricted to a defensive war depends also on the interpretation of the passage at the beginning and the end of the section on warfare (cp. the last sentence in the final Tibetan quotation below): ... *rgyal pos (')thab mo'i g.yul zhig nye bar gnas na ji ltar nan tan du bya / (S 40b4; Q 67a3-4)*. If we assume, in line with *Ch₂*, that the king has to deal with a war of defence, we should understand (*')thab mo'i g.yul zhig nye bar gnas na* as “when an [attacking hostile] army is kept ready [for a] battle” or “when [the righteous king is] providing an army [for a] battle [to defend his own territory]”. This is, in any case, a possible translation, though not the only one. I think also the opposite interpretation, namely that the righteous king attacks the “enemy” can philologically not be ruled out: “when a [hostile] army is kept ready [for a] battle [to defend its own territory]” or “when [the righteous king is] providing an army [for a] battle [to extend his territory]”. It is not difficult to imagine how such an act of aggression could be justified, if we just recall to mind the sūtra's statements above that, in case of a *cakravartin*, the other rulers are obliged to follow the righteous way. Also the argument that the application of the three *upāyas* (see below) before engaging in the battle could somehow constitute a defensive element, is not adequate. Though they definitely are intended to avoid a major military conflict (which for every ruler would from the outset mean an immense economic burden), their use is not only restricted to situations of defence, so to say their nature is neutral in terms of aggressively expansionist or peace securing policies. Their descriptions in the *arthaśāstra* literature document that they can be duly applied as a simple tool in offensive undertakings governed by the principle that the end justifies the means.

⁶⁹ Cp. *Manu* 7.101, 106ff., 170f., 181ff.; 9.251; *Yājñ* 1.342, 1.348; *AŚ IX*. Basham (1959: 122f.) states that warfare “afflicted the Indian sub-continent during most of its history ...” and characterises Aśoka as “possibly the only ancient Indian king who finally broke with the tradition of aggression ...”

sowing discord (*bheda*), and military action (*daṇḍa*), which should be applied in this order.⁷⁰ It is not surprising that in the *BGUVVNS* the sowing of dissent (*bheda*) does not appear. Though its employment could serve to avoid a larger military conflict, it comprises acts obviously contradicting the Buddhist ethics such as inciting jealousies, hatred, quarrels and murder among one's antagonists by means of bribes and lies.

The third of the stratagems suggested by the sūtra, i.e., the demonstration of military superiority is also attested in the *arthaśāstras*, though not among the four *upāyas*: In the set of seven *upāyas*, which is enlarged by the members *māyā*, *upekṣā* and *indrajāla*, the last element *indrajāla* consists in “creating the illusion before the eyes of the enemy that a vast army is coming to attack them ...” (Kane III.172). I am not sure if the authors of the *BGUVVNS* wanted the third *upāya* to be understood in this way, but we could assume that the concept of *indrajāla* was not unknown to them. The last *upāya* in the classical set of four, i.e., the employment of military force, is taken up in the *BGUVVNS* as the third step. As the second step, to which the king should proceed if the means mentioned before remain unsuccessful, an element is introduced which is not found among the classical set of four (or seven) *upāyas*. In this second step the king should cultivate the following three thoughts:⁷¹

*bdag chos dang ldan pa'i rgyal po yin na / bdag gis skye dgu rnams phung bar byas par mi
'gyur grang / phung bar 'gyur ba las ma bzlog pa lta'ang med dam zhes / dang por skye dgu
yongs su bskyang ba la sems nye bar gzhas par bgyi'o // gnyis pa ni phas kyi dgra las rgyal bar
bgyi ba'i sems so // gsum pa ni srog¹ gzung² ba'i sems te / sems gsum po 'di dag nye bar bzhas
la / dpung gi tshogs yan lag bzhi pa la bka' stsal par bgyi ste / (S 41a2-a4; Q 67a8-68b2)*

¹ Q: sog; ² S: bzung.

“As I am a king loyal to the *dharma*, it should not happen that I bring [my] subjects into misery; [but] isn't there also danger that [I] would not have kept [them] away from falling into misery?”⁷² First [the king] should bring forth [these] thoughts regarding the protection of [his]

⁷⁰ The same set appears several times with *sāman* instead of *sāntva*. Cp. Kane III.171 ff.; for the *AS* cp. *AS_{JM}* Sachregister s.v. *Mittel, die 4, bzw. 7 politischen*. In *ŚP* 69.22-23 the king is advised to make use of the (first) three *upāyas*, viz., *sāntva*, *anupradāna* and *bheda*, and to avoid a battle.

⁷¹ *Ch₂*: 一者思惟。此返¹逆王²無慈悲心，自殺衆生，餘人殺者，亦不遮護。我今不令如此相殺。此是初心護諸衆生。二者思惟。當以方便降伏逆王²士、馬、兵、衆，不與鬪戰。三者思惟。當以方便活繫，縛取，不作殺害。生此三種慈悲心已，然後莊嚴四種兵衆分布士、馬，唱說號令。

(T 337c22-28; Ji 879a22-b6)

¹ Var. given in T: 反; ² Var. given in T: 主.

The Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai “translation” of the passage into German cited by Schmidt-Leukel (p. 14, n. 38) is supposedly based on this Chinese text. Given the fact that it contains several misleading interpolations not found in the actual Chinese text, it should better be labeled a free rendering with additional interpretative elements.

⁷² I am not sure if my translation is the only possible understanding. The thoughts could point out questions of conscience of the king: he does not want to cause serious problems for his subjects by

subjects. Secondly [he should bring forth the thought that he] will conquer the hostile army (*pratyanika*). Thirdly, [he should bring forth the thought that he] will take hold [of the enemy's] lives.⁷³ [The king] should bring forth these three thoughts and then address [his] army (*balakāya*) consisting of four parts.”

This second step already introduces the following third step, the arrangement for and the command of the army in the battle. The king appears to have done what he could to solve the conflict with peaceful and moral means. With these thoughts, then, he seems to reconfirm his own integrity as a righteous king, to strengthen his will to defeat the enemy,⁷⁴ and, most surprising, to decide to spare the life of the hostile soldiers. For this last point there seem to be no parallels in the *arthaśāstra* literature. Kane (III.209f.) gives a comprehensive enumeration of rules on how the life of an enemy in war should be spared, among them some of which, according to Kane, “will bear comparison with the conventions of the Geneva and Hague Conferences”, but I am not aware of any Indian text describing strategies of taking prisoners. There can hardly be any doubt that the main effort of the warrior must have been directed towards the annihilation of the enemy.⁷⁵ Kane also cites a passage of the

deciding for warfare, but, on the other hand, he also sees the danger that they could all be put into misery when not protected by his army. For the auxiliary verb *grang* with the main function to express a certain necessity for Skt. *arhati*, the optative or the future cp. M. Hahn, “On Some Rare Particles, Words and Auxiliaries in Classical Tibetan”, in *Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes 1992*, Vol. 1, ed. Per Kvaerne, Oslo: The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994, 288-294, pp. 291f. The construction with the particle *lta* in the second thought could represent a Skt. wording with *mā* (*haiva*). Cp. e.g. *Śrāvakabhūmi* 413.12-14 (*Śrāvakabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga*, ed. K. Shukla, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. 14, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973), where *mā me ... asti kaścic chikṣāvvyatikramah* / (so the ms) is translated as *bdag gis ... bslab pa las 'gal bar gyur pa lta med grang* in the Tibetan (*Q* 5537, vol. 110, *mDo 'grel (Sems tsam)*, *Wi* 183a8-183b1). For *mā* (*haiva*) meaning “I hope ... not ...?” and “Isn't there danger that ...?” cp. F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, Vol. I: Grammar, §42.13-14. The particle *lta* with examples in literature is discussed in Hahn, op. cit., pp. 289-291.

⁷³ The expression *srog gzung ba* could also be interpreted as “to kill”, though being a rather uncommon formulation. The Chinese, however, leaves no room for doubt that the meaning must be “to take hold ...” or “to catch [the hostile soldiers] alive”, corresponding to Skt. *jīva-grāham*: 當以方便活繫，縛取，不作殺害。：“[I] shall with [adequate] means bind and catch [the hostile soldiers] alive, not [shall I] kill or wound [them]!” Cp. Skt. *jīva-grāham*: “ind. with \sqrt{grah} ... to capture alive” (Monier-Williams, Monier, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1899, Reprint Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951, s.v. *jīva-grāham*²) and Pāli *jīva-gāha*: “(adv.) taken alive, in phrase *j.° ganhāti* or *ganhāpeti* ... [several references]” (*The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary*, eds. T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, London 1921-1925. Reprint London: PTS, 1972, s.v. *jīva-gāha*).

⁷⁴ The Chinese reads that the enemy should be overpowered **without** fighting with the army (... 士、馬、兵、衆、不與鬪戰。). This is very unlikely to happen, as already before all stratagems to avoid a military confrontation have been applied without success.

⁷⁵ The exhortation could at most be understood in the sense of not killing **unnecessarily**, e.g., in case a hostile soldier becomes unable to fight or surrenders. This would amount to no more than a

Gautamadharmasūtra where the soldier who has killed or wounded an enemy is promised to remain without sin (*doṣa*) (III.209). It is thus highly unlikely that this third resolution of the king could have been put in practice as such. When the enemy could not be convinced to desist from his belligerent intentions by any of the *upāyas* mentioned above, how could one make prisoners without engaging in a full-scale battle? The intention to do so is, as a matter of fact, a noble one but I rather doubt that it could have a large effect in the actual battle. Probably this third thought is nothing more than an antidote against any qualms about violating one of the basic Buddhist precepts. No other thoughts of regret or of compassion are explicitly mentioned, such as those formulated in relation to the infliction of violent forms of punishment other than death penalty and mutilation. One could surmise that the pair “killing with compassion” was conceived of as incompatible with the basic Buddhist ethics. The authors of the *BGUVVNS* appear to have chosen instead a solution which was more in keeping with the precepts but less realistic in actual combat.

Finally, examples for how the king or one of his close counsellors should address and thereby encourage the army before the battle, as mentioned in the citation, can be found at *AS_{JM}* 570f. In the following third step the king optimises the power of his army by arranging its different units and urges his soldiers by various means not to give ground. The paragraph with which section K. ends discusses the question of the karmic results for the king who has engaged in warfare. It makes clear that for the king the order to slaughter and wound hostile soldiers remains without any negative consequences. It therefore deserves to be cited in its whole:⁷⁶

call to respect the normative prescriptions of the “laws of battle” contained in the *dharmaśāstra* texts for the instances in which the hostile warrior is traditionally considered to be *avadhya*. In his analyses of *Manu* 7.94-95, dealing with the warrior slain in battle when he turns back in fear, Wezler concludes that these verses may in fact “refer to the real world, to what does really happen in many cases to a warrior «who turns back in fear», viz. that he is killed ...” (1987/88: 395). The exhortation in our sūtra could be understood as an attempt to make the king and his soldiers aware of these laws before the battle. As a second interpretation of this thought to spare the lives of the enemy one could also imagine the employment of special weapons or special fighting techniques aimed at knocking the enemy out only temporarily or wounding him so that his participation in the battle is no more possible. As stated above, I have not yet found any scriptural evidence to support this interpretation. The question definitely deserves further attention.

⁷⁶ *Ch*₂: 爾時雖復殺害衆生，而彼王得輕微、少罪、非決定受、懺悔、能滅。何以故。彼法行王，爲欲入戰，先生三種慈悲心故，雖作此惡，得罪輕微、非決定受。大王，當知彼法行王爲令衆生，爲護沙門，護沙門法，爲護妻子、族姓、知識，能捨自身及資生物，作如是業。因此事故，彼法行王得無量福。大王，當知若爲護國，養活人民興兵鬪戰，彼時國王應當先發如上三心，勅令主將一依王教，如是鬪者，有福無罪。(T 338a8-a17; Jī 879b17-c5); ¹ Var. given in T: 戰。

de ltar thabs mkhas shing g.yul legs par shom pa'i rgyal pos ni / pha rol gyi dpung bkum¹ 'am / rma phyung² yang des rgyal po la kha na ma tho ba chung zhing / bsod nams ma lags pa chung ba dang 'bras bu myong ba yang³ ma mchis par 'gyur ro // de ci'i slad du zhe na / 'di ltar des snying rje ba dang / yongs su mi gtang ba'i sems kyis las de mngon par 'du bgyis pa'i slad du'o // gang des skye dgu yongs su bskyang ba dang / bu dang / chung ma dang / rigs kyi don du bdag dang longs spyod yongs su btang ste / las de bgyis pas gzhi de las bsod nams tshad ma mchis pa yang rab tu 'phel lo // rgyal po chen po 'thab⁴ mo'i g.yul zhid nye bar gnas na / chos dang ldan pa'i rgyal pos de ltar nan tan du⁵ bgyi'o // (S 41b1-b5; Q 67b6-68a1)

¹ S: om. bkum; ² Q: byung; ³ S: yang nges pa ma; ⁴ Q: thab; ⁵ Q: om. du.

“Even if a king, [who] is skilled [in the application of appropriate] means and [who] has correctly prepared for the battle in the way [described above], slaughters or wounds the hostile army, there will be not [even the] slight[est] blame (*avadya*) and not [even the] slight[est] demerit (*apunya*) nor the experiencing of [karmic] consequences (*phala*) for [that] king. Why is that? [It is] because he has thus performed (*abhisamkaroti*) the tasks with a mind [full of] compassion and without giving up (*aparityāga*). [A king] who protects [his] subjects and renounces his [life] and [his] material wealth for [his] children, wives and clan: by doing that, even immeasurable merit will therefore (**tannidānāt*) grow [for him]. Great King, when providing an army [for a] battle/when a [hostile] army is kept ready [for a] battle, a king loyal to the *dharma* should make efforts in the way [described above].”

Let me first point out that also in this last paragraph there is no mentioning that the king is dealing with a war of defence. At least in theory, the section, as it is found in the Tibetan, could also be taken to sanction a war of aggression, if the king would only follow the basic rules laid down above. The king remains free from any kind of spiritual pollution because he has compassion and does not give up. The appearance of compassion surprises, for, as mentioned above, it is not part of the preceding paragraphs in section K. The Chinese identifies this compassion with the three thoughts (三種慈悲心) translated above, including the intention to capture the hostile army alive. At least from the viewpoint of the Tibetan, such an association seems not very convincible: The only compassionate element among the three thoughts is that the king should try to keep the enemy alive, whereas the main emphasis seems to lie on strengthening the king's self-confidence in the battle. I therefore cannot but infer that the mentioning of compassion in the last paragraph is little more than a sporadic addition, without being of substantial relevance in the foregoing descriptions. As a second element besides compassion we find the reference to *aparityāga* which here should probably be understood as relating to the battle itself, in the sense of not deserting the fight.⁷⁷ With *aparityāga* we see a basic element of *kṣatriyan* ethics. To flee from the battlefield is considered a severe violation. *Manu* and *Yājñ* state that a warrior who turns back from the

⁷⁷ The technical term for the one who takes to flight in the battle, however, seems to be *parāvṛtta* (cp. Wezler 1987/88: 384f.).

battle and is killed would lose all his merit.⁷⁸ The *BGUVVNS*, too, seems, at least in this respect, to follow clearly this particular strand of warrior ethics.

At the end of the cited passage the king is said to be rewarded with immeasurable merit. His selfless dedication to the protection of his subjects obviously suffices to remain free from any kind of flawed consequences for his merit. No further discussion follows concerning the obvious contradiction between his obligation to protect living beings, on the one hand, and his warfare activities eventually leading to suffering and death of other living beings, on the other.

This brief review of the criticism against the *arthaśāstras* in the *BGUVVNS* has helped us see the basic standpoint of the sūtra concerning punishment and war. One of the issues of this criticism was the fact that the *arthaśāstras* would lead to harm. If this is construed as fundamentally opposed to the sūtra's own way of handling the two themes in question, we cannot but call the criticism a propagandistic move. Also the forms of punishment suggested in the *BGUVVNS* and the fact that king (and warriors) are finally expected to engage in warfare actually do entail harm and suffering of living beings. The main differences, as shown above, are the underlying attitude of compassion, with which punishment should be inflicted, and the exclusion of death penalty as well as all forms of mutilation. Compassion is certainly not an element to be sought for in the *arthaśāstra* literature. On the contrary, any form of commiseration can lead to the loss of advantages, as it is plainly stated at *AS* 9.4.142 (*AS_{JM}* 541.5) in the case of mercifulness (*sānukrośatā*). Compassion joins hand with the reformatory function of punishment in the *BGUVVNS*, a tenet that can hardly be imagined to have been of great importance in the *arthaśāstras*. Brahminic rehabilitation of the transgressor by means of *prāyaścitta* can, as Wezler points out, also include the capital punishment inflicted on him.⁷⁹ Highest priority seems thereby to lie on the complete

⁷⁸ According to Kane III.211; *ŚP* 23.15 states that a king who does not struggle with an enemy is swallowed by the earth. On the problem of the warrior taking to flight from the battle cp. Wezler 1987/88.

⁷⁹ "Der vorzeitige Verlust des Lebens – im Rahmen der *prāyaścitta*-Praxis freiwillig, als vom König verhängt und in der Regel von einem *caṇḍāla* vollzogene, zu erleidende Strafe im Rahmen des Strafrechts – als äußerste denkbare Steigerung der Schmerzzufügung, so scheinen die Inder gedacht zu haben, eliminiert eben darum endgültig und vollständig die Folgen von als besonders verwerflich angesehenen (Un-) Taten. Nicht die 'Todeswürdigkeit' eines Verbrechens / einer Sünde steht für den Inder im Vordergrund, sondern der Gedanke, daß es/sie nur durch den Verlust des Lebens – das allen Lebewesen lieb ist, auch wenn es ganz und gar nicht einmalig ist – in seinen Folgen für den Täter 'wieder gutgemacht' werden kann." (Wezler 1995: 134f.)

elimination of the negative *karman*, so that in his coming births the culprit would not be hindered anymore by it. I cannot deal here with the question of how ethical the belief in death penalty as a form of elimination of the negative karmic substance can be said to be. Wezler cautiously speaks of a mixture of ethical and non-/pre-ethical elements respectively inherent to, on the one hand, the general notion of *dharma* and, on the other hand, the substantialism on which the concept of *karman* is based and which perpetuated the *in toto* non-ethical magic techniques of removal.⁸⁰ In any case, the idea of expiation through inflicting irreversible corporal damage or death could not convince the authors of the *BGUVVNS*. The reason may have been the fact that they did not believe in the possibility of a more or less automatic, or even magic, purification by the infliction of punishment, which they might have felt to be non-ethical, or a stronger emphasis on the life in the world here.

For Lingat (p. 39), the brahminic-orthodox belief in the necessity of chastisement runs counter to the spirit of the politics of King Aśoka, who presumably believed in the perfectibility of the human nature.⁸¹ Our sūtra seems to breathe the same air. In case of punitive measures it appears that the demand to abolish execution and mutilation is a concrete reflection of this attitude. Practicability may thereby have been a decisive factor: Other frightening measures could remain in use; the efficacy of the punitive system as a whole would still be secured while the abolishment of the two forms of penalty could pay tribute to some of the fundamental precepts of the Buddhist ethics.

In case of warfare the situation looks quite different. Leaving aside the more or less inert appeal for a battle without killing, on the whole, the politics follows a *kṣatriyan* code of ethics. The traditional obligation of a king to guarantee the protection of his subjects from external aggressors and – in the case of the Tibetan *BGUVVNS*, not clear – to conquer new territories, did apparently not leave any space for less violent strategies. From the very outset it would be impossible to survive on a subcontinent where for the most time many small kingdoms co-existed in competition with each other. A weakness of the potential enemy – and an army known to refrain from killing would certainly give reason to be perceived as

⁸⁰ Cp. Wezler 1995: 137.

⁸¹ The view that Aśoka did not only abolish the death penalty but also “instituted a system of after-prison care” is held by Norman on the basis of his interpretation of the fourth Pillar Edict (K.R. Norman, “Aśoka and Capital Punishment”, in *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1990, 200-213 (= *JRAS* 1975, 16-24)). Though suggesting that Aśoka believed in the perfectibility of the human nature, Lingat does not follow Norman’s analysis and states that Aśoka never abolished the death penalty (pp. 40f.).

such – would sooner or later invite the neighbours of the kingdom to take control of it. No king with such a strategy would have been found competent to offer his subjects effective protection.⁸² Whereas in case of punishment a more moderate approach could clearly be advocated (though still far from being in complete harmony with Buddhist ethics), a mild approach towards warfare would have been unrealistic. Knowing this, the authors of the sūtra did not hesitate to assure right after the concerned paragraph that the king would attain immeasurable merit. The “équilibre des pouvoirs”, as Bareau (p. 39) calls the basic relation between the “pouvoir spirituel” of the historical Buddha and the “pouvoir matériel” of his contemporary sovereigns, seems in the case of war, still clearly perceptible. The non-intervention of the historical Buddha to dissuade the ruler from abstaining from war, as transmitted to us in the Pāli sources, could in fact, as Bareau points out (p. 38), have its reason in an anticipation of the futility of such efforts and could further be interpreted as an unwelcome intervention into royal affairs. For the authors of the Mahāyānist *BGUVVNS* the latter aspect does not seem to have been of any relevance, since it is exactly this what they were aiming at with their sixth chapter. It is more likely that they realised that any attempt to go further would have ended up in total futility.

Now, what would be the position of the *BGUVVNS* within the two poles of “Buddhist fundamentalism” and “harmonisation of Buddhist ethics with politics”? Candrakīrti in his commentary on the fourth chapter of the *Catuhśataka* deals extensively with the conflict between Buddhist ethics and the political duties of a righteous king. Based on Lang’s presentation of his analysis, there are two main issues, which I find important enough to point out. Firstly, it is the king’s lack of affection (*brtse ba*), which in several passages is heavily criticised. For Candrakīrti the king is without affection because he punishes criminals (*D* 79b; Lang 237), and he can never go to heaven when killed on the battlefield because there he “rushes around with rage and without affection, raising the weapon directed to the enemy’s head in order to kill without any affection towards the other men” (*D* 84b1). Candrakīrti does not further deal with the possibility of combating and “killing with compassion” as it is occasionally found in other writings of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.⁸³

⁸² Even King Aśoka continued to maintain his army after the establishment of his reign (cp. Lingat 41). Schmithausen mentions the legend of the Sakyas who only offered symbolic resistance when attacked by the enemy’s army and were slaughtered (1999: 49; cp. *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (PTS ed.) I.358).

This leads to the second point: For Candrakīrti there seems to be no way to combine Buddhist ethics with the traditional responsibilities of a king. He states that the king will have to experience the result of his bad deeds, i.e., the harassment of living beings in association with his political role, in the same way a butcher will have to endure the results of the slaughtering of animals (*D* 88a-b).

This fundamental approach, which grants only minimal or no readiness at all to compromise the principle of *ahiṃsā* is, as a matter of fact, no isolated occurrence. Lingat (p. 15) observes in relation to Pāli Buddhism that one strand of texts stresses the incompatibility of the handling of power with the Buddhist path. Characteristic for the same kind of thought is a verse in the *Buddhacarita* (9.48-50) where the pairs *mokṣadharmā/śama* and *rājadharmā/daṇḍa* are contrasted, and the ruler, in order to attain *śama*, remains without any other choice than finally giving up his kingdom. This situation must have been felt as unsatisfactory and it is thus only natural that, again according to Lingat (p.15), in Pāli Buddhism there exists another strand of texts which deals with the kingdom as a helpful organisation for both king and subjects. This second strand, a model of “harmonisation between ethics and politics”, emphasises the benefiting role of the king for his subjects and does not charge him with any offences.

The *BGUVVNS* clearly represents such a “harmonising” approach. The king’s merit can even become immeasurable by punishing and fighting with the right intention. No contradiction is found there between *rājadharmā* and *mokṣadharmā*. We are not led to argue that the sūtra suggests a “compartmentalisation of values”, as Schmithausen terms the adoption of diverse ethical standards based on the membership in a certain group or according to the respective professional function one has to fulfil, as in case of the general Siha who – as a Buddhist follower – refuses to kill animals but is not in conflict with his warfare activities as a general.⁸⁴ It seems as if for the authors of the *BGUVVNS* the renunciation of capital punishment and mutilation together with the cultivation of a compassionate mind were deemed sufficient to view a king as acting in line with Buddhist ethics. This moderate approach might result from a tendency to give priority to practicability rather than moral absolutism. In other words, the authors might have considered it worth

⁸³ Cp. Schmithausen 1999: 59; Demiéville 379ff. The concepts of killing with compassion and war motivated by compassion was (mis-)used in this century among some Japanese Buddhist sects to justify Japan’s expansionist war in Asia. In detail cp. Victoria 86ff.

⁸⁴ Cp. Schmithausen 1999: 53.

compromising the key issue of *ahimsā* in order to spare wrong-doers from their fate, viz., the facing of death penalty or mutilation. On the other hand, the downside of this compromising attitude was the undermining of the norm not to kill, and, *volens volens*, allowing traditional elements of Kṣatriyan war ethics to creep into Buddhist morality, which previously had paid almost no attention to this field.

After all, we should keep in mind that the *ekayāna* doctrine, to which the *BGUVVNS* belongs, could well provide the philosophical grounding for a political leadership facing and affirming a multireligious society.⁸⁵ If we assume that our sūtra was intended to have some kind of influence on the political settings of that time, it would be just natural to find it framing a doctrine dominated by practicability, which, in addition, a Buddhist ruler could use without having to fear that his royal duties would run against Buddhist ethics. It is impossible to ascertain how much interest, if any, our sūtra stimulated amongst Indian rulers and how much it really contributed to the increase of humanitarian ideals, which Basham claims to be “probably encouraged by Buddhism ... in moderating the fierce punishment of earlier days” (1959: 119). In light of India’s long martial tradition, the sūtra itself seems to be well aware of the difficult task of convincing Indian sovereigns of more humanitarian ideas. It is perhaps not without ironic realism that in the sūtra king Caṇḍapadyota is not depicted as an ideal student: He threatens twice with execution for minor “transgressions”: first, Satyaka, because he accuses the king of being “too passionate” (cp. n. 15) and, later, those who would not join the assembly in front of the Buddha. These episodes might only too well illustrate the inefficiency of moderate humanitarian ideals, let alone moral rigorism, in the lives and the *Realpolitik* of the Indian rulers.

Abbreviations

- AN* *Aṅguttaranikāya*, ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, 5 vols. London: PTS, 1885-1900.
AŚ *The Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra, Part I, A Critical Edition with a Glossary*, ed. R.P. Kangle. Bombay: University of Bombay, 1960.
AŚ_{JM} *The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya*: Translation by Johann Jakob Meyer, *Das Altindische Buch vom Welt- und Staatsleben, Das Arthaśāstra des Kauṭilya*. Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1926.
BGUVVNS **Bodhisattva-gocāropāya-viśaya-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa-sūtra* in three translations:
Ch₁: Chinese translation of the *BGUVVNS* by Guṇabhadra (394-468 CE): *Fo shuo pusa xing fangbian jingjie shentong bianhua jing* 佛說菩薩行方便境界神通變化經: T 271, vol. 9, 300b-316b.

⁸⁵ It is not surprising that the *Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra*, as the principal exponent of the *ekayāna* doctrine, was among the three sūtras of foremost importance for Prince Shōtoku (574-622) who is associated with the implementation of Buddhism in Japan. The *ekayāna* doctrine enabled him to integrate very different religious and philosophical thoughts of that time.

- Ch₂**: Chinese translation of the *BGUVVNS* by Bodhiruci (572-727(sic!) CE): *Da saze'niganzi suo shuo jing* 大薩遮尼乾子所說經: *T 272*, vol. 9, 317a-365c. For all citations of *T 272* the Jin Edition 金藏廣勝寺本, No. 172 (cp. *Ji*) has been checked; I have mentioned only significant variants (including the apparatus in the Zhonghua Dazangjing itself).
- Tib**: Tibetan translation of the *BGUVVNS* by Prajñāvarma(n), Ye she sde, and others (ca 800 CE): *Phags pa byang chub sems dpa'i spyod yul gyi thabs kyi yul la rnam par 'phrul ba bstan pa shes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*: *Q 813*, vol. 32, *mDo sna tshogs*, Nu 37a8-101b8; *S 246*, vol. 77, *mDo sde*, La 1b1-83b3.
- Ch₁** Cp. *BGUVVNS* above.
- Ch₂** Cp. *BGUVVNS* above.
- D** The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* by Candrakīrti in the *Sde dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka Bstan ḥgyur*, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, dBu ma 8, no. 205, ed. Tōkyō Daigaku Bungakubu Indotetsugaku Indobungaku Kenkyūshitsu 東京大学文学部印度哲学印度文学研究室, Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai, 1978: No. 3864, *Ya* 1b1-30b6.
- DN** *Dighanikāya*, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter, 3 vols. London: PTS, 1890-1911.
- Ji** **Ch₂** in the Zhonghua Dazangjing 中華大藏經: No. 172, vol. 17, 840b1-929a12 (*Zhonghua Dazangjing* (*Chinese Tripiṭaka*) 中華大藏經, ed. 'Zhonghua Dazangjing' Bianjiju 《中華大藏經》編輯局, vol. 1-. Peking: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984-).
- MN** *Majjhimanikāya*, eds. V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers, 3 vols. London: PTS, 1888-1899.
- Manu** *Manav Dharma Shastra or The Institutes of Manu, Code of Hindu Laws, Vol. I: Sanskrit Text*, ed. Graves Channay Haughton, Reprint of the 1825 publication. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1982.
- Q** *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition*, ed. Daisetz T. Suzuki, vol. 1-168. Repr. under the Supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto. Kyoto, Tokyo: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1955-1961.
- S** Reprint of the Stog Palace Ms Kanjur: *The Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur*, ed. Ta-rugser-mgar-pa Tshen-brtan rNam-rgyal, 109 vols. Shesrig Dpemzod, Leh: C. Namgyal Tarusergar, 1975-1980.
- SN** *Saṃyuttanikāya*, ed. Leon Feer, 6 vols. London: PTS, 1884-1904.
- ŚP** The *Śāntiparvan* book in the *Mahābhārata* (The Poona Critical Edition).
- T** *The Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo (The Tripiṭaka in Chinese)*, eds. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, 100 vols. Tokyo: The Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo Kanko Kai, 1924-1929.
- Tib** Cp. *BGUVVNS* above.
- Yājñ** *Yājñavalkya-smṛti of Yogīśvara Yājñavalkya, With the commentary Mitākṣarā of Vijñāneśvara, Notes, Variant readings, etc.*, ed. Narayan Ram Acharya. Bombay: Nimayasagara Press, 1949.

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Brief Communication

Identification of Some Buddhist Sanskrit Fragments from Central Asia

Recently, I have been able to identify the following Buddhist Sanskrit fragments and a manuscript from Central Asia.

(1) A Fragment of the *Samantamukha-parivarta* of the *Saddharmapundarikasūtra*:

In his article “Buddhist Sanskrit”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (1955), p. 16, Plate II, Prof. Bailey reproduced a facsimile of “three Harvard Buddhist Sanskrit fragments” (p. 15) without referring to their physical whereabouts. Though he wrote “three”, it is in fact just one fragment, which was apparently broken into two, and both sides of one piece and only the obverse of the other piece were photographed separately. A facsimile of the reverse of the latter is not found in the article.

Also, Bailey neither edited nor identified the fragment. My transliteration of it is found in a footnote of my precedent article, namely “Hokekyō no Bunkengakuteki Kenkyū (2) — Kannon Avalokitasvara no Gogi Kaishaku” (“Philological Remarks on the Lotus Sutra [2] — On the Name Avalokitasvara”), in: *Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University II* (1998), p. 41, fn. 3. It corresponds with the *Saddharmapundarikasūtra*, ed. H. Kern, B. Nanjio, St. Petersburg 1908-1912 (Bibliotheca Buddhica 10), p. 443, l. 5~ p. 444, l. 13.

(2) Two Fragments of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra*:

Recently, I have been able to identify two so far unidentified fragments, which were acquired by the expedition of Count Otani in Central Asia, as parts of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra*. Their transliterations are found in *Saiiki Bunka Kenkyū* 西域文化研究 (*Monumenta Serindica*), vol. 4, *Buddhist Manuscripts and Secular Documents of the Ancient Languages in Central Asia*, The Research Society of Central Asian Culture, Kyoto 1960, p. 77. One of them, MS. No. 622, corresponds virtually to Johannes Nobel’s edition of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra* (*Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*, ed. Johannes Nobel, Leipzig 1937), p. 31, l. 12(?) ~ p. 33, l. 4. The other, MS. No. 624, agrees basically with p. 91, l. 6 ~ p. 92, l. 12 of Nobel’s edition. Only the photograph of MS. No. 622 is

attached in the above mentioned book, plate II.

(3) A Manuscript of the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins:

Dr. M. I. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya has recently published a transliteration and an annotated translation along with photographs of folios of a Sanskrit manuscript, which is a part of the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins, from the Merv oasis in Turkmen, now preserved in the collection of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies: "A Sanskrit Manuscript on Birch-bark from Bairam-Ali. 1. The Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins", in: *Manuscripta Orientalia*, Vol. 5, No.2, pp. 27-36 and No. 3, pp. 27-35. I was able to trace its parallel in the Chinese translation of the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins, Shísònglǜ 十誦律, trans. Kumārajīva, Puṇyatṛāta and Dharmaruci, 404 CE, T. no. 1435, 423b10f.

Seishi Karashima

Brief Communication

Identification of a Quotation in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti*

I have been able to trace a hitherto unidentified quotation in the *Ratnagotravibhāga(vṛtti)* (*RGV(V)*) to the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS)*. The sentence in question occurs in the *RGV(V)* in the context of the explanation of the three *svabhāvas* of the *dhātu*, viz., *dharmakāya*, *tathatā* and *gotra*, the three key terms of verses I.27-28, which constitute the central section of the *RGVV*. The quotation is part of the commentary on the third aspect, i.e., *gotra*, and is placed after the last of the three interpretations of the compound *tathāgatagarbha*. In this context the *dhātu* of living beings, i.e., their buddha essence, has just been declared to mean “cause” (*hetu*). The quotation serves to illustrate this interpretation. It runs as follows (*RGVV* 72.10-12)¹:

yata āha / tatra ca sattve sattve tathāgatadhātur utpanno garbhagataḥ saṁvidyate na ca te sattvā budhyanta iti /

Now, the so-called Newark Manuscript Kanjur from Bathang² contains a second, paracanonical and presumably older Tibetan translation of the *TGS*. There we can find the following sentence:³

de nas sems can dag de bzhin gshegs pa'i khaṁs skyes pa yang yod : snying po la gnas pa yang na : sems can de dag gi khong du mi chud te :*

**khaṁsu* emended to *khaṁs*. The colon represents two vertically aligned dots where in other Kanjurs a *shad* is used.

Also the wording of this passage in the Chinese translation of the *TGS* by Amoghavajra testifies that this must have been the source of the quotation:⁴

然——有情有如來界，具如來藏。是彼有情不覺，不知。

The quotation could not be traced easily, because the canonical Tibetan translation of the *TGS* shows a wording not in accordance with the Sanskrit passage. This confirms the conclusion of my former research that the canonical version was subject to a redactional operation not based on the Indian original. The canonical version reads:⁵

des na sems can rnam la de bzhin gshegs pa'i rigs bzhugs te / khong na yod kyang sems can de dag gi khong du ma chud do //

In a future article I intend to deal with the question of why the translators or redactors of the canonical version of the *TGS* preferred *rigs* (Skt. *gotra* or *kula*) to the standard translation *khams* or *dbyings* for Skt. *dhātu* as well as with the obvious differences in the understanding of this sentence between the *TGS* itself and the *RGV(V)*.⁶

We can now be sure that the term *tathāgatadhātu* designating the buddha nature of living beings was already part of the Indian *TGS*.⁷ The quoted Sanskrit text of the *TGS* will also contribute to throw light on the relation between the *RGV(V)* and the two Chinese recensions of the sūtra as well as on the translation techniques of the Tibetan scholars from the period before the use of compendiums like the *Mahāvīyutpatti* and the *sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa*.

Notes

¹ *The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra*, ed. E.H. Johnston. Patna: The Bihar Research Society, 1950. The Chinese translation omits the quotation.

² For the Newark Kanjur cp. my contribution “A Second Tibetan Translation of the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* in the Newark Manuscript Kanjur from Bathang: A Translation of the Early Period (*snga dar*)”, in *Transactions of the International Conference of Eastern Studies* 43 (1998), Tokyo: The Tōhō Gakkai, 1998, 33-50. The *TGS* carries no. 20.288 and is found in *mDo bsde, Ta* 245b1-258a8. Currently Dr. Eimer from the Universität Bonn is in charge of the compilation of a catalogue of this Kanjur.

³ *Ta* 252a8.

⁴ *Da fang guang rulai zang jing* 大方廣如來藏經: *T* 667, vol. 16, 460b25-466a6: 463c14-16. The other Chinese translation by Buddhahadra (*T* 666) represents a different recension.

⁵ Peking Kanjur (Otani Reprint): no. 924, vol. 36, *mDo, Shu* 259b4-274a1: 267b8-268a1.

⁶ Whereas the compound *garbhagata*, referring to *dhātu*, should be understood in the sense of “inside (of living beings)” in the context of the *TGS*, the *RGV* takes it to mean “as an embryo”. This interpretation is particularly interesting in light of the verses of the *RGV* which freely re-tell the content of the *TGS* and are most likely part of an older layer. In the passage concerned they use *garbhāntarastha* and *svātmāntarastha* (I.123). This formulation is in line with the understanding in the *TGS* and contradicts the (later) interpretation at *RGV* 72.7-12.

⁷ The term *tathāgatadhātu* or *buddhadhātu* as “buddha essence” was thought to have been coined by the Mahāyānistic *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (*MMPNS*) which identifies it with the *tathāgatagarbha* of the *TGS*, as a second, independent strand within the buddha nature teaching. The *MMPNS* quotes the *TGS* in one passage.

Michael Zimmermann

活動報告

平成11年2月以降の研究所のあゆみ

「国際仏教学高等研究所運営委員会」を年に2、3回の割合で開会。
「国際仏教学高等研究所所員会」を月2回の割合（夏期・冬期休暇中を除く）で開会。
以下、月日を追って研究所および所員の主要な活動を記す。

3月4日(木)～26日(金) 湯山教授 米国出張

6日～9日 プリンストン大学・ニュー・アーク博物館等訪問

10日～18日 Association for Asian Studies・99年度学術大会に出席
(ボストン・11～14日) / ハーヴァード大学等訪問

19日～24日 American Oriental Society・第209回学術大会に出席(ボルテモア・21～24日) “Some Philological Problems of the Mahāvastu-Avadāna”
と題して研究発表(23日) / ジョンズ・ホプキンス大学(ボルティモア)・米
国議会図書館(ワシントン)等訪問

4月12日(月) 第7回仏教学懇話会

ハンブルク大学教授ランベルト・シュミットハウゼン博士を招聘
テーマ「空性－超脱と思ひ遣り：仏教精神の二極」

4月19日(月) 年報・研究叢書発送

- ・創価大学国際仏教学高等研究所 年報 平成10年度(第2号)
(3月31日付)
- ・梶山雄一著 The Antaryvāptisamarthana of Ratnākaraśānti

5月11日(火)～12日(水) 梶山所長

東洋哲学研究所シンポジウムに出席

「法華経と空思想」と題して講演(11日・創価大学内多目的ホール)

5月9日(日)～13日(木) 辛嶋教授

「アフガニスタン出土梵語写本研究会」に出席
(主催：佛教大学総合研究所)

5月25日(火) 第8回仏教学懇話会

元ベルリン・インド美術館学芸員ローレ・ザンダー博士を招聘

テーマ「ベルリン・インド美術館所蔵の漢文・蔵文木版に見える施主ダ
ニヤセーナ」

5月31日(月) 辛嶋教授

京都大学人文科学研究所桑山共同研究班例会に出席。
『高僧伝』 「卑摩羅叉」の訳注を発表

6月14日(月) 辛嶋教授

京都大学人文科学研究所桑山共同研究班例会に出席。
『高僧伝』 「佛陀耶舎」の訳注を発表

8月23日(月)～30日(月) 辛嶋教授

The International Association of Buddhist Studiesの第12回国際会議（24日～
28日／スイス・ローザンヌ大学）に参加
“Some Features of the Language of the Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra (梵文法華
經の言語の諸相)” と題して発表(24日)

9月 1日(水)～3日(金) 梶山所長

佛教大学集中講義を担当
講義題目『空の思想』

9月 8日(水)～10日(金) 梶山所長

日本印度学仏教学会学術大会に出席（龍谷大学）

11月12日(金) 第9回仏教学懇話会

東北大学講師 岡野潔博士を招聘
テーマ「新発見の正量部コスモロジー文献を中心にして」

11月19日(金) 辛嶋教授

佛教大学総合研究所公開研究会において「バーミヤン溪谷出土『摩訶僧祇
律』の梵文断簡について」と題して発表

平成12年

1月14日(金) 第10回仏教学懇話会

国立民族学博物館名誉教授 本学客員教授 加藤九祚先生を招聘
カラ・テパ仏教遺跡の大仏塔について発表

国際仏教学高等研究所所員の著作

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編集後記

本誌第三号は、和文論文が二篇、英文論文が六篇、計八篇の論文に加えてBrief Communicationが二篇あり、ますます充実したものとなった。

中国社会科学院の蒋忠新博士からはハリバドラの『宝徳藏般若釈』梵語写本の研究論文を寄稿して頂いた。貴重な文献を世界に向けて公表する場として、本誌を選んで下さったことに深く感謝したい。関西医科大学のデアヌ教授からは大乘仏教の成立に関する示唆に富んだご論考を、また本学の菅野教授からは天台智顛の法華経観を明らかにしたご論文を、佛教大学の工藤氏は昨年につき*Mahākarmavibhāṅga*の校訂研究を御寄稿下さった。

梶山所長は仏教認識論に関する、深い思索に裏打ちされたご論文を纏められ、また湯山教授は本研究所の叢書第三巻の執筆の傍ら『尊勝陀羅尼』のネパール出土梵本の校訂と研究論文を書き上げられた。また研究生のツインマーマン氏は大乘の『実利論』批判という興味深い論考をご寄稿下さった。

ご多忙のなか執筆を賜った諸先生方に深く感謝申し上げます。

また、私たち研究員が研究に専念できるのは、献身的に事務を遂行して下さる中野研至前事務長、出井士鶴現事務長、岸寿美子課長、また、庶務全般の仕事をごこなして下さる椎名明実さん、図書注文から管理までを担当して下さる岡松陽子さん、及川弘美さん、そして図書登録及び海外との通信をお手伝い下さるオランダ・ドイツ・フランス・中国・香港・タイ・インドネシア・アルゼンチンからの留学生の方々、すべての皆さんのお蔭です。一年間の研究成果を纏めるにあたり、深い感謝の意を記したいと思います。

論文執筆で季節を忘れていたが、今日久しぶりにキャンパスのなかを散歩したら、ミツマタが明日にも一斉に花開かんばかりになっていて、しだれ梅や紅梅は咲き始め、木蓮や雪柳の芽も膨らんでいた。枯れたように見えた桜も近付いてみると枝の先の膨らみから開花に向けての息吹が聞こえるような気がした。暗く長い冬を過ごした留学中、なかなか勉強の成果があがらず、学問の難しさに挫けそうになった。そんな僕の心のうちを察してか「今は書けなくても、あせらず、読書を続けることだね。しっかりと根をはってれば、いつか自ずと論文が書けるようになるものだよ」と言ってくれた師のことをふと思い出した。僕はゆっくりと研究室へ向かって歩き出した。

(2000.1.28 / 辛嶋)

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
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