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"Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa's Definition of *Kartṛtva*:

Second Chapter of the *Kāraḥcakra*"

NYĀYA-VASISṬHA

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**BHAVĀNANDA SIDDHĀNTAVĀGĪŚA'S DEFINITION OF
KARTRVA: SECOND CHAPTER OF THE KĀRAKACAKRA¹**

NORIYUKI KUDO

Introduction

After defining 'karakatva' as "kartrvakarmatvādiṣaṭkānyatamatve sati² kriyānvayitvamkarakatvam: the state of being *kāraka* is the state of being syntactically connected with action (*anvayitva*) when it has a property of any one of the six like agency or object-ness, etc." in his *Kārakacakra*,³ Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa proceeds to discuss the notion of agent (*kartrva*). The difference between Bhavānanda, a *Navya-Naiyāyika*, and the grammarians lies mainly in their attitude toward "*śābdabodha*" (a verbal cognition). In general, the process of acquisition of the verbal knowledge is firstly to hear an utterance of word elements, either in sentence form or in word form; to recollect the meanings of elements; and to reach the integrated meaning. This meaning obtained at the last stage is called *śābdabodha* (a verbal knowledge). The grammarians hold a view of "*bhāvārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*" (a verbal cognition wherein verbal meaning is predominant)⁴ and the *Naiyāyikas*, on the other hand, have an opinion of "*prathamārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*" (a verbal cognition wherein a nominal meaning of word ending in first case is predominant). For instance, a verbal cognition according to the grammarians is as follows (here, I quote an example found in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa): "*taṇḍulam pacati caitraḥ*" ityatra "ekataṇḍulāśrayikā yā viklittih, tadanukūlaikacaitrābhinnāśrayikā vartamānā bhāvanā," "taṇḍulah pacyate caitreṇa ityatra ca "ekacaitrāśrayikā ekataṇḍulābhinnāśrayikā yā viklittih, tad anukūlā sāmpratīkī bhāvanā" iti bodhaḥ [VBh on Bhaṭṭoḥjī Dīkṣita's *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* v. 2, p. 19].⁵ As seen in this analysis, "*bhāvanā*" (activity) is regarded as a main constituent in verbal cognition. On the other hand, Gaṅgeśa, the one who established the *Navya-Nyāya* school, gives the following analysis: "*caitras taṇḍulam pacati*" ity atra taṇḍulasya karmatvenānvayāt taṇḍulavṛttiphalajanakavyāpārajanakayatnāśrayaś caitra iti pratīyate iti sa eva viśeṣyaḥ. "caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍula" ity atra caitravṛttiyatnajanavyāpārajanayaphalāśrayas taṇḍula pratīyate iti yatnasya paramparayā taṇḍula eva viśeṣyaḥ [Tattvacintāmaṇi, ākhyātavāda, vol. 4 part 2, pp.837-8].⁶

This difference is reflected on the notion of agent. In the following, I would like to present a Sanskrit text of "kartṛ-section" of the *Kārakacakra* and its English translation. In this section Bhavānanda refutes the grammarians' view and then puts forward his fibak view. Due to a limit of space and time, I would like to give a comment on his opinion in another occasion.

About the Author

Roughly speaking, there are two main schools among *Navya-Naiyāyikas*. The one is of Gaṅgeśa (ca.1300-1360), i.e., Mithilā-school and the other one is initiated by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (ca. 1430-1540), namely Bengal-school. Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa belongs to the latter. However there is a confusion concerning his date and *guru-śiṣya-paramparā*. D. C. Bhattacharya⁷ states that Bhavānanda was a pupil of Kṛṣṇadāsa Vāsudeva (ca. 1500-1550) and Umesh Mishra⁸ gives another relationship that he was a pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (ca.1500). On the contrary, Gopinath Kaviraj⁹ states that after the death of Raghunātha, Bhavānanda became a pupil of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (ca. 1540-1600) who was a pupil of Raghunātha. In spite of every effort to fix his date, those assumptions are not strong beside the fact that Bhavānanda was later than Raghunātha. If, as D. C. Bhattacharya remarks¹⁰, it is reliable that [Rāma-]Rudra Tarkavāgīśa, Bhavānanda's grandson, wrote his commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi-Dīdhiti* at the year of 1660, Bhavānanda might have lived at least in the middle of 16th century. Taking this into consideration, the most probable date might be ca. 1520-1580 (given by G. Bhattacharya¹¹ and ca. 1570 (by B. K. Matilal¹²).

Title of this Text

According to several manuscript catalogues, a title of "*Kārakacakra*" is not recorded; instead of it the following titles are found, namely *Kārakavāda*, (*Ṣaṭ*-)*Kārakavivecana*, or *Kārakādyarthanirṇaya*.¹³ As far as I could see by myself, all the manuscripts preserved at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, with exception of that not having a colophon read as follows: *iti Śabdārthasāramañjaryāṃ Bhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśaviracitaṃ . Śaṭkārakavivecanaṃ samāptam* (Here ends the *Ṣaṭ-Kāraka-Vivecana*, a part of the *Śabdārthasāramañjarī*, written by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa). Therefore, it is probable that the title *Kārakacakra* is not a genuine one but used conventionally by the editor(s) (although for the referential convenience I will follow this convention).

Synopsis of 2

- Texts 7-13 : Against Grammarians
 Texts 14-15 : Against *Pracīna-Naiyāyikas*
 Texts 16-18 : Bhavānanda's *siddhānta*
 Text 19 : Supplementary comment

Text and Translation¹⁴***Karṭṛtvavivecanam.***

[Text 7]¹⁵ *tatra "kriyāśrayatvaṃ karṭṛtvam" iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ. teṣāṃ
 ayam āśayaḥ - yaddhātūttarākhyātena ya Gādyasamabhi-
 vyāhṛtena¹⁶ yaddhātvarthān-vitayādṛśadharmavattvaṃ
 bodhyate, tādṛśadharmavattvaṃ eva tatkriyākarṭṛtvam.*

Translation : According to the Grammarians, the state of being an agent (*karṭṛtva*) is the state of being a substratum of action. What they mean is that through a personal ending added to verbal root, which is not associated with a passive affix *yaK*, etc.], a property of having a certain feature connected with the meaning of verbal root is realized. That property is the agency of that action.

[Text 8] *evaṅ ca "pacati" ityādau pākānukūlavyāpāravattvaṃ,
 "jānāti" ityādāv āśrayatvaṃ, "naśyati" ityādau
 pratiyogitvaṃ tatkriyānirūpitatvaṃ tattatkriyākarṭṛtvam.*

Translation: Thus, the agency of each action described by that action is as follows: in case of "pacati" [it is] a state of having an activity (*vyāpāra*) conducive to an act of cooking [i.e., result (*phala*)]; in "jānāti" [it is] the state of being a substratum; and [it is] the counterpositive-ness in "paśyati."

[Text 9] *yaGādyasamabhivyāhṛteneti viśeṣanāt "pacyate taṇḍula"
 ityādau pākajanyaphalāśrayatvena taṇḍulāder bodhān na
 tasya karṭṛtvam.*

Translation : Owing to the qualification of "not being associated with the passive affix. *yaK*, etc.," rice grain in case of the passive constructions such as "pacyate taṇḍulaḥ: rice grain is cooked," etc., has no agency because it is regarded as the substratum of the result produced by the act of cooking.

[Text 10] “*kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanaṃ pacati*” ityādaḥ *karaṇādihikaraṇakarmanām kriyānvitakaraṇatvādi-dharmavattve 'pi sa dharmo nākhyātapratipādyah. yadā tu tattātparyeṇākhyātam prayujyate, tadā**⁴ “*kāṣṭham pacati*” (“*sthālī pacati*”)¹⁷ ityādaḥ *teṣāṃ karṭṛtvam iṣṭam eva.*

Translation: In case of “*kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanaṃ pacati*: he cooks rice in a pot by means of the sticks of fire-wood,” even though [sticks of fire-wood being] ‘*karaṇa*,’ [pot being] ‘*adhikaraṇa*,’ and [rice being] ‘*karman*’ have the state of having a feature like instrumentality [, locus-ness or object-ness] connected with action [respectively], such a feature is not known by the personal ending.

However, when the personal ending is selected by respective intention of speaker, the agency of ‘stick of fire-wood’ in the expression “*kāṣṭham pacati*: stick of fire-wood cooks” [and the agency of ‘pot’ in the expression “*sthālī pacati*: a pot cooks”] is indeed desired.

[Text 11] *tathā* “*pacate odanaḥ svayam eva*” ityādaḥ *karmakartary odanādeḥ karmaṇo' pi karṭṛtvam, tatra hi svavṛttivyā-pārajanyapākajanyaphalaśāly odana iti śābdabodhaḥ, (tatra)*¹⁸ *odanapadottaraprathamāyā vyāpāro lakṣaṇārthaḥ. yadvā vyāpārasāmānye śaktasyākhyātasārthaḥ.*

Translation: In the same manner, in the reflexive construction of “*pacate odanaḥ svayam eva*: rice cooks itself,” ‘rice’ being the object [of cooking in fact] has the agency because it is cognized that ‘rice’ is the abode of the result produced by the act of cooking which is produced by the activity existing in itself. In this case, the activity is implied by the first case ending coming after the word ‘*odana*.’ Or rather, the meaning of the verbal ending is the denotative which has the relationship with the activity in general.

[Text 12] *vyutpattivaicitryāc cātra yaGādisamabhivyāhṛtākhy yātārthavyāpāre prathamāntārthasya viśeṣaṇat' yānvayah. tatrākhyātasya vyāpāravācivād odanānvitatādṛśavyā-pārasya ya Gādyasamabhivyāhṛtākhyātapratipādyatvād odanasya yaGādyasamabhivyāhṛtākhy ātapratip*

*ādyadhātvarthānvita-vyāpāravattvarūpakarṭṭvam
nirābādham eva¹⁹, "odanaḥ svaṃ pacati" ityādiprayoga-
syāsādhutayābhāve 'pi tādrśavyā-pāre tujjanyapra-
pattivīṣayatvayogyatānapāyād iti.*

Translation: And due to the diversity of understanding the meaning of the first case ending is connected with the activity as the qualifier, which is the meaning of the personal ending associated with the passive suff. *yaK*. In this case, since the personal ending in the active voice signifies the activity [and] such an activity connected with 'rice' is not expressed by the personal ending not being associated with the passive suff. *yaK*, etc., the agency in the form of the state of having an activity connected with the meaning of verbal root which is expressed by the personal ending not being associated with the passive suff. *yaK* is incontestable to 'rice.' Even if there is no expression like "**odanaḥ svaṃ pacati*: rice cooks itself" because of the grammatical incorrectness, the semantic compatibility (*yogyatā*) to such activity, being the content of knowledge produced by that [usage], does not vanish.

[Text 13] "*pācayati*" *ityādau tu pākānukūlavypāro NiJantārthaḥ, tadanukūlavypārārthaś cākhyātas tadāśraya eva karteti. "svatantraḥ kartā [P.1.4.54]" iti Pāṇinisūtram apy etatparatayaiva vyākhyeyam iti. tan na, acetane 'bhiyuktānām svarasataḥ karṭṭpadāprayogāt.*

Translation: In the causative constructions such as "*pācayati*: he makes [someone] cook," etc., the meaning of causative suff. *-NiC* is the activity conducive to the act of cooking, and the personal ending means the activity conducive to that [activity], and the substratum [of the latter activity] is the agent. Likewise, Pāṇini sūtra 1.4.54: "*svatantraḥ kartā* (agent is the one which is independent)" is to be explained in this way only.

It is not correct because, for the opponent, [if so,] the word *karṭṭ* would not be used to any inanimate object automatically [i.e., without resorting to '*lakṣaṇā*'].

[Text 14] *yat tu "kārakāntaraprayojakatvaṃ sati kārakāntāra-prayojakatvaṃ karṭṛvam" iti.²⁰ satyantāc ca chedyasaṃ-yogādirūpavyāpārajanake kuṭhārādau nātivyāptir ity apare. tad apy asat, īśvarā*prayojyānāṃ saṃsārināṃ tattatkriyās-vakarṭṛtāpatteh.*

Translation: Some [Old *Naiyāyikas*] hold that the agency is the state of being prompter of another 'kāra-ka-s' when it itself is the state of not being prompted by another. [By the qualifying clause "kārakāntarāprajoyatve sati"] this definition would not overapply to 'axe,' etc. [in the expression "kuṭhāreṇa chinnati"] which is the producer of the activity in the form of the contact with that which is to be cut [tree] [because 'axe' is prompted by the 'axe-user'.] This view is not adequate to the fact. [If it were correct.] any human being would not become an agent of any action because he might be prompted by God.

[Text15] *aprayojyatvañca yadi phalānukūlatajjanyavyāpārānāśrayatvāt tadā daṇḍādijanyasaṃyogādirūpavyāpārānāśrayatvāt kulālādāv ativyāptih, anyac ca durvacam iti.*

Translation: If the state of not being prompted is the same as the state of not being a substratum of activity produced by that [= God] which is conducive to the result, in that case, above definition would be too wide to apply because 'potter' is not the substratum of the activity in the form of the contact, etc. produced by stick etc. [Here, 'stick' would be an agent.]

[Text 16] *atrāhuḥ - "anukūlakṛtimattvaṃ karṭṛtvam," pākānukūla vyāpāravattvapratisandhāne 'pi kāṣṭhādau tāntrikāñāṃ svarasataḥ karṭṛpadāprayogāt, kṛtākṛtavibhāgādinā kṛdhātor yatnārthakatve niścite āśra yārthakatḥ Jantakṛdhātuvyutpannakarṭṛpadasya yatnāśrayārthabodhakatvāc ca, acetane karṭṛpadaprayogo gaṇaḥ.*

Translation: Here, [we] say: the agency is the state of having an effort conducive to [action]. [Therefore,] even though the state of having the activity conducive to the act of cooking is remembered [from the personal ending -ti], it is naturally impossible for Analysis (Tāntrikas) to use the word 'kart' to 'stick of fire wood' etc. Moreover, once verbal root

kr- is determined to have a meaning of 'volition (*yatna*)' through the distinction of [action which is either] done or yet to be done, the word '*karṭṛ*' - derived from *kr-* with a *kṛt* suff. -*trC* expressing the substratum, is the conveyer of the substratum of volition. [Therefore,] an usage of the word '*karṭṛ*' to the inanimate thing is secondary.

[Text 17] *yadi cānyaviṣayakṛtijanye nāntariyake "matto bhūtaṃ na tu mayā kṛtam" iti vyapadeśān na mukhyaṃ karṭṛtvam, tadā tattadviṣayatvenāpi kṛtir viśeṣaṇīyā. na caivam tadviṣayakṛtimattvam eva tattatkriyākṛṭtvam*⁴ astu, gurutarabhārōttolanādau tadviṣayakṛtimattve 'pi uttolanakriyādyaniṣpattau karṭṛpadāprayogāt.*

Translation: In case of that which is produced by the effort having a different content but not taken in the middle such as the expression "*matto bhūtam na tu mayā kṛtam*: it was happened me, but it was not done by me," it [= 'I'] has no real agency. In that case, effort is to be qualified by the property having such and such content. [However,] one need not to argue that such agency is nothing but the state of having an effort whose content is so and so because, in the case of '[an act of] lifting up something heavy' etc., even though there is the state of having an effort whose content is such [=lifting up'], the word *karṭṛ* will not be used to [a person who] has no ability to complete the act of lifting up a heavy load.

[Text 18] *viṣayatvañ ca sādhyatvena bodhyam. tena bhojanakṛter uddeśyatvena sukhādiviṣayatve 'pi tatkartur na sukhakarṭṛtvam. asmadādikarṭṛkapākādāv apīśvarasya karṭṛtvam iṣṭam eva, na Caivam "īśvaraḥ pacati" iti prayogaḥ syāt, tathāvivakṣyām iṣṭatvāt.*

Translation: The state of being a content should be realized as the state of that which is to be accomplished. Therefore, even if the effort of 'eating' [in "*bhunakti*: he eats"] is aimed to gain pleasure [from eating], the agent [of eating] cannot be said to be the agent of [the act of gaining] pleasure. [If so,] even in the cooking in which 'I' is the agent the agency of God would be indeed desired. [However,] one should not say

“**īśvaraḥ pacati*” [in stead of “*caitraḥ pacati*”] because, if it is intended to express, then such an usage is certainly desired.

[Text 19]²¹ *kāryatvānavacchinnaḥ janyatānirūpitam asādhāraṇam anukūlatvam eva vā lakṣaṇaghaṭakam ity āhuḥ.*

Translation: It is said that a peculiar conduciveness which is described by the state of being the produced not delimited by the effect-ness forms the part of above definition [in order to prevent from applying this definition to *īśvara*]. Here ends the section of ‘*karṭva*.’

References

- 1 This is a partial extract of my paper written in Japanese (“*Shinronrigakuha no Kouishutaisei (karṭva) Teigi - Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa Kārakacakra Dai-ni-shou*,” [“*Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa on Karṭva: Annotated Japanese Translation of the Kārakacakra 2*”], in: *Bukkyou Daigaku Bukkyougakkai Kiyō*, vol. 5, 1997, pp. 29-74).

Here, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Professor Dr. V. N. Jha, Director of the Centre of Advanced Studies in Sanskrit, University of Pune, who kindly gave me an opportunity to read this text throughoutly during my stay in Pune, especially January-July, 1992. This meeting was constantly conducted four or five days a week in the morning during that period.

Furthermore, he checked my English translation throughoutly and gave me a number of valuable suggestions to understand this text. Without his guidance and kindness, it was not possible for me to read this difficult text in such a short period. Needless to say, any errors or misunderstandings that remain in this paper are my own.

- 2 Edition (3) reads “⁰*ṣaṭkānyatamadvārā* (through through intermediary of any one of the six ...)” instead of “⁰*ṣaṭkānyatamatve sati*.” (For the editions, see note 14 below).
- 3 As far as I know, there are several studies on this text. B. K. Matilal deals with ‘*karāṇa*-section’ (“*The Doctrine of Karāṇa*” in: *Logic, Language and Reality*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1985, pp. 372-378); and ‘*kāraka*-section’ (“*Bhavānanda on ‘What is Kāraka?’*,” in: *Pāṇinian Studies: Dr. S. D. Joshi Felicitation Volume*, eds. by M. M. Deshpande and Saroja Bhate, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies Number 37, University of Michigan, 1990, pp. 263-288 and “*The Kāraka Theory*,” in: *The Word and the World- India's Contribution to the Study of Language*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 40-48). Achyutananda Das studies it and presents its critical edition which covers from the beginning up to the end of ‘*karāṇa*-section’ (*Bhavānandiyam Kārakacakram: Ekam Adhyāyam*. [Ph.D. Thesis submitted to University of Poona, 1987, unpublished, in Sanskrit]). Aravinda Kumar examines this text as a whole (*Bhavānanda-Kṛta Kārakacakra -- Eka Adhyāyana [Vyākaraṇaśāstra*

evaṃ Navyanyāya ke Ālika meṃ], Kurukshetra: Nirmaḷ Book Agency 1992, [in Hindi]).

- 4 Among the grammarians, especially *Navya-Vaiyākaraṇas*, namely Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, there is again difference of opinion concerning the denotation of verbal root. I cannot deal with this problem in detail here (see my paper, "A Study on Sanskrit Syntax (5): *Śabdakaustubha* on P.1.4.54-55 [Kartṛ and Hetu]," in: *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Sambhāṣā*, vol. 21, 2001, pp. 55-85, esp. pp. 59-61).
- 5 VB.: *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa. Ed. by Pt. Manudeva Bhaṭṭācārya. Harijivandas Pracyavidya Granthamala No. 2, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakashan, 1985. Nāgeśa gives different analysis: *tathā ca grāmaṃ gacchati caitra ity atraikatvāvacchinnacaitrābhinnakartṛko vartamānakāli grāmābhinnakarmaniṣṭho yas saṃyogaḥ tad anukūlo vyāpāraḥ, grāmo gamyate maitreṇetyatratu maitrakartṛkavarta-mānakālikavyāpārajanyogrāmābhinnakaramramaniṣṭhaḥ saṃyoga iti ca bodhaḥ. [Paramalaghumañjūṣā, M. S. University of Baroda Research Series 7, 1961, p. 140].*
- 6 *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. with commentaries *Rahasya* and *Āloka* respectively by Mathūranātha Tarkavāgīśa and Jayadeva Miśra. Ed. by K.N. Tarkavāgīśa, 4 vols (6 parts) Bibliotheca Indica No. 98, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1884-1901. (Rep. Vrajajīvan Prācyabhāratī Granthamālā No. 47, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, 1990).
- 7 D. C. Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, Darbhanga: Mithilā Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958, p. 154.
- 8 See Umesh Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol.II, Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications, 1966, p. 426.
- 9 See Gopikanath Kaviraj, *The History and Bibliography of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika Literature*, (Rep. The Princess Wales, Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Varanasi: Sampūrṇānada Saṃskṛta Viśvavidyālaya), 1982, p. 83.
- 10 See D. C. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- 11 See Gopika Mohan Bhattacharya, *Navya-Nyāya - Some Logical Problems in Historical Perspective*, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1978, p. 8.
- 12 See Matilal, *Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika. A History of Indian Literature*, volume 2, fasc.2, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1997, p. 109.
- 13 For instance, see *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. 3 (pp. 372-373).
- 14 The text of KC is based on the following three editions: (1) Ed. by Mahadeva Gangadhara Bakre, in: *Vādārthasaṃgraha*, part 2, Bombay: The Gujarati Printing Press, 1914, pp. 1-23, esp. p. 2, l.4-p. 3, l. 23.; (2) Ed. by Sudhāṃśuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya, Calcutta, 1923; (3) Ed. by Brahma Saṅkara Sāstrī (Haridāsa Saṃskṛta Granthamālā No.154), Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Office, 1942, pp. 8-18. I use Edition (3) as a basic text and note only significant variant readings found in (1) and (2). Besides

them, I consulted eight manuscripts of this text preserved at BORI, Pune; however, owing to limited space I could not include their readings in this paper.

- 15 I follow division of the sections given in Edition (3); other editions do not have any division. The *kartṛtva*-section starts from 7; first chapter of the *KC*, i.e., *kāraka*-section, is divided into six.
- 16 Edition (3) does not have this phrase but editions (1) and (2) have. As seen in Text 9, it should be added here.
- 17 Edition (1) adds this example.
- 18 Edition (2) adds "sitra"; (1) adds "evaṃ ca."
- 19 Edition (2) omits whole sentence from "odanasya."
- 20 Cf. *Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha*, Nyāyadarśana (BORI edition, pp. 253, 4-18): *tac ca sarvaṃ kartṛviśeṣopahitamaryādam, kartṛtvaṃ cetarukārakāprayo jyatve sati sakalakārakaprayokṛtvalakṣaṇaṃ Jñānacikīrṣāprayatnādhāratvam; Paramalaghumañjūṣā* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, p. 170: *yat tu kārakāntarāprayo jyatve sati kārakacakra prayojakatvaṃ kartṛtvaṃ iti. tan na. sthāli pacati, asiś chinnattityādau sthālyādeḥ kārakacakra prayojakatvāt kārakāntarāprayo jyatvāc ca tattvaṃ na syād ity alam.*
- 21 Before this section, some manuscripts have a following additional passage which is lacking in the editions: *vastuto 'vacchedakatāsaṃsargeṇaiv ākhyātārthakṛteś ca caitrādāv anvayasya vyutpannavāt: tena ca saṃsargeṇa kṛter īśvare bādhān na tathābhilāpaḥ. prakṛte 'pi tatsaṃsargeṇaivā kṛtimattvasy a praveśe tu na tathātiprasāgo' pi iti dheyam* (Really speaking, it is realized that the effort being the meaning of the personal ending is related to 'Caitra' through the relation of the delimitor-ness. Therefore, since the effort is not the obstacle against 'Īśvara' through this association, such an expression does not arise. Thus, it should be noted that basically when the state of having an effort is taught by that association, it does not lead to the fault). It seems to be a mere memorandum aiming to summarize a preceding discussion.

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