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A Study on Sanskrit Syntax (3):
Śabdakaustubha on P.1.4.25–31 [Apādāna (2)]
A STUDY ON SANSKRIT SYNTAX (3)*: ŚABDAKAUSTUBHA ON P.1.4.25-31 [Apādāṇa (2)]

Sanskrit Text and Annotated Translation

Noriyuki Kudo

Introductory Remarks

In this study, P.1.4.25-31 are discussed. These rules prescribe the items to which the term apādāṇa is given in seven different cases, i.e., bhayahetu, asodha, yenādarśanam icchati, īpsita, ākhyāṛ, prakṛti, and prabhava. However, according to Patañjali, these are all downgraded to a sort of sub-classes of the previous one, dhrutva, because the condition given in P.1.4.24, āpāye, can be interpreted extensively. The meaning of āpāya is ‘separation’ and this meaning is re-interpreted as the one which connotes not only the physically perceived separation but also the mentally conceived separation such as cancellation, abandonment, indifference, etc. Most typical his comment is that “iha tāvad vṛkebhya bibheti, dasyubhyo bibhetīti ya esa manuṣyāḥ prekṣāpūrvvakāī bhavati sa pāṣyati yadi māṁ vṛkāḥ pāṣyanti dhruvo me mṛtyur iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nivartate. tatra dhruvam āpāye ’pādāṇam [P.1.4.24] ity eva siddham” [MBh ad. P.1.4.25, I, 327, 24-328, 1]. Commentators after Patañjali do not criticize his refusal of 25-31 but Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita alone does so.

Text, Translation and Notes

3. bhitrārthānāṁ bhayahetūḥ [P.1.4.25: SK. 588]
3.0. Explanation of the rule {118, 18-20]
Text: bhayam bhiḥ, trāṇām trāḥ, bhayārthānāṁ trānārthānāṁ ca yogo bhayahetūḥ kārakam apādānām syāt. “corebhya udvijate; bibheti; rakṣati vā trāyate.”

* Previous parts of this study, part (1) = Kudo[1996] and part (2) = Kudo[1997], are all published in Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā, vols. 17, 18 respectively.

Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā 19, 1998
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Translation: The word $\sqrt{bhi}$- in this rule means “bhaya: fear” and $\sqrt{tr\text{-}}$ “trāṇa: protect.” [This rule means that] when the [verbal roots] in the sense of fear or protection are used, the one which causes that fear or protect is kāraka [and gets the designation] apādāna. Examples are “corebhya udvijate; bibheti; rakṣati; trāyate: he is frightened of; is scared of; guards against; protects from thieves.”

Notes: KV on P.1.4.25 says [I, 538]: bibhetyarthānām trāyatyarthānām ca dhātūnām prayoge bhayahetur yas tat kārakam apādānasamajitam bhavati. Here, something to which someone feels a fear (bhayahetu) is termed as apādāna when the verbal root expected in the sentence means the fear or the protection.

3.1. On the word bhayahetu

3.1.1. pūrvapakṣa <unnecessity of the word bhayahetu> {118, 20-21}
Text: bhayahetugraham cintyaprajyamanam. “aranye bibheti” ity-ādau tu paratvād adhikaraṇasamajā.
Translation: The word bhayahetu in this rule is redundant. If the word bhayahetu is not mentioned here, in case of “aranye bibheti: he fears in the forest,” [aranya might be wrongly termed as apādāna because the verb bibheti is used]. However, such a wrong application is avoidable by means of the paratvā-principle and aranya might be correctly termed as adhikaraṇa. [Thus, the word bhayahetu is redundant.]

Notes: In the previous rule (P.1.4.24), the word apāya is, according to Patañjali, meant not only for the physical separation but also for the mentally conceived separation. If the word “bhayahetu” is not mentioned in this rule, in the sentences wherein the verbal roots having a sense of fear or protect are used every item from which one wants to keep away would be designated as apādāna and thus take a fifth case ending. Here, let us consider following situation. If someone is wondering in the forest and he/she feels vague fear about the situation where he/she is staying, then the forest would be designated as apādāna because the situation, that is staying in the forest, is regarded as a source of fear.

However, when the forest is simply intended to express the place where the person is staying or in which something causes the fear,¹ it is

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¹ Commentators, such as Jinendrabuddhi and Haradatta, say as follows: Nyāsa on do. [I, 538]: nātrāranyād bhavayam, kim tarhi? tatrashebhyaś cauvādibhyah; PM on do. [Ibid.]: aranye iti. atra tatashebhyo vṛksādibhyo bhavayā nāranyāt.
to be designated as *adhitaraṇa*. In spite of the intention of speaker, since the verb \(bhī\)- is used in the usage, the forest would be termed as *apādāṇa*. In order to prevent this wrong assignment we need the word *bhayahetu* as the scope of application, which in turn excludes this case from the scope of this rule. Once it is mentioned in this rule, the forest in above situation does not receive the designation *apādāṇa*. This is a supposition for this argument.

Against this claim of the necessity of the word *bhayahetu* in this rule, pūrvapakṣa says that resorting to the *paratva*-principle we can manage correct application. Even though the word *bhayahetu* is not prescribed in this rule, since the designation *adhitaraṇa* is prescribed after the designation *apādāṇa*, the former would set aside the latter. Therefore, the word *bhayahetu* is not necessary. In this case, as the pūrvapakṣa says, we can manage correctly without the word *bhayahetu*. Then, how about the case where the genitive case is introduced?

3.1.2. Reply [188, 22-23]

Text: “*kasya bibhyati devās ca jātaraṣosya samyuge*” *iti Rāmāyaṇa- ślokaḥ tu kasya samyuge iti yojanayā vyākhyaḥ.

Translation: [It is not correct] because of the usage in the Rāmāyaṇa verse [1.4cd]: “*kasya bibhyati devās ca jātaraṣosya samyuge*: of whom anger is feared even by the gods, aroused in the battle.” In this case, [the use of genitive form *kasya*] is explained by the usage.

Notes: As explained earlier, we can adequately operate the rule 25 without the word *bhayahetu* by means of the *paratva*-principle. This *paratva*-principle is a grammatical device which functions in case that two rules having same validity are in conflict. In the conflict between *apādāṇa* and *adhitaraṇa* this device works well and we can avoid undesired application. That is why the commentators do accept the objection and do not further say the necessity of the word *bhayahetu*. (The actual reason why they do not take this objection seriously is that they consider this rule itself as unnecessary.) See Nyāsa and PM on this rule: *Nyāsa* [I, 538-9]:

\[
nanu cātraḍikaraṇasamjñā paratvād bādhikā bhavisyati. api ca — dhruvam ity anuvartate, “dhruvaṅ cāvacadhibhūtam” ity uktam. na cāraṇyam avadhibhāvena vivāksitam, tat kim etan nivrṛtyarthena bhayahetugrahaṇena? evam tarhi pūrvasyāyaṃ prapañcaḥ, na hi kāyasamprāptipūrvaka evāpāyo bhavati, kim
\]
tarhi? buddhisamprātipūrvako 'pi. asti ceha buddhisamprātipūrvako 'py apāyah, tathā hi — caurebhyo bibhetity atra yas tāvat puruṣāḥ prekṣāvān bhavati sa evam paśyati — “yadi māṃ caurāḥ paśyectur dhruvaṃ me mṛtyuḥ” iti. vicārayams tān buddhyā prāpnoti, prāpya ca tato nivartate. tatra dhruvaṃ ityādinaiva siddham. tasmāt pūrvasyāyaṃ prapañcaḥ.

PM [Ibid.]: nanu ca dhruvaṃ ity anuvartisyate, na cāranyam avadhitvena vivakṣitam, paratvāc cādhikaraṇasamjñaiva bhaviṣyati. satyam, pūrvasyāvāyaṃ prapañcaḥ.

Then, how about the case quoted from the Rāmāyaṇa? This established example is quoted to illustrate the necessity of the word bhayahetu. Here someone in strong anger of whom even the gods are afraid is referred in the form of kasya jātaroṣasya, both having a genitive case. In this case, the rule 25 without the word bhayahetu would be applied because of the verb vṛhi- and the word kasya would become *kasmāt. However, is ‘someone’ really the source of fear? If someone is really the source of fear, he would be termed as apāḍāṇa, whether the word bhayahetu is in 25 or not, because the verb vṛhi- is used. If someone is not the source of fear and we have 25 with the word bhayahetu, the form kasya is correct (this genitive case is introduced by P.2.3.50: śēṣe), that is to say the designation apāḍāṇa would not be applied because he is not bhayahetu. If he is not so and we do not have the word bhayahetu, he would be termed as apāḍāṇa and thus the usage cannot be admitted. Therefore, it is the only way to justify above usage that we have the word bhayahetu in 25. My explanation is based on the following commenting passage from the Tattvabodhini on SK. No. 588 [I, 658]:

“kasya bibhyati devās ca jātaroṣasya saṃyuge” iti Rāmāyaṇe tu kasyety asya saṃyugenānvayān nāsti bhayahetuvam iti śaṣṭhi-prayogah saṃgacchata eva. na caivaṃ saṃyugasyāpāḍāṇa-tvāpattir iti vācyam. parayā adhikaraṇasamjñaYNAM apāḍāṇasamjñaibadhihit.2 adhikaraṇatvāvivakṣāyām tu iṣṭāpatteḥ. (Tr.: In the Rāmāyaṇa verse, since the word kasya is related to the word saṃyuga, it does not serve as the source of fear. Thus, it is realized that a genitive case is used in this case. It should not be

2 Another edition of the Tattvabodhini (2) reads apāḍāṇasamjñaibadhihit. Here, this reading is preferred because on the problem of the conflict between apāḍāṇa and adhikaraṇa we have already seen that apāḍāṇa is blocked by adhikaraṇa which is prescribed later (parayā adhikaraṇasamjñaayā).
argued that the word *sanyuga* would be termed as *apādāna* because the designation *adhikarana* [which is prescribed] later would block the application of *apādāna*. However, if [to express] the location is not intended, [the application of *apādāna*] is desired.)

We have idiomatic usages of the genitive case used instead of the ablative case which represents the *bhayahetu*. Speijer gives several examples [Sanskrit Syntax § 126]: Rāmāyaṇa. II.29.4: tava sarve hi bibhyati; Pañcatantra. III.195: yā mamodvijate nityam; Rāmāyaṇa. III.46.29-31: iha śākhāmygāh simhāh ... katham tebhyo na bibhyase. ... kuṇjarāṇāṁ tarasvināṁ katham ... na bibheṣi.

4. *parājer asodhāḥ* [P.1.4.26: SK. 589]

4.0. Explanation of the rule {118, 24-26}

Text: *parāpūrvasya jayateḥ prayoge 'sodho hyorthā'*1 'pādānāṁ syāt.* “adhyayanāt parājayate” glāyaty arthah. akarmakaś cāyam. tatra śaṣṭhyām prāptāyāṁ vacanam.

*1. Read 'sahyo 'rtho. [MS93Ob9]. Also KV reads parāpūrvasya jayateḥ prayoge 'sodho yo 'rthah — sodhum na śakyate, tat kārakam apādānasamajjham bhavati [I, 539] and SK. 589 [I, 659]: parājeh prayoge 'sahyo 'rtho 'pādānāṁ syāt.

Translation: When the verbal root *vji*- prefixed by *parā*- is used, the one which is not endured, i.e., not bearable (*asahya*) [is kāraka and] becomes *apādāna*. For example, “adhyayanāt parājayate: he cannot stand study.” It means “he is not able to study (glāyati < glai-).” This verbal root [parā-*vji*- in the sense of “not being able to bear] is an intransitive verb. In this case, since [otherwise, i.e., it is a transitive verb] the genitive case would be applicable, this rule is to be prescribed.

Notes: The verbal root *parā-* *vji*- has two opposite meanings, namely an intransitive meaning and a transitive one. In the former, it means “asahya: not bearable” or “nyūyibhāva: unable” and is paraphrased by the commentators into “glāyati: he/she is tired of” or “hrasati: is diminished.” (SK gives the paraphrase glāyati and Kaiyaṭa gives hrasati but this is used in the sense of glāyati).3 In case of this meaning, this verbal root is intransitive. On the other hand, it means also “abhībhava: defeat.” It is a transitive verbal root. In this rule, the

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3 Pradīpa on P.1.4.26 [II. 250r]: adhyayanāt parājayate hrasati. adhyetum glāyaty arthah. atra cātthe 'karmakatvāḥ śaṣṭhyām prāptāyāṁ vacanam.
former meaning is intended and when the verbal root \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i- is used in the latter sense, the usage is not covered by this rule and thus is regarded as \textit{\=se\={s}a} which introduces a genitive case (See \textit{PM} on P.1.4.25 [I, 540]: \textit{akarmaka\={s} c\={a}yam atr\={a}rtho, tatra \=sa\=sth\={y}\={a}m pr\={a}pt\={a}y\={a}m vacanam, pratyd\={a}hara\={n}e tv abhibhave vartate.})

Therefore, in order to elude this confusion concerning to the meaning of \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i- the word \textit{asodha} is mentioned. By this word, the verbal root \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i- is referred to in the meaning of “not being able to” but not “to defeat.” As for this, \textit{Ny\={a}sa} clearly explains these two meanings in the contrary way [on P.1.4.26, I, 539]: \textit{so\=dh\={u}m na \=sakyata iti. abhibhavitum na \=sakyata ity artha\={h}. adhyayan\={a}t par\={a}j\={a}yata ity adhyayanam abhibhavitum na \=saknoti, na p\={a}rayatity artha\={h} (Tr.: On “so\=dh\={u}m na \=sakyate.” This means that the person cannot defeat. In case of “adhyayan\={a}t par\={a}j\={a}yate,” it means that the person cannot defeat the study, not but overcomes it.) Here, \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i- is paraphrased into “na abhibhavitum,” i.e., “not being able to” but it does not mean “p\={a}rayati,” i.e., “defeat.” According to this explanation, this verb, when it is intransitive, means “not defeat” and means “defeat” when transitive.

4.1. The purpose of the word \textit{asodha} \{118, 26-28\}

Text: \textit{asodha iti K\={a}\={r}tho bh\={u}tak\={a}lo \=tr\={a}\=vivak\={s}ita\={h}. tena “adhyayan\={a}t par\={a}j\={a}syate” ity\={a}di siddham.}

Translation: What is [the purpose of mentioning the word] \textit{asodha} in this rule? [In order to prevent the application of \textit{ap\={a}\=da\={n}a} to \textit{satru} in the expression “\=satru \=par\={a}j\={a}yate: he defeats the enemies.” Here \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i- means “defeating (abhibhavati).” The word \textit{asodha} is derived with a past passive participle suffix -\textit{kta} but the sense of past is not intended here. Thus, the expression “adhyayan\={a}t par\={a}j\={a}syate” [in the future sense] is possible.

Notes: To mention the word \textit{asodha} in this rule is aimed to ascertain the meaning of the verbal root \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i-. This purpose has been partly treated in 4.0. When the verb \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i- means “to defeat,” the transitive meaning, 26 is not to be applied to the example “\=satru \=par\={a}j\={a}yate.” Here, the word \textit{\=satru} is termed as \textit{karma} by P.1.4.49 and takes an accusative case by P.2.3.2. Only when the verb \textit{par\={a}}-\textit{j}i- is intransitive, 26 brings into effect. See \textit{Prad\={i}pa} on do. [II, 250r]: \textit{iha tv asodhagraha\={n}an ny\={u}yib\={h}\={a}vav\={r}titr grhyate. (Tr.: Here, because of
the mention of the word asodha, [the meaning of that verb] is known as nyūyībhāva [i.e., its meaning is of intransitive]). Therefore in order to indicate that pariṇ-ji- is intransitive the word asodha is mentioned. (However, we will see later, this justification using above example is wrong. See 4.2).

The word asodha (naN-tatpuruṣa) is formed with the past passive participle -Kta. As for the derivational form of asodha, it might lead to a restrictive interpretation of this rule, namely that this rule is concerned only to the past tense. The prakṛtyā-s of sodha and asodha are as follows:

\[\text{sodha-} \quad \text{\^{s}ah} + -\text{Kta} : \text{P.3.2.102 (niśṭhā=Kta by 1.1.26; bhūte 84)}\]
\[\text{sah} + \text{\^{s}a} : \text{P.1.3.8 [K=IT], 9 [IT→φ]}\]
\[\text{sadh + ta} : \text{P.8.2.31 hāh dhah [h→dh]}\]
\[\text{sadh + dha} : \text{P.8.2.40 jha\textsuperscript{a}s tathor dhaḥ adhaḥ [th→dh]}\]
\[\text{sadh + dha} : \text{P.8.4.41 s\textsuperscript{a}Unā s\textsuperscript{a}Uḥ [dh→dh]}\]
\[\text{so\textsuperscript{a} + dha} : \text{P.6.3.112 sahīvahor ṭAvārṇasya [-adh→-oḍh]; 8.3.13 dhah dhe lopah [-dh + dh→° + dh-]}\]
\[\text{sodha}\]
\[\text{asodha}\]
\[\text{[naN + sU] + [sodha + sU]]} + sU : \text{P.2.2.6}\]
\[\text{[(na\textsuperscript{o} + s\textsuperscript{o}) + [sodha + s\textsuperscript{o}]]} + sU : \text{P.1.3.2 [U=IT], 3 [N=IT], 9 [IT→φ]}\]
\[\text{[(\text{o}a + °) + [sodha + °]]} + sU : \text{P.6.3.73 [na→° a-], 2.4.71 [s\textsuperscript{o}→φ]}\]
\[\text{[a + sodha] + s\textsuperscript{o} : \text{P.8.2.66 [-s→-r], 8.3.15 [-r→-h]}\]
\[\text{a-sodha-h}\]

Since this word asodha is derived with the past passive suffix -Kta, it is possible to interpret that the scope of this rule is restricted to the cases of past events. In order to avoid such a restricted operation, ŚK and Uddyota give remark. See Uddyota on do. [II, 250r]: atra kālo 'vivakṣitaḥ. tena parājasyata ity api bhavati (Tr.: In this case, the [notion of ] time is not intended. Thus, an usage such as “parājasyate: he will defeat” in the future sense is also allowed).

4.2. Siddhānta [118, 28-29]

Text: vastutas tv asodhagrahaṇaṁ vyartham, “śatrūn parājayaate” ity atra paratvāḥ karmasamjugṛśiddheḥ.

Translation: Really speaking, the word asodha in this rule is meaningless. According to the paratva-principle, śatrū would get the designation karman.

Notes: If we accept the above-mentioned purpose of mentioning the word asodha in this rule, without this word we come to face a
difficulty that the *apādāna* instead of the *karman* (which is actually desired) would be introduced to the word *satru-* in the expression “*satrūn parājajayate*” because the verb *parā-√ji-* is used anyway, regardless of its meaning. However, even if the word *asodha* is not mentioned, the *karman* is duly introduced by means of the *paratva*-principle. Thus it is useless.

However, this example is unsuitable to this case because the verb *parā-√ji-* as intransitive verb is a condition for applying the *apādāna*.4 Previously, we see that this verb has two meanings and these two meanings are respectively of intransitive and of transitive verb. By the presence of the word *asodha* in 26 two examples “*upādyāyān parājajayate*” — the verb is intransitive — and “*satrūn parājajayate*” — it is transitive — are realized as the cases being handled by different rules. If this word is not in 26, since the meaning of *parā-√ji-* is not decided, the conflict seems to come arise. However, when a speaker intends to use the verb as the intransitive, rule 26 would be applied and when the speaker wants to use it as the transitive, rule 49 would be applied. In other words, the problem which is implied here (and this should be considered) is that when the word *asodha* is not in this rule and the verb is used as transitive, if 26 is to be applied to here, then this case is not covered by this rule but by P.2.3.50. As for this, *PM* says [I, 540]: *tena prayudāharane paratvāt karmasamjñā bhavisyatitī na codaniyam* (Tr.: Therefore, it is not put forward that as for the counter-example [“*satrūn parājajayate*”] the *karman* will prevail by the *paratva*-principle). Therefore, the word *asodha* is necessary in order to prevent the application of P.2.3.50.5

4.3. About the form of *parājeh* [118, 29-32]

Text: *iha sūtre parājjer iti rūpam “viparābhyān jeh”* [P.1.3.19] itivat samarthaniyam. yat tu paratvāt “GHEr ōitī” [P.7.3.111] iti guṇa iti Haradattenoktam tatsūtrabhāṣyādiviruddham iti prāg eva prapañcicatam.

Translation: In this rule the form *parājeh* representing the verbal root *parā-√ji-* is terminated as a nominal i-stem. Such an usage is authorized by the form *jeh* in P.1.3.19: *viparābhyān jeh.* However, according to Haradatta, the *guṇa* replacement should be

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5 Cf. *Tattvabodhini* [I, 659]: *atrāpi vadanti — karmatvāvivaktiśām śeṣaśaṣṭhiṁ bādhitvā pañcamī syāt, sā mā bhūd iti kartavyam evāsodhagrahaṇam.*
taken place by P.7.3.111. It is already explained that this is contradictory to the bhāṣya, etc. on that sūtra.

Notes: This passage deals with the form parājeh in this rule. This form is the genitive form of i-stem parā-ji- representing the verbal root parā-√ji-.

As for the form jeh, we have the authorized form in P.1.3.19: viparābhyaṃ jeh. Then, how is this genitive form parājeh [<parāji- + Nas] derived? Haradatta mentions the introducing process of substitute that P.6.4.77 is firstly introduced but this rule is prevailed by subsequent rule P.7.3.111.7

\[\sqrt{ji} - + Nas\]
\[*j-iyāN + Nas : P.6.4.77 aCi Śnudhātubhṛuvāmyvor iyāNunaNau [i \rightarrow iyāN] \]
\[jī- + as\]
\[je- + as : 7.3.111: GHEr NIṬi [i \rightarrow e (guna replacement)] \]
\[je + 0s : 6.1.110: NasINasoś ca [e + a- \rightarrow -e-] \]

6 Cf. MBh ad pratyāhārasūtra 2 [I. 21, 7]. The number of this paribhāsā is different according to different authors of paribhāsā text: Vyāki = 86; Puruṣottama = 114; Śrīadeva = 18; and Nāgāśa = 36 (see Paribhāsendsūsekha, vol. I, p. 175)

7 PM on do. [I, 539]: parājēr asodhāk. atra dhātuṇāṭhagataśya jīty etāvānātṛasyānukaraṇam. tataḥ parāpurvo jīḥ parājīr ity uttarapadali pānto dṛśṭavyaḥ. ūnun “prakṛtivad anukaraṇam bhavati” ity adhātāt iti prātipadikasāmījaḥāyāḥ prātipadhd hās aubanta avānt samāsa na prānati, na; aprātipadadhāt. nāyam prasajyaprātipadēdaḥ — dhātāt neti. kim tarhī? paryudāsa ’yam — yad anyad dhātāt iti. dhātāt na vidhiḥ na prānipadēdaḥ. evam aprānādēdaḥ prānati, prātipadēd gher nīśṭī guṇa bhavisyatīti (Tr.: Here the form jī- is an imitation form of that which is enumerated in the Dhiitupītha. Therefore, it is to be known that this form is a compound giving dropped the middle member in the form of parā-purva-ji-. Here is an objection: According to the paribhāsā “prakṛtivad anukaraṇam bhavati,” jī- in parājī is originally a verbal root ħji-. [However,] since an application of the designation prātipadika is prohibited because of the prescription of “adhātah” [in P.1.2.45], that is to say, it is not a nominal, the compounds should not be made. Answer: [Objection] does not [stand] because it is not prohibited. The reason is that the form adhātah does not mean the prohibition after tentatively applied (prasajyaprātipadēda) in the sense of “it is not so to the verbal root” but the exclusion [of it from the scope] (parānādaḥ) in the sense of “it is applied to the one other than the verbal root.” Thus, this is not the prescription as to verbal root nor the prohibition. In this way, a substitute iyāN is added after [ji-]. However, this operation is prevailed by subsequent rule P.7.3.111).
However, this operation is not correct because P.6.4.77 does not work in this case. This rule gives substitute $iyaN$ when the final phoneme to which it is added is followed by affixes beginning with the vowels. The genitive affix $Nas$ is not the affix beginning with vowels. This form is derived from P.7.3.111 but this operation is not that is applied after prevailing.

As for this, Bhaṭṭoji also says in ŚK on P.1.3.19 [I, 66, 13-26]:

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Tr.: Objection. How is the form jeḥ taught? According to the paribhāṣā: “prakṛtividh anukaranam,” the affix $iyaN$ is introduced after [ṛ}i-] as the verbal root and it results in the form “jiyaḥ.” However, since this suffix is sāvakaśa to the long vowel [of the aṅga final] such as “niyaḥ (< ni-)” or “kriyaḥ (<kṛ-)”, according to the paratva-principle the guṇa-replacement by P.7.3.111 would prevail. It is not correct because the suffix $iyaN$ is required due to the conflict with the preceding rule even if the aṅga final is a short vowel. Thus the form ‘kṣiyaḥ’ is taught. Furthermore, in P.8.2.46, the word dīrgha mentioned in this rule again [serves] as jñāpaka. Otherwise, since the form kṣiyaḥ is taught, what is taught by it when the word dīrgha is ascertained [in the rule]? Answer: It is because it is non-obligatory substitute [that is taught]. Therefore, the substitute $iyaN$ is not to be introduced. As for this “non-obligatory”, it is already stated wherein the pratyāhārasūtra ṛK is discussed. Or rather, it is for the imitation of the form but not the meaning. Then, it is said by Haradatta that P.7.3.111 prevails over P.6.4.77 because it is
subsequent. This claim is meaningless since it is contradictory to the statement of MBh,8 Kaiyata,9 and KV10 on one hand and to that mentioned in this book here and there11 on the other hand.

5. vāraṇārthaṁ īpsitam [P.1.4.27: SK. 590]
5.0. Explanation {118, 33-119, 2}
Translation: In the expression wherein [the verbal roots having] the meaning of keeping back [from doing something] are used, the object which is desired to be reached by that action is kāraka and [becomes] apādāna. The verbal root vṛśN- means ‘intervention’ and belongs to the tenth class. ‘Intervention’ means the act of obstructing someone from doing something.
Notes: KV explains this rule as follows [I, 540]: vāraṇārthaṁ dhātunāṁ prayoge ya īpsito ṛṭhah tat kārakam apādānasamjñāṁ bhavati. pravrṭtivighātaḥ = vāraṇam, yavebhoyo gā vārayati.

The word āvaraṇa means an act of intervening or obstructing someone from doing something (pravrṭtivighāta). Here, we can understand two actions, namely the act of preventing (vighāta) and the act of doing something (pravrṭti), and basing on this understanding, we can translate the word āvaraṇa as “X is obstructing Y from doing/approaching Z.” While the agent of obstructing is X and the object of this action, i.e., the one desired to be reached is Y, the agent of doing something is Y and its object is Z. In the example given in the next passage “yavebhoyo gāṁ vārayati,” Y is a cow (gāṁ) and Z is bean field (yavebhyaḥ). In order to apply the designation apādāna to yava-, we have to realize this rule as to intend that the designated is the one desired by the object of the act of obstructing, viz., Z and not

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8 Cf. MBh. ad P.8.2.46 [III,407,22-408,1]: nātra nirdeśah pramāṇam śakyam kartum. yathaivārāprptā vibhaktir evam iyaḥādeśo ’pi.
9 Cf. Pradīpa on do. [VI, 120]: nātra nirdeśa iti. na hiyañādeśād dirghasya grahanāṁ pratyetum śakyate, iyāninthitiṣya vibhaktir durlabhatvāt tato ’prptā yathā vibhaktiḥ sautravāṁ nirdeśasya bhavati evam hravasyāpiyānādeśaḥ syād iti dirghagrahaṁ arthavat.
10 Cf. KV on P.8.2.46 [VI, 413]: hravasyāpi dhātvamukaraṇasya iha iyaṁ nirdeśah. kṣiyah “niśṭhāyam aranyad arte” [P.6.4.60] ity atra dirghagrahaṁ kriyate. “viparābhyaṁ jeh” [P.1.3.19] ity evamādau tu dhātvam anukāryagatoṁ sad apy avivakṣitvatvāt jirūpasyāmānānuvīrāyaṁ draṣṭavyam.
11 The word tatratyehatve probably refers to the passage 4.3 of this ŠK itself.
the object of the act of obstructing, viz., Y. As for this, Kaiyata says [Pradipa on P.1.4.27, II, 2511]: tatra vāraṇakriyā parakīyā api māṣā vārayitur āptum ितः bhavanti mā naśann ete ity ete bhayo 'sau gā vārayati (Tr.: Even when the beans are owned by other, they are the one desired to be reached by the act of obstructing of the person who obstructs). And see also Uddyota on do. [II, 2511-r]:

sa ca tadvyāparyārajanyatatphalābhavaprayojaka bhakṣaṇādi-
janakavyāpārābhāvānukulo vyāpārah kvacit. kvacit tadvyāparya-
janatatphalābhavaprayojakah saṃyogānukalyāṇyāpārābhāvānuk-
lavyāpārah (Tr.: This means, in certain case [to prevent something from eating], the activity conducive to the absence of the activity producing the act of eating, etc., which instigates the absence of that result produced by that activity. In another case [to prevent someone from approaching somewhere], this means the activity conducive to the absence of the activity conducive to the contact, which instigates the absence of that result produced by that activity).

5.1. The purpose of the word īpsita
5.1.1. Conflict 1 <apādāna and adhikarana> {119, 2-3}
Text: ‘īpsita’ iti kim? “yavebhayo gām vārayati kṣetre.”
Translation: What is [the purpose of] the word īpsita in this rule? [The counter-example is] “yavebhayo gām vārayati kṣetre: he keeps a cow back from [eating] barley in the field.” [If there is no word īpsitam, “kṣetre” would get apādāna designation because it is related to the act of preventing].
Notes: If the word īpsita is not mentioned in this rule, wrong application would arise according to a pūrvapakṣin. That is to say, in the example, the verbal root which means the act of preventing (vārayati) is used and thus all items related to this action are called apādāna. The field can be regarded as īpsita because someone wants the cow not to approach the barley, in other words the field where that barley is growing. Supposing like this, pūrvapakṣin points out the possibility of applying the apādāna to kṣetra.

However, in this case what is actually meant for by the word kṣetra is to denote the place and on this reason kṣetra is termed as adhikarana by P.1.4.45 which is prescribed subsequently. Therefore, the conflict between apādāna and adhikarana cannot happen and this rule is well-managed even without the word īpsita. See Nyāsa on do.
5.1.2. Conflict 2 <apādāna and karman> {119, 3-5}

Text: nanv iha paratvād adhikaraṇasaṃjñā bhaviṣyatī yathā krte 'pipsitagrahāne gāvī īpsitamatavatprayuktā karmasaṃjñā.

Translation: In this case, according to paratva-principle, the designation adhikaraṇa would be applied to kṣetra. And furthermore, even if "īpsita" is not mentioned in this rule, the word gau- which denotes the most desired object would take karman designation.

Notes: Next difficulty concerning to the application of apādāna is the conflict with the designation karman. In the rule 27 the word īpsita is mentioned and on the other hand in 49 the word īpsitatama is prescribed. The notion of īpsitatama is included in that of the word īpsita and this seems to imply that rule 27 would be applied to the whole īpsita items including the īpsitatama items. In the above example, we have two īpsita objects, yava and gau. Do we apply 27 to both? It is not correct. Inspite of the presence of the word īpsita in this rule, the one which is realized as īpsita item by this rule is not the īpsitatama item because the īpsitatama items are all īpsita item but not vice versa. Both the cow and the barley are īpsita but the former is not mere īpsita but again realized as īpsitatama. Thus, it is called karman by P.1.4.49. In this way, the conflict between apādāna and karman does not arise, regardless of whether the word īpsita is mentioned in this rule or not, and karman designation is properly applied. As for this, PM says [on do., I, 541]:

 athātra gāvām apādānasāṃjñā kasmān na bhavati, īpsitatamo 'pipsito bhavaty eva, yathā śuklatamo 'pi śuklaḥ? paratvāt karmasaṃjñā bhaviṣyatī. (Tr.: Then, why is the designation apādāna not applied to the cow because the most desired thing is nothing but the desired thing such as the most brilliant thing is included in the bright ones? [That application is not taken place] because due to the paratva-principle the designation karman would be applied).

Patañjali re-formulates this rule [I, 328, 17]:
Alternative A: (vāraṇārthānāṃ) karmano yad īpsitam (what is desired [to be reached] by the karman [is called apādāna]).

Alternative B: (vāraṇārthānāṃ) īpsitepsitam (what is desired [to be reached] by the īpsita object [is called apādāna]).

In order to overcome the conflict of application, in case of “agner māṇavakāṃ vārayati,” Patañjali rephrases P.1.4.27. As is seen in the rephrased rule, since the word karman is already introduced, P.1.4.49 is at first to be applied, and then 27 is applied to in the remaining domain. This rephrase is not of Patañjali because Katyāyana has already stated that vāraṇārtheṣu karmagrahanārthakyaṇam kartur īpsitataṃ karmeti vacanāt (In this rule, i.e., 27, the word karmanah is not necessary because 49 is prescribed). This seems that original Pāṇini rule might be formulated with the word karmanah. (See in detail Joshi and Roodbergen [1975], pp. 86-87).

5.1.3. Siddhānta [119, 5]

Text: satyam, cintyaprayojanam evepsitagrahalam.

Translation: True. Thus, it is meaningless to mention the word “īpsitam” in this rule.

Notes: Here, Bhaṭṭoji claims that the word īpsita is not necessary in this rule. As we have seen in part (2) of this study (2.5, pp. 165-166; 2.8.1, p. 178), P.1.4.25-31 are regarded as unnecessary because P.1.4.24 alone can manage the application of apādāna to the different cases described by P.1.4.25-31. However, Bhaṭṭoji does not admit this unnecessity of P.1.4.25-31, and re-approves them (9.2-3). Therefore, Bhaṭṭoji needs P.1.4.25-31, and especially 27 without the word īpsita.

6. antardhau yenādarśanam icchati [P.1.4.28: SK. 591].

6.1. On the word antardhau [119, 6-7]

Text: antardhav' iti saptami.

Translation: The word antardhau is the locative form of “antardhi.”

Notes: This rule means that a person/being by whom someone wishes not to be seen when the act of hiding is taken place [or when it is

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12 See Joshi and Roodbergen [1975], p. 85. It says that “The different wordings mentioned by Patañjali do not affect the meaning of the rephrased rule. This remains the same in both cases.”

13 Deshpande[1991(b)], although its context he refers to is not of apādāna but of sampradāna, says “the masculine gender in these rules clearly seems to point to the fact that sampradāna in all these cases is prototypical animate, preferably human.” (p. 476) And he translates the apādāna item of this P.1.4.28 as “The person or being.” I follow his translation.
caused by the act of hiding] is called \textit{apādāna}. Example, \textit{"upādhyāyād antarddhatte: a person is hiding from [his] teacher."

At first, the meaning of the locative case of the word \textit{antardhau} is dealt with. There are two interpretations. According to \textit{KV} and \textit{Nyāsa}, this locative case means \textit{"nimittasaptam"}: a locative case which means a cause/ a condition." (\textit{KV} on P.1.4.28 [I, 541]: \textit{antardhiniimitam yenādarśanam ātmana icchati tat kārakam apādānasamjñam bhavati; \textit{Nyāsa} [ibid.]: \textit{nimittat karma(sam)yoge iti saptami}). Second interpretation is given by Haradatta, namely \textit{"viṣayasaaptami"} or \textit{"sat(i)-saptami"} [\textit{PM}, ibid.]. This is supported by Nāgeśa. ([\textit{Uddyota} on do., II, 251r]: \textit{antardhir vyavadhānaṃ "yasya ca bhāvena [bhāvalakṣaṇaṃ. P.2.3.37] iti saptami}).

First interpretation, \textit{nimittasaptami}, is based on \textit{Vt} VI on P.2.3.36: \textit{nimittat karmasamṣyoge} (the locative case is introduced after [the word denoting] \textit{nimitta} when it is related to the object). For example, \textit{"carmanī dvipinam hanti: someone kills a tiger for (its) skin."} Here, as for the act of killing, the object, i.e., a tiger\textit{(dvipin)} is killed because the person wants its skin. We can easily understand that its skin \textit{(carman)} is here intended as \textit{nimitta} for killing. If we accept \textit{KV}'s interpretation, it is meant by \textit{"antardhiniimitam adarśanam"} that someone wishes \textit{‘not-to-be-seen’ (adarśana)} which is caused by the act of hiding. Since the form \textit{antardhau} is explained by above \textit{Vt} according to \textit{KV} and \textit{Nyāsa}, the act of hiding must have a relation to the object. What is the object to be referred? It might be the object of wishing, in other words, of \textit{‘not-to-be-seen’}, namely \textit{‘oneself’} (\textit{ātmānam}, not explicitly referred in the example). However, is there really the relation between the act of hiding and oneself in the form of a sort of causal relation? Haradatta clearly criticizes this interpretation as follows [\textit{PM} on do., I, 541]:

\begin{quote}
\textit{antarddhau iti neyam “nimittat karma(sam)yoge” iti saptami, yathā hi vetanena dhānyam lunātity atra vetanasya dhānyena yogo ’sti, tatthehāpy adarśanam icchatītīcchākarmanā ‘dar-śanēntarddher yogo nästi. athādarśanasya yat karma ātmā-}
\end{quote}

\textit{14 According Kaiyāta, this word \textit{nimitta} denotes \textit{“kriyāphala: result of the action”} and if there is no (intimate <Note. This qualifier is given by Joshi and Roodbergen [1980, p. 85]> relation between \textit{nimitta} and \textit{karmā}, the locative case is not used. Therefore, in \textit{“vetanena dhānyam lunātī”} the word \textit{vetana} cannot have the locative case but the instrumental case which denotes the cause (\textit{hetu}) by P.2.3.23 because between \textit{vetana} and \textit{dhānyat}, there is no relation. (Strangely enough, Haradatta says that there is a relation between \textit{vetana} and \textit{dhānya}. See the subsequent quotation from \textit{PM} in this section.)}
khyam ātmano 'darśanam icchatīti tenāntarddhēr yogo 'sti?
yasyaiva-darśanam — tasyaiva-antar-dhānānam ity ucyate. evam api
“nimittāt karmayoge” iti kiṃ nimittām grhyate, kāraṇam?
prayojanaṃ vā? kāraṇam cej jādyena baddhah — atrāpi
prāpnoti, ya eva baddhyate tatraiva jādyam iti; tasmāt prayo-
janasya tatra grahanam. yathā — carmaṇi dvipinām hanti
arma dvipihana-sasya prayojanaṃ. iha tv antardhānam
adarśanasya kāraṇam, antarhitah khalv asau na drśyate.

Tr.: The locative case of the word antardhau is not meant for
nimitta introduced by Vt. VI on P.2.3.39. In case of “vetanena
dhānyaṃ lunāti: he is reaping a harvest for the earnings,” we can
find the connection between vetana and dhānya. [However, in
case of “antar-dhau yenādarśnam icchati”] such a connection
between the object of wishing [not to be seen] and the act of
hiding is not found. If [you say that] the object of wishing not to
be seen is ‘oneself’ and this [object] has the connection with the
act of hiding, [it is replied that] one who [wants not to be seen] is
the same person who hides himself. Furthermore, if antardhau
denotes nimitta, what kind of nimitta is intended, a cause
(kāraṇa) or a purpose (prayojana)? If it means kāraṇa, see the
example “jādyena baddhah: he was kept in custody due to his
stupidity.” In this case, we see the cause, namely stupidity is
existing in that person kept in custody. Then the instance of
prayojana is mentioned. For example, “carmaṇi dvipinām hanti.”
Here carman is the purpose for killing the tiger. However, in the
instance of P.1.4.28, namely when one hides, the act of hiding is
the cause of non-seeing. In fact the one which hides is not seen.

According to him, the nimitta-interpretation does not stand because the
relation between the word denoting nimitta and the karman is not seen
in this case of P.1.4.28.

As for the second interpretation, the locative case of antardhau
denotes only the situation, namely “in case the person hides” or “if he
hides” and thus, the application of apādāna does not concern to the
relation between the object and the item to which the apādāna-
designation is applied. (Nāgeśa, while admitting that this locative case
means satisaptamī, gives nimitta-interpretation of this rule later:
antardhinimittakam yat kartṛkam ātmakarmakādarśanam icchatī tad
apādānam ity arthaḥ [Uddyota, II. 252r]).
6.2. On the word *yena* \{119,7-8\}

**Text:** ‘*yena*’ iti kartari trīyā. na ca kṛdyoge*1 śaṣṭhīpraśaṅgaḥ.
‘ubhayaprāptau karmany [P.2.3.66] eva’ iti niyamāt.

*1. MS93R7. kṛdyogasāṣṭhi-. This reading is also supported by Tattvabodhini [on SK 591, I. 660].

**Translation:** The instrumental case of the word *yena* means ‘agent.’

However, it is not proper to say that in connection with a word ending in the *kṛt*-suffix [the word standing for the agent] takes the genitive case. Because of the restriction that when two words, [the word standing for the agent and the word standing for the object, are used in connection with the word ending in the *kṛt*-suffix, then only the word standing for] the object takes the genitive case.

**Notes:** The word *yena* is considered as incorrect (or ungrammatical) word by the commentators.

According to P.2.3.65, the word denoting the agent takes the genitive case when it is used with the word ending in the *kṛt*-suffix. By applying this rule to the sentence of P.1.4.28, “*yena* adarśanam: by whom [someone wishes] ‘not-to-be-seen’” should be “*yasya adarśanam*” because it is along with the word adarśana deriving from naN-drś-Lyut [P.3.3.113; -yu- → -ana- by P.7.1.1]. However, when two words — one denotes the agent and the other the object — are expressed along with the word ending in the *kṛt*-suffix in the same sentence, the latter will take the genitive case by P.2.3.66 and the former will have the instrumental case by P.2.3.18. In P.1.4.28, since we have the word adarśana and as far as the surface vocabulary of this rule is concerned, we have no word denoting the object. Therefore we have to apply P.2.3.65 to this rule and the word denoting the agent, *yat*-, should be put in a genitive form. The fact is not so.

Commentators have puzzled about how to interprette this ungrammatical use of instrumental case. There are two solutions to maintain the Pāṇini’s wording. One is mentioned in *KV*. Its comment (see 6.1) shows that by adding the word ātmanah in this rule the instrumental case of the word *yena* denotes the agent. Nyāsa gives more explanation that the word *yena* means the agent (of the verb √iṣ-) and the object of ‘not-to-be-seen’ is oneself (ātmanah). (Nyāsa on do. [I, 541-2]: *yeneti. kartari trīyā. nanu ca “kartṛkarmanoḥ kṛti” iti śaṣṭhyā bhavitavyam iti? naitad asti; “ubhayaprāptau karmanī” iti niyamāt karman yeva, na kartari. karma tv atrādarśanasyātmā, tasya-ntraraṅgatvāt sa eva karma vijñāyate). If we supply the word ātman.
in this rule, since both the words are used and then by P.2.3.66 the word ātman would take the genitive case and by P.2.3.18 the instrumental case of the word yena is justified. Then PM gives further explanation that when someone is asked that who does want not to be seen by other, he might reply that I myself. Thus, although the word ātmanah is not mentioned in this rule, at least its meaning is implied in this rule. (PM on do. [I, 541]: navā ātmane iti na śrūyate, mā śrāvi; yenādārśanam icchatīty ukte kasyety apekṣāyām ātmana iti gamyate). Both PM and Nyāsa admit the form yena as correct. This reasoning paradoxically makes alternation in Pāṇini’s wording by adding the word ātmanah.

Bhaṭṭoji does not explicitly speak of the supplement of the word ātmanah but, as far as it can be inferred from his statement: na ca kṛdyaoge śaśṭhiprasāṅgaḥ, it might be concluded that he also admits to supply the word ātmanah because unless this word is in this rule the genitive form of *yasya is inevitable.15

However, Nāgeśa opposes to this view. According to him, since we do not have the word ātmanah, we cannot apply P.2.3.66 to this case. Although the usage of P.1.4.28 is opposed to P.2.3.65, we have to accept it as correct simply because Pāṇini himself prescribes this rule. (Uddyota on do. [II, 252r]: yeneti sautṛiḥ trīyā. ubhayāḥ pravṛtyitāḥ ity asyāpravṛtyeḥ. ubhayapravyoge eva tatpravṛtyītī ātmanāne [KHaŚ ca. P.3.2.83] iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam,16 antardhinimittakaṃ yat kartṛkam ātmakarmaśādarśanam icchati tad apādānam ity arthah.) Nevertheless, Nāgeśa states contradictory opinion in his LS on do. [I, 690-691]: yenety atra “kartṛkarmanoḥ” [P.2.3.65] iti śaśṭhi na sautravatvā. “ātmanah” iti prayāsatiṭaḥ-dham.17

15 Cf. Bālamonarāma on SK 591 [I,661]: ātmana iti darśanaśabdayoge karmanī ṣaṭṭhi. ātmana ity adhyāhāralabhyam. ata eva yeneti kartari trīyā saṅgacchate. anyathā kṛdyaogaśaṭṭhi-prasāṅgāt. ātmana ity adhyāhāra tu ubhayaprāptau karmany eveti niyāmān na kṛdyaogasaṭṭhi.

16 MBḥ ad P.3.2.83 [II, 110, 8-10]: nana coktaṃ kartary api vai tenaiva vidhiyate. tatra kuta etat. karmanī bhavisyati na punah kartarit? evaṁ tarkaḥ ātmagrahanasāmarthiyāt karmanī vijñayate. Uddyota on do. [III, 175]: ātmagrahanam anarthakam iti. yady api ubhayaprāptāḥ iti niyāmān api na kartari vaktūṃ śahyam. tathāpyo ubhayoh pravṛtyabhōvād atra tad aprāptāḥ.

17 LS is the shorter version of his commentary on SK. The larger one is called Brhatśabdentuhakshara and it is, according to Kapil Dev Shastri, the editor of the Vaiyikara-siddhāntamaṭiṣās of Nāgeśa, “probably completed before the completion of his Uddyota.” (Introduction of VSM, p. vi) It is not clear that LS is earlier than Uddyota but it is highly possible.
6.3. Bhaṭṭoṭijo’s interpretation of P.1.4.28 {119, 8-10}


Translation: When the placing [something] in between is taken place, [a person] to whom someone wishes the absence of seeing of which has agent and oneself [as the object] is kāraka and apādāna. For example, “mātur niliyate krṣṇaḥ: Krṣṇa is hiding from his mother.” Here, the verbal root ṣleṣ- means “to attach, cling to” and belongs to fourth conjugation [but not the passive form].

Notes: This comment is same as that of SK. No. 591 [I, 661]18 with minor changes: vyavadhāne sati yat kartṛkasyātmano darśanasyābhāvam icchati tad apādānāṃ syāt. mātur niliyate krṣṇaḥ. Bhaṭṭoṭijo gives his interpretation of the word antardhau, i.e., “vyavadhāne sati,” and this is apparently the usage of absolute locative. See 6.1. Nāgeśa comments on this passage [LS, I. 690]: antardhir anyakartṛkvasv-karmakadarśanabhāvānukūlo vyavahitodesāsthirūpāḥ, tadghatikām yat kartṛkadarsanabhāvam icchati tad apādānām ity arthas phalitam āha — vyavadhāne satiti (Tr.: The act of hiding means the situation where something is blocking between, which is conducive to the absence of seeing having the other person as its agent and oneself as its object. As such the person of which someone wishes the absence of that agent’s seeing is apādāna. To clarify this meaning, [Bhaṭṭoṭijo] says “vyavadhāne sati”).

6.4. Again on the word antardhau {119,10-11}

Text: atra ‘antardhāv’ iti cintyaprayojanam.19 “na didṛṣate corān” ity atra hi paratvāṃ karmatā siddhā.

Translation: The word antardhau is redundant [in this rule]. It is because, according to the paratva-principle, [if it is not in the rule, then the word caura] would be termed as karmā [and take the accusative case] in the expression “na didṛṣate caurān: he does not want to see the thieves”.

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18 Cf. Bālamanoramā [ibid.]: iha tūpasargavaśād vyavadhānena parakartṛkvasvaviṣayaka-darśanavirahānukūlayāpāre vartate. tataḥ ca krṣṇo māṭr Kartṛkvasvaviṣayakadarśanavirahāhya kudyādāṃ prachanno bhavatīty arthaḥ. atra vyavadhānam āśritya māṭr Kartṛkvasvaviṣayaka-darśanavirahasya kṛṣṇeseyamānātatay māṭur apādānāvāt pañcamī.

19 Tattvabodhini [I, 661] says “Sabdakaustubhe tu “antardhau” ity etac cintyaprayojanam iti sthitam.”
Notes: In this section the (un-)necessity of the word antardhau is again discussed by giving the counter-example. See the comment of Jinendrabuddhi.

Nyāsa [I, 542]: caurāṇ na didṛksata iti. atra yaś caurāṇ na didṛksata iti sa tair ātmano 'darśanam icchati, na tv antarddhi-nimittam; kintūpaghātanivrtyartham. vispaśtarthaṁ cāntarddhi-grahaṇam. paratvāt karmasaṃjñāyayaiva bādhitvāc caurāṇām apādānasamjñā na bhaviṣyati.

Tr.: On "caurāṇ na didṛksate." Here in this counter-example the person who does not want to see the thieves is the one who wishes not to be seen by them. [In this case, the act of not-seeing] is not caused by the act of hiding. Rather, it aims at the escape from injury. The mention of the word antardhi- is very clear [because if it is not in this rule, the thieves by whom the person does not wish to be seen would be termed as apādāna. However, it is not necessary] because by means of the paratva-principle the designation karman will prevail over apādāna.

Joshi and Roodbergen [1975] say that this counter-example is wrong because Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of that example itself is not correct and as such P.1.4.28 cannot be applied. 20

6.5. On the word icchati {119,11-12}

Text: 'icchati' iti kim? icchāyām asatyāṁ*1 saty api darśane yathā syāt.

*1. Read “icchāyām satyāṁ” instead of “icchāyām asatyāṁ.” This reading is supported by KV and SK No. 591: icchatigrahaṇam kim — adarśane- cchāyām satyāṁ saty api darśane yathā syāt.

Translation: What is the purpose of the word icchati? When someone has a desire of “not-to-be-seen,” even if the act of seeing is taken place [against his wish, apādāna designation] would be [applied to].

Notes: This remarks the case where the act of seeing is actually taken place. If someone wishes not to be seen and against his wish the other person sees him, since the intention of the former person conforms to

20 "Strictly speaking, however, sa tair ātmano 'darśanam icchati cannot be a correct interpretation of the sentence caurāṇ na didṛksate, because, according to P.1.3.7, the desirative suffix can only be used, if the agent of the action denoted by the verbal base and the person who wishes are one and the same person. Therefore caurāṇ na didṛksate can only mean: ‘he does not want to see the thieves.’” (p. 89) Also they refers to the interpretation suggested by D.H.H.Ingalls, although his translation of the KV is still unpublished. See ibid. p. 90.
the condition prescribed in P.1.4.28, this rule can be applied. *KV* on do. [I, 542]: *icchatigrahanam kim ? adarśanecchāyāṃ satyaṃ saty api darsāne yathā syāt.* Also see *LS* [I, 691]: *saty api. adarśanecchā tadanukālavyāpārakaranā daivavaśād darsāne saty api yarthāḥ. athavā yatra darsanābhāva eva tatraiva syād iti bhāvaḥ.* (Tr.: On “saty api.” It means that “when the activity conducive to the desire of ‘not-to-be-seen’ is employed, even though he is seen by chance.” Or rather, it is implied that only when the act of seeing is absent [this rule] would be applied).

7. ākhyātopayoge [P.1.4.29: *SK*. 592].

7.0. Explanation {119, 13-15}

Text: *upayogo niyamapūrvakāṃ vidyāsvikāraṇa. tasmin sādhye ya ākhyātā tat kāraka apādāṇam syāt. “upādhyāyād adhīte.”*

Translation: The word *upayoga* means “an acquisition of knowledge following a discipline (niyamapūrvakāvidyāsvikāraṇa),” [namely taking a lesson regularly]. When such [an acquisition] is to be done, a person who provides [instruction] is kāraka [and becomes] apādāna. For example, “upādhyāyād adhīte: he learns from a teacher.”

Notes: *KV* on P.1.4.29, [I, 543]: *ākhyātā = pratipādayitā. upayogah = niyamapūrvakāṃ vidyāgraḥaṇaṃ. upayoge sādhye ya ākhyātā tat kāraka apādānasajñāṇaṃ bhavati. upādhyāyād adhīte. upādhyāyād āgamayati.*

Patañjali states that the word *upayoga* means ‘prakarṣagati: to reach the higher level’ or ‘niyamapūrvaka: to follow the discipline’ [MBh ad P.1.4.29, I, 329, 9-10]. However, the commentators prefer the latter sense and say “niyamapūrvakāṃ vidyāsvikāraṇam (vidyāgraḥaṇaṃ).” *Uddyota* on P.1.4.29 says [II, 253r]: *upayogaśabdaśya tatraiva rūdhir anyatra tu lakṣaṇayā prayoga ity arthaḥ. niyamo bhikṣācaraṇabhūśayādīḥ.* (Tr.: The word *upayoga* means “rūdhī: a traditional custom” in this case but in other cases “prayoga: [simple] practice” through the secondary meaning. *Niyama* is, for example, “going for alms,” or “sleeping on the ground,” etc.).

The word *niyama* means “vidyāgraḥaṇārthāṃ śisyapravṛttiḥ: the activity of the student in order to obtain the instructions.” (This explanation is given by the *Nyāsa* on do. [I, 543]). As for what kind of activity, Nāgeśa says in above quotation, viz. *bhikṣācaraṇa and bhūśayā, etc.* or Haradatta says [*PM* I, 543]: *yathā teṣāṃ mantrānām*
upayoge dvādaśaham adhah śiṣyeti niyamo bhikṣācaraṇādīḥ. We have, for example, the following traditional statement about these: Manusmṛti 2.108: agnindhanam bhaikṣacaryām adhahśayyām guror hitam / ā samāvartanāt kuryāt kṛtopanayano dvijaḥ // (The dvija who completes his upanayana rite should continue to do the act of keeping a [sacred] fire, going for alms, sleeping below [= on the ground], and serving for his guru until he arrives at the time of samāvartana rite).21

7.1. On the word upayoge {119,15}
Text: ‘upayoge’ iti kim? “nātasya śṛṇoti.”
Translation: What is the purpose of the word upayoga? [To prevent the application of apiidiina to nata] in the expression “nātasya śṛṇoti: he listens to the song.” [In this case, since mere act of listening is intended, it has no regular lesson].
Notes: This counter-example is oft-cited to show the difference between the kāraka and non-kāraka, i.e, śesa. (See part (1) 2.8.5, pp. 49-50 and part (2) 2.3.1, pp. 150-152). Since to hear the actor singing has no regularity and academic aspect, nāṭa cannot be regarded as ākhyātr and thus 29 would not be applied. (Nyāsa on do. [I, 543]: nātasya gāthām śṛṇotīti. sambandhalakṣaṇā śaṣṭhi. niyamapūrvakam iha vidyāgraṇaṇam nāsti.)

If non-regularity becomes a criterion to decide whether the word upayoga is to be in this rule or not, even though upayoga is in this rule, it is not possible to block the application of the designation apādāna to nāṭa because to hear the gāthā of the actor regularly and, putting in another way, to have a lessen how to sing the gāthā from the actor adjusts to the condition of P.1.4.29. Therefore Haradatta acquiesces in this interpretation, namely nāṭa can serve as the fixed point from which the gāthā comes (this understanding of Haradatta apparently follows Patańjali’s refusal of P.1.4.25-31) but he entrusts this problem whether nāṭa is termed as apādāna or śesa to the speaker who expresses it. (PM [ibid.]: nanu nātasya saty apy avadhitve śeṣarūpeṇa viśeṣanāt śaṣṭhi bhaviṣyati, yathā na māṣānāṁ aśañād iti vastutāḥ karmatvaṁ māṣānāṁ, satyam, sa eva vivakṣānīyamaḥ

21 As for the niyama during the brahmacārin period prescribed in the Manusmṛti, see 2.173-242. For examples, 182 udakumbhaṁ samanasa gosakṛṣṇaṁtiśākṣān / āharedyāv arthāṇī bhaikṣam cāharahaḥ caret //; 183 vedajajnair vikṣaritam prāṣastānām svakarmanu / brahma-cāryāhāred bhaikṣam gṛhebhyaḥ prayato 'nāvam //; 184 gurōh kule na bhikṣeta na jñātikula-bandhuṣu / alābe tv anyogehōnāṁ pūrvaṁ pūrvaṁ vivarjayet //; 185 sarvaṁ vāpi cared grāmaṁ pārvoktīnāṁ asambhave / niyamya prayato vācam abhiṣastāṁs tu varjayet //
sūtrakāraṇa pradarśyate — upayoge 'vadhītvam vivakṣitam, anyatra śeṣatvam iti).

8. janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ [P.1.4.30: SK. 593]

8.0. Explanation {119, 16-17}

Text: jāyamāṇasya hetur apādānam syāt. “putrāt pramādo jāyate.”
Translation: The cause of one who is born becomes apādāna. Example, “putrāt pramādo jāyate: a mistake arises from a son.”

Notes: KV on P.1.4.30 [I, 543-4]: janeḥ karttā janikarttā. janyarthasya janmanah karttā jāyamānah, tasya yā prakṛtiḥ kāraṇam, hetuḥ tat kārakam apādānasamjñānam bhavati.

Bhaṭṭoji gives another example in his SK., i.e., “brāhmaṇaḥ prajāḥ prajāyante.” Why does he quote this example instead of the ordinarily used one? According to the Tattvabodhiniḥ, this example can cover two positions concerning to how to interpret the meaning of the word prakṛti. (Tattvabodhiniḥ on do. [I, 662]: tadubhyasādhāraṇam udāharanam āha — brāhmaṇa iti). This concern leads to the ontological issue discussed later (8.2).

8.1. On the word janikartuḥ {119,17-18}
8.1.1. About the form and meaning of jani-.

Text: iha janir utpattih. “janir utpattir udbhavaḥ” ity Amaraḥ [AK. 1.4.30].
Translation: Here, jani- means a production. Amara says that jani- means a production or a generation.

Notes: The first constituent of the word janikartuḥ, jani-, is explained. The verbal root jāṇi- belongs to the fourth conjugation class (Dhp. IV, 41: jāṇī prādurbhāvē). Bhaṭṭoji refers to the b pāda of verse from the Amarakośa: janur jananajanmāni janir utpattir udbhavah / prāṇī tu cetano jannī jantujanyuśāriṇāḥ //30//.

8.1.2. Two alternatives of the formation jani- {119, 18-20}

Text: “iNājādibhyah” [*1] [Vt on P.3.3.108] iti janer bhāve iN,*2 “janighasibhyām” (Uṇādi-sūtra 579) ity Uṇādisūtreṇa vā. “janivadhyos ca” [P.7.3.35] iti vrddhipratisedhah.

*1 and *2. Should we read “iNājādibhyah” instead of “iNājādibhyah” and ‘iN’ instead of ‘iN’? See the following Notes.

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22 MDhV, p. 415, 11-12 and 18-19: prādurbhāva utpattir abhivyaktir vā. atrāyam akarmakah. ... “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ” iti jāyamāṇasya kāraṇam śrīgam apādānam.
Translation: (1) According to Vt. “iğerādibhyaḥ,” suffix $iN$ denoting the state of production is added to $\sqrt{\text{jana}}$. (2) [However,] according to Uṇādisūtra, the word jani- is formed by adding suffix $iN$ to $\sqrt{\text{jana}}$. [In both cases,] the vṛddhi is prohibited by P.7.3.35.

Notes: In discussing the form of jani-, there are two possibilities of its derivation: (A) $\sqrt{\text{jana}}$ + $iN$ and (B) $\sqrt{\text{jana}}$ + $i/N$. Alternative (A) is based on the Vt. VII on P.3.3.108: $iN\varpi\apādibyaḥ [in MBh ad P.3.3.108, II, 155, 5] and (B) is based on Vt. VI on do.: $iN\jādibhyaḥ [ibid., 3]. Both forms are directly introduced after the verbal roots. And the vṛddhi replacement does not occur on account of P.7.3.35: janivadhyoṣ ca ([The vṛddhi replacement does not occur on the short penulti-mate vowel $-\text{a}_2$ before the suffixes $\sqrt{\text{jana}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{vadh}}$ [before the suffixes $\sqrt{\text{jana}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{vadh}}$ having $\N$ or $\text{N}$ as $\text{IT}^2$]). We have one more alternative which is introduced after the verbal root to specify it. Vt. II on do. [ibid., 154, 18]: $iKŚtPau dhātunirdēse. This derivational possibility is rejected in 8.1.4.

Here, we fall into a confusion about the suffix. ŚK quotes the Vt in the form of “iğerādibhyaḥ” but this does not conform to the present Vt. VII. Haradatta, supporting alternative (A), gives different reading [PM on do. I, 543-4]: etad uktaṁ bhavati — janiśabdo 'yam “iğerādi-bhyaḥ” iti janer bhāve iNam utpadya vyutpāditah. “janivadhyoṣ ca” iti vṛddhipratiṣeṣho janyārthavacī. On the other hand, alternative (B) is supported by the commentators of SK, namely Bālamanorāma on SK. 593 [I, 662]: jani prādurbhāve daivādikā 'karmakaḥ. iğerādibhyaḥ iti bhāve iN. “janivadhyoṣ ca” iti niṣedhān nopadhāvṛttiḥ; Tattvabodhini on do. [ibid.]: “iğerādibhyaḥ” iti janer bhāve iN. “janivadhyoṣ ca” iti vṛddhiniṣedhaḥ. This alternative corresponds to the Uṇādisūtra, and Dhātuvṛtti-s such as the MDhV and the Kṣirataṅgini quote this Uṇādisūtra as a reference (MDhV. [p. 417, 7-8]: janih — “janighasibhyām $iN$” iti$N$; Kṣirataṅgini [p. 126]: janighasibhyām iN [U. 4.129], janivadhyoṣ ca [VII.3.35] iti vṛddhiniṣedhaḥ janih). Why do the two commentaries on SK, quoting the passages of the ŚK so frequently, give different derivation and Vt? Does it mean that the passage of ŚK in this section is misunderstood and thus they correct it because the Vt which Bhaṭṭoji refers to is a

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23 Cf. Commentary on the Amarakośa [pp. 55-56]: “janighasibhyām $iN$” (Un. 4.130), “janivadhyoṣ ca” (7.3.35) iti vṛddhiniṣedhask. utpattisāhacarvāy jāneh strīvam. As for the number of this Uṇādisūtra, according to the Osmania University edition of the KV(a), it is 1.58 in dasapādyanādisūtra and 4.139 in pañcapādyanādisūtra [part III].
mixture of Viś VI and VII? Therefore, tentatively speaking, if the present \( Vt \) given in the \( MBh \) is to be accepted, the text of \( ŠK \) should be read as suggested under the text portion (in this case the passage of the \( PM \) also needs correction) and if we read the text of \( ŠK \) as it is, it should be rendered that it reflects simply a difference of opinions. In both cases, the meanings are not different.

8.1.3. The formations of \( \text{janikar}tṛ \) [119, 20-24]
Text: \( \text{tasyāḥ karteti sāṣṭhitapuruṣāḥ.} \) \( \text{“kartari ca” [P.2.2.16] iti pratiśedhas tv anityaḥ, ata eva jñāpakāt. yadvā, śeṣaśaṣṭhyā samāso ’yam. nisedhas tu karmaśaṣṭhīvisaya iti “kārake” [P.1.4.23] iti sūtre Kaiyataḥ. tathā cārthamātrasya grahaṇād dhātvantarayoge ’pi bhavati “āṅgād anāṅgī samabhavati” yathā.} \)
Translation: (1) [The compound \( \text{janikar}tṛ \)] is a genitive \( \text{tatpuruṣa} \) which means the agent of the production. However, as the prohibition of compounding by P.2.2.16 is not obligatory, so that this formation is allowed as the indicator. (2) Or, this is the compound of \( śeṣa-\text{ṣaṣṭhi} \). However, Kaiyata says that the prohibition is prescribed in the domain of \( \text{ṣaṣṭhi} \) which denotes \( \text{karman} \). Thus, since the meaning alone is obtained, even if another verbal root is used, it is possible to have the usages such as “\( aṅgād aṅgīt samabhavati: \) from each part it comes arise.”

Notes. About the formation of the compound \( \text{janikar}tṛ \). According to the \( KV \), this compound is analyzed as \( \text{janeb karttii janikarttii} \) (see 8.0). The underlying string is \( [[\text{jani-} + \text{Ñaś} ] + [\text{kartr-} + \text{sU}]] + \text{sU} \). However, this compounding is prohibited by P.2.2.15: \( tṛjakābhhyām kartari \) (The word ending in the sixth case\(^8\) denoting the agent [is not\(^1.10\) compounded\(^1.3\) with\(^1.4\) the word having the suffix \(-tṛC\) or \(-aka\) ) and P.2.2.16: \( \text{kartari ca} \) (The word ending in the sixth case\(^8\) is not\(^1.10\) compounded\(^1.3\) with\(^1.4\) the word having the suffix \(-tṛC\) or \(-aka\)\(^1.15\) denoting the agent). These readings of Pāṇini rule follow the Katre’S translation. In this case, when the genitive case of the word \( \text{janeb} \) denotes the agent, the compounding is prohibited by P. 2.2.15. And if we consider this form as the genitive case denoting the object (see \( PM \) [I, 543: \( \text{janeb karttii janikarteti karmanī sāṣṭhyāḥ samāsah. ayam eva ca nirdeśo jñāpayati — “kartari ca” iti pratiśedho ’niyta} \)
this case is outside of the scope of P.2.2.15. However, since this formation is allowed as the indicator (jñāpaka), this prohibition is not regarded as “obligatory.”

As for the reading of P.2.2.15-16, commentators and translators have different opinions. KV reads kartari in 15 as the qualifier to șașṭhi continued from P.2.2.8 and kartari in 16 as the qualifier to -trC and -aka (KV on P.2.2.15 [II, 116]: kartṛgraṇaṁ ṣaṣṭhivīśeṣaṇaṁ; on 16 [ibid., 116-117]: sāmarthyād akasya viśeṣaṇārthaṁ kartṛgraṇaṁ itaratra vyabhicārābhāvāt). This reading is taken by the modern translators. See the followings (not the translation as the whole):

Böhtlingk [1887, I, 53]: ... ein subjectiver Genetiv (15); Auf nicht ein (objectiver) Genetiv mit einem Nomen ag. auf tr oder aka. (16);
Vasu [1891, I, 262]: ... when the force of the genitive case is that of an agent (15); ... when the force of these latter affixes is that of an agent (16);
Renou [1966, I,104]: ... quand (ledit Gén. a valeur d’) agent (15); ... quand (ledit dérivé à “tr” ou aka a valeur d’) agent (16);
Katre [1987]: [A nominal pada ending in the sixth sUP triplet] introduced as an agent marker ... (15); ... [the affixes -trC- or -aka-] introduced as agent markers ... (16);
Cardona [1988, 255]: ... bases ending in trc and aka (trjākābhyaṁ) introduced to signify an agent (kartari) (16);
Sharma[1995, 81, 84]: A pada which ends in ṣaṣṭhi and denotes karman does not combine, ... with a syntactically related pada which ends in sUP, contains a stem in trC or aka, and denotes kartṛ (15); A pada which ends in ṣaṣṭhi and denotes kartṛ ....

However, Bhaṭṭoji considers that kartari in 15 is the qualifier not to ṣaṣṭhi but to -aka of trJākabhyaṁ (ŚK on P.2.2.15 [I, 206, 1-2]:

If the condition karman in P.2.2.14 is continued to 15, this interpretation of Haradatta, karmasaṣṭhi, does not stand but, as he says, this compounding is allowed as jñāpaka. See the footnote 27.

Vasu says that kartari in 16 does not qualifier “trC” but “aka” alone.

Katre gives the sūtra-number of continuing rules but they are omitted.

Sharma [1995] here thinks that karman in P.2.2.14 is continued to 15 as the qualifier to ṣaṣṭhi (Böhtlingk translates 16 as “objectiver” Genetiv.” This means that karman is the qualifier to ṣaṣṭhi in 16). And Joshi and Roodbergen [1973] discusses these problems that whether karman is continued to 15 or 16 and that what is represented by this karman (pp. 164-176), although Patañjali did not comment on P.2.2.15-16. To clarify the functions of P.2.2.14-16 it is necessary to be treated at another occasion.
kartrarthatrJakābhyaṃ ṣaṣṭhyā na samāsah. kartarity akasyaiva viṣeṣanam na tu tṛC 'pi) and that kartari in 16 qualifies the ṣaṣṭhi and -tṛC is not continued to 16 (ŚK on P.2.2.16 [ibid., 15]: pūrvatradvandvānā nirddisto 'pi tṛC neḥānuvartate).28 According to this interpretation of Bhāṭṭoji, the prohibition of the genitive tatpuruṣa in this case is by P.2.2.16 because the kartrṣaṣṭhi is not excluded from the scope of P.2.2.15.29

Another interpretation of the formation is that in this compounding the genitive case does not denote any kāraka-meaning but non-kāraka-meaning (śeṣa). Since the genitive case does not represent kāraka and thus it is not covered by P.2.2.15-16, the compounding is allowed by P.2.2.8. This alternative is probably the solution by Bhāṭṭoji. (See Bālamandanāma [I, 662]: janeḥ karteti vigrahā. śeṣaṃ saṣṭhiyā samāsah “tṛJakābhyaṃ kartari” iti niṣedhas tu kārakasaṣṭhyā eveti vāksyate; Tatrabodhinī [ibid.]: tasyāḥ karteti saṣṭhīyā samāsah; na tu kārakasaṣṭhyā, “tṛJakāhyāṃ —” iti niṣedhā).

As for the reference to Kaiyāṭa, such a description is not found in his commentary on P.1.4.23 but instead the following is found in the Pradīpa on P.2.2.14 [II, 434r]: tṝJakābhyaṃ ceti kartari yau tṛjakau tatra sāmarthyāt karmāṇy eva ṣaṣṭhīti anenaiva pratiśedhaḥ siddhāḥ. (Cf. ŚK on P.2.2.15 [I, 206, 10-12]: Kaiyāṭas tu śeṣaṣṭhyā samāsā ity āhā. “janikartuḥ prakṛtīḥ” [P.1.4.30] “tatprayojaka hetuś ca” [P.1.4.55] iti jnāpakaḥ anityo ‘yam pratiśedha iti tu bahavaḥ).

8.1.4. What is denoted by jani- ?{119, 24-27}


Translation: Therefore, depending on the derivation of jani- on account of the Vt. II on P.3.3.108 that “iKŚ-tiPau dhātunirdeśe: when the verbal root itself is cited, the krt-suffix -iK or ŚtīP [i.e., ŚaP and tiP] is added [after the verbal root],” Kumārila said that the elision of upadhā (a penultimate vowel) and the non-acquisition of the meaning are explained.

28 SK No. 709 [=P.2.2.15, II, 53]: kartrarthatrjakābhyaṃ ṣaṣṭhyā na samāsah; No. 710 [P.2.2.16, ibid., 54]: neha tṝC anuvartate. tadyoge karturabhitiṣṭeṇa kartṛṣaṣṭhyā abhāvāt.
29 As for the opposite interpretations presented in KV and SK, see Sharma[1995], pp. 80-84.
Notes: In this section, what is meant by the word \textit{janī} is discussed. Is it representing the verbal root $\sqrt{\text{janī}}$- or the meaning of that verb?

If it is intended to indicate the verbal root, it will lead to two difficulties. One is that since the final vowel -i of \textit{janī} is added on account of \textit{Vt} II on P.3.3.108: \textit{iKŚtīPau dhātunirdeśa}, P.6.4.98 is inevitably introduced and the drop of the penultimate vowel (\textit{upadhālopa}) results. The other difficulty is that P.1.4.30 cannot cover the cases wherein other verbal roots having the meaning of “production; coming forth, etc.” such as \textit{sam-\text{nīhū}}- is used. In order to avoid those difficulties it is admitted that the form \textit{janī}- represents the meaning of “production; coming forth, etc.” denoted by the verbal roots such as $\sqrt{\text{janī}}$-, etc.

The reference of the \textit{Tantravārttika} is as follows [on JŚ.1.3.24, 1, 515, 5-11]:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

Tr.: In case of P.1.4.30, there are two incorrect [ungrammatical] usage. (1) Namely, the word \textit{janī} means the verbal root $\sqrt{\text{janī}}$- which is based on \textit{Vt.} “iKŚtīPau dhātunirdeśa.” In this case, the designation apādāna is not to be applied to the agent of that, i.e., its source. The word \textit{janī}- is not admitted as denoting “the one which is born (jāyamāna)” which is desired by the rule. Therefore, as the word \textit{aśva} is used in the sense of “daridra (poor)”, the word \textit{janī} as the denotatum of that meaning is incorrect.

(2) Since P.2.2.15 prohibits the compounding with the word ending in the genitive case, [if you admits the compound \textit{janikartr}]- it is nothing but a cancellation of the grammatical effect. In this way, the compounding of \textit{tatprayojaka} is also prohibited.

The context whence this passage is quoted is to show how the grammarians themselves used ungrammatical forms. In this passage,
although the *upadhālopā* is not mentioned, two problems are treated. If the from *jani-* represents the verbal root itself, the compound form *janikartṛ-* cannot denote the meaning “jāyamāṇasya kartuḥ” and the compound itself is ungrammatical form.

8.2. On the word *prakṛti*

8.2.1. First view {119, 27-30}

Text: *atra prakṛtigrahaṇām upādānamātraparam ity eke. ata eva “prakṛtiś ca pragṛṣṇādrśāntānuparodhā” [Brahmasūtra 1.4.23] ity adhikaraṇe brahmaṇo jagadupādānatāyāṁ “yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante ” iti pañcamīm upāmbhikām āhuḥ.

Translation: Some hold that the word *prakṛti* is used to refer the material cause(*upādānakāraṇa*) alone. Thus, in the section of BS. 1.4.23 “[Brahman] is the [material] cause because [such understanding is not contradictory to the statement(*pratijñā*) and the example (*drṣṭānta*),” when the Brahman is regarded as the material cause of this world there is *ṣruti* to prove that the ablative case denotes [the material cause] such as “yato vā (imāni) bhūtāni jāyante: from it [=Brahman] these elements come arise.”

Notes: In the passages 8.2, two interpretations of the word *prakṛti* are discussed. One provokes that *prakṛti* is *upādānakāraṇa* and the other is that it is *hetu* or *kāraṇa* in general. As far as the grammarians are concerned, the former position is hold by Patañjali and Kātyāṭa and the latter by *KV* and *Nyāsa* (see *Tattvabodhini* on SK. 593 [I, 662]: *iha prakṛtigrahaṇam hetumātraparam iti Vṛttikṛnmatam. putrāt pramādo jāyata ity udāharanāt. upādānamātraparam iti tu Bhāṣya-Kātyāṭa-matam*).³⁰

Patañjali, although he himself does not explicitly claim that the word *prakṛti* means *upādānakāraṇa*, gives examples “gomayād *vrścikā jāyate*: a scorpion is born from cowdung” and “golomā-

³⁰ See also *Bālamanaśūra*. On the example given by Bhāṭṭoji in his *SK*, namely “brāhmaṇaḥ prajāḥ prajāyante,” it comments as follows [on SK 593, I, 662]: brāhmaṇa iti. hiranyagarbḥūd ity arthaḥ. gaṭhāṇaḥ kulalādivat tasya prajotpattau nimattakāraṇatvam iti bhāvah. Vṛttikṛnmatam etad ayuktam, samyogaviśeṣasatvāt vṛddhovapiyā —” iti eva siddhatvāt. aito ‘tra māle hetusābda upādānakāraṇapara eva. ata eva Bhāṣya-Kātyāṭayoh “gomayād vrścikā jāyante,” “gomolāvīlomābhya dovāv jāyante” ity udāhṛtya pariṇāmeṣu prakṛtidvṛddhāvavavāmājeśasatvāt “vṛddhovapiyā” eva siddham iti pratyākhyānam sanappacchate. evaṃ ca “brāhmaṇaḥ prajāḥ prajāyante” ity atra brahmaśabdādena mahāvaiśnavi iti *Vedāntasiddhāntaḥ*. 

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vilomabhyo dūrvā jāyante: dūrvā grasses are born from the hairs of a cow and of a sheep.” These examples show that Patañjali thinks of the word prakṛti as the material cause. Kaiyata further explains Patañjali’s position. Pradipa on P.1.4.30 [II, 2551]: lokaprasiddhyāsrayena ucyate. loke hi yad yasmāj jāyate tat tasmān nirgachātiḥ ucyate. tarkāśrayās tu prakriyā bhidyante. Vaiśeṣikadarśane paramāṇvādi-samavetāṃ kāraṇebhyo ‘prthagdeshāṃ kāryam upādyata iti nāsti kāryasyāpakramāḥ. Sāṃkhya darśane ’py avirbhāvatirobhāvalakṣaṇa-janmanāśarūpaparājñām abhyupagamāṃ nāsti apakramāḥ.31

The latter view is stated in the Nyāsa on P.1.4.30 [I, 544]: dvividhāṃ hi kāraṇam — upādānakāraṇam, sahakārikāraṇāṃ ca. tatra yat kāryenābhinnaśaṃ tad upādānakāraṇam, yathā — ghātasya mṛtpindāḥ. sahakārikāraṇāṃ yat kāryeṇa bhinnadeśaṃ, yathā — tasyaiṣa daṇḍacakraḍī. tatrāṣati prakṛtigrahaṇe pratyāsatter upādānakāraṇasyaiṣa syāt, netarasya. prakṛtigrahaṇe tu sarvasyaiva kāraṇamātrasya bhavati (Tr.: The cause is of two types, namely a material cause and a co-operating cause.32 The material cause is the one which exists in the same place where the result does. For example, a lump of clay for a pot. The co-operating cause is that which exists in the place whereon the result does not. Example, a stick or a potter’s wheel, etc. for [the pot]. If the word prakṛti is not mentioned in this rule, [it means] the material cause alone because of the proximity. However, when it is mentioned, [it means] the cause in general for everything).33

In order to show how the ablative case standing for the apādāna denotes the prakṛti, Bhaṭṭoji refers to the Vedānta school who claims

31 As for the translation and explanation of this passage, see Joshi and Roodbergen [1975], pp. 100-105.
32 The co-operating cause (sahakārikāraṇa) is nothing but the efficient cause (nimittakiiraṇa).
33 KV simply says “prakṛtiḥ kāraṇaḥ, hetuḥ” (see 8.0). Generally, kāraṇa is classified into two by Vedānta, namely upādānakāraṇa and nimittakiiraṇa. On the other hand, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hold three, i.e., upādānakāraṇa, samavāyikāraṇa, and asamavāyikāraṇa. See, for example, Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatṭa, section 40 [pp. 26-27]: kāraṇam trividhāṃ samavāyya-samavāyainimittabhedaḥ, yat samavetam kāryam upādyate tat samavāyikāraṇam. yathā tattavah pātaṣya pataṣa ca svagatārūpāḥ, kāryena kāraṇena va sahākṣaṁ arthe samavetate sati yat kāraṇam tad asamavāyikāraṇam. yathā tattusamyogah pātaṣya tanturūpam pataṣṭāt pātaṣaya. tadubhayabhinnaṃ kāraṇam nimittakiiraṇam. yathā turvemādikam pātaṣya. In this study, I limit myself to see the discussion presented in the grammatical texts because this issue is too much wider to treat here.

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that the Brahman is the material cause as well as the efficient cause. See the following Śaṅkara’s commentary on BS 1.4.23 [340]:

\[
yata iti 'yaça ‘yata iti pānchāmi “yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante” ity atra “janikartur prakṛtī” iti viśeṣasamāraṇāt prakṛtīlakṣaṇa eva-pādāne draṣṭavyā. nimittavām tv adhiśṭhāntarantaraḥbhāvād adhi-gantavyaṃ. yathā hi loke mṛṣuvarṇādikam upādānakāraṇāṃ kulālasuvarṇākāraṇādīn adhiśṭhātīn apekṣya pravartate naivām brahmaṇa upādānakāraṇasya sato ’nayo ’dhiśṭhātāpekṣyo ’sti, prāguptaṭer ekam evādītiyām ity avadhāranāt. adhiśṭhāntaraḥbhāvo ’pi pratijñādṛṣṭāntāntaṃparo Thread evodito vedita-vyāḥ. adhiśṭhātāri hy upādānād anyasminn abhyupagamyamāne punar apya ekaviṃśaṃnena sarvaviṃśaṃnasyāsāṃbhavāt pratī-νādṛṣṭāntaṃparo eva śvāt. tasmād adhiśṭhāntarantaraḥbhāvād ātmanaḥ karṣṭtvam upādānantaraḥbhāvāc ca prakṛtītvam.\]

Tr.: As the ablative case of the word ‘yataḥ’ in the passage from the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad is introduced by a special rule P.1.4.30, this case ending should be known as denoting the source (pralōti). However, since there is no ruler (adhiśṭhātī) [other than this], the efficient cause-ness [of it] is also to be admitted. Although in the ordinary world the material cause such as clay or gold, etc. is depending on a potter or a goldsmith as its adhiśṭhātī, the Brahman as the material cause is not subject to other adhiśṭhātī because it is already established that it is nothing but the one before this world is created. Furthermore, that it does not have any adhiśṭhātī [other than itself] is clearly realized because [such understanding] is not contradictory to pratijñā and dṛṣṭānta. If it is admitted that there is adhiśṭhātī other than this material cause, it would lead to the fault that from one cognition all the knowledges are not obtained and thus make a contradiction to pratijñā and dṛṣṭānta. Therefore, Ātman is the agent [i.e., nimittakāraṇa] because there is no other adhiśṭhātī and it is the prakṛtī as well because of the lack of other material cause.

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34 See also sub-commentaries on Śaṅkarabhāṣya [ibid.]: Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā: “yato vā” ity atra śrutau yata iti pānchāmi prakṛtīvad draṣṭavyāty avavyayā; janikartur jyāmānasaya kāryasya prakṛtim apādānasamajjīkā bhavatī satārthah; Bhāmaṭi: yata iti ca pānchāmi na kāraṇāmāre smanāte api tu prakṛtīvad. “janikartur prakṛtī” iti tato ’pi prakṛtītvam apagacchāmah; Nyāyaśāstra: jyāmānaśāstra kāryasya prakṛtim apādānam apādānasamajjīkā bhavatī apādāne pānchāmi smanāṇān kāramāmāre sā yuktye arthah. yady api sūtre prakṛtirgraṇānam sarvāvānasamagraṇārtham ity uktām tathāpi tadasāntaryā “prakṛtī ca” iti sūtrasthānaprakṛti-śabdāvad ayam apitī manyate, tathāpi kathām nimittavām, tad āha — nimittavām iti.
Śaṅkara refers to Taittirīyopaniṣad III (Bhṛguvallyadhyāya)1: bhṛgur vai varūniḥ / varūṇam pitaram upasasāra / adhihi bhagavo brahmeti / tasmā etat provāca — annām prāṇam caksuḥ śrotraṃ mano vācam iti / taṁ hovāca — yato vā īmāni bhūtāni jāyante / yena jātāni jivantī/ yat prayanty abhisamviśanti / taḥ vijijñāsasva tad brahmeti / sa tapo 'tapyata / sa tapas taptvā //35

8.2.2. Second view {119, 30-33}


Translation: However, others say that since the meaning of the expression “putrāt pramādo jāyate” is favoured, the word prakṛti means here the cause [not only the material cause]. According to this view, the word which expresses the general meaning [such as the word prakṛti] can denote the particular such as the material cause (upādaña). It is said by the maxim in the sixth [chapter] that “On the other hand, it is he-goat because of the mantra” [JS.6.8.31].

Notes: PM says [ibid.]: anye tu dhruvagrahaṁānuvṛtter eva prakṛti-parigrahe siddhe prakṛtigrhaṇam kāraṇamātraparigraphārthaṁ varṇayanti. ata eva vṛttāv uktam — kāraṇam iti, na punar upādaṇa- kāraṇam iti. tena ca putrāt pramādo jāyata ityādāv api bhavatīti (Tr.: On the other hand, others say that since, when the word dhruva- is continued from [P.1.4.24], the meaning of the word prakṛti is included in [that notion], the purpose of mentioning prakṛti is to show the general term kāraṇa. Therefore, it is said in KV that kāraṇam iti. It does not mean the material cause alone. In this way, the example is given).

In this passage, the discussion of sixth chapter of the JS is referred to. JS 6.8.30-43 are concerned to the problem which kind of animal is to be offered to Agni and Soma gods. Even though there is no special rule that prescribes the kind of animal, since we have another statement that “Invoke with the fat of the marrow of a goat,” it is

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35 See also Chāndogya Upaniṣad I.9.1: asya lokasya kā gatir iti / ākāśa iti hovāca / sarvāni ha vā īmāni bhūtāni ākāśād eva samutpadyante / ākāśam pratyastām yanti / ākāśo hy evaibhyo jyāyān / ākāśah parāyaṇam //
clearly realized that the animal to be offered is the goat. 36 And the
goat is one of species of animal. When the animal as the genus is
referred to, it includes its species, i.e., the goat. In this way, when the
general notion is expressed, it includes the particulars. See Šabarabhāṣya on JS 6.8.35 [5, 370]:

\[
\begin{align*}
niyamārthayām  \text{ hy arthabheda} & \text{ḥ bhedāḥ prthaktvēnābhidhānāḥ} \quad //35// \text{ aniyamā vā. aikyārthayām hi paśuchāga-
sabdāyāḥ}. \text{ sāmānyām paśur iti. chāgādāyā viśēṣā ucyante.} \\
\text{kathām. vai sāmānādhi karanyāt. paśuṣ chāgāḥ, paśur utṣṭrāḥ,} \\
paśur mesāḥ, paśur usrāḥ iti. evam sati na mantravartnāḥ 
paśuṣadena viruddhyate. 
\text{tena chāgo 'py ālabdhāvyaś coiditāḥ.} 
\end{align*}
\]

mantravarna upādīyamāne, idam avagamyate. chāgāṃ vivakṣi-
vā’yaṃ paśuṣabda uccaritā iti, nāyān viśēṣān iti. chāgopā-
karaṇam asyopadaṃsitam. yad upadamsane paśuṣabdaś chāgā-
bhiprāya iti gamyate. yathā yugavaratropadaṃsitē, iśācakraś-
saṃnīdhanē ca aksāṃ ānayety ukte, yānākasmī adhikṛtya brūta 
itī gamyate, na tu videvanaṃsatī iti. yadi hy arthabhedo bhavet
paśuchāgaśabdāyōḥ prthaktvēnābhidhānāṃ, tato bhedāḥ syāt,
na chāga eva niyamāyate. aviḥitaḥ chāgārtha ity aśvopādānām.
api ca chāgapakṣe tāṃ mantravartnāḥ prakāśayet. chāgārthāhi-
dhānē punaḥ paśuṣabda uccaritā, chāgaprāptāv anyēsāṃ aprāptā 
ity anyasmin prāpte līṅgena niyamāṃ kriyata itī; on 43 [ibid., 373]:
\[
\begin{align*}
jātīr vā tatprāyavacanārthavatvābhāyām \quad //43// \text{ vāśabdō 'va-
dhāraṇāyām}. \text{ tasmād avayavaprasiddhyā samudāyaprasiddhār} 
nā bādhyate. tasmāj jātēr eva chāgāsabdō vācakah. evam sam-
udāyasyārthavattā' nugṛhitā bhavisyati. 
\end{align*}
\]

8.2.3. Appositional relation { 119, 33-120, 3}

Text: “aham eva bahu syām” iti hi sāmānādhi karāṇyāṃ śrīyate. tāc
cā caturdhā — bhrame, bādhāyām, abhede, tādātmya ca.
prakṛte tādātmye, bhinnate saty abhinnasattālatvam āvidyakaḥ
sambandhaviśeṣo vā tādātmyam ityādy Uttaramīmāṁsāyāṃ
spaṣṭām.

---
36 See Šabarabhāṣya on JS. 6.8.31 [5, 368]: vāśabdāḥ paśaṃ vāvartayati. naitad asti.
yatrakvacana dravye paśutvam upādeyam itī. asty utṣrāstavyasya niyamakāraṇām mantravartnāḥ.
chāgasya = vapaḥ medaso ’nubṛtīti, chāgaprakāśanasamarthe mantravartnāḥ samāmāyate.
yadi chāgo nopaśyeyas tatāt prakāśanasamarthe sambhāyām anarthaḥ. tenāvagamya
tē chāgām adhikṛtyotsargaṃ vidadhāttī. mantravartnīkā dravyaniyamavādhitī itī.
Translation: The identical relation [of Brahman and material cause] is clearly stated in the passage “aham eva bahu syām: I will be many.” There are four types whence the appositional relation is realized, namely, in case of the error (bhrama), of an absurdity (bādhā), of an [imposed] non-difference (abheda) and an [actual] same-ness (tādātmya). In this case, [what is meant for] is the same-ness. The same-ness is the state of having the same existence if there [seems to be] a difference or the particular relation which is based on avidyā. This is clear in the view of Vedānta.

Notes: On the śruti “aham eva bahu syām,” see Chāndogya Up. VI.2.3: tadaikṣata — bahu syām prajāyeyeti / tat tejo 'srjata / tat teja aikṣata / bahu syām prajāyeyeti / tad apo, 'srjata / tasmād yatra kva ca śocati svedate vā pirāsas tejasa eva tadadhīpo jāyante //, Taittiriya Up. II (Brahmavāl.ladyāya) 6: so 'kāmayata / bahu syām prajāyeyeti / sa atapo 'tapyata / sa tapas taptvā / idam sarvam asṛjata / yad idam kīm ca / tat srṣṭvā / tad evānuprāviṣat / tad anupraviṣya / sac ca tyac cābhavat / niruktām cāniruktām ca nilayananām ca / vijñānaṁ cāvījñānaṁ ca / satyam cānṛtāṁ ca / satyam abhavat / yad idam kīm ca / tat satyam ity ācākṣate / tad apy eṣa śloko bhavati //

Śaṅkara states the appositional relation (sāmānādhikaranāya) of the Brahman and the prakṛti as follows [on BS. 1.4.26, 341]: pariṇāmād iti vā prthaksūtram. tasyaiśo 'rthaḥ — itaś ca prakṛtir brahma, yat kāraṇam brahmaṇa eva vikārātmanā pariṇāmāḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁnāmāyate “sac ca tyac cābhavat. niruktām cāniruktām ca” [Tai. Up. II.6] ityādīneti (Tr.: Or rather, “pariṇāmāt” [which is a part of this śrutā] itself is an independent śūtra. It means that the Brahman is prakṛti because it is said that pariṇāma as the transformation of the Brahman is expressed appositionally [with the Brahman] such as “[Having entered here, It] became ‘existence (saṁ)’ and ‘that (tya)’; ‘what is expressed (nirukta)’and ‘what it not expressed (anirukta)” [Tai. Up. II.6”]). (Unfortunately, its source stating the four factors which cause the notion of sāmānādhikaranāya collectively, as is referred in this ŠK, is untraced).

Śaṅkara comments on this śruti as follows [on BS. 1.4.24, 340]: abhidhyopadeśaḥ cātmanāḥ kartāvaprakṛtive gamayati “so ‘kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya’” [Tai. Up. II.6] iti, “tadaikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya” [Ch. Up. VI.2.3] iti ca. tatrābhidhyānapūrvikāyāḥ svātantryapravṛtteh kartetī gamyate. bahu syām iti pratyogātmanivāsavitvād bahubhavānābhidhyānasya prakṛtir ity api gamyate.
9. *bhuvah prabhavaḥ* [P.1.4.31: SK. 594]

9.0. The meaning of the rule {120, 4-7}.


*1. Read vītastā. This reading is supported by MS94R2 and PM. And ŠK itself gives the form vītastā in explaining its derivation.

Translation: The point of origin for an agent of the verbal root √bhū- is [kāraka and called apādāna] as is explained earlier. For examples, “himavato gaṅgā prabhavati: the Gaṅgā river flows from the Himālaya,” and “kaśmirebhyo vītastā prabhavati: the Jhelum (Vītastā) river comes from Kashmir.” In the second example, the name vītastā is derived from the verbal root √vīṣa-U: to decrease” plus affix -Kta which means the state (bhāva). Furthermore, the prefix vi- is attached. [Totally,] it means “not to be dry” (aśosya). The form prabhavati means the same as the meaning of the passive form of upa-√labh-. It means “to come arise” (prakāśa).

Notes: KV [I, 545]: “kartuḥ” iti vartate. bhavāṇaṃ bhūḥ. bhavaty asmād iti prabhavaḥ bhūkartiḥ prabhavo yas tat kārakaṃ apādānasamjñāṃ bhavati. ... prathamata upalabhyaṁ ity arthaḥ. This rule prescribes the application of the term apādāna to the point of birth (prabhava) when the verbal root √bhū- is used. The meaning of the word prabhava is paraphrased into “prathamata upalabhyaṁ: something is perceived for the first time” (by KV) and “prathamataṁ prakāśate ’sminn iti prabhavaḥ, prathamaprakāśasasthānam ity arthaḥ: whereon something appears for the first time, namely the place of its first appearance” (given by Bālamanoramā on SK. 594 [I, 663]).

It is Haradatta who gives the explanation of the word vītastā but the reason why such an explanation is mentioned is unclear [PM, ibid.]: karteti. bhavatārthasya kārtety arthaḥ, bhuvō vā dhātoḥ. kathāṃ punar dhātor nāma kārtā syād, dhātur vai śabdāḥ, sābde ’sambhāve ’rthe kāryāṃ vijnāsyate. “tasu upaṇkṣaye” bhave Ktaḥ, “vi gatau” tātā, vīsteti, aśoṣyety arthaḥ. upalabhateḥ karmavyāpāre prabhavatiḥ, pravartata ity arthaḥ. prakāśata iti yāvat. etena janyarthābhāvāṃ pūrvenāśiddhaṃ darśayati. anekārthatvād dhātunāṃ asminn arthe vṛttiḥ.
9.1. The rejection of P.1.4.25-31 {120, 7-14}


[P.1.4.27] “vārayati,” pravṛttītim pratibadhnan nivartayati.

[P.1.4.28] “niliyate,” nilayanena nivartata ity arthāḥ.

[P.1.4.29] “adhīte,” upādhyaśīn niḥsarantaṁ sādam grhaṇāti ity arthāḥ.


[P.1.4.31] “prabhavati” ity atra bhavanapūrvakaṁ niḥsaraṇaṁ arthāḥ.

*1. Tatvabodhini adds tatrettham upapattisambhavah. *2. Tatvabodhini adds nirgacchatity arthāḥ and omits the sentence beginning from yathā.

Translation: Pāṇini sūtras 1.4.25-31 are rejected in the MBh. [According to Patañjali, the scopes covered by 25-31 are all managed by P.1.4.24 alone. Examples of respective rules are interpreted as follows].

On “corebhyo bibheti” [which is covered by P.1.4.25]. It means that he escapes (nivartate) because of the fear. [The thieves are the point of separation. Thus, it is termed as apādāna and takes the ablative case ending]. On the usages like “trāyate.” It means that someone makes himself to escape from the thieves by protection. [Here, he perceives a certain relation with the thieves in his mind and, then, he makes himself turn away from them. Thus, the thieves serve as the point of separation.]

On “parājāyate” [by 26]. It means that someone turns away by his delibity.

On “vārayati [yavebhyaḥ gām]: he prevents [a cow] back from [eating] barley” [by 27]. It means that he stops the activity [of the cow] after binding it with [something].

On “niliyate [upādhyaśīt]: he conceals [himself from his teacher]” [by 28]. It means that he escapes from the teacher by hiding.

On “adhīte [upādhyaśīt]: he learns [from his teacher]” [by 29]. It means that he gets word which is going forth from the teacher.
On “brāhmaṇaḥ prapañca jāyate: a dialogue comes from brahmin” [by 30]. It means that it [= prapañca] moves away from that [= brahmin]. [This understanding] is just as “vrkṣāt phalam: a fruit moves away from tree.” [38] [Namely, a speech is moving from brahmin.] In the same manner, the separation should be realized through the established fact in this world. [39]

On “prabhavati [gaṅgā himavataḥ]” [by 31]. It means that [the Gaṅgā river,] appearing for the first time, flows.

Notes: This and the following passages, 9.1-3, are quoted, although with minor changes, in the Tattvabodhini which says in the end of its quotation that etac ca Śabdakaustubhe spaśtam [I, 663]. Here is dealt with the unnecessity of P.1.4.25-31, apparently put forward by Patañjali. His interpretation of the word apāya in P.1.4.24 is, as we have seen, [40] that the word apāya does not only mean mere separation that something moves from one point to another, i.e., a sort of physical separation but also a non-participation or an abandonment which is not seen, i.e., a sort of mental separation. The meanings prescribed in 25-31 which are the condition for introducing the term apādana such as the frightening, the intolerance, the prevention, etc. are all included in the notion of mental separation. [41] Depending on this extended interpretation, he invalidates the effect of 25-31 [MBh. ad P.1.4.24, I, 327, 2-7: tat tariṣṭaṁ vaktavyam. na vaktavyam].

As for the rejection of P.1.4.25-31 proposed by Patañjali, although KV says nothing, Jinendrabuddhi and Haradatta agree with him

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38 This refers to Kātyāyaṇa’s explanation but it is found in his commentary on P.1.4.29 [II, 2541]: yathā phaṭām vrkṣād apakṛntam na punar vrkṣe tad bhavati, evaṁ sabde ‘pi prasanga ity arṭhaḥ (Just as a fruit moved away from a tree does never grow on that tree, the speech would be so [if it moves away from the teacher]).

39 Taking “lokaprasiddhi” as its proof is found in the Pradīpa on P.1.4.30 [II, 2551]. See Notes on 8.0.

40 See Kudo[1997] 2.5 p.165; 2.8.1 p.178.

41 MBh. ad P.1.4.25 [I, 327, 24-26]: iha tāvad vrkṣeṇa dasyūbhya bibhetīti ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakāṁ bhavati sa paśyati yadi māṁ vrkāṁ paśyanti dhrūvaḥ me mṛtyur iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartate; ad 26 [I, 328, 5-7]: ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakāṁ bhavati sa paśyati dūkham adhyayaṇam dūrdharam ca guravā ca durpacārā iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartate; ad 27 [ibid., 21-23]: paśyaty ayaṁ yadamā gāvas tatra gacchanti dhrūvaṁ sasyaviṁśah sasyaviṁśāh ‘dharmaḥ caiva rājabhayaṁ ca. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartayaḥ; ad 28 [I, 329, 2-3]: paśyaty ayaṁ yadi māṁ upādhyāyaḥ paśyati dhrūvaṁ presaṁṇam upālayam veti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartayaḥ; ad 29 [ibid., 20-21]: apakṛmati tasmāt tad adhyayaṇam. yady apakṛmatīt kīṁ nātyantāyāpakṛmati. samtatavat; ad 30 [330, 1-2]: apakṛmati tāṁ tebhyah. yady apakṛmati kīṁ nātyantāyāpakṛmati. samtatavat.
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(Nyāsa, for instance, says: evam tarhi pūrvasyāyam prapañcaḥ [on P.1.4.25, I, 539]).

9.2. Justification of P.1.4.25-31 [120, 15-19]

Text: atredam vaktavyam,ṃ nivṛttinihsaraṇādiś-dhātvantarārtha-
vīśiṣṭe svārthe vṛttim āśṛtya yathākathaścid uktraprayogānām
samarthane 'pi mukyārthapuraskāreṇa šaṣṭhīprayogo durvārah.
“naṭasya śṛṇoti” itivat. na hy upādhyāyanaṭayoḥ kriyānukula-
vyāpārāṃśe viśeṣo vaktum śakyah. anabhidhānabrahmāstram
āśṛtya pratvākhyānan tu nātvamanorānam.


Translation: It should be stated. Even though depending on [the interpretation that] its own meaning [of the verbal root mentioned in the rule] is qualified by [the meaning of] another verbal root such as “to escape (nivṛtti)” or “to go forth (niḥsaraṇa),” etc. these usages are justified in somehow or other [by P.1.4.24 alone], the use of the genitive case is irrepressible as is in case of “naṭasya śṛṇoti” because the primary meaning [which is expressed by the word(s) used in the sentence] is [always] the first consideration. In fact we cannot make a difference between the case of upādhyāya and that of naṭa when both consist of the part of the activity conducive to the whole action. Furthermore, it is not exceedingly pleasant to make a denial [of 25-31] by [using the meaning which is] not expressed as the last-weapon such as Brahma’s missile.

Notes: In the previous passage, Bhaṭṭojo makes mention of Patañjali’s rejection of 25-31 but the interpretation of the word apāya as the denotative of both physical and mental separation and the implantation of additional meaning to the contextual verbal roots are not accepted by Bhaṭṭojo. Patañjali’s rejection is based on the extended interpretation of the word apāya and the re-explanation of the usages in accordance with that interpretation, viz., to take the saṃjñins prescribed in 25-31 in the scope of the word dhruva. In case of rule 25, for example, someone is afraid of (bhaya) the wolves or something else and he/she imagines as follows: “If the wolves find me, my destiny is decisive.” Here his/her relation to the wolves is supposed even in his/her mind and then that person decides to escape from them (nivṛtti). In this way, the separation, although it is not perceived optically, is taken place and the point of departing (dhruva) is verified. Therefore, we can manage this case by 24 alone, which is to be managed by 25.
However, this process how to operate 24 in lieu of 25-31 needs additional meanings such as nivṛtti or niśarana, etc. to fulfill the requirement of 24. Unless we resort to these additional or secondary meanings we cannot cover the scopes of 25-31. For Bhaṭṭośi Dikṣita, such a process is cumbersome and seems to be not what was originally intended by Pāñini. Thus, he rejects Patañjali.

9.3. Conclusion [120, 19-24]

Text: evaṁ ca “jugpsāvirāma[-pramādārthānām upasaṅkhyaṁ]”

tathā ca sūtrāvṛttikamatam eveha prabalam iti yāvad bādham sādhu.*2 tathā dhruvaṁ bhayaḥetūr asodha ityādisamjñinirdeso ‘pi sārthakaḥ. paratvāt tattatsamjñāprāptāv api śesatvavivakṣāyām “na māsānām aśṇīyād” ityādāv iva śaṣṭhyā īṣṭatāyā tatrāpādānasamjñāyā vāraṇiyatvād ity avadheyam.*3

*1. Tattvabodhini omits the word avaśya. *2. Tattvabodhini omits iti yāvad bādham sādhu *3. Tattvabodhini gives iti Śabdakaustubhe spaṭṭam.

Translation: In this way, Vts on P.1.4.24 are inevitably to be made. Since the opinions of Pāñini and Kātyāyana are here, the authority [of the grammar, that is, stronger than that of Patañjali], the rejection [of Patañjali’s proposal] is right. Thus, the entries of samjñin-s, i.e., dhruva, bhayaḥetu, or asodha, etc., becomes meaningful. Even though those to be designated get respective designations by the paratva-principle, if śeṣa is desired as in case of “na māśānām aśṇīyāt: do not eat the beans,” the genitive case would be preferred. [In this case, dhruva, etc. is required] in order to prevent the application of apādāna to [the one which is supposed to take the genitive case].

Notes: If we do not accept Patañjali’s refusal of 25-31, the word apāya stands for the separation wherein something changes its physical position from one place to another. This comprehension is doubtlessly of Pāñini himself, otherwise he would not lay down the rules 25-31 in order to cover the usages cited.43 For Bhaṭṭośi, Pāñini is the (final) authority of the Pāñinian grammar and thus, even if Patañjali speaks of

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42 Pradhāpa on P.1.4.25 [II, 250]: bhayam ākulibhāvah, trāṇam anarthapratiḥgāta iti. tatra ca nāsti mukhyo ‘pāya iti prāśnaḥ.

43 See Deshpande[1991(b)], p. 476. He says “It is obvious that Pāñini, for whatever reasons, did not believe that all of these meanings could be reduced to a common factor, and therefore formulated these eight rules for apādāna.” Also see Joshi-Roodbergen[1975], p. 75.
the unnecessity of 25-31,44 Pāṇini rules are to be authenticated. Therefore, as far as we accept the narrow interpretation (of course, in relative to that of Patañjali and it might be Pāṇini’s idea) of the word apāya, rules 25-31 and the additional prescriptions given by Kātyāyana are needed. If we follow Pāṇini’s notion of apāya on one hand and if, on the other hand, there are no rules of 25-31, these examples cited in respective rules are not covered by P.1.4.24. When the cases are not covered by 24, it leads to wrong applications of rules, for instance, introducing adhikaraṇa instead of apādaṇa (see 3.1.1), seṣa instead of apādaṇa (see 4.0 and 6.2), karman instead of apādaṇa (see 5.1) would happen.45 Therefore, in order to apply the term apādaṇa to the desired cases and prevent its application from the cases undesired, we need P.1.4.25-31 (as Pāṇini formulated).

(To be continued)

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44 As for Patañjali’s argument, Deshpande writes “It is interesting to note that while Patañjali offers this reductionist argument for the rules defining apādaṇa, he does not put forword a similar argument for other kārakas.” (Emphasis by N.K.) [1991(b), p. 477, footnote 48]
45 See Pradipta on P.1.4.25 [II, 250r]: sūtrārambhāpakṣe tu kārakāśeṣatvāt śaṣṭhyāṃ prāptāv idāṃ vacanam.
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