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A Study on Sanskrit Syntax (2):
Śabdakaustubha on P.1.4.24 [Apādāna (1)]
A STUDY ON SANSKRIT SYNTAX (2):*
ŚABDAKAUSTUBHA ON P.1.4.24 [Apādāna (1)]

Sanskrit Text and Annotated Translation

Noriyuki Kudo

Introductory Remark

A relationship between an action and a thing which is related to that action is expressed differently according to how to recognize an aspect of that action. This relationship is, when we cognize the action, realized on an ontological and epistemological scheme. The action itself is regarded as having several aspects that consist of it and something is realized as the one which is undertaking some role and supporting that aspect in the course of accomplishing the action. Pāṇini seems to use a term kāraka to represent such relationship in his grammar. The term kāraka is thus based on a sort of extra-linguistic scheme. However, since it is the term which is set forth in sentence composition, it is purely grammatical, i.e., syntactic and semantical. In verbalizing the action, some item is at first perceived as the one having a relation to that action. Depending on the relation to the action, its role is classified into one of kāraka-categories. A word denoting that item is provided a suffix which represents the notion of one kāraka. In this derivational course, we have different levels of procedure. The presumptions based on epistemological and ontological dimensions are included in this very grammatical notion of kāraka. Kiparsky and Staal [1968] is one of the attempts to extract such a different stages in Pāṇini’s derivational procedure, and recently Deshpande [1991(b)] reconsiders this kāraka system by introducing the idea of “prototype.”

The notion kāraka has six categories which are differently related to actions: apādāna, sampradāna, karana, adhikaranā, karman, and kartṛ. (All these are prescribed in the kāraka section, namely, in the rules of P.1.4.24-55). Each of these categories is operated under the condition of P.1.4.23: kārake (when it is [directly] related to the action) and unless they are not perceived to be related to the action they cannot be established.

* The first part of this study, Kudo [1996], is published in Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Sāṃbhāṣā volume 17. For the materials of the text and the principles adopted by the present author, see Kudo [1996] pp. 28-29.
P.1.4.24 (dhruvam apāye 'pādānam) introduces a designation of “apādāna: an ablation.” In this Šabdakaustubha, Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita discusses following subjects: the meaning of the word dhruva, the relation of apādāna to a verb (in this discussion a basic notion of sentence, i.e., viśeṣanavisēṣayabhāva [a relation of qualifier and qualificand] in śabdabodha or a verbal understanding, is reviewed in detail), types of apādāna and the validity of this rule.

Sanskrit Text, Translation and Notes

2. dhruvam apāye 'pādānam. [P.1.4.24: SK.586]
2.1. The meaning of the word dhruva {115,18-20}
Text: apāyo viśleṣo, vibhāgas taddhetuvopahito gativiśeṣaś ceha vivaksitas tasmin sādhye 'vadhīhutam apādānasamīṭhajñām syāt. “vrkṣāt patati.”
Translation: [An act of] “moving away” (apāya) means a disjunction (viśleṣa). Here, a separation (vibhāga) or a particular movement which is represented as its cause is intended. When it [= that movement] is to be accomplished, what is a fixed point is termed “apādāna.” For example, “vrkṣāt patati: it is falling from a tree.”
Notes: This interpretation of P.1.4.24 is based on the Kāśikāvyrtti, more precisely on the Padamanārī. KV on P.1.4.24 [1,535] says: dhruvam yad apāyayuktam apāye sādhye yad avadhīhutam tat kārakam apādānasamīṭhajñām bhavati. (When a separation has taken place, the one which is related to the separation as the fixed point serves as kāraka and is given a designation apādāna.)
PM on do. [1,535,7-10]:
apāyaḥ viśleṣaḥ, vibhāgas taddhetubhūtaś ca gataviśeṣaś 'vadhīsāpeksaḥ, tatra vibhāgasya dvīṣṭhatvāt na kevalam apayān eva tena yuktāḥ, kim karhi ? yato 'paiti so 'pī yutk evety āha -- ‘dhruvam yad apāyayuktam’ iti. kathāṃ punaḥ sapāminirdeśe 'py apāyayuktam iti pratipadyemahity atrāha -- ‘apāye sādhya’ iti.
Tr.: The act of moving away [means] a disjunction. Such a separation or a particular movement which becomes a cause of it depends on a fixed point. In this case, since the separation resides in two entities, it is not proper to say that only one entity is separating. Why? The one from which something is moving is properly [called dhruva]. Thus said, “dhruvam yad apāyayuktam.” How do we realize the one which is related to the act of moving away, though it is mentioned in the locative case [such as “apāye”? Thus explained, “apāye sādhya.”
2.1.1. The formation of the word *dhruva* <first alternative> {115,20-21}

Text: “*dhruvam* ity atra “*dhru* gatisthairyayoh [1400; Dhātupātha. VI.107]” ity asmāt kuṭādeḥ pacādy aC.

Translation: The word “*dhruva*” is derived from a verbal root √*dhru-* (its meaning is both movement and stability) adding the agentive krt suffix -aC [by P.3.1.134]. [The root √*dhru-* belongs to kuṭādi class.] Thus, this √*dhru-* is within the scope of P.3.1.134 prescribing pacā-, etc.

Notes: This and the following passages deal with the formation of the word *dhruva*. Two alternatives are discussed. In the first alternative, the word *dhruva* is analyzed as a derivation from a verbal root √*dhru-*, a member of sixth class of dhiitus. The root √*dhru-* is sub-classed in the heading of kuṭādi [Gaṇapāṭha 54; Dhp. VI,107]. The krt suffix -aC is added to the stems beginning with √pac- by P.3.1.134 (nandigrahapācyadhyayo LyuNiny aCah).

\[\sqrt{\text{dhru-}} + \text{aC} > \text{dhru-} + \text{a}^\circ > \text{dhr-uv-a} \text{[P.6.4.77]}\]

Actually, the heading pacādi does not refer to the class of verbal roots but the nominal forms (pacādi is listed in Gaṇapāṭha 133 and is said as ākṛtigaṇa). Then, how we can introduce the suffix -aC after the verbal root √dhru-. SK.2896 on P.3.1.134 says [IV, p. 35]:

pacādir ākṛtiganaḥ. ‘śivāsamaristasya kare’ [SK.3489; P.4.4.143], ‘karmaṇi ghaṭo ’thaC” [SK.1836; P.5.2.35] iti sūtrayoh karoter ghaṭēs cāCprayogāt. aCprayaye pare yaNlugvidhānāc ca.

Tr.: The heading pacādi is an open list. In the sūtras such as P.4.4.143 and 5.2.35, the forms kara- and ghaṭa- are mentioned, which are derived from √*kr-* and √*ghat-* respectively with the suffix -aC. [Although those verbal roots are not included in the list of pacādi, such examples are admitted as correct. Therefore, we have to conclude that the suffix -aC can be introduced to every verbal root.] Furthermore, [in P.2.4.74,] it is prescribed that zero suffix replaces the affix -yaN (Intensive marker by P.3.1.122) before the suffix -aC.

As is clear from this statement, the suffix -aC is not explicitly prescribed to be added after √pac- but, by the analogical interpretation, the scope of this suffix is extended. This indicates that the suffix -aC is introduced after the stem of Intensive. Since the conjugation of Intensive is not listed in the pacādi, we have to conclude again that the suffix -aC is affixed after every root.

2.1.2. <Second alternative> {115,21-23}

Text: ye tu “*dhru*ʻ1 sthairye [Dhp. I.990]” iti paṭhanti. teśām igup-adhalaksāṇah kaprattyayaḥ. dhruvaṭīti dhruvaṃ sthiram. eka-rūpam iti yāvat. “*dhruvam asya śīlam*” iti yathā.

*1. Read dhruva instead of dhru (MS. 90R5), based on PM reading.
Translation: Some hold that [the word dhruva is derived from] a verbal root √dhrauA- denoting a stability. To those verbal roots such as having a penultimate vowel ["iK-upapada: having iK (=i,u,r,l) as penultimate vowel"], an agentive suffix -Ka is introduced [to denote the agent].

[The form “dhruvati” means that] something is stable. Therefore, it keeps one and the same form (ekarīpa). For example, “dhruvam asya śilam: his conduct is stable.”

Notes: Here is explained the second derivation of the word dhruva. In this opinion, the word dhruva- is derived from the verbal root √dhrauA- with kṛt suffix -Ka which is prescribed in P.3.1.135: iGupadhajiāprikirāh Kah.

√dhruva- + -Ka > dhru- +  coincidence greater than > dhru-v-a

As regards to the derivation, commentators have already discussed on it. PM on P.1.4.24 [I,535,5-7] says:

“dhruvam” iti. “dhru gatisthairyayoh” [Dhp. 1400] ity asmāt kutādeḥ pacādy aCi rūpam. ye tu “dhruva gatisthairyayoh” [Dhp. 1400 pā.] iti paṭhanti, teśām iGupadhalakṣaṇaḥ Kah pratayayah.

Tr.: On the word dhruva. Since it [=√dhru-] is included in the kutādi class [sixth class of Dhp.], a suffix -aC, prescribed to pacādi, is applied. Others, however, list the root in the form of √dhruvA-. To such verbal roots, a suffix -Ka is introduced because it has a penultimate vowel -u.

This passage is quoted by Sāyāna (or Mādhava, 14 c. CE) in his Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti on √dhru- [p. 479]:

dhru gatisthairyayoh. (dhruvati) ityādi guvatīvat. (dhruvaḥ) pacādy aC. atra Svāmyādayo1 dhruva iti vakārāntam dhātun paṭhanti. utkān ca “dhruvam apāye” ity atra Haradattena -- dhru gatisthairyayor ity asmāt pacādy aC, ye dhruva gatisthairyayor iti paṭhanti, teśām iGupadhalakṣaṇaḥ Kapratayaya iti.

Also, he says [on √dhru- (Dhp. I.990), p. 263]: dhru sthairye. dhruvaḥ -- iti bāhulakāt Kah. yadvā ‘dhruvam apāye’ iti nirdēsāt sādhuh. ayam tudādau gatyarthaḥ ca. tasmād vā aCi dhruvaḥ. sa hi kutādiḥ.

From the first alternative, the word dhruva has two meanings, the movement and the stability. It seems to imply that the notion of dhruva would contain some sort of motion. On the other hand, the second alternative gives the meaning, stability, and this seems to exclude the item having the motion from the range of dhruva.

1 Sāyāna specifies “others” as “Śvāmyādayah (Kṣīrasvāmin, etc.).” However, in the Kṣīratarangini of Kṣīrasvāmin, the root √dhruvA- is not listed (See Liebich [1930, p. 151]). In this connection, Kṣīrasvāmin says [p. 86]: dhru sthairye. dhruvati, bāhulakāt [P.3.3.1], Kah [Uṇ. II.61]: dhruvaḥ. tudādau [Dhp. VI.107] dhruvat [I.990].
Sanskrit Syntax (2): Sabdakausubha

According to Palsule [1955], some Dhātupāṭhas give different list of √dhruv-

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(As for the abbreviations of Dhātupāṭhas, see Palsule [1955]).

2.2. Nature of the word dhruva {115,23-29}

Text: tathā cāpye sādhya yad ekarūpam ity ukte prakṛtadhaṭṭapattagyanāvishatva sati tadapayogitā labhyate. tac*1 cārthādavadhibhūtam eva paryavasyatī. tena “dhāvato śvāt patati” ityādau kriyāyā*2 viśiṣṭasyāpy asvasya prakṛta*3dhāṭpattakriyāṃ praty avadhitavām na virudhyate. tathā “parasparasmān meśāv apasaratāḥ” ity atra sṛdhātum gatidvasyāpy apādānād ekameṣaṇiṣṭhāḥ gatim praty aparasyāpādānātvam sidhyati.


Translation: Accordingly, when [dhruva] is said as “the one which remains the same where the moving is to be done,” it [= dhruva] is realized as the one which helps the movement if it itself is not involved in that movement denoted by the contextual verbal root. And on the basis of this meaning it leads to [the notion of] “the one which is a limit (avadhibhūta).” Therefore, in case of “dhāvato śvāt patati: he is falling from a running horse,” even though a horse is qualified by one action [i.e., running], it does not make a contradiction to become a limiting point in relation to the other action [= the act of falling] obtained by the contextual verbal root √pat-. Similarly, in case of “parasparasmān meśāv apasaratāḥ: two rams back away from each other,” even though two movements are obtained by root √sr-, in regard to the movement existing in one ram, the other [ram] functions as apādānā.

Notes: The word dhruva means “a fixed point” or “something stable” (as is stated in 2.1.2). If this literal interpretation alone is admissible, a thing which itself is moving is not eligible to become dhruva. In the example quoted in this passage, ‘aśva’ would not be considered as the fixed point because it is running. This kind of objection is already discussed in Vt II on P.1.4.24 [I,327,9]: gatiyuktesv apādānasamjñā nopapadyate ‘dhruvatvāt (It is not justified to give a designation apādāna to the things related to the action, because they are not fixed point). This Vt is, however, immediately refuted by Vt III: na vādhrauvyasyāvivaksitavitāt (Or, it is not the case because adhrauvyā [instability] is not intended here).

2 Cf. Tattvobodhinī on SK No.586 [I, p. 657]: iha dhāvanakriyāvājisasyāpy asvasya prakṛta-dhāṭpattakriyāṃ praty avadhitavām na virudhyate.

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The point of this discussion is how to interpret the *dhruva*. Does this allow us to make an extension of the meaning? The stability referred to in this is not an absolute notion. Even though a horse is running, this act of running is not of the agent who is falling. In the verbal understanding, the main denotation is the act of falling and with regard to this falling the *apādāna* is decided because the horse is not involved in the act of falling. The notion of the *dhruva* is thus relative. Kaiyāta clearly says about this relativeness of the notion of *dhruva* [on P.1.4.24, II,249] that “*na tv anavacchinnam. tato 'pāye yad anā- viśtam tad apāye dhruvam ucyate:* But it is not a restricted meaning. Thus, something which does not enter into [the act of] moving away, that is called *dhruva*.”

2.2.2. Proof by Bhārtrhari {115,29-116,3}

Text: uktañ ca harinā prakīrṇakānde

\[\text{apiy e yad udāsīnaṃ calam vā yadi vācalam.} \]
\[\text{dhruvam evātadāveśāt tadaapādānām ucyate.} \]
\[\text{patato dhruva evāśvo yasmaād aśvāt pataty asau.} \]
\[\text{tasyāpy aśvasya patane kudādir dhruvam isyate.} \]

\[\text{[116]mesāntarākriyāpeksam avadhītvam prthak prthak. [VP. III,7.141]} \]

\[\text{mesayoḥ svakriyāpeksam kartṛtvān ca prthak prthak. iti.} \]
\[\text{atadāveśād ity apāyānaṅveśād ity arthaḥ.} \]

Translation: Thus said by Bhārtrhari in his *Prakīrṇakānda* [VP III,7,141]:

“When the moving away has taken place, the one which is indifferent to the movement or does not move is the fixed point because of not being involved in it [= moving away]. It is called *apādāna*. In case where someone is falling from a horse which is itself falling from the fixed point, the wall, etc. is desired as the fixed point with regard to the falling of that horse. [In case where two rams are separating,] the limiting point [of the act of separating of one ram] is decided with reference to the act of the other ram, and in each case the agency is decided with regard to each rams’ own action.”

Here, “*atadāveśār*” [in c *pāda* of first *kārikā*] means “because it does not enter into the act of moving away.”

Notes: First two *kārikās* are not found in the present *Vākyapadiya*. Both are quoted by Haradatta in *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,536,5-6; 8-9]. The *pāda* a-c of the former *kārikā* is quoted by Nāgėśa, attributing this to

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3 Cf. *Uddyota* on P.1.4.24 [II,249]: *apāye yad anāvīṣast iti. apāye sati prakṛtadāṅgāḥpātayā kriyayā yad anāvīṣast ity arthaḥ. evam ca prakṛtadāṅgāḥpātayānāvīṣast eva dhruvatvam iti tātparyam.* Also *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,535,12] says: *īha tad apāyena viśeṣyeta -- apāye yad dhruvam iti, na tu sārvarātikām.* (Here, [To express the notion that] it is specified by the separation, it is said “*apāye yad dhruvam.*” However, it does not mean the absolute [stability].)
Bhartrhari, in his *Uddyota* on P.1.4.24 (II, 249): *harir apy āha ...*). Cf. See the remarks by Abhyankar and Limaye in their edition of *VP*, the Appendix IV, no. 2 (pp. 358-9) and no. 14 (pp. 363-4).

*VP* III.7.140 says: *ubhāv apy adhruvau meśau yady apy ubhaya-karmaje. vibhāge pravibhakte tu kriye tatra vivākte (Even though two rams are not stable in the act [of separating] performed by both, two actions are intended to be different [from the other]).

2.2.3. In sum {116,4-8}
Text: *gatir vinī tv avadhina nāpāya iti kathyate*\(^1\) iti *VP.*III,7.143ab

\(\text{tatraivokter avadhinirapekṣasasya calanasyāpāyatvābhāvād iti bhāvāḥ. “parvatāt patato ’śvāt patati” ity atra tu parvatāvadhikapatanāśrayo yo ’śvas tad avadhikām devadattāśrayaṁ patanam arthaḥ.}\)

\(^1\) In the Iyer’s edition of *VP*, gamyate instead of kathyate.

Translation: “It is said that there cannot be any act of moving away without the limiting point.”

Here it is implied that the motion which is not related to the fixed point is not [called] “moving away.” However, in case of “parvatāt patato ’śvāt patati: he is falling from a horse which is falling from the mountain,” the verbal understanding is the act of falling down in which Devadatta is its substratum and has the fixed point, i.e., the horse which is the substratum of the act of falling down having the mountain as its fixed point.

Notes: When mere separation is intended, that is to say, a separation of one thing into two or more is expressed, if those two or more have no movement, we cannot speak of the separation (*apāya*). For example, cutting a tree into pieces. In the course of cutting, we realize that the separation in the form of the tree divided into pieces has happened. Since the pieces are not moving (*acala*), we cannot say that “pieces are separating from the tree.” We cannot admit the tree as the fixed point.

When the movement is witnessed and it is a sort of separation from a certain point, this is called *apāya*. In this action, there are both the agent and the fixed point. If the horse is falling down from the mountain and a person is falling down from that horse, both person and horse are in motion. In this case, two movements are involved, i.e., horse’s and person’s falling down. Here, two actions are as realized to be distinct. Each act has its own agent and fixed point. That is, horse is the agent of its falling and has the mountain as the fixed point. The person is the agent of his movement and has the fixed point, horse. Therefore, even though two movements are involved, there is no confusion in usage. We have such usages quoted in this passage and admit them as correct.
2.3. Relation of apādāna to kriyā (116,8-10)

Text: pañcamī tv avadhau śaktā. tatrābhedena saṃsargena prayārtho viśeṣaṇam. prayāyārthas tu kriyāyāṃ viśeṣaṇam. kārā-kānāṃ kriyayaiva sambandhāt. anyathāśādhuṭvāt. kriyānvyaye saty eva hi kārakasaṃjñā, tatpūrvikā viśeṣasamjñās ca sthitoḥ.

Translation: The fifth case ending (pañcamī) denotes the fixed point. In that case, the meaning of the nominal stem is a qualifier [to case ending] through the relation of identity (abheda). And the meaning of the suffix serves as the qualifier to the action because kāraka is the one which is related to the action. Otherwise any expression would be wrong. Thus, when something is related to the action, it is called kāraka. And as it being kāraka, a particular designation is applied to it.

Notes: This passage refers to the maxim “prakṛtipratyayārthayoḥ prayāyārthah prādhānyah: among the meanings of the nominal stem and the suffix the meaning of the suffix is predominant.” This is based on Patañjali, MBh ad P.3.1.67 [II, 58,11-12]: prakṛtipratyayau prayāyārtham saha brūta iti (the nominal stem and the suffix are conveying the meaning of the suffix conjointly).

According to the grammarians, the nominal stem is related to the suffix through the relation of identity (abheda) because the substratum denoted by the elements are identical. In the example “वṛक्षात् (पर्णम) पतति,” the nominal stem वṛक्षा expresses the meaning “tree” and suffix -नास expresses the meaning “the starting-point.” Tree is the substratum of this starting-point-ness, which is denoted by the suffix. Therefore, both are connected by the relation of identity. The kāraka, apādāna in this case, is related to the verb. The suffix added after the nominal stem expresses the starting-point and this meaning together with the meaning of the nominal stem delimits the meaning of the verbal root. This relation is not of identity but of non-identity (bheda), simply because their substrata are different.

2.3.1. Relations between two words in sentence (116,11-18)

Text: ata evāhuh - [Tantravārttika on Jaiminiya Sūtra 2.2.9.23]

nāmno dvīdaiva sambandhah sarvāvayēsv aṣavasthitah.
śāmānādhikaraṇyena śaṣṭhyā vāpi kvacīd bhavet.
“śāmānādhikaraṇyena” iti “niḍo ghaṭah” ityādy abhiprayām.
“niḍam ghaṭam ānaya” ityādāv apy antaraṅgakriyānvayā-
nantaram ekakriyāvāṣikṛtāṃ pārśnikyabodhābhiprayāṇa ca.
“śaṣṭhyā” ity akārakavibhakter upalakṣanaṁ, “haraye namah” iti yathā. “kvacid” iti akārakavibhakter api, “nāṭasya śrṇoti” ityādau kriyānvayadarśanād iti bhāvah.

Translation: It is said: “It is established that the relation of two nominals in every sentence is of two kinds. Namely, through the appositional relation and through [the meaning of] the sixth case ending in certain cases.”
The appositional relation (saṃānādhikaranāya) [is the relation realized in the phrase], for example, “nilo ghatam: a blue pot.” And in case of “nilam ghatam anaya: bring the pot which is blue,” immediately after the relation to the action is understood, the integrated cognition of which is subdued to one action is realized. The word “saṃthya” is an indication of the case endings which represent the non-kāraka relation. For example, “haraye namah: salute to Hari.”

The word “kvacit” means the case wherein the case endings do not represent the kāraka relation. By this, it is implied that nāta in case of “nātasya śrṇoti,” [although it does not represent any kāraka relation,] does relate to the action.

Notes: The verse quoted here is taken from Tantravārttika of Kumārila on JS. 2.2.9.23 [III,97]. In ṇāda text runs as “vā pratipādyate.” The context is how the relation between the two words in the sentence “vājibhyo vājīnām” is established without the verb.

nāmām dvidhaiva sambhandhā sarvavākyeṣv avasthitāḥ.
   saṃānādhikaranāyena saṃthya vā pratipādyate.
na cātra saṃānādhikaranāyam saṃthim vā paśyāmāḥ. na ca vājibhyāḥ iti kārakavibhaktāḥ kriyāpadād anyena sambadhyate.
   na ceha tadupāttam. tatrādhyāhārakālpanād eko viprakarṣāḥ.
   tripadasambhandhāgauravād aparāḥ.”

Tr.: It is established that the relation of two nominals in every sentence is of two kinds. [It is expressed either through the appositional relation or through [the meaning of] the sixth case ending.

Here, we have neither the appositional relation nor [the relation expressed by] the genitive case. [The case ending of] the word vājibhyah is not expressive of kāraka and it is not related to any word other than the verb. Here, there is nothing which represents it [i.e., the verb]. This is a sort of remoteness because some supplementary [word] (adhyāhāra)4 is supposed. The other point is that it is cumbersome to establish the relation among three words [vājibhyah, vājīnām, and dadyāt].

The word antarangakriyānāvaya referred to in this passage means a relation that an action, a meaning denoted by a verbal form, is a core of sentence meaning and others such as the meanings of nominal forms are joined to the action. In the example quoted in this passage, “nilāṁ ghaṭam ānaya,” we have two (preliminary) relations, i.e., between the word nilam and ānaya, and between the word ghaṭam and ānaya. Both have same relatum, i.e., ānaya, and through this word two words nilam and ghaṭam are combined. Consequently, we get a knowledge of “bring a blue pot.” This interpretation of a sentence is apparently

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4 See Notes on 2.5.
They claim that a meaning of verbal suffix is main qualificand of verbal understanding if we say in the later terminology. The verbal suffix denotes ‘bhāvanā: productivity.’ Other meanings denoted by the nominal words in the sentence are integrated to the meaning of verbal suffix. This position is already maintained by old Mīmāṃsākās. Kumārila says in his *Tantravārttika* on JS 1.2.4.32 [II,52]: *kārakānām kriyāparihārenānyonyasambandhābhāvāt. tena vākyam api kriyayaiva sambadhniyāt* (It is because the *kāraka* have no mutual relation except [the relation to] the action. Thus, a sentence is tied to the action).  

There are two relationships between two nominal words. One is *sāmānādhikaranya* (an appositional relation) or *abheda* (identity) and the other is *bheda* (difference or non-identity). The relation of identity is, roughly speaking, expressed by the words having the same case ending and that of non-identity is by the genitive case.

The example “*haraye namāḥ: salute to Hari*” is justified by P.2.3.16 (namahsvastsvāhasvādhākamvasadyogāc ca). As for the sentence “*nātasya śṛṇoti,*“ see Kudo [1996], pp. 49-50.

2.3.2. The relation of non-identity <Against Naiyāyikas> {116,18-21}

Text: etena “bhūtale ghaṭo na” ity atra “bhūtalādheyatvābhāvo” ghaṭe, “bhūtalādheyatvām” vā ghaṭabhāve višeṣānāṃ iti dvedhā vyācaksāṇā Naiyāyikāḥ parāstāḥ, ubhayathāpi kriyānanvaye kārakavibhaktier asādhūtvāt, arthābhāve ‘vyayiḥbhāvāpatteś ca. tasya nityasamāsātvāt.

Translation: In this way, in regard to “bhūtale ghaṭo na” Naiyāyikas explain its *sābdabodha* in two ways, namely, that the absence of the superstratumness on the ground is a qualifier to the pot [that is to say, pot has an absence of the superstratumness on the ground], or that the superstratumness on the ground is qualifier to the absence of the pot [the ground has the absence of the pot]. Their position is not acceptable because in both the *kārakavibhakti* is wrongly used in spite of non-connection to the action. And if there is no meaning [of *kāraka* which is to be related to the action], there must be *avyayībhāva* since it is permanent compound which is not affected by the relation to the action.

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5 To this interpretation, Navyanaiyāyikas, for example Gadādhara, criticize [*Vyūpatīvāda*, p. 31]: *atha nilam ghaṭam ānayetvādau nilāder ghaṭādāv anvayopagame nilādipadottaravibhaktya-arthakarmavādeḥ kutrānva ya iti cen na kutrāpi. vibhātikādām sādhūtvārtham eva pravyupate* (Then, even if we admit that a word *nilam* is related to a word *ghaṭa*, which is an object-ness expressed by case ending added after the word *nila* related to? [Answer]: It is related to nothing. The case ending [attached to the word *nila*] is only used for the grammatical correct-ness).

6 As for the verbal understanding of the Mīmāṃsākās’, see Rao [1969], pp. 24-34, especially p. 28.

7 This is discussed by Bhide [1980], p. 138.
Notes: Next discussion is concerned with the verbal cognition based on the relation of non-identity, especially on how the negative particle naN is construed in the sentence composition. Here is referred to the Naiyāyikas. Bhattoji refutes them by saying that in the sentence “bhūtale na ghaṭāḥ” we have no verbal form, so the negative particle is not construed with either bhūtale or ghaṭāḥ. As is stated in this passage, if we want to construe the negative particle with ghaṭa, these two words do not stand separately in the sentence but form a compound. According to P.2.1.6 (avyayaṃ vibhakti-samipa-samṛddhi-vyṛddhi-arthābhāvātyaya-asamprati-śabda-prādurbhāva-paścād-yathānupūrvyā-yaugapadya-sāḍṛṣya-sampattisākalyāntavacaneṣu), an avyayībhāvā compound is formed from avyaya and a nominal stem if it is used to connotate an absence of the object (arthābhāva). This is an obligatory compound. Thus, avyayībhāvā which connotes the absence of a pot is ‘nirghaṭam,’ derived from the underlying sentence “abhāvo ghaṭasya.” Therefore, since the negative particle cannot relate exclusively to the meaning of one word in the sentence, the above discussion itself is impossible.

The proposition “bhūtale ghaṭo na” referred in this ŚK is oft-quoted statement in the Navya-Nyāya literature to illustrate the relation of qualifier-qualificand (viṣēṣanaviṣēṣyabhāva). For the Naiyāyikas the absence (abhāva) is admitted as a real entity. It is to be understood as “absence of something” and at the same time recognized “on/in something.” This relation is also called ādhārādheyabhāva wherein the absence of pot is ādheya (superstratum) and a piece of the ground is ādhāra (substratum). Something of which the absence is known is called pratiyogin and something wherein the absence exists is amuyogin. In the case of the above statement a piece of the ground is amuyogin and the absence of the pot is pratiyogin.

Here we realize a certain kind of relation in the form that one restricts the other between the absence of the pot and the piece of the ground. Wada [1990] classifies the cases of this relation, viṣēṣanaviṣēṣyabhāva, into two, viz., (1) direct and (2) indirect, and further gives sub-classes as follows [pp. 55-56]:

(1) direct: viṣēṣanā is (a) the superstratum of viṣēṣya
(b) the substratum of viṣēṣya
(c) neither the superstratum nor the substratum of viṣēṣya.

When the absence of the pot (ghaṭābhāva) distinguishes the piece of the ground (bhūtala) from the other piece of it, ghaṭābhāva is viṣēṣanā and bhūtala is viṣēṣya. In this case, the knowledge from that statement is “The piece of the ground has the absence of the pot.” This is the case of (1-a). Contrary, when the ground distinguishes the absence of the pot from the absence of something other than the pot, bhūtala is viṣēṣanā and ghaṭābhāva is viṣēṣya, and the knowledge is “There is no
pot on the ground” or “The absence of the pot is on the ground.” This is the case of (1-b).

However, we have another interpretation, i.e., “The pot has the absence of the occurrence on the ground.” This third interpretation is treated in this SK passage. The relation of qualifier-qualificand is considered between two relata but as regards these two we have different interpretations about two relata as: (i) the pot and the absence of the occurrence on the ground or (ii) the absence of the pot and the occurrence on the ground. Such consideration is found in Nañvāda of Raghunātha Śiromāni (1510 CE) [in the edition of the Tattvacintāmaṇi, part IV (śabdakhaṇḍa), vol.2, pp. 1039-1042].

yatra cādāhārādheyyabāhāvo na samsargamāryādayā labhayā tatrānuyogipade saptamyaṃpeksā yathā bhūtale ghāto na ghāta ity atra tātparyyavasaśāt kadācid bhūtalādau ghāṭabhāvāḥ kadācid dhaṭādau bhūtalavṛttitvābhāvāḥ pratiyate, ata eva prthivyāṁ gandho na jale ityādau pratīter ekārāṇyaḥpātānābhahāvāḥ.8

Tr.: Where a superstratum-substratum relation cannot be otherwise obtained as the [intended] ‘relational seem’ (samsargamāryādā), the locative case ending becomes necessary in the word expressing the subjunct (anuyogin), e.g., “There is a pot on the ground” and “There is no pot on the ground.” Here, depending on the intention of the speaker, one (the hearer) may understand an absence of pot [to occur] on the ground or an absence of occurrence-on-the-ground [to occur] in the pot. It is because of this [second alternative] that the cognition “There is smell in earth and not in water” is felt to have only one qualificand [viṣeṣya, i.e., smell and two qualifier, viz., occurrence-in-earth and absence-of-occurrence-in water]. (Tr. by Matilal [1968], p.152.)

Raghunātha thinks that the second interpretation [= (ii)] is preferable (see Matilal, op.cit., p.153). On this passage, Gadādhara (1700 CE) gives following commentary [in op.cit, p. 1042]:

tathā ca bhūtale ghāṭa ity ato ghaṭe bhūtalavṛttitvisya viṣeṣanatayā bodhanāt, bhūtale na ghāṭa ity ato ‘pi ghaṭe bhūtalavṛttitvābhāva eva viṣeṣanatayā pratiyate, na tu ghāṭa-bhāve bhūtalavṛttitvam. ekāārāṇyaḥpātaṃ. ekākāravākyasya dvividhabodha-
janakatopagame naNyade saaptamyaṃabhūtalādisamabhāvi- 
hārajnānasya dvividhakāranaatvakalpanāpatteḥ.

8 Parallel passage is found in VSM of Nāgēśa [nipātārthanirṇaya, p. 48]: etena - ‘bhūtale na gohaḥ’ ityādau tātparyyavasaśāt bhūtalādau ghāṭādyabhāvāḥ, kadācid ca ghāṭādau bhūtalavṛttitvābhāvāḥ pratiyate - ity āpātastam, atyantabhāvārthakaṇāṇaḥ pratiyogibhūtaśvya-
nyayitvaniyamāt, kāraṇāṃ kriyaṅyayitvaniyamāc ca. kiṃcaitam avayībhāvasya nityasamāvatvā vākyasyaiva durlabhāvatvāpatteḥ, na caivaṃ prthivyām gandhāha, na jale ityādau pratīter ekārāṇyaḥpātānābhahavo na syāt, iti vācyam. iṣṭāpatteḥ, tathā-
nubhavasyavābhāvāḥ.
Tr.: As in case of “bhūtale gāthah” we realize the relation of which the occurrence on the ground is viśeṣaṇa for the pot, so in case of its negative statement “bhūtale na ghaṭah” we know that the absence of the occurrence on the ground is a qualifier to the pot, [namely “The pot has the absence of the occurrence on the ground”]. However, it [should] not be [considered that] the occurrence on the ground is a qualifier to the absence of the pot because, for one and the same sentence, twofold cause-ness of the knowledge which is produced from the word ending in a locative case such as bhūtale, etc. would be [wrongly] assumed to the negative particle naN which has the producer-ness of twofold cognition.

2.4. Correctness / incorrectness of the cognition {116,21-26}
Text: nanv asmad ukto ‘pi bodho ’smaddarśanavypatpannānām anubhavasākṣika iti cet?

satyaṁ, na hi vayaṁ bodha eva nodetiiti brūmaḥ. sarve sarvārthabodhanasamarthe ity abhyupagamati, kintu tasmān arteḥ ’sādhatām. tathā ca “siddhe śabdārthasambandhe” iti vārttikāṁ vyācakṣānā Bhāṣyakārā āhuḥ -- “samāṇāyām arthā-vagatau sādhubhiṣ ca sādhubhiṣ ca gamyāgamyेतiva niyamaḥ kriyate” iti.

Translation: [Objection]: The cognition we claimed is also observed in the experience of the understanding of our philosophy.

[Reply:] [If Naiyāyikas say as such,] it is true. We do not say that the cognition does not arise in that case because it is accepted that every [word] is capable of conveying its meaning. However, even if such a meaning is [obtained], incorrectness [of the usage] is inevitable. Thus, in the course of explaining Vārttika “siddhe śabdārthasambandhe,” Bhāṣyakāra said that even though the meaning is understood equally both from the correct word and from the wrong word, a restriction like meaningful (gamyā) or non-meaningful (agamyā) is still effective.

Notes: Every word has its meaning and from this meaning we come to have a knowledge, but the correctness of the knowledge is not determined by mere acquisition of the meaning. Every school has its own epistemological scheme. The correct cognition for one school is not so for other schools. From the grammarians’ point of view, the analysis of sentence into words, again into the meaningful elements, the relation of word-meaning, the faculty of the word, and the epistemological and ontological considerations based on aforesaid analysis held by other schools are not acceptable because they have their own criteria. This passage simply clarifies their standpoint.

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The statement “sarve sarvārthabodhanasamarthāḥ”\(^9\) is exhibited differently. In the MBh, it is said [MBh ad P.1.1.20, I,75,13-14; ad 7.1.27,III,251,12-13]:

\[
\text{sarve sarvapadađēso dākṣiputrasya pānīneḥ / ekadesāvikāre hi nityatvam nopapadyate ([This is an opinion] of Pāṇini, the son of Dākṣi, that all are the substitutes (ādeśa) of the rest, because the permanency of them would be not damaged even if there are changes [of the words]).;}
\]

or [ad P.5.1.119, II,367,26-27],

\[
yadvā sarve śabdāḥ svenārthena bhavati sa teśāṁ artha iti tadbhidhāne vā tvataLau bhavata it vaktavāman (Or rather, every word has its meaning. When it is said that it is their meaning, the suffix -tva or -taL are possible. Thus to be stated).
\]

Also PM on P.1.1.1 [I, p. 60] says “ataḥ sarve śabdāṁ samjñārūpeṇa sarvāṁ arthāṇ pratipādayitum samarthaḥ (Therefore, every word has a capacity to express own meaning in the form of the technical term).

In the discussion of the relation of the word and its meaning, Navya-Naiyāyikas hold that it depends on the will of God (Īśvarecchā), see the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali [p. 293]: sā cāsmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya itīśvarecchārūpā.

The phrase “siddhe śabdārthasambandhe” is first part of vārttika I\(^10\) in the paspasānhiika (I,6,16), but not of Kātyāyana. This aims at establishing a permanent relation of a word to its meaning. The quotation from MBh is taken from the bhāṣya on the second part of Vt I [I,8,20-22], stating that the grammar gives us criteria to make a distinction of correct words and incorrect words and consequently leads to the ultimate happiness:

\[
evam ihāpi samānāyāṁ arthagatau śabdena cāpaśabdena ca dharmaniyamāḥ kriyate śabdenātvartho 'bhidheyo nāpaśabdene-ti. evaṁ kriyamāṇam abhyudayakāri bhavatīti.
\]

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\(^9\) Nāgēśa sometimes quotes this statement. In PLM [pp. 62,63] it reads “sati tātparye sarve sarvārthavācakā iti bhāṣyāl laksanāyā abhāvāt, vṛttādayāvasekadevāvayakalpane gauravāt. (Even if there is an intention of speaker, a secondary function of the word is not possible on the basis of the bhāṣya, namely "sarve sarvārthavācakā: every [words] can denote the their meanings." Because it is redundant to postulate two delimiter for two imports). In this, Nāgēśa refers to Bhāṣya, probably the portions quoted in the Notes.

\(^10\) In the Kielhorn ed. this Vt I is divided into three parts, namely, “siddhe śabdārthasambandhe,” “lokato ‘rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge sāstrenā dharmaniyamāḥ,” and “yathā laukikāvaidikeśu.” However, Joshi and Roodgergen propose different division and numbering of this first vārttika. They consider the opening statement of MBh, “atah śabdānusāsanam” [I,1,1], as first v and “rakṣahomaladhasamdehāḥ prayojanam” [line 14], which is included in the bhāṣya-portion in Kielhorn ed., as second. Subsequently, v III is “siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokatāḥ,” IV is “arthaprayukte śabdaprayoge sāstrenā dharmaniyamāḥ,” and V “yathā laukikāvaidikeśu.” For the reasons why they give different readings, see Joshi and Roodgergen [1986], Introduction p. ix, Note (2) [pp. 7-8] and fn.331 [p. 90].
Tr.: Likewise, when a meaning can be obtained equally from correct words and incorrect words, a restriction for *dharma* is made that the meaning is to be made explicit only by the correct word not by incorrect word. If it is managed as such, the [words] used become a navigator to *abhyaḍaya* (welfare).

2.4.1. Proof [116,26-28]
Text: *uktan ca* - [VMM. *kārikā* 21]

*bhedābhedaśambandhopādhībhedenīyantritam.*

*sādhvatvam tadbhāve 'pi bodho neha nivāryate. iti.*

Translation: It is said: “The correctness [of the word form] depends on the distinction conditioned by the relation of difference and identity. Even if there is no [correct-ness], the [verbal] cognition is not denied [by grammarians].”

Notes: This is *kārikā* 21 of *VMM*. Its *a-b pāda* is “*bhedayabhedaśambandhopādhīhedanibandhanam*.” Nāgęśa attributes this *kārikā* to Bhartṛhari in his *VSLM* (p. 746 and p. 799), but it is not found in the present *VP*. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa comments on it [*VBh*, Dhātvarthanīṇaya, p. 65]:

*bhedya* = *viṣeṣya*, *bhedaka* = *viṣeṣanam*, *tayor yah sambandhaḥ, tasya yo bhedaḥ, tan nibhandhanam sādhvatvam ity arthatḥ. *ayam bhāvah -- yasmin viṣeṣye yādṛśaviṣeṣanānvite yādṛgāṇupūryāḥ sūtraṃvāṃkābhāṣyakāraḍyanyatamena sādhvatvam uktam, sa śabdaḥ tatra sādhuh, anyatraśādūr eva.*

Tr.: The word *bhedya* means a qualificand and the word *bhedaka* a qualifier. [The compound in *a-b pāda*] means that the correctness is a juxtaposition such as the difference of the relation between two. What is meant is: When certain qualifier is related to some qualificand, such a particular order is said to be the correct-ness of the words. It is provoked by *Pāṇini*, Kāṭyāyana and Pataṅjali. [Thus,] one word is correct in a certain case but not in another case.

On this line, it is also remembered that Bhartṛhari says [*VP. I, 133* (142)²] that the tradition of grammar has the knowledge of correctness as its subject (*sādhvatvajñānaviśayā seyam vyākarana-smṛtiḥ*).

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¹¹ For the compound *dharmaniṣṭha*, Pataṅjali discusses its formation [I,8,4-7]: [under the partial *śrūṇā* (*lokato 'rāpṛṣyaṇkta saṃḍhaprayoge sāstrenā dharmaniṣṭhā*)] *lokato 'rāpṛṣyaṇkta saṃḍhaprayoge sāstrenā dharmaniṣṭhā kriyate. kim idam dharmaniṣṭhya iti. dharmaṇīya niyamo dharmaniṣṭham. dharmaṁrtho vā niyamo dharmaniṣṭham. dharmaprāyojano vā niyamo dharmaniṣṭham.*

¹² This numbering is given in Iyer’s edition. In Rau [1977], it is numbered as 158.
2.4.2. The verbal cognition and the [in-]correct sentence {116,29-33}

Text: evaṁ ca kasmād vākyāḥ kidṛg-bodha iti praśne yo yathā 
vuyutpānṇas tasya tādṛg eveti sthitih. kidṛṣe bodhe sādhūtvām 
kutra neti param vicāravijaya iti tat-tvam. etena “ghaṭāh karmat
vam ānaya-ṇaṁ kriṣṭḥ” ityādīnāṁ svarūpāyogayetī parāstām, 
tathā vuyutpānṇasya bodhānubhavāt. anyathā vuyutpānṇasya vyu-
pattirūpāsahākārīr-virāhāt kārīyānudaye ’pi svarūpāyogayā-
nāpāyāt.

Translation: Similarly, in regard to the question that what kind of 
cognition arises from which kind of sentence, it is already 
established that one who is trained as such gets such a kind of 
knowledge. In fact, it is another subject of consideration as to 
whether the correctness exists in the knowledge or not. 
Accordingly, it is rejected that there is no compatibility of its own 
form [= sentence form] in case of the expression like “ghaṭāh karmatvam ānaya-ṇaṁ kriṣṭḥ: a pot, the object-ness, the act of 
bringing, [and] an effort.” Because it is experientially known that 
those who are trained in that way get a cognition from it. 
Otherwise, since one has no helping factor for language training 
in particular way, even if the result [= the śābdabodha] does not 
arise, it would have nothing to do with the issue of the 
compatibility of its own form.

Notes: In this passage, the correct-ness of the sentence and the validity 
of the cognition are sorted out as different issues. Even though the 
sentence is grammatically correct, not all sentences would give a valid 
knowledge. Roughly speaking, the process of acquisition of the verbal 
knowledge is firstly to hear the utterance of word-elements, i.e., 
sentence form or word form, to recollect the meanings of those 
elements and to reach the integrated meaning. This meaning obtained 
at the last stage is called śābdabodha (a verbal knowledge). However, 
it is not enough to have the meanings of the uttered elements. For the 
Naiyāyikas, there must be several factors to enable us to reach the 
“correct” knowledge or verbal cognition and it is said that there are 
four causes, i.e., yogyatā (semantic compatibility), āsatti (contiguity), 
ākāṅkṣā (syntactic expectancy) and tātparya (intention of speaker).
Naiyāyikas often quote above the string “ghaṭāh karmatvam ānaya-ṇaṁ 
kriṣṭḥ” to illustrate how four causes are necessary. For example, the 
Nyāyāsiddhāntamuktāvalī, on kārikā 84, says [pp. 348-350]:

yat padena vinā yasyānubhāvakata bhavet. ākāṅkṣā. [k.84 
a-c]
ākāṅkṣāṁ nirvakti -- yat padeneti. yena padena vinā yat 
padasyānuyānubhāvakatvaṁ tena padena saha tasyākāṅkṣety 
arthāḥ. kriyāpadam vinā kāarakapadam nān-vayabodham jana-
yatiti tena tasyākāṅkṣā, vastutas tu kriyākāarakapadānāṁ san-
nidhānam āsattyā caritārtham. parantu ghaṭakarmatābodham
prati ghaṭapadottaradvitiyārūpākānksājñānaṁ kāraṇam, tena ghaṭah karmatvam ānayanam kriṁ itiyādau na śāodbodhah.

Tr.: "That one word cannot convey a complete meaning without some word, it is called ākānksa (syntactic expectancy)."

Here the expectancy is now going to be explained, so said “yat padena." The word X has a syntactic expectancy to the word Y when X without Y cannot convey any syntactic relation [between the two]. Any nominal word [ending in certain case suffix which represents] kāraka does not produce relational knowledge without a verb. Thus it has an expectancy to [the verb]. However, truthfully speaking, the juxtaposition (sannidhāna) of the verbs and nominal words is fulfilled by the contiguity (āsatti). On the contrary, as for the cognition of a pot being an object [of some action], the knowledge of expectancy in the form that an accusative case ending follows the stem ghaṭa is a cause [of verbal cognition]. Therefore, the sequence “ghaṭah karmatvam ānayanam kṛtih” cannot produce any verbal cognition.

Here, Viśvanātha at first gives the definition of ākānksa that it is an expectancy of the one word to another. After saying so, he immediately redefines that it is required between, for instance, the stem and the case ending.\(^{13}\)

Let us examine the sentence “ghaṭam ānaya.” The relation of juxtaposition (sannidhāna) is realized because those two words (ghaṭam kārakapada and ānaya kriyāpada) are placed contiguously. In order to get the cognition “bring a pot,” it is sufficient to have this contiguity for the verbal cognition. Even if we divide one word into its elements, e.g., ghaṭam into ghaṭa- and -am, we find another contiguity between them.

\(^{13}\) Cf. Kīrāṇivali on Nyāyasiddhāntamuktaivali, k. 84 [p. 349]: nanv evam sati vyabhicārād ākānksājñānasya śādhasāmānye kāraṇatvā nupapattit ity atā āha — param tv iti. 'ghaṭam' ity atra ādheyatāsambandhaṇa ghaṭapraṇākārakarmatavīśeyaṅkaṅṭaṣṭhakarmatavat iti bodhaṁ prati, ghaṭapadottaradvitiyārūpākānksājñānāṁ = avyavahitottaratvasambandhena ampade ghaṭapadavatvav ghaṭapade va 'vyasvahitāpurvarvatvasambandhenaṁ'mpadavatvav evaṅkānksa tajjñānaṁ = smaranam kāraṇam ity arthaḥ. evam 'naya' ity atrāpi nayanaprākārakārakabhāṣyayak nayanānuśūkālakṛtimāṁ iti śāodbodhaṁ prati avyavahitottaratvasambandhena loṭpade niṁpi padavatvav niṁpade 'vyasvahitāpurvarvatvasambandhena va loṭpadavatvav ākāṅkṣa tajjñānāṁ kāraṇam iti bodhayam. tathā ca ghaṭakārakāsanayanānuśūkālakṛtimāṁ iti śāodbavyāpākam yad ghaṭanāṣṭhakarmatavīśeyakāsāḥdatavatvam nayanānuśūkālakṛtivesyakāsāḥdatavatvam ca tad avacchinnan prati ākāṅkṣājñānasya kāraṇatvena, ākāṅkṣājñānānunāyakale tu tādṛṣṭvyāpākaṁ ṛdhmavacchinnabodhaḥ nupatyaḥ vīśṣṭaśāḥdatavātmakavyāpādharmavacchinṇasyāpy anupādaḥ vyabhicārāḥ prasakteḥ ākāṅkṣājñāṇasya vyāpākadharmaḥvacinṇaḥnotpādakāṣāmagraṇirupasya vyāpādharmavacinṇam prati niyapāpurvavṛtattiva (kāraṇatāyoh) nirābhadhatvat. kintu prayajanān bhāvād vyāpādhaṛmavacchinnam prati ākāṅkṣājñāṇasya kāraṇatvam prthaktena nāṅgikriyate eveti bhāvaḥ. nanu tattvyāpākadharmavacchinṇo prati api āsattāḥ catārthāḥvatāt ākāṅkṣājñāṇasya kāraṇatvam nirārthaḥ ity āsāṅkāṁ pariharati — teneti. tattvyāpākadharmavacchinṇam prati ākāṅkṣājñāṇasya hetuvanet arthaḥ.
Following is the elements divided from the sentence “ghaṭam ānaya,” according to the Naiyāyikas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>word</th>
<th>element</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ghaṭam</td>
<td>-am</td>
<td>ānaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ghaṭa</td>
<td>karmatva</td>
<td>ānayana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, an expectancy comes from the verb ānaya in the form of “what is to be brought?” The word ghaṭam also has an expectancy to the verb because otherwise the case ending which denotes the object would not be justified. Therefore, those two have mutual expectancy. However, in the verbal understanding, when these are uttered contiguously, āsatti (contiguity) is perceived and their meanings are matched to each other (yogyatā). On the basis of āsatti and yogyatā the cognition is achieved without ākāṅksā. Does it mean that for the verbal cognition ākāṅksā is not required?

The answer is no. The expectancy is required between the elements consisting of the word. When the word ghaṭam is uttered, there is āsatti between the stem ghaṭa- and the case ending -am. We can indubitably say that there is āsatti between -am and ghaṭa- even in this order. By the reverse order, however, no cognition arises. That is why we need ākāṅksā between the elements. The order, first ghaṭa- comes and next -am, is desired and only this combination of the elements produces the knowledge such as “a pot being the object.” Therefore, ākāṅksā is the syntactic expectancy not only between the words in the sentence but also between the elements of one word.

When the meanings of the elements are phrased in the sentence in the form of independent words, for example, in “ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛtih,” it is possible to say that there are āsatti and yogyatā between the meanings. But this string does not have any syntactic expectancy and thus it does not produce the cognition. In this way, the syntactic expectancy between the elements consisting of the word is required in addition to āsatti and yogyatā.

Generally, the syntactic expectancy is of two types - utthitākāṅksā (an expectancy arisen [naturally]) and utthāpyākāṅksā (an expectancy to be arisen).\(^{14}\) VSLM says [I, p. 505]:

"utthāpakatāviṣayatā nyatārasambandhenaḥ bhayasyasambandhena vā jijñāsviśeṣaḥ sākāṅksā ity ucyate. tatrāntyaḥ - pacati tānḍulam devadatta iti. kriyākāraṇaḥ dvayaḥ api parasparam tadutthāpakatvāt tadviṣayatvāc ca. ādyam paśya mṛgro dhāvatīti. atra paśyārthaḥ kārakadēhāvanā "kāṅkṣotthāpakatvām dhāvānaṁ tu tadviṣaya eva."

\(^{14}\) Raja [1966 (1977), p. 159] gives the translations of these two term as “natural expectancy” for utthitākāṅksā and “potential expectancy” for utthāpyākāṅksā.
Tr.: The expectancy is particular intention to know (jījñāsā) through the relation of either the property of bringing about (utthāpakatāsambandha) or the property of being a content (viṣayatāsambandha), or the relation of both. An example for the latter is “pacati taṇḍulam devadattah: Devadatta is cooking rice.” In this case between the verb pacati and the nominal words such as taṇḍulam and devadattah there are both the relation of the property of bringing about and the relation of being a content [of that action]. Next is an example for the former, “paśya, mrgo dhāvati: See, a deer is running.” Here the meaning of “the act of seeing” brings about the expectancy to the act of running which is a kāraka. [Namely,] the act of running is just an object of seeing.

The utthitākāṅkṣā has the relation of being either its content or its producer. In the example “paśya, mrgo dhāvati,” the act of seeing needs something to be seen, i.e., the running of a deer, as its content. Here, viṣayatāsambandha exists. However, in this case the act of running of a deer expressed in the sentence functions as kāraka and so it has an expectancy to the act of seeing. This is utthāpakatāsambandha. These two relation cannot stand simultaneously, because the phrase “mrgo dhāvati” is possible without another verb paśya and only when the phrase as a whole functions as kāraka it has an expectancy to paśya. Therefore, in this utthitākāṅkṣā the relation is always one-sided.

The utthāpyākāṅkṣā is realized between kriyā and kāraka. The verb that represents the action expects some word which represents its content. In the example quoted in VSLM, the act of cooking needs something to be cooked, e.g., rice, as its object. This relation is viṣayatāsambandha. At the same time, the rice needs some action which causes it to be cooked. This relation is utthāpakatāsambandha. Since these two relations interactively exist between these two words, this utthāpyākāṅkṣā is mutual expectancy.

2.4.3. Conclusion from the grammarians [116,33-117,6]

Text: etena pra{117}kṛtyarthaprakārako bodho yatra viṣeṣyatayā tatra viṣayatayā pratyayajanyā ityādi kāryakāraṇabhāvan kalpayanto 'py apāstāh, viparitavyutpādite vyābhidhārasyodbhavāti.

siddhānte tu “ghaṭah karmatvam” ityādy asādhy eva. tathā hi “abhihitā prathamā” iti Vārttiκaṇḍa [Vt IV on P.2.3.1], tat kathām “ghaṭah karmatvam” iti prathamā? ghaṭānayanayor ānayanakṛtī prati karmatayā “kārtṛkarmaṇoh [kṛtiḥ]” [P.2.3.65] iti śaṣṭhirprasāṅgāc cetī dīk.

15 For the Pāṇinian notion of the sentence and, particularly, the discussion to this sentence “paśya, mrgo dhāvati” which seems to have two finite verbs in one sentence, see especially Deshpande [1991(a)] and Dikshit [1980].
Translation: There are some who assume the cause-effect relation [in the verbal cognition] in the form that wherever the cognition having the meaning of the nominal stem as its subject through the [relation of] qualificand-ness appears [the remembrance of the knowledge] produced by the suffix is the cause for [that result = that verbal knowledge] through the [relation of] content-ness. [Such an opinion] should be set aside because, if [the elements] are placed in the reverse order, a deviation of knowledge would happen.

However, as the siddhānta, the string “gṛhataḥ karmatvaṁ ānayanaṁ kṛtiḥ” is not correct. As for it, Vīt says that when it is already expressed the first case is introduced.

Then, why is the first case introduced after the elements in the string “gṛhataḥ karmatvaṁ ānayanaṁ kṛtiḥ”? The reason is that since both the pot and the act of bringing are related to the act of bringing and the effort respectively as the object [and this object-ness is not specified otherwise], the sixth case should be introduced according to P.2.3.65. It is enough to say so to refute their view.

Notes: The verbal cognition obtained from the sentence “gṛhataṁ ānaya” is, according to the Naiyāyikas, “gṛhavrūḍhitikarmatāṇirūpita-nayanāṇukūla-kṛtimān tvam: You having an effort conducive to the act of bringing which is described by the object-ness existing in pot.” The verbal suffix -hi, which denotes the volition (kṛti), qualifies the agent (= you) and the volition is qualified by the act of bringing though the relation of conduciveness, while the act of bringing is qualified by the pot through the relation of objectness. When this cognition is again verbalized into the string such as “gṛhataḥ karmatvaṁ ānayanaṁ kṛtiḥ,” we have to add some relations that combine the elements because the sentence meaning is nothing but the relation of qualifier-qualificand. In that string, there is no ākānśā. Although this is seemingly correct, we cannot have knowledge of “bring the pot.” Nor have we the śābdabodha proclaimed by Naiyāyikas “gṛhata-vṛttikarmatā-nirūpita-ānayana-anukūla-kṛtimān tvam” from that string.

Then, even if we accept that string as meaningful and those who are trained by the Naiyāyikas’ way of thinking are able to have that cognition, the string has no grammatical correct-ness. In the cognition tentatively accepted, the pot is an object of the act of bringing and the act of bringing is also an object of the volition. These object-ness are not specified otherwise in that string and according to P.2.3.65 (kārtikarmacanōḥ kṛtiḥ) the elements are to be put in the genitive case, resulting in “*gṛhataśya ānayanam, ānayanasya kṛtiḥ.” The use of the nominative case endings after the elements is not justified by grammar. In grammar, the nominative case is introduced after the stem to express mere meaning of the stem, etc., (P.2.3.46: prāti-padikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā) if the notion of the
object, etc. which is attributed to that meaning of the stem is already expressed (Vt I). The nominative case does not convey the notion of the objectness here.

Therefore, Bhaṭṭoji concludes that the string “ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛitiḥ” does not produce the cognition and that it is not grammatically correct and thus meaningless. Nāgeśa says about the correct-ness of the cognition in his VSLM [I, pp. 501-2]:

\[
\text{ata eva ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛitr ity ato viparita-vyuṭpannyaṣya bodhaḥ. sadyuṭpannyaṣya cābodha upapadyate. sadyuṭpannyaṣva ca vyākaraṇaśāstroktapraṇātritiprayaṇavibhā-gatattadarthavibhāgatattadanavyabodhavisaṣyajñānavattvam.}\]

Tr.: Therefore, in the string “ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛitiḥ” [incorrect] knowledge [obtained from the reverse order of the elements] comes arise. [That is to say,] a right cognition cannot occur. To be right cognition is to have the knowledge of following contents such as the divisions of stem and suffix, each meanings of them and the relational knowledge of them which are prescribed in the grammar.

This criticism against Naiyāyikas is, of course, an arbitrary one imposed on them by the grammarians. “From the Nyāya point of view,” as is stated by Matilal [1968, p. 20], “it will not be improper to say that examples like (11) [that is, above string. Noted by N.K.] lack the syntactic property ākāṅkṣā and hence do not generate any cognitive meaning.”

In this connection, the Kiraṇāvali, a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhāntamuktiāvali, gives Naiyāyikas’ explanation [p. 349]:

‘ghaṭam ānaya’ itivākyasāhare prayuktā ‘ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛitr itivākyāt ’ādheyatāsambandhena ghaṭapra-kāräkakarmañvīṣayakaḥ anukulatāsambandhena ca ānayanapra-kāräkṛitivīṣayakaḥ śābdabodho na jāyate, ... ‘ghaṭam’ itisthāne prayuktē ‘ghaṭaḥ karmatvam’ ity atra ‘karmatvam ghaṭaḥ’ ity api vaktum śakyatvāt tatra aviparīte viparīte vā prayoge āsattiyogatāsattte ‘pi aviparīto viparīto vā śābdas-bodho na bhavati, ākāṅkṣāḥ bhāvāḥ, yatas tatra ‘karmatvam ghaṭaḥ’ ity atra ākāṅkṣā nāsty eva, ampade ghaṭapadottaravasyai-vā’ ‘kāṅkṣātvāt, anyathā ‘am ghaṭaḥ’ ity api prayogāḥ suddha āpadyeteti vyāpakadharmāvacchinnā khāṇḍabodhe ākāṅkṣājñānasva kāraṇatvaṃ sārthakam eveti bhāvāḥ.

Tr.: In the case of the sentence “ghaṭam ānaya,” since its divided string is already shown, the verbal knowledge which has a pot as a qualifier and an objectness as its qualificand through the relation

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16 Bālam Bhaṭṭa says in his Kalā, a commentary on VSLM [in VSLM, p. 504]: yady api tattat-samahivyātāre tattadodbodhājanakatvaniiṣayāḥ pratibandhaka iti. tad api na. ghaṭam ānayet-ādau tattatpade ghaṭampaddādau prayeṣyam grhitāsaktikasya tädṛṣṇāupārvi-jñānavato ‘kāraṇata-viṣayāḥbhāvavato viparitavyayutpannyaṣya tato bodhāpattā gauravāc ca.
of superstratumness and which has the act of bringing as a qualifier and the volition as its qualificand through the relation of conduciveness would not arise from the string “ghaṭaḥ karma-tvam ānayanam kṛtih.” ...

In the case of the word “ghaṭam,” even though it is shown in the form of “ghaṭaḥ karmatvam,” it is possible to say “karmatvam ghaṭaḥ.” Here, even though there are āsati and yogyaṭā between two elements, neither right nor incorrect verbal cognition would occur because there is no ākānksā. That is to say, ākānksā does not exist between karmatvam and ghaṭaḥ in this order. The element -am has ākānksā when it is placed only after the element ghaṭa. Otherwise, it would be claimed that the expression “am ghaṭa” is correct usage. In the cognition obtained from the divided sentence which is delimited by the pervader-ness, the knowledge of ākānksā is the cause.

2.5. Types of apādāna {117,7-16}

Text: nirdiṣṭaviṣayaṁ kiñcid upāttaviṣayaṁ tathā. 
apekaṣṭitriyaṁ cett tridhāpādānam ucyate. [VP III.7.136]. 
yatra sāksād dhatunā gatir nirddiśyate tan nirdiṣṭaviṣayam. 
“āsvāt patati” yathā. 
yatra tu dhatvantararthaṁ svārtham dhatur āha tad 
upāttaviṣayam. yathā “balāhakād vidyotate” iti. niḥsaraṇāṁge 
vidyotane dyutir vartate. yathā vā “kusūlāt pacati” iti. 
ādānāṅge pāke 'tra pacir vartate. 
apekaṣṭitriyaṁ tu tat, yatra pratyaḵṣasiddham āgamanam 
manasi nīḍāya prccati “kuto bhavān” iti, “pāṭaliputrād” iti 
cottarayati, arthādyāḥārasya nīyyatāyā uktavāt.

Translation: [Bhartṛhari says (VP III.7.136)]: “The apādāna is said to 
be of three types. That where [apiya] is directly mentioned, that 
where [apiya] is included, and that where [apiya] is implied.”

In case where the movement is directly expressed, it is 
nirdiṣṭaviṣaya. An example is, “āsvāt patati: he is falling from a 
horse.”

Where the verbal root denotes a meaning which becomes a part of the meaning of another verbal root, it is said “upāttaviṣaya.” An example of it, “balāhakād vidyotate: it is lightening from the cloud.” Here, a verbal root ṅdyut- is used in the sense of “udyotana: lightening” in which [the act of] “niḥsaraṇa: going forth” is included. [Thus, that expression is same as saying “balāhakān niḥsraya vidyud vidyotate”]. Or, another example for it, “kusūlāt pacati: he cooks out of granary.” Here, a verbal root ṅpac- is used in the sense of [cooking] in which the act of “ādāna: taking out” is included. [Thus, it is literally equivalent to say “kusūlāt taṇḍulān ādaya pacati”].
The third one, "apekṣitakriya" is one where, having someone's approach obtained by the direct perception, a person asks "From where, sir?" And the other who is coming replies "From Pāṭaliputra." It is already stated that the supplement of the meaning [in sentence] (arthādyāhāra) is [one of] proper way [of understanding].

Notes: Bhartrhari summarizes types of apādāna as three. His classification is followed by almost all grammarians after him. Above SK's passage is based on PM on P.1.4.24 [I,537,6-12]: yatra dhūtunā 'pāyalaṅkṣaṇaḥ saṁjñāvisāṅyo nirdiśyate, yathā — grāmād āgačchatīti, tan nirdiṣṭavīśayam. yatra dhātūr dhātvantarā'ṛthāṅgaṁ svārthaṁ āha, yathā balāḥkākād vidyotate vidyud iti. atra hi niḥsaraṇāṅga-vidyotane vidyutir vartate — balāḥkān niḥṣṛtya vidyotate ity eva. kusūlāt pacatīty atrādānāṅge pāke pacir vartate. kusūlād ādāya pacatīti, tadupāttavisāyam. apekṣitakriyam tu — yatra kriyā na śrūyate, prāmāṇaṁnaṁtārena tu pratiyate, yathā — āgačchantam puruṣam pratyaṅkṣena paśyann āha — kuto bhavān iti, so 'pi tad eva pratyaṅkasiddham āgamanam upajīvann āha — pāṭaliputrad iti.17

Helārāja, commenting on above kārikās of Bhartrhari, explains the meaning-implication by the phrase “gūṇabhāvena pradāhānabhāvena vā: through a secondary function or a basic function [of meaning].”18

Patañjali realizes the mental acquisition of the action for applying the designation apādāna. P.1.4.25-31 prescribe the application of apādāna to the items which represent “a source of fear,” etc., but Patañjali thinks that those rules are redundant because the application of apādāna is justified solely by P.1.4.24 in terms of taking the mental stages into consideration. For example, he says [ad. P.1.4.25, I,327,24-328,1]:

iha tāvad vrkebhyo bibheti, dasyubhyo bibhetīti ya eṣa manuṣyaj prekṣāpūrvakāri bhavati sa paśyati yadi mām vrkāh

17 Parallel passage is found in Pradīpa on P.1.4.24 [II,248r]: tatra nirdiṣṭavīśayam, — yatra dhūtunā 'pāyalaṅkṣaṇo viṣaya nirdiṣṭaḥ, yathā grāmād āgačchaḥati. upāttavīśayam — yatra dhātūr dhātvantarārāthāṅgam svārthaṁ āha, yathā ca balāḥkākād vidyotata iti. niḥsaraṇāṅge dyotane 'tra dyutir vartate. — yathā vā kusūlāt pacatītyādau. ādānāṅge pāke pacir vartate. apekṣitakriyam — yatra kriyāvāci padam na śrūyate, kevalaṁ kriyā pratiyate. yathā sāṃkṣayekebhyā pāṭaliputraḥ abhirūpataṛā iti.

18 Helārāja on VP III.7.136 [p. 338]: upāṭṭaḥ kriyāntarasya gūṇabhāvena pradāhānabhāvena ya yatrāpāyalaṅkṣo viṣayaḥ tad anyadupāttavisāyam apādāno. tadāyaḥ 'balāḥkākād vidyotate,' 'kusūlāt pacati,' 'brāhmaṇac chāṃsīti.' atra hi niḥsaraṇāṅge vidyotane dvipātanāṁ niḥsaraṇāṅge niḥsaraṇe dvipātur vartate iti niḥsaraṇalakṣo 'pāyo vidyotanasya gunapradāhānabhāvenopātāḥ. balāḥkākān niḥṣṛtya jyotir vidyotate, balāḥkākād vā vidyotamanāṁ niḥsaraṇitī arthāḥ, kusūlād ādāya pacatīty ādānāṅge pāke pacir vartate. brāhmaṇād gṛhītvā śaṁsatīti grahāṇāṅge śaṁsane śaṁsir vartate.
paśyanti dhruvo me mṛtyur iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nivartate.
tatra dhruvam apāye 'pādānam [P.1.4.24] ity eva siddham. 19

Kaiyaṭa further says that such mental consideration belongs to the type of upāttavisayā in his commentary on MBh ad P.1.4.25 [II,250r] (prekṣāpūrvakāriti. buddhyavasthāpito trāpāyo 'stūti bhāvah. tatra nivṛttyange bhaye bibhetyādayo vartanta ity upāttavisayam etad apādānam.)

For the technique of adhyāhāra (supplement), Pāṇini uses the word vākyādhyāhāra in his P.6.1.139 (upāti prayatiyānavaiśkṛta-vākyādhyāhāreṣu ca). Bhaṭṭoji comments on this word as “vākyasyādhyāhārāh ākāṅśitaikadeśāpūraṇaṃ: The supplement of the sentence means to fulfill the part [of the sentence] which is expected.” [SK.2552 on P.6.1.139, III. p. 375] Patañjali uses the word “vākyādhyāhāra” in commenting on the word vṛkṣyāna two times (strictly speaking, the passages are the same) [MBh, paspaśāhnikā, I,11,23; 12,25-26]: udāharaṇāṃ prayudāharaṇāṃ vākyādhyāhāra ity etat samuditaṃ vṛkṣyānaṃ bhavati (Explanation consists of udāharaṇa or example, prayudāharaṇa or counterexample and vākyādhyāhāra or supplement to the sentence). In this connection, Patañjali also states about “the natural ellipsis” (Deshpande [1985, p. 57]) [MBh ad P.1.1.45, I,111,22-24]:

 athavā drśyante hi vākyesu vākyaiśikesan prayuñjānāh padesu ca padaśikesan. vākyesu tāvad vākyaiśikesan. praviṣa pindim praviṣa tarpaṇam. padesu padaśikesan. devadatto dattāh satyabhāmā bhāmeti.

Tr.: Or rather, it is seen that people use a part of sentence instead of [whole] sentence and a part of word instead of [whole] word. Examples of the sentence, “praviṣa pindim” for “praviṣa grhaṃ bhakṣaya pindim: Come in the house, eat food” and “praviṣa tarpaṇam” for “praviṣa grhaṃ kuru tarpaṇam: Come in the house, make a refreshing.” Examples of the word, “dattāh” for “Devadattāh” and “bhāmā” for “Satyabhāmā.”

Bhartrhari discusses such ellipses in detail in his VP II after he mentions the ways of deciding the meaning. See VP II.315-316 onward. The technique arthādhyāhāra is held by Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā (See Raja [1963, p. 170]). They assert that what is to be supplied is not the word but the meaning. On the other hand, Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā holds padādhyāhāra-view. For details, see Raja [1963], pp. 169-176.

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19 This type of statement is repeatedly found in bhāṣya on all the remaining rules which describe the termed.
2.6. On the sentence “sārthād dhīyate”
2.6.1. Objection 1 {117,17-20}

Text: iha “sārthād dhīyate” ity api nirdīṣṭaviṣayasyoddhāhanaṁ. syād etat. paratvāt sārthasya kartārṣamjñā prāppnoti. utktaṁ hi “apādānaṁ uttarāṇī” iti. kiṁ ca sārthasya kartṛtvābhāve tvajya-māṇasya karmasamjñā na syāt, kartṛtvāpāravyāpātvaḥbhavāt. tataś ca “hiyate ; hīnāḥ” iti karaṇi lakaṁro niśṭhā ca na syāt.

Translation: There is another example for the first type of apādāṇa, i.e., “sārthād dhīyate: he is excluded from a caravan.” So be it. According to the paratva-principle, the caravan would get the kartṛ designation because of the paribhāṣā “apādāṇa is set aside by the latter designations.” Or, when the caravan has no agency, the one which is to be excluded would not get the karaṇ designation because it is not pervaded by the activity of the agent. Therefore, in the expression like “hiyate” or “hīnāḥ,” the formation of passive voice and the use of past passive participle (niśṭhā) respectively are not justified.

Notes: Passages 2.6.1-4 deal with how to justify the passive construction “sārthād dhīyate.” Active construction probably supposed to this passive might be either “sārtho devadattam jahāti: a caravan banishes Devadatta” [alternative A] or “devadattāḥ (svayam eva) sārthād jahāti (= apagacchatā): Devadatta leaves a caravan by himself” [alternative B].

At first, in this passage, the ablative case put after the word sārtha is discussed. Pūrvapaksin criticizes the ablative case after sārtha as being incorrect if we suppose the passive construction having alternative A as its underlying sentence. In this underlying sentence, Devadatta is karaṇ and the caravan is kartṛ. The -l-ending, here substituted by atmanepada ending -te, expresses the notion of karaṇ (P.3.4.79). The notion of karaṇ is already expressed by the verbal ending and thus the word which expresses the object of the action, i.e., Devadatta, takes nominative case in the passive. On the other hand, the agent, the caravan, is not expressed in this passive construction and so it should take instrumental case by P.2.3.18 (resulting in “[devadattāṁ] sārthena hiyate”). At the same time, if a speaker wants to express it as the fixed point from where Devadatta is banished, the caravan would be designated as apādāṇa. Consequently, two designations are attributed to one and the same item, so according to the principle for the conflict, namely “apādānasamjñāṁ uttarāṇi kāraṇaṁ bādhante: the designation apādāṇa is prevailed by other kāraṇas [which are prescribed] after [it in grammar]” (MBh ad. P.1.4.1 [I,302,13]), the latter designation prevails. Therefore, the caravan would be regarded
as *kartr* and the passive would be “sārthena [devadattaḥ] hīyate: Devadatta is banished by the caravan,” which is not the case here.

If the caravan is not admitted as the agent, in this case since there is no agent, no *karman* is possible. The object is the one which is pervaded by the activity of the agent. Hence, Devadatta cannot be *karman*, and neither passive construction nor the use of the past passive participle is justified.


Tr.: About “sārthād dhiyate.” The verbal root √hā- means the act of banishing and the ātmanepada ending is meant to the object and before passive marker yaK the last phoneme -ā of the root is substituted to -i by P.6.4.66. [Thus, the form hi-ya-te is derived.] Then, [if the caravan is not admitted as the agent,] how does one apply the designation *karman* [for Devadatta]? It is said in P.1.4.49 that *karman* is most desired by the agent. [Reply:] The caravan is not deserved as the agent. Since it is intended as to be a fixed point, it has the designation apādāna. Nor should be called it as the agent. Because, as for the sentence “jahāti sārtho devadatta,” if the caravan does not banish Devadatta, there would be no separation. [That is to say, there would be no fixed point and no agent because the act of banishing is not done yet.]

2.6.2. Objection 2 {117,20-28}

Text: na ca karmakartary ayam lakāra iti vūcyam, jahāteḥ kartṛstha- kriyatvāt karmany evāyam lakāra iti Indumoktavāt.

Translation: It should not be argued that this is l-suffix which is introduced to form a reflexive construction (karmakartari). It is said by Indumitra that it is l-suffix which denotes the object alone, i.e., passive voice since √hā- is the verbal root whose action is observable in the agent.

Notes: In the previous passage, the agency is not admitted to the caravan. If so, the passive construction is not justified. Then, pūrva-pakṣin asserts that the sentence “sārthād [devadattaḥ] dhiyate” is a reflexive construction (karmakartari).

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21 P.6.4.66: GHuMāsthāgāpājahātissām haLi. The substitute phoneme -i is by previous rule P.6.4.65.
If we admit this objection, the result is that Devadatta is the agent turned from the object, namely Devadatta is the object of the act of banishing and the agent of that action as well. In other words, Devadatta leaves the caravan by his own intention. The sentence is meant to “Devadatta excludes himself from the caravan.”

However, this objection is refuted simply because the verbal root āhā- is kartrsthakriyaka. This type of verbal root is not allowed to form the karmakartari construction. Thus, the form hiyate is the passive form not the reflexive. Bhaṭṭoji refers to Indumitra’s statement. It is likely that it is quoted from the Mādhaviyadhātuvṛtti [p. 275]: Indur api svayam eva hiyata iti pratīteḥ karmakartari lakāro ’stv ity āśānKYa jahāteḥ kartrsthakriyavāt karmany eva lakāra iti. (For the whole passage that treats with this discussion, see Notes on 2.6.4). Indumitra (1070?) is said to write the Anunyāsa, a commentary on the Nyāsa, but it is not available at present. See New Catalogus Catalogorum, vol. 1, p. 154; vol. 2, p. 248.

Patañjali classifies the verbal roots into four.
1) kartrsthakriyaka: [a verbal root] whose action is observable in the agent.
2) kartrsthabhāvaka: [a verbal root] whose static action resides in the agent.
3) karmasthakriyaka: [a verbal root] whose action is observable in the object.
4) karmasthabhāvaka: [a verbal root] whose static action resides in the object.

Among these, only the verbal roots belonging to last two classes are allowed to form the karmakartari because this reflexive construction is based on the attribution of the agency to the object of the action in the active voice. When some changes are seen in the object, it can be said from a certain point of view that the changes are made by that object itself. By this attribution, the object in the active voice is treated as the agent in the reflexive. However, if the result of action is not seen on the side of the object, since there is no changes in the object which enable us to regard them as being made by the object itself, such attribution is not possible. The verbal root āhā- is kartrsthakriyaka and this action does not produce any visible change on the object. Therefore, the object “Devadatta” in the active voice cannot be regarded as the agent. (See also 2.7.1.4 [pp. 45-46] of part (1) of this study. In the Notes and Bibliography of part (1), the paper referred to as Kudo [1993] is a misprint and please refer to it as Kudo [1994].

2.6.3. Objection 3 {117,21-28}
Translation: However, the others say that as Jinendraubdhi and Kaiyata say in their commentaries respectively on P.5.4.45 and P.1.4.32, the mention of the word kartr implies the independency in the rule prescribing the designation karman. As far as the act of leaving is concerned, since the caravan does act independently, although it is designated as apādāna, the caravan is regarded as the agent [even if it is not represented as such]. Thus, it is possible to apply the designation karman to [Devadatta].

This is questionable. [Then, consider this example] “māsesv aśvam badhnāti: he ties a horse in the bean field.” Here, although horse is the object [of the act of tying], it is independent as far as the act of eating is concerned. As a result, the designation karman would be [wrongly] applied to the substratum [i.e., the bean field] because they are directly reached by the horse. Therefore, it is said by Kaiyata in his commentary on P.1.4.49 that since the activity of the prompting agent is not expressed in [the collection of] the meaning of the words [in above expression], it is improper to apply the designation karman to that which depends on it [= prayojakakartr].

Notes: This objection is that even though the agency of the act of banishing is not attributed to the caravan and this agency is not expressed explicitly in the sentence, the caravan is independent as far as that action (hānakriyā) is concerned and by this independency it is regarded as the agent. When the speaker wants to express it as the fixed point, its apādāna-ness is intact by its independence because the independency (svātantrya) is larger notion than apādāna-ness. At this stage, we can have a potential agent of that action, i.e., a prompting agent or instigator (prayojakakartr), inspite of the fact that it and its agency are not expressed in the actual sentence. Presupposition that when some X has a desire to exclude other Y, this desire is directed to Y allows us to regard Y as the most desirable object of that agent. By P.1.4.49, this most desirable thing (ipsitatama) is called karman and that is why the objectness for Y is justified and the passive expression is derived. Pūrvapākin quotes Kaiyata as his support. For the sources referred in ŠK, see the Pradipa on P.1.4.32, [II,256l-r]: nanu siṣyasya kartrtvābhāve katham goḥ karmasāṁjñā? naiśa dośah. karmasāṁjñāṃ svātantryasya kartrgraṇahenopalakṣanāti. tathā ca ‘sārtthād dhiyata’ ity atra karmāni lakārotpatiḥ; and the Nyāsa on P.5.4.45 [IV,357]: sārtthād dhiyata iti. “OhāK tyāge” laḥ karmany ātmanepadam. “dhumāsthā” ityādisūrṇettvam. nanu cākārtrkām karma nāsti, “kartur ipsitatamaḥ karma” iti vacanāt, sārthaś cātra
na karma\textsuperscript{22}, kim tari? apādānam? naiṣa doṣaḥ; karmasamjñāyāṁ hi
kartṛgrahanam svātāntryopalakṣaṇam.

To this argument, Bhaṭṭoṭi replies that it leads to a wrong sequence. For example, \textquotedblleft māṣeṣv aśvaṁ badhnāti: he ties an horse in the bean field.	extquotedblright In this sentence, māṣa would be karman if we accept the above reasoning. Someone wants the horse to eat the bean and for that purpose ties it in the bean field. As for the horse, it is independent with respect to its eating of the bean. Since above reasoning allows this independency, even though it is not directly expressed in the sentence, the horse as the agent of the act of eating wants the bean as the most desirable. Then, the bean field regarded as the most desirable is called karman and takes the accusative case instead of the locative case (*māṣān aśvaṁ badhnāti). However, this string is clearly incorrect. As is stated by Kāyata, the presupposition of the independency which is not expressed in the sentence and the attribution of the object-ness based on such presupposition should not be accepted. \textit{Pradīpa} on P.1.4.49 [II,262l-263r]: anye tu prayojakakartrapēksaṁ prayojaśaya karttur anipitāṁ api karmet ācakṣate. tat tu prayojaśayāpāra-syāśabdatvāt pūrvoktodāharaṇe 'yuktam iti nyāyavido manyate. (Tr.: Others say that the one which is not desired by the instigated agent would be karman by presupposing the role of the instigator [who instigates the latter to do so]. But this is not correct. Since the activity of the prompting agent is not expressed in the sentence, [to suppose his role and assign the objectness] in the above example [i.e, nāḥaṁ kaṭaṁ karśiṣyāṁ] are improper).

See also \textit{PM} on P.5.4.45 [IV,357,14-18]: svātāntryopalakṣaṇam ca
karmasamjñāyāṁ kartṛgrahanam, kartṛsamjñā bhavatu, mā vā bhūt. evaṁ cāpādānasyāpi sataḥ sārthasya hāne yat svātāntraṁ vāstavaṁ,
tadāśrayā kartṛsamjñā bhavati. yady evam, māṣeṣv aśvaṁ badhnāti-
ty atra karmano 'py aśvasya vastuto yad bhakṣane svātāntraṁ tād
āśrayā māṣāṁ kartṛsamjñā prāpnoti, tasmāt karmakartary atra
lakāraṁ.

2.6.4. Conclusion \{117,29-32\}

Text: atrāhuḥ -- \textquotedblleft sārthād dhīyate\textquotedblright ity atra karmakartary lakāraḥ.

tathā hi, apagamanā jahāter arthaḥ. să ca kṣudupaghātādīnā
devadattasyāpi tāt saṁarthācaranāṁ.\textsuperscript{*1}

yadā tu kṣudupaghātādīnā svayam evāpagačchati tadā karm-
kartṛtvam. sphaṭaṁ cedām Haraddattamādhanagranthahayoh.

*1. Read -gamane. (See the quotations from \textit{PM} and \textit{MDhv} below).

Translation: Here is said. In the example \textquotedblleft sārthād dhīyate,\textquotedblright l- suffix is
used as karmakartari. Namely \textit{vṛhā}- means \textit{going away}

\textsuperscript{22} Joshi and Roodbergen [1975] reads kartā instead of karma [p. 115, fn.335]. As they note, \textit{PM}
reads: na cātra sārthāh kartṛsamjñākaḥ. (Quoted in Notes on 2.6.1.)
(apagamanā).” When [hā- is used to mean] the departure of Devadatta by reasons of hunger or disease, etc. [which is instigated by the caravan], it leads to special kind of meaning.

However, in case where he himself goes away by suffering from hunger or disease, there is the object-turned agency [in Devadatta]. This is clearly stated in the PM of Haradatta and the Dhiituvṛtti of Mādhava.

Notes: Here, the alternative B (see 2.6.1) is dealt with. At first, the meaning of the verbal root ṣārthā- is understood as “going away (apagamana),” not as “throwing away (tyāga).” The sentence “sārtho devadattaṁ jahiiti” is paraphrased into “sārtho devadattam apagamayati: the caravan lets Devadatta go away.” Here, we realize the meaning of the causative, apagamayati, as indicated in PM. This meaning modification is expressed by the word samarthācarana. In the background of this paraphrase, the commentator seems to take into consideration that the act of going away of the caravan is transferred to the act of departure of Devadatta by particular reasons. The departure of Devadatta is at least caused by two situations. One is direct or indirect instigation by the caravan. For instance, by not being given food, Devadatta feels hunger and as a result he departs from the caravan. In this case, though the caravan does not seem to act as an agent of excluding, he is the agent of this instigation.

Active [sentence describing the simple fact]
[sārthād] devadatto 'pagacchati (Devadatta departs from the caravan).

Causative [sentence considered with the particular situation]
sārthah [sārthād] devadattam apagamayati (The caravan lets Devadatta leave off [from the caravan]).

Passive
[sārthena] sārthād [devadatto] apagamyate [→ sārthād dhīyate].

The other situation is that if Devadatta himself decides to depart from the caravan for reasons of hunger or disease, etc., he is the agent of the departure and the object as well. Thus, the status of agent turned from the object is admitted to Devadatta and the reflexive construction is justified.

References in ŚK are as follows:
PM on P.5.4.45 [IV,357,18-22]: katham iha jahiitir apagamanāyāṁ vartate? devadattam sārtho jahiitī, apagamayatity arthah. esaiva ca sārthasyāpagamanā yat kṣudupaghātādīnā devaddattasyāpagamanat samarthācaraṇām, yadda tu kṣudhādinā svayam evapagacchati tadā

23 P.1.4.52 (gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabakarmakārmanā naNikartā sa Nau) prescribes that the agent in the active voice is regarded as karman in the causative (and takes accusative case) when the verb denotes the movement.
SANSKRIT SYNTAX (2): ŠADBKAUSTUBHA

karmakarttytvam, tataś ca hiyata iti. ko 'rthah? svayam evāpaga­
cacchatīty arthah. punah “kuto hiyate?” -- ity apekśāyaṁ sārthena
sambandhaḥ.

MDhv on the verbal root OhiiK [p.275]: sārthād hiyate devadattaḥ,
hīna ityādau lakārādau vivadante. tatra ‘apādāne cāhiyaruhoḥ’
P[5.4.45] ity atra Nyāsē devadattasya kartur īpsitamatavābhāve 'pi
karmasamjñāyāṁ kartṛgraḥaṇasyā svātāntryopalakaṇaṁarthavād
hānakriyāyāṁ svatantrasya apādānasyepsitamatavāt karmanī lakārā-
dava iti prapañcena samarthitam. sampradānasūtre Kaiyaṭe 'py evam
uktam. Indur api svayam eva hiyata iti pratiṣeḥ karma kartari
lakāro 'stv ity āśaṅkya jahatēḥ kartṛsthakriyātvāḥ karmany eva lakāra iti.
Haraddattas tu Nyāsamatam uktvā, yady evam, maṅeṣv aśvaṁ
badhnātity atra karmano 'py aśvasya vastuto yad bhākṣāne svāt-
tanṛyaṃ tad āśrayā [māśānāṁ] karmasamjñā prāpnoti, tasmāt
karmakartary atra lakāra iti. upapāditaṁ ca “iha jahātir apa-
gamanārthaḥ, sā ca kṣudupaghāṭādinā devadattasyāpaga[mana]ne tat
samarthācaranam. yadā tu kṣudhādinā svayam eva paga­
cacchati tadda
karmakartṛtyvm” iti. punah kuta ity apekśāyaṁ paścāt svārthe
sambandhaḥ.

2.7. On the purpose of the word dhruva
2.7.1. Reason 1 for necessity and its rejection {117,33-118,1-3}

Text: syād etat. dhruvagrahāṇam kim artham?

na ca “grāmād āgacchati śakataṇa” ity atra {118} śakate
’tīvyāptivaraṇāya tad iti vācyaṁ, paratvāt tatra karaṇa-
samjñāpravṛtyeḥ. yathā “dhanuṣā vidhyati” ity atra. iha hi
śaraniḥsaranam praty avadhibhāvopagamenaiva vyadhane
karaṇatety ubhayaprāsaṅgaḥ.

Translation: May it be so. Here is a question. What is the purpose for
mentioning “dhruvam”?

It should not be argued that in order to prevent the
overapplication to “śakata” in “grāmād āgacchati śakataṇa: he is
coming from a village by cart” [the word dhruva is mentioned],
because the designation karana will set it aside by the paratva-
principle. For example, “dhanuṣā vidhyati: he pierces with a
bow.” In this case, since a bow is considered as the fixed point in
regard to the act of shooting of an arrow, it is the instrument in
regard to the act of piercing. Therefore, both designations
apādāna and karana become applicable [but according to the
paratva-principle the latter prevails].

Notes: If the word dhruva is not mentioned in P.1.4.24, whatever
relates to the separation (apāya) would be called apādāna. Ex.
grāmād āgacchati śakataṇa. Here, someone is coming from the
village and we realize that a separation occurs. The cart (śakata) is apparently
related to this separation and thus called apādāna, which is not the

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case here. Therefore, in order to prevent such wrong application we need the word *dhruva* in P.1.4.24. This is first *pūrvapakśa*.

The answer to this objection is that the wrong application is prevented by another grammatical device, i.e., the *paratva*-principle. Since the cart is the most effective instrument for coming, it is called *karaṇa*. The designation *karaṇa* appears later than the designation *apādāna* and term *karaṇa* prevails over *apādāna* by P.1.4.1. Therefore, even if there is no word *dhruva* in P.1.4.24, we can produce desirable composition. This argument is based on *MBh* ad P.1.4.24 [I.326,19-20]: *dhruvam iti kim artham. grāmād āgacchati śakaṭena. naitad asti. karaṇasamjñātra bādhikā bhaviṣyati.*

See *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,537,13-17]:

*dhruvagrahaṇam kim? grāmād āgacchati śakaṭena -- atra śaṅkatsya mā bhūt. atha kriyāmāne 'pi dhruvagrahāna iha kasmīn na bhavati -- dhanuṣā vidhyatitī, atra hi śarānām apāyaṃ prati avadhībhāvenaiva dhanuṣāḥ sādhakatamatvam? satyam; ubhayaprāsāṅge paratvāt karaṇasamjñā bhaviṣyati. nanv evam akriyāmāne 'pi śaṅkatsya naiva bhaviṣyati, evam samjñāntaraviṣaye sarvatra.*

Tr.: What is a purpose of mentioning the word *dhruva*? [In order to prevent an application of the designation *apādāna* to the cart.] For example, “grāmād āgacchaḥti śakaṭena.” Here, [the designation *apādāna*] should not be applied to the cart. Then, why should such an application is not to be done even though the word *dhruva* is mentioned in this rule? It is because, in case of “dhanuṣā vidhyatitī,” the bow is the most effective means of action functioning as the fixed point from where an arrow is shot. [That is why the designation *karaṇa* is applied to]. It is true. When two designations become conflict, the latter prevails because of the *paratva*-principle. If it is questioned that even though [the word *dhruva*] is not mentioned, [the designation *apādāna*] is not applied to the word *śakaṭa*, it is true because term *apādāna* is always [set aside when it collides] against the scopes of the other designations.

2.7.2. Reason 2 and its rejection {118,3-4}

Text: “vrkṣasya parṇam patati” ityādu tu vrkṣah parṇaviśeṣanām, na tv apāyena uyāyate.

Translation: In case of “vrkṣasya parṇam patati: a leaf of tree is falling,” the word *vrkṣa* is a qualifier to the word *parṇa* and is not related to *apāya*.

Notes: If the word *dhruva* is not mentioned in P.1.4.24, every item which is related to the separation is called *apādāna*. In the previous
passage, this type of wrong application is avoided by the *paratva*-principle. However, this principle is operative among the rules that have same applicability. Then, how about the word *vrksasya* in “*vrksasya parnam patati*”? In case of the separation, the tree is apparently related to it and it is possible to apply the designation *apadaana* to the tree. The sentence “*vrkṣāt parnam patati*” would be meant for “a leaf of tree is falling.” Even though the speaker does not want the tree to be the fixed point of the separation, since the tree is related to this separation, it would be wrongly called *apadyana*. Consequently, we have only one sentence to express the same connotations (“*vrkṣāt parnam patati*” means “a leaf of tree is falling down” and “a leaf is falling down from the tree” as well). In order to prevent such an application, we need *dhruva* in P.1.4.24.

Keeping this objection in mind, this passage simply refutes it by stating that the tree is represented as having the relation to the leaf and, thus, it does not serve as the means for the separation. Since it does not represent the *karaaka* relation, it is in the scope of *seše* (P.2.3.50). Therefore, even though there would be no word *dhruva* in P.1.4.24, the wrong application of *apadaana* to the tree would not happen.

Patanjali already discussed this problem in his *MBh* ad P.1.4.23 [I.324,1-4]: *na vaśāyaśāyāvivakṣītatvāt. [Vt V] na vaśā doṣāḥ. kim kāraṇam. apāyaśāyāvivakṣītatvāt. nātrāpāyo vivakṣītāt. kim tarhi. sambandhah. yadā cāpāyo vivakṣīto bhavati bhavati tadāpādāna-samjñā. tadyathā, vrkṣāt parnam patatiti. sambandhas tu tadā na vivakṣīto bhavati. He also gives the sentence “*vrkṣasya* ...” as the counter-example against the unnecessity of the word *dhruva* in MBh ad P.1.4.24 [I.326,2122] and this seems that Patanjali considers the word *dhruva* as necessary despite the fact that he does not explicitly state it.

Kaiyata says [Pradipa on P.1.4.24, II, 247r]:

vrkṣasyeti. asty atrāpāya iti bhāvaḥ. nanvatra kārakatvābhāvāt samjñā na bhaviṣyatī, apāyābhāvāc ca. saty eva hy avadhāv apāyo bhavatītī purvasūtre uktatvāt.

Tr.: On the example *vrkṣasya*. It implies that when there is a separation, [the designation would be applied. But this is not the case.] [Objection:] Since [in the examples quoted the tree and the wall] has no *karaaka*-status, the designation would not be applied. Moreover, there is no separation. As is stated in the discussion of the previous rule, only in the case that the fixed point is available *apāya* is to be considered.

Kaiyata seems to have an opinion that the word *dhruva* is superfluous. Counter-examples are all managed by other rules if we have no word *dhruva.*
2.7.3. Reason 3 and its rejection {118,4-5}

Text: na ca sanjñinirdesārtham dhruvagrahaṇam, apāye kriyāyām yad anvetti asyāksiptasya sanjñisamarthakatvat.

Translation: It is not the purpose of the word “dhruvam” in P.1.4.24 to prescribe the termed (sanjñin) because [by resorting to supplying the phrase] “kriyāyām yad anvetti” in the rule “apāye [apādānam]” this implied meaning [namely, P.1.4.24 means that when the moving away has taken place, the one which is related to that action is termed as apādāna] is capable to [specify] the termed.

Notes: Third argument for the necessity of the word dhruva. In the rule that prescribes the technical term, there should be at least sanjñā (the term) and sanjñin (the termed). P.1.4.24 has sanjñā and we need the word dhruva as sanjñin. This is a purpose of mentioning dhruva.

This is refuted. Kaiyata refers to some grammarians [Pradīpa on P.1.4.24, II,247r]: tatra kecid āhuḥ — sujjñāntvāt pūrvāśūtre uktatvāc ca bhāsyakāreṇāyam artho noktaḥ (Some hold that since such a notion is easily understood and really argued in [the discussion on] the previous rule, Patañjali has no intention to speak of it.) Kaiyata’s reference is not clear but according to Nāgęśa it describes the unnecessity of the word dhruva [Uddyota, ibid.]: sujjñāntvād iti. evaṃ ca sanjñinirdesāsasya kāraṇāksiptena siddhātvād dhruvagrahaṇam cintyaprayojanam iti bhāvaḥ (What is the meaning of sujjñāntvāt? Because the listing of the termed is established by its close relation to the kāraṇa, it is implied that the mention of the word dhruva is not necessary).

By the implication (ākṣepa), the termed is understood. Even if we have no sanjñin in P.1.4.24, since the condition for application, i.e., apāye (when the separation is taken place) is given, what is called apādāna (a relatum to the separation) is easily obtained. All items that relate to the separation (in those the fixed point is of course included) are able to be called apādāna but when this designation is in conflict with other designations, it is always set aside. In this way, we can apply the designation apādāna without having the word dhruva.

2.7.4. Conclusion {118,5-7}

Text: yadvā, “kārake” [P.1.4.23] iti nirdhāraṇasaptamyāśrayanāt kāraṇam iti labhyate. pūrvatṛpi prathamārthe saptamity uktatvāc ca. tasmādh dhruvagrahaṇam cintyaprayojanam.

Translation: Or rather, [the phrase “kārake(ṣu) madhe yad apāye dhruvam] kāraṇam” is obtained in terms of the locative case, kāraṇe [P.1.4.23], which means the selection of one from the whole. And it is already stated that the locative case is meant for the nominative case. Therefore, the mentioning of the word dhruva in P.1.4.24 is purposeless.
Notes: The translation of the phrase "... kārakam iti labhyate" is based on the *PM* [on P.1.4.23, I,531] which reads "viśeṣanādhikāre tu – kāratesu madhye yad apāye dhruvāṃ kārakam ity artho labhyate" (However, in the interpretation of P.1.4.23 as the qualifier as well as the governing rule, it is obtained that among the kārakas one kāraka being the fixed point is [called apādāna] when the separation has taken place)."

The interpretation of P.1.4.23 is again introduced here. According to this passage (as seen below, it is based on the *PM*), the locative case is understood to express the specification (nirdhāraṇa). Given all the six varieties of kāraka, we select one, e.g., apādāna, out of among them. In selecting it, if the word dhruva is not mentioned, the sole condition would be whether it is related to the separation or not. This condition inevitably facilitates the wrong nomination that the one which is not the fixed point and which is to be designated as another kāraka can be termed apādāna. However, such wrong nomination is avoided as we have seen in the previous passages 2.7.1-3. Accordingly, we do not need the word dhruva.

Sharma [1990, pp. 232-233] considers this "nirdhāraṇa interpretation" acceptable. He considers this view as having advantages because "it does not propose to interpret locative as nominative, nor does it resort to rule-splitting (yogavibhāga)" and "... would block the assignment of a kāraka term to something which is not a kāraka." See also *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,537]:

\[
\text{s\textit{am}jīn\textit{nir}dēś\textit{ar}tham tu na hi "kārake" iti saptam\textit{y}antena sakyah \textit{sam}jīn ni\textit{r}de\textit{ṣ}tum, siddhām tu nirddhāryamāṇasya \textit{sam}jīnivēd apāyavi\textit{ṣ}ayesu kārakesu madhye yat kārakam \textit{sam}jīnāntarasyāvi\textit{ṣ}ayas tad apādānam iti, tad evaṃ dhruvagrahānāṃ cintyaprayojanam.}
\]

Tr.: Regarding to the purpose as the prescription of the \textit{sam}jīn. It is not possible to describe \textit{sam}jīn by the word ending in the locative case (i.e., kārake). [To describe \textit{sam}jīn] is to be done as follows: since what is to be specified is \textit{sam}jīn, apādāna as one class of kāraka is the one which is not covered by other \textit{sam}jīnas when there are the kārakas associated with the separation. In this way, the word dhruva is redundant.

2.8. On the necessity of \textit{Vārttika} I
2.8.1. \textit{Vt} I on P.1.4.24 {118,8-12}
Text: "jugpsāvirāmapramādārthānām upasāṅkhyaṇām" [\textit{Vt} I].
"adharmāj jugupsate; viramati; pramādyati vā." \textit{sam}śleṣapūrvako viśleṣo vibhāgaḥ. sa ceha nāstī. buddhikalpitas tu gaunatvān na grhyata iti \textit{Vārttikārangbah}. Bhāsyakārās tu jugupsādayo 'tra jugupsādipūrvvikāyāṃ nirvīrtāv varatanta ity upāttaviṣayam etat.
Translation: It is said by Kātyāyana that an addition of [the verbal roots] denoting “jugupsā: disgust,” “virāma: cessation,” and “pramāda: neglect” should be made. For examples, “adharmaịjugpsate; viramati; pramādyati: he is disgusted with; ceases to practise; neglects adharma.” [Apāya] means “viśleṣa: separation” or “vibhāga: disjunction” which is preceded by [physical or actual] conjunction (samśleṣa). [However,] that is not seen in these examples. Thus, since [the notion of separation] mentally pictured is secondary, that meaning [= imagined separation] is not realized from this rule [directly]. Thus said in Vt.

On the other hand, since Patañjali said that the word jugupsā, etc. are used when “nivṛtti: desisting from” preceded by disgust, etc. happens, this is [the apādāna of] “upāttaviṣayā.”

Notes: This section 2.8 deals with the meaning of the word apāya. In the previous passages, we have treated the case that is the separation from a certain point, in other words, the act of moving away which is actually/physically perceived. When this physical separation alone is meant by the word apāya, mental separation such as disgust, neglect, etc. would not be covered by P.1.4.24. Therefore, as given by Kātyāyana, an addition is required (i.e., Vt I on P.1.4.24).

Patañjali, however, does not admit the necessity of this additional statement, instead he says that all the examples are within the scope of P.1.4.24 by extending the notion of apāya. MBh ad P.1.4.24 [I,273, 2-4] says:

\[iha tāvad adharmāj jugupsate adharmād bibhatsata iti, ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakāri bhavati, sa paṣyati duḥkho 'dharmo nānena kṛtyam astiti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nivartate. tatra dhruvam apāye 'pādāṇam ity eva siddham.\]

Tr.: Here, it is shown that the association of two (or more) is at first formed in the mind and later the separation of one from the other(s), i.e., the desist (nivṛtti), is taken place. These two phases ongoing in the mind is regarded as the separation inspite of it being psychological, although it not being physical. By this extentional meaning of apāya, the addition by Kātyāyana and P.1.4.25-31 as well are considered as dispensable.

For this extentional interpretation of P.1.4.24, see also 2.5.

2.8.2. First reason for rejecting Vt I [118,12-13]
Translation: Even in the section where kārakas are prescribed this secondary meaning is understood. It is because the use of suffix -tama after the word sādhaka- in P.1.4.42 indicates that the secondary meaning is to be considered.
Notes: In 2.8.1, it is said that Patañjali extends the meaning of apāya as the separation both in a physical and psychological sense. This
extensional meaning is not directly understood from the word apāya. As is stated by Kaiyāta (on P.1.4.24, [I,2481]: buddhikalpitas tu gauna iti bhāvaḥ), it is a secondary meaning (gauna). In order to know that this secondary meaning is intended here, we need clues in grammar. Two are given.

First clue is the use of the suffix -tama in sādhakatama of P.1.4.42. Patañjali discusses the purpose of this suffix [ad P.1.4.42, I,331,20-21]:

\[
\text{evam tarhi siddhe sati yat tamagrahaṇam karoti taj jñāpayaty}
\text{ācāryah kārakasamjñāyāṁ taratamayogo na bhavatīti.}
\]

Tr.: Even though it is well-managed [by reading the word sādhakatama in the sense of simply ‘accomplisher (sādhaka)’], since the teacher [Pāṇini] uses the suffix -tama, he lets us know that in [the section prescribing] the kāraka-designations [the words] are not used to express the relative or superlative sense.”

By this statement, it is turned out that the words used in defining the kāraka-designations do not express their full meanings. In other words, there is room to interpret them in the secondary sense. For the purpose of this indication, the suffix is added. Accordingly, the word apāya is read not only in its literal sense but in secondary sense. Patañjali says [ibid., 22-24]:

\[
apādānam ācāryah nyāyyam manyate, yatra sampṛṣya nivṛttih. tenehaiva svat grāmād āgacchati nagarād āgacchāti. sāmkāśyakebhyaḥ pātaliputrakā abhirūpataṁ ity atra na svaṁ. kārakasamjñāyāṁ taratamayogo na bhavatīty atrāpi siddham bhavati.\]

Tr.: What does Ācārya consider to be adequate for apādāna? [It is the case] where having reached then [someone] stops. [If we take apāya in literal meaning, we can derive the sentences] “grāmād āgacchāti: He is coming from the village” and “nagarād āgacchāti: He is coming from the city,” but not the sentences such as “sāmkāśyakebhyaḥ pātaliputrakā abhirūpataḥ: People of Pātaliputra are more praiseworthy than those of Sāmkāśya.” Depending on the clue that in [the section prescribing] the kāraka-designations [the words] are not used to express the relative or superlative sense, we can derive the latter sentence.

2.8.3. Second reason for rejecting \text{VtI(118,13-17)}

Text: apāyādipadānāṁ svaritavād vā “svaritenādhikāraḥ” [P.1.3.11]
gauṇo ’py artho grhyata iti vyavasthāpanāt. tena buddhikalpasyāpy apāyasya sattvat siddham. pūrvaṁ hi buddhyādharmanam sampṛṣya tato dosadarsanāṁ nivartata ity asty apāyah. evam uttarāsturesv api prapañcatvaṁ bodhyam iti dik.

Translation: Or, it is established that since the word apāya, etc. is marked with svarīta accent and whatever marked with svarīta accent is regarded as an adhikāra rule by P.1.3.11 [and adhikāra
means that which achieves something extra; the secondary meaning would be realized from it. Therefore, the separation taken place in the mind is covered [by the word apāya]. Namely, precedingly having [formed] a connection with adharma, he [then] leaves it off. Here, the separation is taken place.

In this way, in the following rules [upto 32] this explanation is to be considered.

Notes: Second clue is based on an etymology of the word adhikāra. According to P.1.3.11: svaritenādhikāraḥ, whatever has the svarita accent is regarded as adhikāra (a governing rule). The word adhikāra paraphrased as “adhikām kāryam” means “something extra is to be done.” Here, the word apāya has svarita accent so it is regarded as adhikāra. Since it is adhikāra, it has to express extra meaning. This extra meaning is nothing but the secondary sense, the psychologically supposed separation. See MBh ad P.1.3.11 [1,273,12-14]: adhikām kāryam. apādānam ācāryah kim nyāyyam manyate, yatra prāpya nivṛttiḥ. tenehaiva syāt grāmād āgacchati nagarād āgacchati. sāṁkāśyakebhyaḥ pāṭaliputraṅkā abhirūpatarā ity atra na syāt. svaritenādhikām kāryam bhavatīty atrāpi siddhāṃ bhavati.25

(to be continued)

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