Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā
vol. 17, 1996, pp. 27–64

Noriyuki KUDO

A Study on Sanskrit Syntax (1): Śabdakaustubha on P.1.4.23
A STUDY ON SANSKRIT SYNTAX (1):
ŚABDAKAUSTUBHA ON P.1.4.23

Sanskrit Text and Annotated Translation

Noriyuki Kudo

PART I: INTRODUCTION

Bhattoji Dikṣita (1575-1640) was one of the great grammarians who furnished the later period of the history of the Sanskrit grammar. He is said to have written more than one hundred works in his life. Among those, although some of them were not done by his own hands, only four works are concerned with the Sanskrit grammar. The Siddhāntakaumudi and its commentary, the Praudamanoramā, are newly systematized texts of the Aṣṭādhyāyī and the Śabdakaustubha and the Vaiyākaraṇamatonmājana are collections of the philosophical and grammatical issues not only from the earlier texts of Pāṇinīyas but also from those of the other philosophical systems. The latter is a summary of the former as stated in the maṅgala verse of it. Bhattoji says:

\[
\text{phañibhāṣitabhāṣyābdheḥ śabdakaustubha uddhṛtah.}
\text{tatra nirṇāta evārthaḥ saṃkṣepena kathyate.}
\]

"From the ocean [called] Mahābhāṣya narrated by Phañi [Holy snake, i.e., Patañjali], Śabdakaustubha (Jewel of the Word) is brought out [by me]. The topic treated there is going to be explained concisely here."

However, the Śabdakaustubha has not been studied as Vaiyākaraṇamatonmājana has. The Vaiyākaraṇamatonmājana along with the commentaries written by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa called the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana and its abridged form the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣānasāra, has been studied and translated several times.

The Śabdakaustubha is a commentary in vṛtti-style, mainly based on the Mahābhāṣya. It bears several philosophical and grammatical speculations which greatly influenced later grammarians, specially Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. It is not an overstatement that despite its importance the Śabdakaustubha is one of undeservedly forgotten texts in the study of Sanskrit grammar, due to both facts, that the Śabdakaustubha is an incomplete text and that its editions do not stand for the critical demand of the modern scholars. In face of such situation, a revised text of kākārāhnikā with an attemptative translation is presented in this paper. This is a first part of ongoing translation.
This text has been printed several times so far. According to *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, volume 5 [The Philosophy of the Grammarians], it was first published at Varanasi, 1876. The subsequent edition is from Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 2, 1898-1917 [second edition, 1991]. It comes next that is included as an appendix of the *Vaiyākarāṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, edited by Guru Prasad Shastri [see MBh(b)]. This edition has only the first nine āṅnikas of the *Sabdaśaubha*. Furthermore, Kunnjuni Raja used the edition of the Asiatic Society of Bengal [date not given] as base for his very small summary of this text in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, volume 5. Among these editions, only ChSS edition gives us the whole text, which now consists of three parts. Unfortunately this edition has a lot of misprints and misreadings which are easily noticeable. In this translation, this ChSS edition is referred to as the main text.

**Commentaries**

T. Aufrecht mentioned six commentaries. In his *Catalogus Catalogorum*, part I, p. 500, the following is listed:

1. *Viṣamapāda* of Nāgesa Bhāṭa [1714],
2. *Prabhā* of Vidyānātha Pāyaguda [1740],
3. *Udyota* of Vidyānātha Śukla [date unknown],
4. *Prabhā* of Satārā-Rāghavendrācārya [Gajendragadkar] [1840],
5. *Bhāvapradīpā* of Kṛṣṇamitra[-miśra, Durbaśāra] [1800],
6. *Dīśanā* of Bhāskara Dīkṣita [date unknown].

Of those, 1, 2, and 5 are available in manuscript form according to various catalogues. Remainings are not reported to be extant.

Besides, two commentaries are added to above list.

7. *Guna* of Indradatta Upādhyāya [1800].

This title is referred in the colophon of the manuscript of his *Sāṃvādacintāmaṇi* deposited at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute [No. 669 of 1891-95, folio 7 Ob, *Descriptive Catalogue of Government Collection of Manuscripts deposited at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, compiled by Shripad Krishna Belvalkar, vol. II Grammar: Part 1 (Vedic & Pāṇinīya), Poona: BORI, 1938, pp. 269-270]. It runs as follows:

\[
\text{vistarasa tv asatkrtaśaubhagunaḥ avasayah. iti śrīmad upādhyaśasukya(?)}\text{lālamanisārmasūnā vaiyākaraṇaksesarimdratapatyayaṇena kṛte sāṃvādacintāmaṇau dhātvārthavādah samāptah.}
\]

8. *Ṭīpāṇa* [Author unknown].

This commentary is mentioned in the *Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Manuscripts Library*, Madras. Three manuscripts which have the same title are preserved. Among these, one is also called
Marici. At present it is under the speculation whether they are same work or not.

Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja Tailaṅga [1650], a well-known poet, is said to have written a work which is an opposition to Bhaṭṭoji, called Śabdakaustubha-Kaṇḍana <lost>. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka quoted a passage from Jagannātha's Manoramā-Kuca-Mardana in his Itihāsa, vol. 1, p. 499. (See Bali [1976, p. 12]).

\[
\text{ittham ca aut sutrāt kaustubhagranthah sarvo 'py asamgata iti dheyam. adhikam ca Śabdakaustubhakāṇḍanād avadheyam.}
\]

All the commentaries on the Śabdakaustubha, from what is known to date, only covers the first nine āhnikas. It is not known whether the remaining portion of the text was ever commented upon or not. At least, as far as kāraṇāhika is concerned, no commentary is available to the present writer.

Manuscripts

There are a considerable number of manuscripts of this text. However, most of them contain only the commentary of the first nine āhnikas which cover the rules from the Śivasūtra to 1.1.75 of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. The manuscripts which have the kāraṇāhika are very few compared to those of navāhnikas. The present writer was able to consult only one manuscript up to date for this translation. The manuscript referred to here is deposited at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, MS. No. 655 of 1891-95, folios 48, lines 11, letters 42, Devanāgarī, Paper, Samvat 1847 [= 1789/90 CE]. This manuscript is supposed to have 121 folios but the first 73 folios are missing. In this extent manuscript, the kāraṇāhika is included.

Remarks on Sanskrit Text and Translation

The Sanskrit text of ŠK is transliterated from the ChSS edition. The page numbers of it are placed in the braces. The text is divided in sections in order to clarify the argumentation of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. In this romanized text, obvious mistypos and inconsistencies of the external sandhi are revised and corrected, however without note, according to the rules of Classical Sanskrit. The double quotation marks are used for the examples and the sutra discussed by Bhaṭṭoji. The sutra number of the Aṣṭādhyāyī is put in the square brackets in the text. Otherwise, the text itself is transliterated as it is without corrections.

Alternative (or more acceptable) readings, mainly based on the above-mentioned manuscript, are given under the text portion, noted with asterisk. Square brackets in the translation are supplied to give a comprehential understanding of the text. More elaborated explanations are provided in the Notes.
As this revised text presented here has no pretension to be critical (in the real sense of the word) due to the lack of more materials to constitute a critical edition, the readings will eventually be treated for revision as other manuscripts or newly found commentaries become available.

PART II:
SANSKRIT TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES

1. kārake [P.1.4.23: Siddhāntakaumudi. no. 534]

1.0 Nature of sūtra

Translation: This is an ‘adhikāra: governing rule’ [which is effective up to P.1.4.55]. By the interchange of case ending, a locative case ending is meant for the meaning of first case ending [i.e., to introduce a ‘saṃjñā: a technical term’ in the Pāṇinian system].

Notes: There have been discussions among grammarians on the nature of P.1.4.23. The principles which are to be concerned here are as follows: (1) This rule is included in the ekasamjñā section which introduces a technical term and (2) in case that the technical term is introduced, it is usual for Pāṇini to put it in a nominative case.

When P.1.4.23 is regarded as an adhikārasūtra, as Patañjali states, the problem is which type of adhikāra it is. There are six types of the adhikāra rule, namely samjñā, viśeṣaṇa, sthānin, prakṛti, nimitta, and ādesa. Patañjali states that this rule is an adhikāra which introduces the technical term kāraka. However, he does not provide any apparent explanation on why this technical term kāraka is put in a locative case. Kaivyata, commenting on Patañjali’s statement, says that "saṃjñānirdeśa iti. ‘sUPām sUPo bhavanti’ti prathamāyāḥ sthāne saptamī kṛteti bhāvah.’" [Pradīpa on P.1.4.23, II,344.]

Then another difficulty arises. If we admit this rule as saṃjñāadhikāra, P.1.4.1 would prevent the application of this term against the following terms. For example, P.1.4.24 introduces the technical term apādāna. If kāraka is a technical term, two designations would be at the same time applied to one single item. Such a conflict is prohibited and the following rule sets aside the previous one. However, this is not desirable and both designations should be applied here. The possible solutions in this case are two, i.e., a co-application (saṁveśa) or an application in turn (paryāya). They are discussed in the next passage.

1 “sUPām sUPo bhavanti” is a bhāṣyavārttika on P.7.1.39: supārśu sulukpūrvasavanīce cheyadbhyāyājaḥ. [III.256,13].
1.1. Co-application of rules (samāveśa)

tathā ca “dhruvam [apāye 'pādānam: P.1.4.24]” ityādau prati sūtraṁ vākyam bhīttvā kārakasāṁjñā viḍhīyate. tathā hy apāye dhruvam kārakasāṁjñā syāt. tato ’pādānam. uktām kārakam apādānasāṁjñām syāt. punāḥ kārakaśabdānuvṛttiśāmarthyaḥ viśesasāṁjñābhiḥ saha samāveśo, na tu paryāyaḥ. anuvṛttiṁ vināśi prathamavākyamātrāt tatsiddheḥ.

Translation: Therefore, after dividing every sūtra [which introduces samāṁjñā] like “dhruvam (apāye 'pādānam)” into [two forms of] sentence, this term kāraka is prescribed to each of them. Namely, (1) when some item is a point of separation, that [fixed] point is called kāraka (dhruvam apāye kārakasāṁjñā syāt). Then, the term apādāna is introduced [in the second sentence]. [Namely,] (2) the kāraka is [also] called apādāna (āyam kārakam apādānasāṁjñā syāt). Since the word kāraka appears twice on the strength of anuvṛtti, it can be co-applied with a particular samāṁjñā, but it does not work in turn (paryāya). Even without the anuvṛtti, it [= samāveśa] can be established because only the first sentence [of rule splitted] is enough for it [= application].

Notes: In order to resolve the conflict of two designations, though Patañjali keeps silent, Kāyiṣṭha resorts to ‘yogavibhāga: a splitting of the rule.’ He says: “dhruvam apāya” iti yogavibhāgaṁ kāraka iti samāṁjñā kriyate. tato ’pādānam ity atra kārakagrahaṇam anuvartate, “dhruvam apāya” iti ca tena kārakam sad apādānasāṁjñām ity evaṁ samāveśaḥ sidhyatīti. antarenāpy anuvṛttīṁ vacanasāmārthyaḥ paryāye siddhe samāveśārthaṁuṇvṛttīṁ vijñāyate [II, 345].

Thus, P.1.4.24: dhruvam apāye 'pādānam is splitted as (1)“dhruvam apāye kāraka[saṁjñām] syāt” and (2) “[āyam kārakam] apādāna [saṁjñām] syāt.” Bhāṭṭoṭi Dikṣita bases his argument on the above passage of Kāyiṣṭha which is again based on Patañjali’s view that P.1.4.23 is samāṁjñādhikāra.

The Kāṣīkāvṛtti brings different views. It says: kārake iti viśeṣaṇam apādānādisaṁjñāviṣayam adhikriyate. kārake ity adhikāra veditavyaḥ. yad ita ārdhvaṁ anukramiśyāmaḥ kārake ity evaṁ tad veditavyam. kārakaśabdaḥ ca nimittaparyāyaḥ. kārakaṁ hetuḥ ity anarthāntaram kasya hetuḥ? kriyāyaḥ. ... kārakaṁsaṁśabdāneṣu cānena eva viśeṣaṇena vyavahāro vijñāyate [on P.1.4.23, I,530-534].

According to the first view, P.1.4.23 serves as a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) to the term apādāna, etc. and P.1.4.24 will be read as “the term apādāna [will apply to] the one which is a fixed point (dhruvam) when the act of moving away is taking place.” In this case, we need not to have the interchange of case. Another view is that P.1.4.23 introduces a condition for the application (nimitta). (For details about the nature of this rule, see Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, pp. 3-26] and Sharma [1987, pp. 141-7; 1990, pp. 229-234]).
1.2. Necessity of samāveśa

tenā “stamberamah” ityādāv adhikaraṇatvāt saptamī, kārakatvāt “gatikārakopapadāt kṛt” [P.3.2.139] itī prakṛtisvaraś ca siddhāḥ. thāṭhādīśvaras tu na bhavati, apā sāhacaryād “er aca” [P.3.3.56] [p. 113] eva tatra grahanāt.

Translation: Accordingly, in case of ‘stamberamah: delighting in bunches of grass [= name of elephant],’ at first we can have a locative case ending in stamb because the grass stands for adhikaraṇa. Then, (since adhikaraṇa is) kāraka, the original accent of [a final member ending in kṛt suffix preceded by kāraka] is established by P.6.2.139. In this case, the accent prescribed in P.6.2.144 does not arise, because the kṛt suffix aC in P.6.2.144 is the one which is mentioned in the rule near to the rule prescribing aP, i.e., P.3.3.562.

Notes: The compound stamberamah is derived by P.3.2.13: stambe-karṇayoh ramijapoḥ. The derivational procedure is now presented in simple form.

stambe ramate > stambe + ram- + aC > stambe-ramah.

- P.3.2.9: harater anudyamane 'C. [aC introduced].
- P.6.3.9: haLaDantāt saptamyāḥ saṃjñāyām. [aluk for the locative ending of stambe].

P.6.2.139: gatikārakopapadāt kṛt. [an accentuation on -ramā].

Now, the problem is how we can have the accent as stamberamah. This compound retains its original accent by P.6.2.139 because the first member of it is kāraka. Since the first member has the locative ending, if it is kāraka as well, then two designations, i.e., kāraka and adhikaraṇa, are to be co-applied. As for the application of P.6.2.139, two difficulties are brought about. One is treated in this passage and the other is in the next.

One difficulty is whether this accentuation is taken place by P.6.2.144, or by P.6.2.139. For P.6.2.144, which is prescribed after P.6.2.139, sets aside P.6.2.139.

P.6.2.144: thāthaGHaÑKtāJaBitrakānām.

The answer is that the suffix aC introduced here is not the one prescribed in P.6.2.144. In P.6.2.144, the suffix aC is followed by suffix aP. According to the interpreting principle of grammar3, this suffix aC is the one which is prescribed in P.3.3.56: er aC, for suffix aP is introduced in the next rule P.3.3.57: ṛdor aP. However, the suffix aC to be introduced here is the one which is prescribed in P.3.2.9, not in P.3.3.56. Therefore, P.6.2.144 is not applicable.

---

2 This view is supported by Nāgṛśa, prakṛtisvara iti. thāṭhādīśvaras tu na, alPā sāhacaryād er aCa eva tatra grahanāt. (Uddyota on P.1.4.23, II,240r).

3 The principles on how to interprete the grammatical rules are the same as those of sentence-interpretation. They are mentioned in VP.II,315:

saṃsārgo viprayogas ca sāhacaryāp virodhitā.

arthaḥ prakaraṇat āhgaṁ śabdasyānyasya saṃpiṇḍhitā.
1.3. Alternative  

For copapadatvād eva kṛduttarapadapraṇītisvāro 'stv iti vācyam, "stambakarnayoḥ" [P.3.2.13] iti nirdeśāt pratiṣṭipadīkayos tathātve 'pi saptamivisiṣṭayor atathātvāt. na hi saptamivisiṣṭam saptamayā nirdīṣṭam, yenopadāsāṃjñāṇā labheteti dīk.

Translation: It should not be argued that since [the form stambako is called] upapada, the original accent [of the final member] ending in kṛt suffix would be retained [by the rule P.6.2.144]. Because of the rule P.3.2.13, even if those two nominals [stamba and karna] are called upapada, what is qualified by the locative case should not be so, i.e., the declensional form stambē [or karnē] has no upapada-status. For what is qualified by the locative is not taught by the locative form again. Thus by which rule can this upapada-status be obtained?

Notes: Another difficulty is that the first member is not kāraka and for this reason the co-application is not allowed. However, the word stambē is called as upapada by P.3.1.92. Then P.6.2.139 becomes applicable simply because of its upapada-status, not of the kāraka-status.

The answer is as follows: The form stambē is not a upapada. P.3.1.92 defines the upapada as being prescribed in the locative case in the Aṣṭāṅga-yāyī. Since the word stamba- is mentioned in P.6.2.139 in the form of stambakarnayoḥ, i.e., in the locative form, the word stambē- is called upapada. But in this compounding the declensional form stambē is required (by the strength of anuvṛti, P.3.2.4: suPī). This form stambē is not called upapada. If one wishes to have the word stambē called upapada, the word stambē is to be again prescribed in the locative case. Therefore the word stambē is kāraka, not upapada and by this reason the co-application is justified.

2.1. Definition of kāraka  
anvarthā ceyam samjñā karotīti kārakam iti. tena kriyānānvyayino na bhavati. "brāhmaṇasya putrām panthāṇam pṛcchati" iti. iha hi brāhmaṇāḥ putraviśesāṇam na tu kriyānuvayī.

Translation: This is the technical term with an etymological sense, i.e., "karotīti kārakam: One who acts is kāraka." Thus, it is not applied to what is not related to the action. For example, "brāhmaṇasya putrām panthāṇam pṛcchati: he asks a way to a son of a brahmin." In this case, brahmin is a qualifier to son, but not a relatum of the act of asking.

---

Nāgēśa opposes to this solution. He thinks that the example stamberaṇāḥ for justifying the co-application is not right. He says: stamberaṇāḥ iti. cintyam idam, upapadatvād eva gatikārakopapadāt kṛt iti svarasya siddheḥ, na ca stambasāśāda upapadaḥ, na tu stambesāśāda iti vācyam. subantasavyapapadātāya upapada-samjñāśūtre bhāṣye vākyamānvyayāt. tasmād gārmevasa iti udāhāryaṃ (Uddyota on P.1.4.23, II,243r).
Notes: The first definition is based on an etymological explanation. This is introduced by Patañjali [MBh ad. P.1.4.23, I.324,9-10]. Another definition of kāraka by him is as follows: sādhakāṁ nirvartakaṁ kārakasamjñāṁ bhavatītī vaktavyam (It should be noted that an accomplisher, or a completer, is given the technical name kāraka) [Ibid., I.323,8-9]. For details, see the articles listed in Secondary Sources.

2.2.1. Objection

\[ \text{nanu putro 'pi katham kārakam? praśno hi jijñāsā. tatra praśtuḥ kārakatve 'pi yam prati praśnas tasya janakatvāyogād iti cēt?} \]

Translation: How is it possible for the son to be kāraka? Because the act of asking is the act of wishing to know something. In this case, even if the person who asks is the kāraka, the person to whom one asks the question has no role as producer [and, therefore, the son cannot be kāraka].

Notes: If we accept the etymological definition, we come to face the objection. The word kāraka is derived from the verbal root kr- and paraphrased into “kriyāṁ janayati: one produces an action.” This means that what is called kāraka is the producer (janaka) of the action. If this is the case, one who asks the question can be called kāraka because he produces the act of asking. However, the son who is asked cannot be kāraka simply because he does not produce that action. Therefore, in case of the act of asking, the son has no kāraka-status.

2.2.2. Reply [Second def. of kāraka introduced]

\[ \text{satyam, maśtu janakatā. kriyānvayamātram iha vivakṣitam. tace cāsty eva. etena sampradānasya kārakatvām vyākhyātām.} \]

Translation: Correct. He would not have a producer-ness (janakatā). Here [in this definition] everything whatever related to action is intended and it [= that relation] is definitely existing in the son. In this way, the kāraka-ness of sampradāna (a recipient) is explained.

Notes: Bhāṭṭoji admits the above objection. He casts away the notion of producer-ness (janakatva). Instead, he explains kāraka in much boarder sense, namely that the relation to the action alone (kriyānvayamātra) is enough to be kāraka. The son is not related as the producer of that action, but he is certainly related to the act of asking. In the same manner, the sampradāna (a recipient) can be called kāraka. Because in case of the act of giving, though a person who is given something is not the producer of that action, he is related to it.

2.3. Third def. of kāraka introduced

\[ \text{yadvā sampradānāder api prathamāṁ buddhyārohāt kārakatā. evam jāyate karotityādau kārtkaraṁṇor api bodhyam.} \]
Translation: Or rather, it could be said that sampradāna etc. has kāraka-ness since it is first conceived [as something which is related to the action] in mind. Similarly, [the kāraka-ness] of the agent or of the object in cases such as jñāyate or karoti respectively should be understood.

Notes: This is a modified definition of the second one. This definition “buddhyāropakriyānvayatvam” is already implied by Bhartrhari. He says: sādhanavyavahāraś ca buddhyavasthā nibandhanah (The usage of sādhanā is based on how it is conceived by the mind) [VP.III.7.3.ab]. The relation to the action is not necessary to be seen externally. When the speaker conceives such a relation in his mind, he imposes the kāraka-status on the item which is regarded to have the relation. Let us see the following examples.

ghaṭāḥ devadattena jñāyate: A pot is known by Devadatta. Here, Devadatta is an agent of the act of knowing. How do we know the act of knowing which is existing in Devadatta? The agency is imposed to Devadatta only through the mind.

kataṁ karoti: He makes a mat.

In the course of making the mat, the mat is not completed. However, we use such a sentence and admit it as correct. In this case, something being made is regarded as the object of that action.

The object of the meanings of the verbal roots like jñā-, iṣ-, kr- (or yam-) are not seen. How can they be a sādhanā (namely, kāraka)? In the verse which enumerates a classification of the objects, Bhartrhari says: nirvartyo vā vikāryo vā prāpyo vā sādhanaśrayah. kriyānām eva sādhyatvāt siddharūpo 'bhidhiyate ([Whether an object is considered as] something to be made or something to be modified or something to be reached, since the action alone is to be done, it [= the object] is represented as an accomplished) [VP.III.7.79]. Therefore, the one which is yet to be accomplished can be karman only because it is aimed by that action. Furthermore, an action itself can work as kāraka. Bhartrhari says about how a previous action becomes sādhanā for the following action that “sāmadarśanam prārthanaḥ vyavasāye tv anantarā. vyavasāyas tathārāṃbhe sādhanatvāya kalpate” (The act of seeing is regarded as sādhanā for desire, the latter [= the desire] for a decision to act and that decision to act is sādhanā when it begins.) [ibid., 16].

As for the sentence “ghaṭāḥ kriyate”, Helārāja says in his commentary on VP.III.8.1:

ghaṭāḥ kriyata iti ca ghaṭa ity evaṃ buddhyā grhyāṁaṇo yo 'rthaḥ sa nirvartyata ity evaṃ padasamanvayāḥ [Prākāś, p. 5, II.18-19].

“In the sentence ‘ghaṭāḥ kriyate,’ the thing such as pot which is conceived by the mind [now] is being made. Thus, as such the word is used.”
2.3.1. Objection 1 and Reply

\[ \text{kāryāvyavahitapūrvavāyatītītīnāḥ}^1 \ \text{kathāṁ kāraṇateti cet?} \]
\[ \text{yathā yāgasyety averī.} \]

^1. Read kāryāvyavahitapūrvavāyatītītīnāṁ. This reading is found in MS.folio 88R5.

Translation: [Objection 1:] How is it possible that they can have a causeness (kāraṇatā) which does not exist in the previous moment adjoined to the result?

[Answer:] It should be noted as akin to the case of sacrifice.
[Because the sacrifice which is a cause of a result has already vanished when the result comes arise.]

Notes: From this passage onwards, three objections are brought into consideration. These objections are based on the question on how the kāraka can be a cause of action.

First objection is concerned about the temporal relationship between the action and its result. If we admit kāraka as the means of action, it should be regarded as the cause of action. However, if there is a time gap between the action and its result, how can the kāraka be the cause since it does not exist when the result appears? The answer is that there is an example where the result comes arise even after the cause has disappeared such as in a sacrifice (yāga). In case of the sacrifice, it is the cause and the result is, say, rebirth in heaven. Here, the sacrifice does not exist just in the previous moment which is followed by the result.

2.3.2. Objection 2 and Reply

\[ \text{tatra vyāpāro } '\text{stītī cet.} \]
\[ \text{na, tāvatāpi yāgasya pūrvvartitānupādānāt.} \]

Translation: [Objection:] Is there any activity [that precedes its result]? [Answer:] No. As far as [the activity is concerned], the previously-existing-ness of sacrifice [to the result] is not justified.

Notes: Even though the sacrifice itself does not exist just in the previous moment of the result, the result in the form of “rebirth in heaven” is expected. In this case, it is believed to be something which connect both of them. It is \text{‘vyāpāra: a causal activity.’} This vyāpāra becomes a direct cause of the result and the sacrifice is an indirect cause. Through this intermediate one the result is produced from the sacrifice. Such an intermediate activity is nothing but \text{‘apūrva.’}

However, this intervene of the vyāpāra does not ascertain that an existence of a cause like the sacrifice at immediately previous moment of the result is justified. The notion of apūrva is not consistently held by all the Mīmāṃsakas (See Gune [1978, pp. 25-31]). In this connection, it seems to be enough to point out that in the causal relationship the cause is regarded either as being existing in the immediately previous moment or as having the intermediate like vyāpāra which maintains until the result will occur.
The theory of *apūrva* is advocated by Śabara in his commentary on *JS.2.1.5: codanā punar ārambhaḥ*. Śabara says: *apūrvaṁ punar asti*, yata ārambhaḥ śiśyate “svargakāmo yajete”ti. *itaratā hi vidhānam anarthakam syāt. bharigitvād yāgasya* [II.358,16-359,1]. Kumārila explains this *apūrva* as follows [Tantravārttika, on *JS.2.1.5. Apūrvādhikaraṇa*, II.364,7-8]:

```
karmabhyaḥ prāgayogasya karmanah puruṣasya vā.
yogyatā sāstrāvagyamyā yā parā sāpūrvam iṣyate.

"[The notion of] *apūrva* is admitted as a possibility (yogyatā) either of the rite which is not able to [cause a result] before the rites or of a person [who is not able to have that result], which is understood from the text and [existing in the] later."
```

The existence of *apūrva* between the sacrifice and the result is necessary for the Mīmāṃsakas because otherwise they cannot establish the authority of the Vedas and the Vedic injunctions. Moreover, if it does not last until the time of the appearance of the result, the sacrifice cannot serve as the means to obtain the result. Therefore, a contiguity of *apūrva* should be assumed. Kumārila says [*ibid., 365,22-366,2; 366,10-14*]:

```
yāgād eva taddhi śaktidvāreṇa sidhyati.
sūkṣmaśaktyātmakam vā tatphalam evopajāyate.
yadi hy asambandhīnā kenacit phalam sādhyaṃ tato doṣaḥ syāt.
yāgāhitaya tu śaktyā sādhyamānam yāgenāva śādhitam bhavati.
sarvasādhanānāṁ īṣṭaphalapravṛttāv āntarālikavyāpārāvaśyaṁ-
bhāvītvāt.
vīnāśītvena vijñātam sādhanaṃ lokavedayoh.
asambhāvītasāmarthyasthātvitvām codyate katham.
nūnaṁ vinaśṭasyāpy etasya sāmarthyām phalanivrāttikālāvadhīḥ
yāvad āsta iti hi yāvan nāvadhāryate tāvad vīnāśini kriyā
codyitum evaśakyā. tasmāt sambhāvanāvadhāraṇā ca
prathamam eva siddheti.

"That [= the result] is established only by the sacrifice with the intermediate of the power (śakti). Or, that result is produced as the one which has a minute power as its nature. If something which is not related to [the sacrifice] accomplishes the result, it would lead to a fault. However, anything which is accomplished by the power left behind by the sacrifice is the one which is accomplished by the sacrifice itself. Because all the means inevitably require the intermediate activity (vyāpāra) in order to produce the result desired.

The means either of the ordinary world or of Veda is known to be destructive. Then, how is it possible to presupposedly prescribe the contiguity of the potentiality? Unless the potentiality of the one which is already vanished can continue till the occurrence of the result, it would not be able to
prescribe the transitory action. Thus, the contiguity [of such a potentiality] is proved at first.”

2.3.3. Objection 3 and Reply
avyavahitapūrvavarttisvasvavyāpārānyantarakaṭvam kāraṇatvam iti cet?
na, vyāpāratvasya kāraṇatvagarbhatayā ātmārayāpatteḥ, svavyāpāraṣyeva svajñānasāyāpi praveṣasambhavāc ca.
Translation: [Objection:] The cause-ness is the state of being a possessor of either oneself or one’s activity which exists in a previous [moment] contiguous [to the result].
[Answer:] No. Because, if so, the activity-ness would lead to mutual dependence, for it is itself included in the cause-ness [to the result]. Moreover, if svavyāpāra is admitted as the cause, then svajñāna would be [wrongly] admitted as the cause.
Notes: Here, a definition of the cause-ness is introduced alternatively. According to this definition, the cause in case of the sacrifice is either the sacrifice or its vyāpāra. The activity (vyāpāra) is defined as “taj janyatve sati tajjanyajanako vyāpāraḥ: when it is produced [by a cause], the producer [of an effect], which is produced, is the activity” according to Naiyāyikas. Thus, the vyāpāra itself is the one which is produced by the cause, i.e. the sacrifice, and becomes the cause to the result.5

2.3.4. Naiyāyikas’ opinion
ata eva jñāyamānaṁ liṅgaṁ padaṁ cānumitiśabdajñāṇayayoḥ kāraṇam iti jarannaiyāyikāḥ.
Translation: Therefore, according to the old Naiyāyikas, the cause of inference and knowledge of word is the sign and the word respectively, which is to be known at present.
Notes: As for an inference (anumāna), Naiyāyikas hold that in the inference a mark (liṅga) is a cause of it. Vātsyāyana says in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5:
tatpūrvakam ity anena liṅgaliṅgingaḥ. sambhandhārāsanam liṅgadarśanam cābhisambadhaye. liṅgaliṅgingaḥ sambhandhāvayor ārūparāraṁ niyārārārā bhasmiḥ alārā Pratīkatī bhasmiharte. liṅgaliṅgingaḥ sambhandhāvayor ārūparāraṁ niyārārā bhasmiḥ alārā Pratīkatī bhasmiharte. [pp. 142, 146].

5 Navya-Naiyāyikas discuss the notion of apūra. For example, Nyāyasiddhāntadipā of Śaṅkhara has a section named ‘Apūrva-vāda.’ “etad api nāsti, kāraṇatvasya kāryāvyavahitapūrvavasamaya-varttīvatapūrvvasamayavarttīvyāpāravattvānyataratāpyatiyatavatādi iti sākṣeṣaḥ: It is not correct. Because the cause-ness is either the state of being existing in the previous [moment] to the result or the state of having the vyāpāra which is existing in the previous [moment to the result]” [p.90,II.26-28] Gaṅgāśa also has Apūrva-vāda-section in his Tattvācintāmaṇi, Śabdakaṇḍa. “naru nirupadhipāravarttītā kāraṇatā sā vyāpāreṇa nirvāhyata ity atra ko ‘ṛthaḥ, kiṃ kriyate, uta jñāpyate. nādyāḥ, uttaravarttītena vyāpārasya tatrāsāmyarthāḥ. netarāḥ, liṅgaiva tadbodhanāt cīrādvās tān karaṇam vyāpāreṇa vyāpāten iti cet” [vol.4, part 2, p. 412,1.3-p. 413,1.2].
And in case of a verbal knowledge, it is a word (pada) which causes it. See the Tarkasamgraha of Annambhaṭṭa [p. 50, 54]:

śaktam padaṁ. asmāt padaḥ ayam artho bodhavya itisvarasamketaḥ śaktiḥ. ... vākyārthajñānaṁ śabdajñānaṁ, tat karaṇaṁ śabdah.

“The word (pada) has a power [to convey a meaning]. This is a convention of Īśvara that from this word this meaning is to be understood. ... The knowledge of a sentence is the knowledge obtained through the language. The language is the cause of it.”

However, Navya-Naiyāyikas oppose to the view of old Naiyāyikas. For example, the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha Paṭīdīnana (fl. ca. 17th CE), which is a commentary of the Bhāṣapariccheda, discussed it.

“padajñānam tu karaṇaṁ, dvāraṁ tatra padārthāḥ. śabdabhodhaṁ phalam, tatra śaktidiḥ sahakāriṇī [k. 81]. śabdabhodhaprakāraṁ darṣayati -- padajñānam tv iti. na tu jñāyamānaṁ padaṁ karaṇam, padābhāve 'pi mauniślokādau śabdabhodhāt.”

Here, his reason why the word to be known at present is not a cause of verbal knowledge is that even if no word is uttered, for instance, when someone reads a śloka in his mind, he realizes the meaning of that śloka. Therefore, a pada, not a pada to be known at present, is the cause of knowledge.

2.3.5.1. Mīmāṁsaka’ opinion 1

jñāyamānaṁ padārthāḥ karaṇaṁ iti ca mīmāṁsakāḥ.

Translation: According to the Mīmāṁsakas, it is the meaning of word to be known that causes the knowledge.

Notes: Śabara says in his commentary on JS. 1.1.25 that “padāni hi svam svam padārtham abhidyāya nivṛttavyāpārāni, athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham gamayati: In fact, [every] words, after expressing [their] meanings, stop their activity [of expressing]. Then, when the meanings of the words are realized, [the words] make the meaning of sentence realize as well”. [vol. 1, p. 116,115-6] Among the Mīmāṁsakas after Śabara, there are two theories about sentence-meaning, i.e., abhīhitānvaśvavādā and anvītabhīdhanāvaśvādā. Bhāṭṭa school takes a position of the former, and Prābhākaras of the latter. Both theories have their root in the above passage of Śabara.

It is the Bhāṭṭa school who holds the view that a knowledge of word is the cause of verbal knowledge. Kumārila states that “atrābhidyāte yady apy asti mūlāntaraṁ na naḥ. padārthānāṁ tu mūlatvam drṣṭaṁ tadbhāvabhāvataḥ: Even though we have no other base [for understanding of the meaning of the sentence], the meanings of the words serve as such bases since that[the knowledge of the sentence-meaning] comes [when] there is that[the knowledge of the word-meanings]”[ŚV, Vākyādhihkaranaṁ,110cd-111ab].

On the other hand, Śālikānātha Miśra, a Prābhākara, says:
pađebhya eva vākyārtha-pratrayayo jāyate yathā. tathā vayam nibadhnīmah prabhākaraguror matam. [Vākyārthamārkā, k.1] pađebhya eva, na vākyāt. nāpy antyavāraṇāt. nāpi padārthebhyā ity arthaḥ” [p. 1].

“As the notion of sentence-meaning comes arise from the words themselves, so we realize the view of Prabhākara teacher. [Com.] This means that [sentence-meaning arises] from the words themselves, not from the sentence itself. Neither from the last phoneme, nor form the meaning of the words.”

2.3.5.2. Mīmāṃsakas’ opinion 2

ata eva rathantarasāmāder aindravāyvāṅvatvādaus1 nimitattaty udghoṣo mīmāṃsakānām.

*1. Read aindravāyvāṅvatvādaus (MS88R9). See Notes.

Translation: Therefore, it is a popular claim of Mīmāṃsakas that the sāman like rathantara, etc. is the cause of the precedence of aindravāyava.

Notes: This refers to the precedence of ‘rathantarasāman’ in the case of Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. For the details, see the discussions of Śabara and Kumārila on JS. 2.3.1.1. rathanarādhikaraṇam [vol.3, pp. 141-147]. The sāman in question is “yadi rathaṁtarvasāmā somāḥ syāt, aindravāyvāṅgran grahaṅ graṅhiyāt: If the soma is connected with the Rathantarvasāma, precedence should be given to the holding of the vessels dedicated to Indra and Vāyu” [tr. by Ganganath Jha, p.805]. The following is quoted from Tantravārttika of Kumārila, which is only the portion related to this ŚK’s passage.

“na ca nimittaṁ naṁittikasya rūpasāṅnindhānenopakarotī. katham tarhi ? jñāyāmānatvena. tasmād aprayuktam api samkalpitavād rathantaram nimittaṁ. yadā tv ekadeśasthenāpi tena viśeṣitaḥ krutur nimittaṁ, tadāsau vartata evety avirodhaḥ. [vol. 3, p. 150,9-12]

“Then again, as a matter of fact, the Condition helps the Conditioned not by its actual material presence, but simply by being fully known; and hence even though the Rathantara may not have been actually sung in the morning, yet, inasmuch as it has been determined upon (in the very act of determining the performance of the sacrifice), and is fully known as such, it could very well serve as the condition (for the particular order of precedence in the holding of the vessels in the morning). And when it is the sacrifice, as qualified by the Rathantara, even though existing in only one part of it, that is the condition of the precedence -- then, inasmuch as the sacrifice is present in the morning also, there would be no incongruity in this” [Jha, pp. 814-815].
2.4. Fourth def. of kāraka introduced

Given athavopasarjanaśamjñā, yathā “rājñāḥ kumāryāḥ; rājakumāryāḥ”

ityādau yathāsambhavam anvarthāpi, “arddhapippali” ityādau

vacanāḥ bhavati. tathā kārakasamjñāpi prati sūtraṃ vidhiyā-

mānaṃvacanāḥ sampradānādau bhavati. pradeśeṣu tu samjñāpra-

kāraka eva bodhah. tattadrūpaprapkārako veti anyad etad.

Translation: Or, the technical term kāraka as one [prescribed in a vidhi

śūtra], not as the

anvarthasamjñā, can continue to the following

rules which prescribe sampradāna, etc. as in case of the technical

term upasarjana. Namely, in case of compound rājakumāryāḥ,

this upasarjana is interpreted as the one which follows its

etymological meaning and, on the other hand, in case of

compound arddhapippali, it is interpreted in the formal sense.

However, in the domain of the grammar, what is understood

[from the rule] is that which has a technical term as its subject or

that which has an individual form as its subject.

Notes: The compound rājakumārī is a śaṣṭhi-tatpurusa by P.2.2.8. Its

elemental string is as follows:

[(rājan +Nās)+ (kumārī + Nās) +] svam + sU.

In this string there are two words ending in śaṣṭhi. If we accept the

literal interpretation of P.1.2.43, i.e., “that which is mentioned by

prathamā in the compounding is called upasarjana,” both of them

would be so because the rule in question is prescribed in the first case

(śaṣṭhi). Then a difficulty arises. Which constituent should be placed

first in compound by P.2.2.30?

In order to resolve this difficulty, an etymological consideration of

the term is introduced here. Namely, one constituent is termed upa-

sarjana in relation to the other. Thus, one derivational unit [rājan +

Nās] is regarded as upasarjana to the other unit [kumārī + Nās] and

the latter is upasarjana to [svam + sU]. (After compounding, the

shortening of final vowel in a word termed upasarjana which ends in a

feminine affix is taken place by P.1.2.48. rājakumārī → rājakumārī.)

In this way, a technical term which is interpreted on the basis of

etymological consideration can resolve the difficulty.

The compound arddhapippali is a Īp. by P.2.2.2: ardhāṃ napum-

sakam. Since the word ardhā is mentioned in prathamā in the present

rule, it is termed upasarjana and placed first in the compound. Here,

term upasarjana is interpreted formally. (In details, see Sharma [1990,

pp.111-112]).

Likewise, the term kāraka is interpreted as anvarthasamjñā in certain

case and as vidhīśūtra in the other. Such different interpretation are

really seen as is in case of upasarjana. Above argument is based on

Nyāsa on P.1.2.48, I. p. 333:

īha ca rājñāḥ kumāryāḥ svam rājakumārīsvarm iti dvayor api

śaṣṭhyantayoḥ samāsāśāste prathamānirdiśṭād ubhayaḥ api

upasarjanasamjñāyāḥ satyāḥ tad eva doṣadvayaṃ pārṇoti?
naiśa doṣaḥ. yasmād upasarjanam iti mahatyāḥ saṃjñāyāḥ karanaśyaitad eva prayojanam — anvarthaśaṃjñā yathā vijnā- yeteti. apradhānam upasarjanam, pradhānam upasarjanam iti. apradhānāṁ ca tat prati tad upasarjānām iti. ... rājñāḥ kumāryāḥ svam rājakaumārīsvam ity atrāpi eṣa parīhāraḥ. atrāpi kumāri- śabdām apekṣya rājaśabdasyāprādhānyam, na tu rājaśadbam apekṣya kumārīśabdasya. tasmād rājaśabdasyopasarjanasamjñā, na tu kumārīśabdasya.

2.5. Objection by Pracīnavaiyākaraṇas

syād etad. “vrkṣasya parṇam patati” ityādau parṇaviśeṣanasyāpi vrkṣasya kārakatāpattiḥ, “vrksat patati” iti prayogānurodhāt. tarhi asmadiyaśabdadprayogavālakṣanyamātreṇa ekasyaiva janak- katvājanakatve vyavatīṣṭhete iti cet.

Translation: It may be so. In the expression “vrkṣasya parṇam patati: a leaf of tree is falling down,” the word vrkṣa which is a qualifier to the word parṇa can be the kāraka because there is an usage like “vrksat (parṇam) patati” in which vrksa is the kāraka. Thus, contrary to our usage, it would lead to establish two properties, i.e., producer-ness (janakatā) and non-producer-ness (ajanakatā), to only one item.

Notes: Let us see the following sentences.

vrkṣasya parṇam patati: A leaf of a tree is falling down.
vrksat parṇam patari: A leaf is falling down from a tree.

In the above sentences, the word vrksa is used. In the first sentence, since this word is a qualifier to the word parṇa, it has ajanakatā. On the other hand, in the latter, since it is regarded as the point of separation, it is called apādāna and thus has janakatā (i.e., kārakatā). Such different usages regarding to one and the same word would imply that two properties which are contradictory to each other do exist in one entity. This is indicated by the interpretation of the term upasarjana.

However, this objection is an argument just for the sake of argument. If kāraka is considered as an exclusive notion, once any entity is called, say, apādāna, it would be so elsewhere. The different attribution of six kārakas which is represented in the sentences are neither exclusive nor factual. It is a linguistic difference which enables the entity to perform such a role. When, in the outside world, the entity is witnessed as a point of a separation, it is called apādāna and takes an ablative case. When the same entity is witnessed as an object and the speaker wants to express it so, then it is called karman. The notion of kāraka is thus relative and every entity is eligible for all types of kāraka in the verbal communication. This is a position of Pracīnavaiyākaraṇas.

2.6. Siddhānta

atredaṁ siddhāntarahasyam.
Translation: Now, this is the secret of final view.

2.6.1. By Pracīna.

\[\text{kārakatvam tadvāpyakartṛtvādiṣatkañ ca vastuviśeṣe 'nava-}\
\text{sthitam. viśeṣaṇaviśeṣavyavat tarhi gauḥ sarvaṁ prati gaur eva, na}\
\text{tu kañcit praty agaur itivad viśeṣaṇm viśeṣaṇ eveti suvacam.}\
\text{tathā ca kiṃ kārakam, kaḥ kartā, kiṃ karmetyādipraśne sarvam}\
\text{ity uttaram.}

Translation: The kāraka-ness, which has six varieties like agency (kartṛtvṛ), etc. prevaded by it, is not fixed in a particular object. Like the relation of qualifier and qualificand, namely, the word go can be used for every cow but not for anything which is not a cow. [In the same manner,] a qualifier is nothing but a qualifier [so it does not serve as the kāraka in the above example]. Therefore, when the question arises “What is kāraka?”, “Who is the agent?”, or “What is the object?”, etc., it is the answer that “everything [can be eligible for it].”

Notes: This view is borrowed from Bhartrhari. According to him, everything can become all types of kāraka because it has sakti which enables itself to do so. He says [VP.III.7.1]:

\[\text{svāśraye samavetānāṃ tadvad evāśrayāntare.}\
\text{kriyānāṃ abhinispattau sāmarthyaṃ sādhanam viduh.}\
\text{“The one which resides in its substratum, or in a substratum of the}\
\text{other, is called ‘a capability (sāmarthya)’ which is a means}\
\text{(sādhana) to accomplish actions.”}\
\]

This capability is nothing but a power (sakti). Such a power is inevitably inherent in the substance and when the action takes place this power functions as the means of that action (sarvatra sahajā saktir yāvad dravyam avasthitā. kriyakāle tv abhivyakter āśrayād upakārinī [Ibid., 28]). When the action is not yet started, the sakti is not differentiated. However, once the action starts, something functions as the agent and something as the instrument, etc. A speaker, witnessing a series of the action and the different roles performed by different substances, attributes the grammatical designations such as kartṛ and karaṇa, etc, to the substances. This attribution of the grammatical role is based on the roles of which the substance plays in that action and, therefore, the substance whose sakti is not exclusively restricted to one role can be given different designations according to the aspects of the action.

2.6.2. By Navya

\[\text{vakṣyamāṇakartṛtvakarmatvāder acetaneśu ānādiśu ca nirbādha-}\
\text{tvāt kayā pacidhātuvyaktyā upasthāpīte 'rthe kiṃ kartrādiṃ itī}\
\text{praśne tu prakṛtapatiprayaktyupāttavyāpārāśrayah kartā. vyāpāra-}\
\text{vyadhirakaṇaphalāśrayah karma.} \text{p.114} {yad vyāpārottara-}\
\]
bhāvītvaṁ kriyāyā vivakṣyate tat karaṇam. kartṛkarmaṇor āśrayo ’dhikaraṇam ityādikramenottaram.

Translation: However, since the agency or the object-ness, etc. which is to be expressed is not assumed to be inanimate and infinite [like space or time], the question should be “Who is the agent in which his action is represented by a particular verbal root like pac-?” In this case, the answer is as follows: the agent is the substratum of the activity obtained by the individual verbal root pac- in context, that the object is the substratum of the result which is residing in a different locus from that of the activity, that the instrument is that which is intended to express the production of action subsequent to the activity, and that the locus is the substratum of either the agent or the object.

Notes: Here, Bhāṭṭoja turns his position. His statement declares that everything cannot become all types of kāraka. Because, in case of acetana or anādi things, although we have the expressions such as “ākāśam pravartate: the sky expands,” or “ratho gacchati: a cart is going,” it does not mean that we accept the acetana or anādi things as being the agent of those actions independently. Since we have such usages and they are desired, in order to derive them we have to postulate the agency, etc., in them. This agency (kartṛtva) is not the power of them but the grammatical expression. This postulation is based on the extremely linguistic treatment of the term kāraka. The term kartṛ or karman is a grammatical designation insomuch as that action denoted by the verbal root in context is concerned. (In detail, see Kudo [1995]).

2.7. Example of verbal root pac-

viklittyanukūlavyāpāro hi pacyarthah. vyāpāras cānekadhā.

Translation: [Let us consider the example of pac-] The meaning of verbal root pac- is an activity conducive to softening. And [this] activity has several stages [in it].

Notes: In this section onwards (2.7), how the sentences differ due to the different aspects of the action and its substratum. This difference is based on the notion that the verbal root denotes a series of several activities. Action consists of several activities. For example, the verbal root pac- denotes the act of cooking. This act of cooking is regarded as a collection of sub-actions. Basing on each sub-action, the agent as the substratum of that sub-action differs and consequently the sentence differs as well. These are illustrated. (For the discussions about the meaning of verbal root, and theory of kriyā, etc., that is to say, Pāṇinian theory of action, is not treated here due to the limit of space.)

2.7.1.1. Different agent due to the different aspects of cooking
tatra pacer adhīśrayanatanṭandulāvapanaidhopakarṣaṇāpakaṭaṁ-phūtkārādītparyakatve tadāśrayo devadattaḥ kartā.
Translation: When the speaker wants to express the activity like putting [a pot] on [the fire], putting the rice grains into [the pot], supplying and pulling out the fuel, and blowing [the fire], the agent is Devadatta who is the substratum of those activities [and the sentence might be “devadattaḥ pacati”].

Notes: cf. Vt VIII on P.1.4.23, 1,324,17-18. adhiśrayanodakāśecana-taṇḍulāvapanaidhopakāraṇakriyāḥ pradhānasya kartuḥ pākaḥ: The act of cooking performed by the main agent consists of “putting [a pot] on [a stove]” (adhiśrayana), ‘pouring water’ (udakāśecana), ‘putting the rice grains in [the pot]’ (taṇḍulāvapana), and ‘supplying [= dragging and pulling out] the fuel’ (edhopakāraṇa).

2.7.1.2. The agent turned from the instrument

jvalanatātparyakatve tv edhāḥ kartāraḥ.

Translation: When the act of heating is intended, the agent is the fuel [and the sentence should be “edhāḥ pacanti”].

Notes: cf. Vt X on do., I,325,1. edhāḥ paksyanty ā viklitter jvalisyantiti jvalanakriyā karaṇasya pākaḥ. The act of cooking by the instrument is ‘heating’ (jvalana) such as “edhāḥ paksyanti: the fuels will cook,” namely “[they] will heat until [the rice grains] become soft” (ā viklitter jvalisyanti).

2.7.1.3. The agent turned from the locus

taṇḍuladhāraṇādiparatve sthāli kartri.

Translation: When the act of holding the rice grains is [intended], the agent is the pot [and the sentence is “sthāli pacati”].

Notes: cf. Vt IX on do., I,324,21-22. dronaṁ pacaty ādhakaṁ pacatīti sambhavanakriyā dhāraṇakriyā cādhi karaṇasya pākaḥ: The act of cooking by the locus consists of ‘taking in’ (sambhava) and ‘holding in’ (dharāna) as in “dronaṁ pacati: it [= the pot] cooks as much as drona,” and “ādhakaṁ pacati: it cooks as much as ādhaka.”

2.7.1.4. The agent turned from the object

avaṇavavibhāgādiparatve taṇḍulāḥ kartāraḥ. ata eva karmakarta karaṇakartetyādi vyavahāraḥ.

Translation: When the separation into small pieces is [intended], the agent are the rice grains [and the sentence is “*taṇḍulāḥ pacanti” or “taṇḍulāḥ pacayante svayam eva”].

Therefore, we have the [linguistic] usages like ‘karmakarta: objective agent’ and ‘karaṇakarta: instrumental agent,’ etc.

Notes: An object, when it is regarded as an agent, is treated as the agent. In this case, the action which is performed by itself is directed to itself. This is so-called reflexive construction prescribed by P.3.1.87: karmavat karaṇāḥ tulyakriyāḥ. The oft-quoted example is “odanaḥ svayam eva pacayat: rice cooks itself.” Here, rice is a substratum of the act of cooking and at the same time a substratum of the result, i.e., a
softening. Although rice is the object of the act of cooking in the active, when the speaker wants to express the act of cooking restrictedly as softening, the *karman* which is the substratum of the result becomes the agent because the *karman* is independent as far as its activity is concerned. This is the *karmakartr* (the object-turned-agent). The verbal understanding from this sentence is, according to Kaṇḍa Bhāṭṭa, “ekodanābhinnāsrayakah pākānukūlo vyāpārah: the activity conducive to the act of cooking in which the substratum of it is identical with rice” [VBS. dhātvartaniṁṇaya, p. 75]. (As for the reflexive construction, see Kudo [1993] and also other articles listed in it. This is also to be referred, Iwasaki [1993]).

2.7.2.

```
evam “sthālyā pacati” ityatra tṛṇyopāṭṭavyāpārāśrayo ’pi sthālī karaṇam eva, na tu tadā kartri. devadattādīvyāpārasyaiva tatra dhātūpāṭṭavāt.
```

Translation: In this way, in case of “sthālyā pacati” the pot is nothing but the instrument even though it is a substratum of the activity represented by the third case. It is not always an agent because the activity of Devadatta, etc. is represented by the verbal root.

Notes: According to the grammarians, a verbal ending indicates either the agent or the object. P.3.4.69: *laḥ karman i ca bhāve cākarma-kebhayaḥ* (l-members are introduced [after a verbal stem] to denote [the agent] as well as the object and [after] intransitive to denote the abstract action in addition to [the agent]).

Bhaṭṭojo clearly states this in his *VMM.* k.3:

```
phalavyārārayos tatra phale taṇyakcinādayāḥ.
vyāpāre śaśnāmadayas tu dyotayanty āśrayānvayam.
```

“Among the activity and the result [which are the meanings of verbal root], āṭmanepada ending -taN, passive vikaraṇa -yaK, and aorist marker -CiN, etc., indicate the relation to the substratum of the result, and the present verbal stem formants such as ŚaP, ŚnaM, etc., indicate the relation to the substratum of the agent.”

Therefore, in the verbal form pacati whose grammatical formation is [pac- + ŚaP + tiP], the verbal ending tiP shows the relation to the agent. In “sthālyā pacati,” since the agent of the act of cooking is already represented in the verbal ending tiP, the pot does not serve as the agent.

---

6 Suffix *taN* is a term for nine personal ending of āṭmanepada [P.1.4.100]. The affix *yaK* is the marker of passive [P.3.1.67: sarvadāḥāutoke yaK]. *CiN* is the aorist marker [P.3.1.66: CiN bhāvavakarmano]. *ŚaP* is the sārvadāḥāuto marker i-al which is introduced after verbal roots in active voice. [P.3.1.68: kartari ŚaP]. *ŚnaM* is the affix introduced after verbal roots which belong to the seventh class [P.3.1.78: rudhāddhibhaḥ ŚnaM].
2.7.3. Another example

tathādikhaḍibhyāṁ upātte 'ṛthe batuḥ kartā. tasmīn evārthe bhakṣayatīnāpāतte 'ṛthe ādhāraḥ karma. adhipūrvaiḥ sāsthāpra-bhṛtibhir upātte 'ṛthe ādhāraḥ karma. tatraiva kevalair upātte 'dhikaranaṁ ityādi.

*1. Read batuḥ. (MS 89R2).

Translation: When the act of eating is denoted by a verbal root like ad- or khad-, a boy (batu) is the agent [and the sentence is “baṭur atti” or “baṭuḥ khāḍati”]. [But,] when such a meaning, i.e., the act of eating is denoted in the causative construction like bhakṣayati, the boy [being the substratum of that activity] is called karman [by P.1.4.52 and takes the accusative case by P.2.3.2]. [Thus, the sentence would be “*(devadattaḥ) baṭum ādayati; khādayati’]. 7

When the verbal roots like śī-, sthā- [and ās-] are prefixed with adhi-, the locus is regarded as karman. [However,] when [those verbal roots] are used without prefix, [the substratum] is called adhikarana [by P.1.4.45 and takes the locative case by P.2.2.36].

Notes: P.1.4.52: gatibuddhipravāsāyārthasābdakarmākarmakāṝṇām aṉikartā sa Nau. This rule teaches that an agent in non-causative construction is regarded as an object in the causative when the verbal root listed in this rule is used. For example:

[aṉīC] gacchati māṇavako grāmam: A boy goes to a village.
[nīC] gamayati māṇavakam grāmam: [He] lets a boy to go to a village.

However, the application of this rule is restricted. The prohibition is given in Vt V: adikhaḍinīvahināṁ pratiṣedhāḥ [MBh ad P.1.4.52, I.337,14]. By P.1.4.52, the agent of a verbal root denoting the meaning of ‘eating’ (pratyavāsānārtha) in the non-causative construction becomes the karman in the causative construction. In case of the verbal roots like ad- or khad-, however, the agent in aṉīC is prohibited to become the karman in ṇīC construction by the present Vt V. For example,

[aṉīC] baṭuḥ annam atti khāḍati: A boy eats the food.
[nīC] baṭunā annam ādayati khādayati: (He) makes a boy eat the food.

In this passage of ŠK, Bhaṭṭoji seems to forget this prohibition of Vt V, for his statement says that “tasmīn evārthe bhakṣayatīnāpāतte 'ṛthe baṭuḥ karma.” If the boy is called karman, the word baṭu should take the accusative, but it is not desired. It is strange that Bhaṭṭoji, here, ignores the prohibition of Vt V even though he himself admits this

---

7 In MBh. ad P.1.4.52, the causative form of ad- is given as ādayate. The prohibition of Vt. V is not only restricted to P.1.4.52, but also to P.1.3.87 which prescribes to add the parasmaipada endings. Due to this view held by another grammarian, the verbal root does not take the parasmaipada but the āmanepada in the causative [1.337,14-19]. In details, see Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, pp. 245-246, Note (170)].
prohibition and quotes the example mentioned above in his Siddhānta-
kaumudi no. 540.
P.1.4.46: adhīṣṭhāsāṁ karma.
When the verbal roots such as si-, sth-, ās- are prefixed by adhi-,
the locus (ādhāra) where that action is taken place is regarded as
karman. Since it is called karman, it takes accusative case by P.2.3.2.
For example:
vaikūṭhe ēṣe; tiṣṭhati; āṣte → vaikūṭham adhiṣete; adhitiṣṭhati;
adhyāste.

2.8.1. Objection.
nanv evam ananugama iti cet?
Translation: This leads to an inconsistency.
Notes: The inconsistency referred here is as follows: the agent in the
active voice (in this case, the non-causative construction) is called
karman in the causative. However, this general exchange has an
exception stated in Vt V on P.1.4.52. Thus, the agent in the active is
called karman in certain cases of verbal roots and takes the accusative
in the causative and, on the other hand, it is called not karman but
kartr, and takes the instrumental.

2.8.2. Reply
satyam, kasya kaḥ pitā ko bhrāta ity atrevānanugatasyaiva
laksyatvāt. ata eva prayogāṇāṁ sādhvasādhutā vyavatiṣṭhate.
anyathā kvacit kartuḥ sarvatra kartṛtapattau sakalaprayogāḥ
saṅkīryeran.
Translation: True. As is in case of the question like “Who is whose
father?”, “Who is a brother of whom?”, this inconsistency is
implied.
Therefore, the correctness or incorrectness of the usages is
decided case-by-case. Otherwise, in certain cases where [someone]
is the agent, he should be so elsewhere and it would lead to the
confusion of all the usages.
Notes: The answer is very simple to say that the kāraka is a relative
notion such as the relation of father-son. Someone is called father of X
and at the same time he is a son of Y.

2.8.3.
uktam ca Harinā [VP.III.7.91]
vastutas tadaniriddeṣyam na hi vastu vyavasthitam .
sthālāḥ pacyata ity eṣā vyavasthā drṣyate yataḥ.8 iti.
Translation: Thus, it was said by Bhartṛhari:

8 VP.III.7.91. The word vyavasthā in d pāda is vivakṣā in the editions of Abhyankar-Limaye,
Iyer, and Rau.
In reality, nothing can be indicated as it [= karaṇa] since [the role of] things is different in each case. This is known from the usage “sthālyā pacyate” in which the speaker wants to say so.

2.8.4. Causative construction

\[\text{ata eva prayojakavyāpāravyāpyatvāvisēse 'pi pacyādidhātuṣu prayojyo na karma, gamyādiṣv eva tu karma.}\]

Translation: Therefore, even if there is no difference in the state of being pervaded by the activity of a prompter, the prompted [agent in NiC construction] in case of a verbal root pac-, etc. does not become karman. However, in case of a verbal root gam- [i.e., the verbal root which has a meaning of the movement (gatyarthā)] it becomes karman.

Notes: See also 2.7.3. Let us see the following examples again.

Ex. \([aNiC] \text{devadattaḥ gacchati} \rightarrow [NiC] (yajñadattaḥ) \text{devadattaḥ gamayati.}\]

\([aNiC] \text{devadattaḥ pacati} \rightarrow [NiC] (yajñadattaḥ) \text{devadattena pācayati.}\]

In both of the causative constructions, Devadatta is ‘prayojyakartr: an agent whose action is prompted by someone (prayojakakartr)’. Now, an underlying role of each item is presented on the right shoulder in a small letters.

\(\text{devadattaḥ gacchati} = \text{devadatta kartr + gam-SaP-tiP kartr.}\)

\(\text{devadattaḥ gamayati} = \text{devadatta prayojyakartr + gam-NiC-SaP-tiP prayojakakartr.}\)

In this case, Devadatta is the prayojyakartr. According to the Vṛ V on P.1.4.52, since the verbal root gam- has the meaning of movement, this prayojyakartr is called karman and thus takes the accusative [P.2.3.3] in the causative.

\(\text{devadattaḥ pacati} = \text{devadatta kartr + pac-SaP-tiP kartr.}\)

\(\text{devadattena pācayati} = \text{devadatta prayojyakartr + pac-NiC-SaP-tiP prayojakakartr.}\)

Here, Devadatta is also the prayojyakartr. However, since the verbal root pac- is not included in the list of P.1.4.52, this prayojyakartr remains as kartr. Being the kartr, it takes the instrumental [P.2.3.18] in the causative.

2.8.5.

\(\text{tathā “paurāṇikāc chṛṇoti,” “nātasya śrṇoti” ity atra paurāṇiko-pādānaṁ kārakaḥ ca, nātas tu nobhayam ityādi vakṣyamānam saṅgacchate.}\)

Translation: Then, in cases of “paurāṇikāc chṛṇoti: he listens to [a story] from a story-teller” or “nātasya śrṇoti: he listens to [a song] of a
singer,” the story-teller is apādāna as well as kāraka. But the actor is neither apādāna nor kāraka. Thus should be noted.

Notes: P.1.4.29: ahyātopayoge: A person who provides information, if [that information] is useful, [is called apādāna].

Ex. naṭasya śnōti.

Mbh ad. P.1.4.29 discusses this example [I.329.6-11]:

upayoga ity ucyamāne ’py atra prāṇīti, eśo ’pi hy upayogaḥ.
ātaś copayogo yad ārambhakā raṅgāṃ gacchati naṭṣya śroṣyāmo,
granthikasya śroṣyāma iti. evaṃ tarhy upayoga ity ucyate sarvaḥ
copayogas tatra prakārṣgatir viññāṣyate. sādhiyo ya upayoga iti.
kaś ca sādhiyāḥ. yo granthārthayoh. athavopayogah ko bhavitum
arhati. yo niyamapūrvakaḥ. tadyathā upayuktā maṇavakā ity
ucyante ya ete niyamapūrvakam adhitavanto bhavanti.'

To hear an actor has no usefulness because it does have neither high utility nor disciplined conduct, even though people have an enjoyment from him (*natac chōti)⁹. Since the actor is not covered by this rule, it is not apādāna. Then, how about the kāraka-status? If it is regarded as kāraka, since it is not apādāna, it would be covered by P.1.4.51 (akathitam ca). This rule gives the term karman to which is not covered by any one of the previous rules. If it is the case, the actor is called karman and takes the accusative case by P.2.3.2. However, it is not desired. Therefore, the actor is out of kāraka-range and is included in sēṣa. By P.2.3.50, it takes a genetive case.

2.9.1. Objection

naṇv evam “laḥ karmanī (ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ)” [P.3.4.69]
ityādi vidhiṣu kim karma grāhyam iti cet?

Translation: In the rules like “laḥ karmanī (ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ)” [P.3.4.69], what kind of karman is to be known?

Notes: In grammar, the karman is classified into three (P.1.4.49-51: kartur īpsitamatam karma; tathāyuktam cānīpsitam; akathitam ca.). Once any item is called karman, there is no difference for the application of the rules. (For the types of karman, i.e., the difference of its content, see VP.III.7.79 quoted in the Notes of 2.3.)

2.9.2. Reply

vinigamakābhāvāt sarvam ity avehi. yathā bhasyety atra sarvaṃ
bham.

⁹ Nāgėśa admits this sentence “naṭāc chṛṇoti” as correct only in case that people go to the theatre in order to get information from the actor as their teacher [Uddyota, II.253]: yadā tu nāṭādibhyo ’pi tathādhyayanaṃ tadā naṭāc chṛṇotiḥ bhavaty eveti bodhyami.
Translation: Since there is no deciding factor between the alternatives, everything can be realized as karman. In case of “BHAsya” [P.6.4.129], this rule means every item which is termed BHA.10

2.9.3. Objection
tarhi tīghubhādīvat pāribhāṣīkam eva kārakatvākarmatvādīkaṃ syād iti cet?
Translation: [Objection:] If so, like TI, GHU, and BHA, etc. [which are an artificial technical term (krtrimā saṃjñā)], the term kāraka and karman, etc., are [to be known] as being technical.11

2.9.4. Reply
ko vā brūte neti. etāvān eva param bhedaḥ tīghubhādīnāṃ sabdasamjñātavam, itaṃśān tv arthasamjñātavam iti.
Translation: [Answer:] No one can refute this. Only this difference is [to be known], namely, TI, etc., is the technical term of the word and, on the other hand, kāraka, etc., is the technical term of the meaning.
Notes: The word sabdasamjñā is related to the rule for a phonetic unit (vamavidiḥ) and, on the other hand, the word arthasamjñā is to the rule for a meaning prescription (arthavidhi).

2.9.5.1. Reason for accepting karman as a technical term
evaḥ ca “karmanī dvitiyā” [P.2.3.2] ity anena yathāyatham ādharādāv api dvitiyā vidhiyate iti phalitam.
Translation: In this way, the second case ending is introduced even after an item which denotes the locus, etc., by P.2.3.2.
Notes: So-called ādhāra-karman is prescribed in P.1.4.46-48. (adhimaśāṃ karma; abhinivīśaḥ ca; upānavadhīyāṇvah). This attribution of term karma to the item which is in fact the locus is technically (or grammatically) decided.

2.9.5.2. Refutation of the view of Naiyāyikas
“rathena gamyate,” “ratho gacchati” ityādāv api kartrvibhakti rutsargaṇaiva siddheta, na tatra laṃaṇaśrayaṇiṇyeta avadheyaṃ.
Translation: It should moreover be noted that the case ending which is introduced after the item which denotes the agent is generally established by P.2.3.18, but it is not necessary to resort to the

---

10 P.6.4.129: BHAsya. This technical term is applied to the pre-affixial stem which is prescribed by P.1.4.18-19, i.e. “yaCl BHAm: BHA denotes an item before an affix with initial semivowel or any vowel” and “tasau matVarthe: [BHA] denotes an item (ending in) the phonemes (-t,-s) before an affix having the meaning of affix matUP (P.5.2.94)” (See Katre [1987]).

11 P.1.1.64: aCo’ntyādi TI. TI denotes a syllable which begins with the last vowel of a given unit. P.1.1.20: dādhā GHVadāP. GHU denotes the verbal roots of the form dā or dāh except those which have the shape of dāP (See Katre [1987]).
secondary function of the word-meaning [in order to introduce that ending] in case of sentences like “rathena gamyate” or “ratho gacchati” [in which an inanimate thing is the agent].

Notes: This is a refutation to the view of Naiyāyikas. According to them, since the verbal ending denotes the effort (kṛtī, yatna), an inanimate thing cannot be the agent of action. In order to explain how the expression like “rathena gamyate” or “ratho gacchati” is to be formed, they have to resort to the secondary function of the word (lakṣāṇā). For the grammarians, the attribution of term kṛtī in case of the inanimate thing is decided by the grammatical rules, and thus they need not resort to lakṣāṇā, which is redundant (see also 2.6.2).

2.10.

_vibhaktinām vācyāṁśānīskarasā _tu karisyațe_ *1_ *1. Read vācyāṁśānīskarasā. (MS. 90R11).

Translation: The odd part of the denoted meaning of case endings is dealt with [as follows].

Notes: From this passage, the discussion is directed to the problem whether the case endings represent either the kāraka or the meaning of the kāraka.

2.10.1. Against Naiyāyikas 1

_ etena jñānasya svaprakāśatve kārtrkarmavirodham udbhāva-
  yantaḥ parāstāḥ, śabdaviśeṣopādhiḥkasya kārtrvādeḥ pratyakṣādāv
  uktisambhavāt.

Translation: Here, even if the knowledge illuminates itself, those who raise the contradiction of agent and object are defeated. Because it is valid to make a statement about a direct perception12, etc., like “devadattaḥ ghaṭam paśyati”, since the agency, etc., is the distinctive feature of a particular word.

Notes: In the direct perception, a knower (pramāṭr) perceives a knowable (prameya). If the perception reveals the form of the object, is it the object itself or the reflection of the form of the object? If a knowledge comes arise with the form of the object, it means that the knowledge knows the knowledge. In this case, the agent of the cognition and the object of it are not differentiated. For the grammarians, however, the notion of the agent or the object is highly

---

12 The notions of kārtr and kāmnā discussed in relation to a direct perception are, for example, found in the Tattvacintāmāṇi of Gaṇeśa, pratyakṣākhaṇḍa, Anuvyasāyavaśa, vol.1, p. 76ff: api ca kriyāyāḥ kṛtār vā samvyāyitvār kartṛtvār, parasamavetkriyāyaphalasāliṇtvār karanavṛtyāpārā-
viṣayatvār vā karmmatvār, dhātvarthavām anyad vā kriyātvām idam abhān jānāmītī vyavasāye
na bhāsate tadbhodhakendriyaśanākarsābhāvāt kīn tv idaṃ viṣayakajñānātviśiṣṭasya jñānasya vaiśiṣṭyaṃ ātmanī bhāsate. na ca svaprapātsa vyavasāye tādṛṣṭaṃ svasya vaiśiṣṭyaṃ bhāsitaṃ
arhati, pūrvāṃ viśeṣaḥ saṃyājanāt. tasmaā abhān jānāmītī na vyavahāraḥ kintu
anuvyavasāyaḥ, syād etat. kārttvādijñānāvaiśiṣṭyaṃ ātmanī mā jñāyī vyavahāraya
svaviṣayakajñānasādhyaḥ atiṣṭhau tad eva jñānāt saṃviṣayakaḥ kalpyate lāghavāt. ...'
linguistical so that the agency, etc., is the distinctive features of the word not the external reality of the object. Thus, the linguistic behavior becomes possible.

2.10.2. Against Naiyāyikas 2

\[ \text{etena parasamavetakriyāphalasālitvam karmatva} \text{ ced apādāne 'tivyāptir ity āsāṅkya dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphalasālitvam tad iti pariśkurvanto 'pi pariśtāḥ.} \]

Translation: Then, if you suspect that in case that the object-ness is [defined as] the state of being an abode of the result of action which is residing in other(s), it would be too broad to apply to an apādāna item; hence, it is well defined that it is the state of being an abode of the result which is the delimitor of the meaning-ness of the verbal root. [It is not correct, thus] those who claim so are also defeated.

Notes: In this passage, two definitions of karmatva are mentioned. First definition is “parasamavetakriyāphalasālitvam.” Let us consider an example “devadatto grāmaṇ gacchati,” and the meaning of verbal root gam-. The meaning of the verbal root gam- is “pūrvadesāvibhāgajanyottaradesāsamyoṅāṅkulaṁvāyāpāra: an activity conducive to the contact with another place produced by a separation from a previous point.” Here, the contact (samyoga) is the result of the action. Thus, its substratum, i.e., grāma (a village) is called karman and takes the accusative case. However, since the separation resides in the one which is other than the agent and this meaning is regarded as that which leads to the result its substratum would be called karman. In this case, the substratum of the separation, which is to be apādāna, would be wrongly covered by the first definition of karmatva. Therefore, this definition should be rejected.

Second definition is “dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphalasālitvam.” In this case, the separation is not the delimitor of dhātvarthatā. Therefore, this definition would not overapply to its substratum which is apādāna.

The definition of the word karman in Nyāya is first appeared in the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana (350-450 CE) on Nyāyasūtra 2.1.16 [pp. 438-9]. Namely, “kriyā vyāptum īṣyamānataṁ karman: it is an object which is most desired to be pervaded by an action.” Uddyotakara (500-600 CE) comments on this passage [ibid., p. 437]: karmani kah kārakārthah? kriyāvisyatvam (What is a meaning as kāraka in the object? It is a state of being a object of the action). Furthermore, Vācaspatti Miśra I (10 c. CE) says in his Nyāyavṛttikatātparyatikā [p. 437] that “anātmasamavetakriyāphalasālitvam kriyāvisayatvam karmatvam: the state of being an object is the state of being an abode of a

\[13\] All dates of the Naiyāyikas’ are given from Matilal [1977].
result [produced by] the action which is not in oneself or the state of being a content of the action.” He exemplifies a sentence “devadatthā vrkṣam paśyati: Devadatta is seeing a tree” and explains its sentence-meaning as follows:

devadattasamavetayā hi kriyayā darśanalakṣaṇayā vrkṣaviśayo 'nubhavo janyate [Ibid.].

“A perception in which the tree is a content is produced by the action in the form of seeing which is residing in Devadatta.”

Vācaspāti’s definition is borrowed by the later Naiyāyikas (namely, Navya-Naiyāyikas). However, it is quoted as a pūrva-pakṣa. For example, in the Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa, Śaśadharā (ca. 12c. CE) says “na cānyasamavetakriyāphalabhāgītavam karmatvam” [p. 25, ll.5-6]. The Kārakacakra of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa (ca. 1570 CE), perhaps the first independent work on kāraka in the history of Navya-Nyāya, discusses the notion of karan, first refuting the definition of Pracīna-Naiyāyikas:14

nāpi parasamavetakriyājanyaphalasālītvam gamipatyoh pūrvasmin deśe, tyajeś cottaraśmin deśe, spandeḥ pūrvāparayoś ca karmatvaprasaṅgat. [p. 19] ... tathā ca tattadhātvārthaḥvacchedakaphalasālītvam tattadhātvārthakarmatvam. [p. 20]

“Nor is it defined as the state of being an abode of the result produced by the action inherent in the other(s). Because [in that case] the object-ness would be incorrectly supposed to ‘a previous point (pūrvadeśa)” in cases of verbal roots such as gam- and pat-, and to ‘a subsequent point [of moving] (uttaradeśa)” in case of tyaj-, and to ‘both [i.e., here and there] points [of moving]” in case of spand- ... Thus, the state of being the object of the meaning of each verbal root is the state of being the abode of result which is a delimiter of the dhātvarthatā.”

Above mentioned passage of ŚK is apparently parallel to this argument of Bhavānanda.

2.11.1. Against Naiyāyikas 3

“grāmam gamayati devadattam” {p.115} ityādau gantry avyāpteḥ. ivaṃmate gamanasya prakṛtyarthatve 'pi tathātvānavacchedakatvāt.

Translation: Because that definition is too narrow to apply for one who goes in case of “grāmam gamayati devadattam: [Someone] lets Devadatta to go to a village.”

In your view, the act of going has no delimiter-ness as such, even if it is included in the meaning of gam-.

---

14 Nāgēśa also refutes the definition of Pracīna-Naiyāyikas in the very same manner as Bhavānanda does [PLM. pp. 175-176]. Almost all the passage of PLM which is directed to Naiyāyikas are complete parallel to Kārakacakra. The authenticity of PLM is doubtful, as already pointed out by Kapila Deva Shastri [1974].
Notes: In this passage, non-causative and causative constructions are discussed.

[āNiC] devadatto grāmam gacchati.
[NiC] devadattam grāmam gamayati.

The verbal root gam- denotes the activity in the form of going which is conducive to the contact (saṁyogānukūlagamanarūpavyāpāra). The contact resides in two substrata, namely the place to be reached, a village, and the goer, Devadatta. At the same time, the goer is the substratum of the act of going. Thus, he is kārtṛ. The village is karman because it is the substratum of the result produced by the activity which is not resided in the village.

In the causative construction, what is understood is the activity in the form of the instigation and as the result Devadatta’s act of going begins. In this case, Devadatta as the substratum of the act of going is still the agent (prayojyakārtṛ) and he cannot be regarded as the karman if we follow the Naiyāyikas’ definition. Hence, the word devadatta cannot take the accusative case.

We find the parallel discussion in VB. subarthanirnaya [p. 99]:

nanu — ‘grāmam gamayati devadatto yajñadattam’ ity atra prayojyakartary avyāptih, uttaradēsasaṁyogarūpaphalasya prayojakriyāvphalavābhaṅgat, tadānukūlavāyāv phalatvē ’pi avacchedakavābhavat.

“Objection arises. In the sentence ‘grāmam gamayati devadatto yajñadattam: Devadatta lets Yajñadatta to go to a village,’ [the definition would] be too narrow to apply to the prompted agent. Because the result in the form of the contact with the latter place does not serve as the result of the action performed by the prompter. And because the activity conducive to that [result] has no property of being the delimitor to the result.”

2.11.2.

tattve vā pācayatyādiprayojyakartary ativyāptēḥ.

Translation: Or, that definition would overapply to the agent which is prompted by (someone) in the case of pācayati.

Notes: VB. says [p. 100,11.1-7]:

nanu — sūddhagamadhātvarthe ’vacchedakatvaviraha ’pi, saṁdayantadḥātvarthrāprayojakavyāpāram prati phalatvam avacchedakatvaḥ ca prayojavyāpārasya aksatam eva iti cet? tarhi ‘pācayati devadatto visnumitrena’ ity atrāpi prayojyakaruph karmāpattau dvitiyāpatteḥ iti cet. maivam, dhātvarthaphalasālitvam iti svīkārtīnām vaiyākaraṇānām apya etad doṣasya dusparaḥaratvāt. ‘gatibuddhipratyavasyānārtha—’ iti sūtraṇa gatyādyarthaṁ eva iti niyamād, nānyesaḥ prayojavyāpādavattvena karmatvam iti cet, tarhi samaṁ mamāpi iti dheyam.

“Objection arises. In the meaning of the verbal root of gam-, even though there is no delimitor-ness, the state of being the result or
the delimitor-ness does not crush the activity of the prompted agent as far as the activity of the prompter [which is the agent of] the verbal root conjugated with suffix saN, etc.15 is concerned. If so, in the expression ‘pācayati devadatto viśnumitra’: Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra cook,’ the prompted agent is called karman and thus takes the accusative case.

Answer: It should not be argued. For the grammarians who admit the karmatva as ‘dhatvarthaphalasālitvam’, such a difficulty is hard to overcome. This is [overcome] by the separate rule like ‘gatibuddhipratyavasānārtha---’ [P.1.4.52]. If you claim that others holds the karmatva as having the activity of the prompted, it is to be noted as we do16.”

2.12.1. Objection

*tatra pāribhāṣikam anuśāsanopayogik karmatvaṃ vacanabalād vy-avasthitam iti cet?

Translation: In that case, it might be claimed that the object-ness suitable for the grammar, i.e., technical [object-ness] is decided by grammatical rules.

Notes: Against the statements of 2.11.1 and 2.11.2 in which the accusative form is based on the definition of karmatva, the grammarians reply that the accusative case of the word devadattam in “devadattam grāman gamayati” and the instrumental case of the word devadattena in “devadattena odanaḥ pācayati” are explained by the separate rules, i.e., the accusative by P.1.4.52 and the instrumental by P.2.3.18, respectively. Since those case endings are introduced by separate rules, there is no harm in defining the karmatva as dhātv-arthatāphalasālitvam. This is an objection from Naiyāyikas.

2.12.2. Reply.

apādāne ’pi tarhi tan nāstīty avehi, ekasamjñādhikāre ’nava- kāśayā *1 bādhāt. ata eva “ātmānam ātmā hanti” ityādau parayā karsmasamjñāyā *2 karsmasamjñābādham āśākyāhaṅkārādviśiṣṭa- tmaḥedam āśritya tatra tatra bhaṣye samāhitaṃ iti dik.

*1. Add sāvakaśayā. *2. Read karṣāṃjñāyā. These follows the MS. readings (MS.90Ob6-8): ekasamjñādhikāre (’)navakāśayā sāvakaśayā bādhāt. ata evātmānam ātmā ha(n)ītyādau parayā karṣāṃjñā(ay)ā

15 The word sanādyanta appears in P.3.1.32: sanādyanta dhātavaḥ. They are listed in the third adhyāya, first pāda and introduced after the verbal root followed by the active marker ŠaP, again followed by lakāra of the Present (sārvadhatuka). Among them, the causative marker NiC (prescribed in P.3.1.21,25,26) is included.

16 Cf. Nāgcsa gives the definition of karmatva in case of the causative construction. “Niśarthaḥṣaṣyantarthasyaṃ jaiṣtatadhātvavāpayāsāyatavam: the state of being a substratum of an activity denoted by the contextual verbal root, which is produced by the activity being the meaning of suffix NiC.” [VSM. p. 127].
Translation: It should be noted that there is no such entity in *apādāna*. In the section of *ekasamāṇā*, since [*apādāna*], as the technical term which has no scope for application [comparing to other *kārakas*], sets aside the technical term which has the scope [like *karman*]. Thus, in the case of “ātmānām ātmā hanti,” etc., the technical term *kartr* would set aside the term *karman*. [Hence, such an usage is not correct.] If you suspect [the validity of those usages], it is granted in *Bhāsya* and elsewhere that these are confirmed by depending on the difference of *ātman* which is restricted by the self-consciousness, etc.

Notes: In the *kārakāhiniya*, six *kārakas* are enumerated in the order of *apādāna*, *sampradāna*, *karaṇa*, *adhikaraṇa*, *karman*, and *kartr*. Since no two technical terms can work at the same time to the same single item, only one term should be applied. According to the *paratva*-principle, when a conflict between two rules happens, the term which is prescribed in the subsequent rule always prevails over the previous one. This conflict arises where two terms have the same scope of application (*sāvakāsa*).

Six *kārakas* have their own scope for application. For example, the term *apādāna* is applied to the one which is regarded as a point of separation (*dhṛuvam*) when a separation is taken place (*apāye*) [P.1.4.24]. P.1.4.27 prescribes the term *apādāna* for the item which is desired by the agent in case of action having the meaning of blocking (*vāraṇārtha*). The term *karman* is applied to the one which is most desired by an agent (*ipsitatamam*) [P.1.4.49]. Let us consider an example “agner maṇavakam vārayati: He keeps a boy away from the fire.” Here, if a suffix -*tama* is not added to the definition of *kāman*, P.1.4.27 and 49 connote the same meaning. The word *maṇavaka* would be called either *apādāna* or *karman*. In this case, since both terms are equally applied (*apādāna* by P.1.4.27 and *karman* by P.1.4.49), the *paratva*-principle is introduced and the latter designation is applied. Then, how about the word *agni*? That is to say, the fire is desired because he wants to keep the fire untouched and the boy is also desired because he wants the boy not to be fired. In this case, two terms can be also applied. When the *paratva*-principle is introduced and the *karman* which is prescribed in the subsequent rule prevails, P.1.4.27 has no scope for application (*niravakāsa*). In order to give it scope, this rule should be applied, and the word *agni* is called *apādāna*; thus, it takes the ablative case.

However, the suffix -*tama* is really added to the definition, such a conflict does not happen. P.1.4.49 is applied to the word *maṇavaka* and P.1.4.27 to the word *agni*. (See *MBh* ad P.1.4.49, I.332, 10-13; Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, pp. 150-154]).
For the expression “ātmānam ātmā hanti”, see, for example, the following:

ātmanah karmatve pratiśedhah [Vt VIII]. ātmanah karmatve pratiśedho vaktavyah. hanty ātmanam. ghātayaty ātmeti. sa tarhi vaktavyah.

na vā nyante 'nyasya kartṛtvāt. [Vt IX]. na vā vaktavyah. kim kāraṇam. nyante 'nyasya kartṛtvāt. anyadatrānyante karmānyo nyantasya kartā. katham. dvāv ātmānāv antarātmā śārīrātmā ca. antarātmā tat karma karoti yena śārīrātmā sukhaduḥkhe anubhavati. śārīrātmā tat karma karoti yenāntarātmā sukhaduḥkhe anubhavatī. [MBh ad P.1.3.67, 1.292, 9-16].

“Vt VIII. The prohibition should be made in case where ātman is the object. <Bh: Explanation> The prohibition should be made in case where ātman is the object. For example, “hanty ātmanam: he kills himself.” When this sentence is converted in causative construction, [the prohibition is necessary to secure ghātayati] in “ghātayaty ātma: he allows to be killed.” Thus it should be noted.

Vt IX. No. [It need not.] Because in the verbal form ending in NiC, it is the agent which is other than [the object in non-NiC].

<Bh: Explanation> [The prohibition] is not necessary. Why? Because in the verbal form ending in NiC what is represented is the agent which is other than [the object in non-NiC]. That is to say, the object in the non-NiC is different from the agent in the NiC. How? In this case, two ātman are considered, namely the ātman inside (antarātman) and the physical body (śārīrātman). When the ātman inside is doing that action, the physical body experiences a pleasure or a pain; when the physical body is doing that action, the ātman inside feels a pleasure or a pain.”

The same discussion is also found in MBh ad P.3.1.87. [II.67, 18-22].

2.13.1. Objection

nanv evam karaṇaṁ kāraṇam iti sāmānādhikaranyāṁ katham?, asvātantryena nvulpratyayāyogāt. anyathā kartṛṣamjñāpattau karaṇasaṃjñāyāḥ paryāyāpattu iti cet?

Translation: How is it possible to make an appositional statement like “karaṇaṁ kāraṇam”? [It is impossible] because kṛt suffix ṇvul should not be attached to an item which is not independent. Otherwise, whenever the technical term kartṛ is applied, the term karaṇa should be applied in turn.

Notes: Both words karaṇa and kāraṇa are derived from the verbal root kṛ-.

Therefore, the word kāraka means the agent of the act of doing something. P.3.3.115: LyuṬ ca. prescribes the kṛt suffix to form a neuter action noun. This suffix is also introduced to denote an instrument or a locus. The word karaṇa derived from kr- plus suffix LyuṬ means the instrument or the locus of the act of doing. Hence, karaṇa has no independence. If something which is not independent [i.e., karaṇa] is equivalent to the one which is independent [i.e., karte], the former would be regarded as independent and, thus, the instrument would be always the agent.

2.13.2. Reply

ucyate, adhikārasāmarthyāt kārakaśabdopanītaṁ svātāntryam avastāntaratagatam vijnāyate. avasthāntare yat svatantraṁ tat “sādhakatamaṁ karaṇaṁ” [P.1.4.42] iti. yathā “kuruṅsetrastāḥ kāśyāṁ vasanti” ityādau. kartus tu sāmpratikaṁ svātāntryam. tac ca kartaṁśanjñāyāṁ upayuyyata iti.

Translation: Since [the technical term kāraka] serves as adhikāra, the word kāraka is applied to that which has independence by itself in the another situation. What is most effective is called karaṇa, which is independent in certain situations. For example, “kuruṅsetrastāḥ kāśyāṁ vasanti: people of Kurukṣtra are now living in Kāśi.” On the other hand, the agent has prior independence [at any stage]. And it is employed in the designation of karte.

Notes: As we have seen, the instrument and the object, etc. are regarded as the agent when the activity of their own is emphasized [see, 2.7.]. The change of a role is easily understood. In the above example, it is intended that people of Kurukṣtra can live in other places such as Kāśi, etc. Likewise, the instrument in a certain case can function as the agent in another case. However, the agent is always independent. MBh. ad P.1.4.23 says “yat sarvesu sādhaneṣu sāṃnihiteṣu kartā pravartiyātī bhavati: when all means are present, the agent is the prompter of them” [I.326,10].

This ŚK’s answer is quoted from PM on P.1.4.23, II,532.

yady evam, kārakavapadeśo ’pi karaṇādyavasthāyāṁ na syāt? karaṇaṁ kārakaṁ iti adhikārasāmarthyāt. kārakaśabdopanītasvātāntryam avasthāntaratagatam vijnāyate avasthāntare yat svatantraṁ tat sādhakatamaṁ karaṇaṁ iti kartu eva ekasya sāmpratikaṁ svātāntryam, tac ca kartaṁśanjñāṅgateyāṁ upayuyyata iti.

2.14. Fifth def. of kāraka introduced

Translation: Or rather, the word kāraka amounts to saying kriyā because of the etymology the one which introduces the designation like kartṛ, karman, etc. Therefore, in the rule which prescribes the technical term apādāna, etc., firstly [the condition] “kriyāyām: in relation to action” is assumed and then each designation would be applied to that which is connected with that action. However, in the rule “kārakāddattaśrutayor eva āśīśi” [P.6.2.148], the word kāraka is marked with svarita accent. Thus, it includes the six varieties like kartṛ, etc., which have been mentioned under this section-heading.

Notes: This paraphrase is also found in MBh ad P.1.4.23 (athavā yāvad brūyāt kriyāyām iti tāvat kāraka iti. evam ca kṛtvā nirdeśa upapanno bhavati kāraka iti. itarathā hi kārakesv iti brūyāt [I,326,16-17]). If we take the meaning kāraka in a literal sense, the word kāraka is equivalent to say kriyā. Commentators such as Kaiyata and Nāgęśa understand this passage as such. This ŚK passage is as same as that of Kaiyata [Pradipa. II,246r]:

atha vetti. kriyātā sūtre kārakasabdenocayate. sā hi kartrādīni viśīstavyapadesayuktāni karoti. viśayatvena cāyam adhikārāḥ. kriyāyām viṣaye tad dhruvam ityādy vastu sampadyate. evam ca kṛtveti. nirdhāranasaptamyāṁ hi kārakesv iti vācyam. nirdhāranasyānekāśrayatvāt. “kārakāddattaśrutayor” ityādau tu kārakaśabdasya svaritavāt tadadhikāropattānāṁ apādānādāniṁ grahanam.

According to Kaiyata, the word kāraka has svarita accent. The word which has svarita accent indicates additional results [MBh ad. P.1.3.11, I.273,14]. Kaiyata interpretes this bhāṣya that this additional results mean six types of kāraka. See Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, p. 48 and footnote (164)].

(to be continued)

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS

(A-1) Sanskrit Sources [Pāñjinian].
KV.: Kaśikavṛtti of Vāmana and Jayādītya.
MBh. : Patañjali’s Vyākaraṇa-Mahābāṣya.


Nyāsa of Jinaṃdrabudhī. see KV(b). [Text referred by volume and page].


PM.: Padaṃśāri of Haradatta Maṭa.
(a) see KV(b). [Text referred by volume and page].
(b) Eds. by P. Śrī Ramacandrudu and V. Sundara Saṃra. 2 vols. Sanskrit Academy Series No. 26, Hyderabad, 1981.

Śīdхаntakaumudī of Bhaṭṭoṭi Dīḵṣaṭa.

Ś.K.: Śabdakaustubha of Bhaṭṭoṭi Dīḵṣaṭa.
(b) see MBh(b).


V.P.: Vākyapadīya of Bhatṛṛhari.


see V.B.S. and V.B.

VP.: Vākyapadīya of Bhatṛṛhari.


(A-2) Sanskrit Sources [Other Systems].

Kārakacakra of Bhāvānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa. (a) Ed. by Jivānanda Vidyāśāgara, Calcutta, 1923. 
(b) Ed. by Brahmā Śaṅkara Śāstrī, Haridāśa Saṃshāta Granthamālā, No. 154, Benares: Chowkamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1942. [Text referred by page].

J.S.: Jaiminīśūra of Jaiminī.
N.KUDO

Nyāyaśāstra of Gautama.

Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa of Śāradā.</p>


Nyāyasiddhāntakāvya of Viśvanātha Pañcānana.

ŚV.: Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Tantravārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
(a) see J.S.
(b) in Māmāṃśādarśana of Mahārṣi Jaimini, with Śābarabhāṣya of Śāharamuni with the commentaries Tantravārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and its commentary Nyāyasudhā of Somesvara Bhaṭṭa, Bhāsyavivarana of Govindāṃśtumuni and Bhāvaprakāśikā, the Hindi translation, by Mahāprabhuḷāḷa Gosvāmī. Ed. by Mahāprabhuḷāḷa Gosvāmī, 3 vols. Prachārabharati Series No. 23, Varanasi: Tara Printing Works, 1987

Tarkasangraha of Annārādhana Bhaṭṭa.

Tattvabindu of Vācaspati Miśra.

Tattvacintamani of Gaṅgeśa.

Vākyārthamārtkā of Śālikānātha Miśra,

(B) Secondary Sources

Ananthanarayan, H.S.
Bali, Suryakant.
Cardona, George.
Deshpande, Madhav M.

62

D’Sa, Francis X.

Ganganatha Jha.

Gune, Jayashree.

Harikai, Kunio.

Iwasaki, Yoshiyuki.

Jha, V.N.

Joshi, S.D.

Joshi, S.D. and J.A.F. Roodbergen.

Katre, Sumitra M.

Kiparsky, Paul.

Kiparsky, Paul and J.F. Staal.

Kudo, Noriyuki.


Matilal, Bimal Krishna.

Sharma, Rama Nath.

63
Shastri, Kapila Deva.


* I wish to thank Dr. Saroja Bhatc, Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages, University of Poona, who kindly gave me the opportunity of discussing about many of the problems of this text and provided valuable suggestions for the readings during my stay in Poona, 1990-1993.

Research Fellow
The Eastern Institute
Tokyo